| ▲ | beowulfey 2 days ago |
| Copied this from my post in the other thread: The Status page is not working well, but I managed to subscribe to their RSS feed and it has been sending out updates periodically. I'll post some of them here. 9:02 PM UTC: We've validated an alternative health check method on a subset of affected infrastructure, which allowed the servers in that subset to successfully return to service, and we're now applying this change more broadly. We're also preparing an automated recovery process to continually detect and restart unresponsive servers, to help keep them in service while this change progresses. Additionally, our review of recent changes has identified a small number of configuration updates that we're investigating as potential contributors to the issue. Previous status: While validating the targeted change, we found that many of the affected servers have become unresponsive, which is preventing us from confirming whether the change is effective. We're restarting these servers so they can come back online with the change in place, and we're applying the same approach to additional affected portions of our infrastructure to validate the results more broadly. 8:52 PM UTC: While validating the targeted change, we found that many of the affected servers have become unresponsive, which is preventing us from confirming whether the change is effective. We're restarting these servers so they can come back online with the change in place, and we're applying the same approach to additional affected portions of our infrastructure to validate the results more broadly. Previous Status: While we haven't identified any recent changes that correlate with the start of impact, our investigation indicates the failed health checks may originate from a specific component on the affected servers that's responsible for processing them. We're deploying a targeted change to bypass this component on a subset of servers to validate whether this restores availability, and we've taken steps to prevent additional servers from being removed from service while we work to return the affected servers to service. We're also investigating why affected servers are experiencing elevated processor usage while handling requests. 7:52 PM UTC: We've identified that affected servers are failing automated health checks, which is causing them to become unavailable, and this may be related to a recent change to a component involved in processing those checks. We're testing a configuration change on a subset of affected infrastructure to address this and, if successful, will apply it more broadly. In parallel, we've initiated a restart of all affected servers and are validating whether they're successfully returning to service. 7:30 PM UTC: We're aggressively pursuing all pathways to reduce impact. As a precaution, we've paused all deployments and configuration changes while we review recent changes for any correlation to this event. We've determined that the elevated load isn't driven by an overall increase in traffic, but by a large number of servers being unexpectedly unavailable, which is shifting load onto the remaining infrastructure. We're investigating what's causing these servers to become unavailable while we work to safely return them to service. 7:16 PM UTC: We're aggressively pursuing all pathways to reduce impact. As a precaution, we've paused all deployments and configuration changes while we review recent changes for any correlation to this event. We've also moved traffic for some services off the affected infrastructure to further reduce load, with additional traffic moves in progress. 6:59 PM UTC: We've completed redistributing connection traffic across our worldwide infrastructure, and we're moving additional traffic off the affected infrastructure to further reduce load. We're also restarting affected servers to return them to service. In parallel, we're investigating whether the elevated traffic reflects a genuine increase in requests or a shift in how traffic is being routed across our infrastructure. |
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| ▲ | no-dr-onboard 2 days ago | parent | next [-] |
| This is like getting transmissions from Cassini before it falls into saturn. |
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| ▲ | hammock 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Why is there not a single mention that this could be a cyberattack? Is the issue only affecting the USA? | | |
| ▲ | outworlder 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Because there's no indications that it is the case, at least for the time being. | |
| ▲ | lazyasciiart 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | No, my family is in Europe and Australia and also seeing it. | | |
| ▲ | skygazer 2 days ago | parent [-] | | I can connect to US account services, but while first VPNing through France, rather than directly from US. |
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| ▲ | pasc1878 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | How would that help. The issue now is fixing this so status of what happens is needed and not how it happened in the first place. The cause will ans should only be published when the issue is fixed and reviewed. | |
| ▲ | colechristensen 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It doesn't look like a cyberattack at all, talking about fixing health checks and the like looks much more like broken automation. | |
| ▲ | testrun 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Australia affected as well. | |
| ▲ | gosub100 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Don't attribute to malice that which can be explained by stupidity. | | |
| ▲ | Exmoor 2 days ago | parent [-] | | > Don't attribute to malice that which can be explained by DNS. Perhaps more accurate in our world. |
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| ▲ | Prickle 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Japan is also seeing the issue. It is probably a global issue. | |
| ▲ | King-Aaron 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Impacting us here in Australia, our company is having fun today. | |
| ▲ | ijustlovemath 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Or a training run gone awry? | |
| ▲ | elmo2you 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Nope. Europe (eastern) for sure included too. | | | |
| ▲ | edging5198 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | [dead] | |
| ▲ | qsfp28 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | [dead] | |
| ▲ | crunkmcgoop 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | [dead] |
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| ▲ | razingeden 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Cortana, play My Heart Will Go - oh. | |
| ▲ | truekonrads 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | This thread is now complete. We can all go home now. |
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| ▲ | EvanAnderson 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I feel bad for the people working on this. It sounds like desperation is increasing. From the 10:11:39 PM UTC update: Current status: We're continuing to pursue all available pathways to restore service, as our actions taken thus far have not provided the anticipated relief. Our investigation has found that a core process on the affected servers is becoming overwhelmed, which causes the servers to stop responding and contributes to the capacity loss. To validate a potential recovery approach, we're fully isolating a portion of our service infrastructure, restarting the affected components, and gradually reintroducing traffic to confirm our services remain stable before applying this approach more broadly. We're also analyzing traffic patterns across our entire service infrastructure and evaluating whether isolating traffic within each region may allow affected regions to recover independently. From the 9:41:46 PM UTC update: Current status: We're continuing to work through restarting and validating the affected servers to safely return them to service, and we're exploring opportunities to expedite this process. In parallel, we're assessing whether reverting the small number of recent configuration updates we identified could help accelerate recovery. From the 9:01:14 PM UTC update: Current status: We've validated an alternative health check method on a subset of affected infrastructure, which allowed the servers in that subset to successfully return to service, and we're now applying this change more broadly. We're also preparing an automated recovery process to continually detect and restart unresponsive servers, to help keep them in service while this change progresses. Additionally, our review of recent changes has identified a small number of configuration updates that we're investigating as potential contributors to the issue. From the 8:44 PM UTC update: Current status: While validating the targeted change, we found that many of the affected servers have become unresponsive, which is preventing us from confirming whether the change is effective. We're restarting these servers so they can come back online with the change in place, and we're applying the same approach to additional affected portions of our infrastructure to validate the results more broadly. Previous Status: While we haven't identified any recent changes that correlate with the start of impact, our investigation indicates the failed health checks may originate from a specific component on the affected servers that's responsible for processing them. We're deploying a targeted change to bypass this component on a subset of servers to validate whether this restores availability, and we've taken steps to prevent additional servers from being removed from service while we work to return the affected servers to service. We're also investigating why affected servers are experiencing elevated processor usage while handling requests. |
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| ▲ | NolF 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | This seems like the same terse language/feedback OpenAI models give me and I leave more clueless than I arrived. | |
| ▲ | baconbrand 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I hope everyone involved in working on this is staying grounded and relaxed and not suffering a ton of physical stress over what is ultimately the result of greedy leadership decisions :( | | |
| ▲ | cucumber3732842 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Considering the middle management culture at MSFT and other tech BigCo's it's probably better that this be a huge public outage where their crappy managers will actually face some heat for creating the kinds of processes that lead to these outcomes rather than can throw the team under the bus when inevitable human error creeps into their obviously un-followable at scale over time process. | |
| ▲ | franktankbank 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I hope they all quit cause microsoft fuckin sucks. | | |
| ▲ | NetMageSCW 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Better than most alternatives. | | |
| ▲ | Ygg2 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Say what you want about OpenOffice it doesn't experience 24h degradation because some idiot pushed vibe slop to production. | | |
| ▲ | EvanAnderson a day ago | parent [-] | | Not to defend Microsoft, but the thick-client Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc) worked fine during the outage. Nobody couldn't use Excel because of this outage. Outlook worked fine too if you were connecting it to an on-premises Exchange instance. This was an outage of a server-hosted database for email, not an outage of desktop application software. | | |
| ▲ | Ygg2 a day ago | parent [-] | | Sure. Just wait till it gets fully entshittified. With thin clients you can enjoy any MSFT fuckup as free time off! |
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| ▲ | yourapostasy 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | This needs to be amplified. A lot of the updates carry all the hallmarks of leadership consistently denying the engineering teams the time to build out sufficient introspective and troubleshooting tooling, on the finance-supported rationale that it is not financially justifiable for such low probability events regardless of impact. And this can be as simple as allowing for enough shadow non-Production environments real-time twinning inputs at scale enough to reproduce thundering herd issues, for example. Take 8:52 PM UTC, for instance. "While validating the targeted change, we found that many of the affected servers have become unresponsive, which is preventing us from confirming whether the change is effective. We're restarting these servers so they can come back online with the change in place, and we're applying the same approach to additional affected portions of our infrastructure to validate the results more broadly." So many questions flow from this. They jumped from "affected servers have become unresponsive" straight to "restarting these servers". No granular troubleshooting of a random sample of the unresponsive cohort to identify the precise origin of the failure mode. Possibly their own organizational chaos prevents the team at the low granularity layer seeing the pattern of whole groups of servers, from effectively interacting with the right team to troubleshoot at the individual server, high granularity layer. I've seen that at many of my clients; sometimes the different teams at different granularity layers don't even have established engagement channels for when things blow up across those granularity layers. I could go on, but you get the drift. If you obsess over internal tooling, you waste time yak shaving and ship nothing; if you only care about shipping features, technical debt accumulates until a major outage hits. Because cutting corners for speed is the path of least resistance, paying down that complexity later is much harder than maintaining discipline upfront. | | |
| ▲ | NetMageSCW a day ago | parent | next [-] | | The fact that they don’t report certain steps in their public communications during an outage does not mean those steps weren’t done. | | |
| ▲ | yourapostasy a day ago | parent [-] | | Fair point. Maybe at their scale they’ve learned something different about crisis management than I’ve experienced on a smaller scale. Would love to hear from those who have been in the trenches at a similar scale as these past couple of days. In a 1-2 hour unplanned outage of typically way smaller systems at some of my clients, I’m generally able to leave my status reports at this level we see here. But as the time and blast radius expands, I find it builds more trust that we’re doing everything within our power and builds more reassurance by sharing progressively more detail. The increasing detail also unlocks massive offers of assistance from many areas of the organization in many cases. Telling stakeholders what my team and I have tried and ruled out often helps them explain to their stakeholders just as much as telling them what has worked. |
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| ▲ | cucumber3732842 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | Everyone wants to blame the bankers and the bean counters. As I get older I realize that businesses will happily forgo insane sums in the name of predictability and continuity and that it's the team leads and the middle managers who don't want the troubleshooting and the control panels because those would provide an quasi-audit log that would more readily quantify bad management. They see these systems as a threat, a way for information of what's really happening to leak around their control. Of course not all team leads and middle managers are like this but too many of them are and the bad ones are a great fit for exploiting BigCo environments so BigCos act like a catch basin for them. |
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| ▲ | EvanAnderson 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Working in reverse-chronological order here: From the 1:06:17 AM UTC update: Current status: Our investigation has found that a process on the affected servers responsible for establishing secure connections becomes overwhelmed, causing the servers to stop processing requests. We're preparing a configuration change to address this behavior that can be applied across all affected servers, and we're validating it on a subset of servers before applying it more broadly alongside restarts of the affected infrastructure. In parallel, we've begun reverting a recent network configuration change that correlates with the start of impact and are monitoring to determine whether this contributes to recovery. The temporary traffic limitations we previously described are now in effect in specific locations. We're monitoring the affected servers in those locations to confirm whether they remain stable while handling a narrower set of connections, after which we'll gradually reintroduce additional traffic. --- The list of impacted services just grew tremendously. From the 12:56:09 AM UTC update: Features of the Microsoft 365 services below that interact with Exchange Online and email services are impacted. Elements of those services that do not depend on interaction with Exchange Online remain functional. - Exchange Online: Users may be unable to access their mailbox using Outlook on the web, Outlook desktop (MAPI), Exchange ActiveSync (EAS), or REST-based connections, and email delivery may be delayed. - Microsoft 365 admin center: Admins may be unable to load some admin center pages. - Microsoft 365 apps: Users may be unable to view their recently used files. - Microsoft 365 Apps Admin Center: Multiple services including Cloud Update, Cloud Policy, and Inventory are affected. - Microsoft 365 Education: Features including Assignments, Reading Progress, and Speaker Progress may be impacted. - Microsoft Copilot 365: Users may be unable to load Copilot Chat or receive responses in the web and desktop apps, and Copilot experiences may be unable to access work data such as email, calendar, and files. - Microsoft Defender for Office 365: Safe Links may be unable to verify URLs, which may impact users clicking links in Outlook and Teams. - Microsoft Defender XDR: Users may be unable to load Microsoft Defender portal pages or solution tabs. - Microsoft Fabric: Users may encounter failures when exporting reports with sensitivity labels to PDF or PowerPoint, or when updating artifacts with sensitivity labels. - Microsoft Graph: API requests that access Exchange Online data, such as mail, calendar, and contacts, may time out. - Microsoft Intune - Microsoft Planner: Users are experiencing Plan and Task operation reliability issues. - Microsoft Purview: Multiple Purview services including Authorization, auto-labeling, Data Loss Prevention (DLP), Communication Compliance, and Data Classification are impacted, and users may be unable to load Microsoft Purview portal pages. - Microsoft Teams: Scenarios that depend on Exchange Online, including calendar, meeting scheduling, and creating chats for organizations using Information Barriers, may fail. Core messaging and online meetings remain largely functional. - Microsoft To Do: The app may not load, and users may see operation failures. - Power BI: All users may intermittently be unable to export reports with MIP sensitivity labels to PDF in Power BI. - SharePoint Online: Features that depend on Exchange Online may be impacted. Accessing files stored directly in SharePoint Online remains functional. - Universal Print: Users may encounter errors submitting print jobs or using admin features. - Windows 365: Customers who have configured their tenant and Cloud PCs to use Microsoft Purview Customer Key for Windows 365 Cloud PCs may have users who are unable to connect to their Cloud PCs. Current status: We've reviewed known impact scenarios and have revised the list of impact services and features, which can be viewed in the "more info" section of this communication. We're continuing our work to isolate the issue affecting server availability, as well as other workstreams. --- So much for seeming hopeful. From the 12:08:53 AM UTC update: Current status: While the servers we've returned to service initially remain healthy, we've observed that they can become unresponsive again once they begin receiving traffic. We're analyzing diagnostic data from these servers with our networking and platform experts to determine what's triggering this behavior. Building on the protective traffic management measures we've implemented, we're also temporarily limiting which types of traffic can reach the affected infrastructure in specific locations. This will help us determine whether a particular type of request is contributing to the impact and allow us to restore service incrementally. Additionally, we're rebuilding a subset of affected servers using a previous software configuration to validate whether this prevents them from becoming unresponsive, and we'll expand this approach to additional servers if we observe positive results. --- The 11:05:31 PM UTC update is is the first since the outage began that feels hopeful. From the 11:06:31 PM UTC update: Current status: We've begun returning a portion of the affected servers to service, and they're remaining stable so far. We've also shifted traffic and connections to alternative pathways wherever possible and have observed limited recovery in some regions. We've streamlined our recovery process to expedite returning the remaining affected servers to service. To further support recovery, we're implementing protective traffic management measures in a specific location to reduce load on the affected infrastructure, and we'll expand these measures to additional locations if we observe positive results. As capacity is restored, users may experience a gradual recovery as their clients reconnect to the service. | | |
| ▲ | EvanAnderson 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Hopefulness continues, I guess? From the 2:14:51 AM UTC update: Current status: We're applying infrastructure capacity improvements where possible in an effort to help support traffic in regions coming online. We're continuing to monitor the results of changes applied so we can identify strategic actions that can help to improve service health across all affected regions. --- Hopefulness returns. From the 1:50:27 AM UTC update: Current status: We're seeing positive results with our efforts to restart affected infrastructure. We're actively monitoring the performance of these to verify stability which will support improved availability. Remediation actions will be expanded as we confirm stability with the changes applied. | | |
| ▲ | nwallin 2 days ago | parent [-] | | They've tried turning it off and back on again, now they're moving on to identifying strategic actions that can help improve service health. This doesn't sound like hopefulness, it sounds like somebody's huffing hopium. It sounds like somebody's who's all out of ideas, but there's no direction to go but forward. | | |
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| ▲ | matt3210 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Sounds like nobody knows how their own systems work anymore. | | |
| ▲ | hn_throwaway_99 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | While I think it's a bit premature to jump to "AI is at fault", and I will emphasize that I appreciate Microsoft's transparency in their status updates, these updates do have much more of a "we don't know what's going on" feel than any other major outage I can think of. It's been hours, and the status updates still feel like there is an undertone of frantic panic (understood if you can't determine the root cause). When I think of past major outages, they may have been down for hours but usually folks knew what the root cause was relatively early, even if remediation took some time. I wouldn't be surprised if AI coding and release pressure was a primary cause, so I really hope the future post-mortem is made publicly available. | | |
| ▲ | Root_Denied 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I think this has to do more with their calculating SLAs for uptime than anything else. Once they have a root cause and start deploying a fix they can "stop the clock" on the outage, even if they don't get to your tenant right away. Imagine the amount of money they're losing right now in credits that will have to be applied once this finally gets resolved. | |
| ▲ | ethbr1 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > I wouldn't be surprised if AI coding and release pressure was a primary cause, so I really hope the future post-mortem is made publicly available. If nothing else, increased change volume will mean the number of candidate diffs ballooned, possible to a level where non-AI review is impossible on incident-level timescales. Coupled with each change also being AI-documented and the relevant teams having less hands-on understanding of their own changes, so going to the pushing team and asking "Tell me about _____" isn't an option. | |
| ▲ | Aloha 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | AI is at fault for what seem like some of the most vaguely worded outage stuff I have seen. | |
| ▲ | 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | [deleted] | |
| ▲ | gred 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The email outage gives me time to order popcorn off Amazon for the inevitable postmortem in a few days. I hope it's a good one! | |
| ▲ | NetMageSCW a day ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | You can be surprised because it (apparently) had nothing to do with AI or release pressure. It was a combination effect of two separate network changes. | |
| ▲ | 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | [deleted] |
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| ▲ | adamsb6 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "Everything went down, trying to bring back a subset of things gets killed by thundering herd" is very common. | | |
| ▲ | Arbortheus 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | This is so true. Not making excuses for Microsoft, but OP’s at this very hard. What would have been a “reboot the server” at small scales becomes a concerted operational nightmare at larger scales. | |
| ▲ | gordonfish 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Why so? I'd have thought that in situations like this, one would limit inbound connections, either to certain IPs, or through rate limiting controls, all of which should be controllable at the router / network infrastructure level. Even more so when dealing with a potential incursion (like servers compromised with botnet software that goes back to work not long after a reboot and slams the server and/or network.) | | |
| ▲ | adamsb6 a day ago | parent [-] | | Some form of demand control is generally how you work around these problems, but maybe those parts are falling over too. For really big services it's also hard to exercise these processes on anything approaching actual prod scale. Ideally you can chop the architecture into pieces where you can simulate region failure and ensure everything works as planned, and fix whatever you find that breaks with every simulation. But maybe some bits of the architecture aren't amenable to being regionalized. |
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| ▲ | londons_explore 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It's very common, but typically teams test things by having a staging instance which also has staging versions of all dependencies. They then deliberately loadtest it to failure and check it can be bought back under control. | | |
| ▲ | voidfunc 2 days ago | parent [-] | | The staging pattern doesn't scale for systems this large and complicated. Everything is constantly in flux and changing. Ive worked on systems this large and we had something we called staging but it was a joke. Gradual rollout, pilot regions and monitoring are usually how you avoid broken stuff becoming global incidents. Will be interesting to read what process failed here next week. | | |
| ▲ | londons_explore a day ago | parent [-] | | This type of loadtest I normally only perform ~annually in the companies I have done it. It's normally a ~2 week-long project for an intern to identify failure modes of any client side apps (ie. Retry loops etc), capture a sample of production API requests, create some fake data store either on staging or an instance setup specially for the purpose, adjust the request sample to hit that fake data (reads, writes etc), then replay the sample faster and faster till staging fails due to overload, and practice a recovery procedure with the load still applied. If it goes well, redo it with different types of overload - especially large percentages of failure responses from various dependencies, or 1000ms delays added to dependency responses which tends to be one of the trickier things to recover from. Typical outcomes from the work are patches to make the service more robust, fallbacks to not use dependencies or disable features when overload happens, on-call procedures for what to do or not do in certain common cases etc. |
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| ▲ | dboreham 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | See also the electrical grid. | | |
| ▲ | quaffcode 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Betting the electric grid has people around who at least understand how their substation works. | | |
| ▲ | venzaspa 2 days ago | parent [-] | | It doesn't matter if large portions of the grid go down at once. See the recent Spanish outage - the coordination of bringing it back on line is an art of its own. | | |
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| ▲ | riffic 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Nobody has ever fully understood how their systems work. Thinking largely about "systems as imagined" and "systems as found." Richard Cook wrote about this years ago, and it's always going to be relevant: https://highscalability.com/designing-for-resiliency-will-be... https://how.complexsystems.fail/ | | |
| ▲ | 10111001 2 days ago | parent [-] | | > Nobody has ever fully understood how their systems work. Thinking largely about "systems as imagined" and "systems as found." But with AI, now we can have systems that no one has understood ever. |
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| ▲ | jacquesm a day ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Wonder why. | |
| ▲ | netsharc 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | E.M. Forster says hello. https://americanliterature.com/author/em-forster/novella/the... | | |
| ▲ | yes_m_ai_n 2 days ago | parent [-] | | thanks for this. Just read it for the first time. 1909 hits above its weight! |
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| ▲ | solid_fuel 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Reading the status updates feels a lot like watching some of the OpenAI models try to debug a thorny issue. Throwing half-baked solutions at the wall, then reacting in surprise when it makes things worse, getting increasingly detached from reality until someone clears the context and makes it start over. | |
| ▲ | imposter 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | [dead] | |
| ▲ | ajdude 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | [flagged] |
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| ▲ | fock 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | their employer brought me agent swarms supposed to take over my php-serving machines. whatever this is, I don't feel sorry for them. | |
| ▲ | trebligdivad 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Nah, they're just debugging a hard problem while the world looks on! The 'normal' problems they have processes to work through, but hey emergent systems and all that - they have to expect the unexpected. | |
| ▲ | eddythompson80 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | they are furiously typing at their agents hoping they can figure out what to do. Getting glimps of hope everytime claude says "I found it." only for their hopes to be crused at "Turns out ...". The clown show at Microsoft is surreal. | | | |
| ▲ | piker 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | So the thundering herd wins again | |
| ▲ | reaperducer 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | Ugh. There's some yahoo from NewsNation on WGN Radio right now saying this is because of the Chinese, and obliquely linking it to Nvidia. Reddit-level speculation. | | |
| ▲ | llama052 2 days ago | parent [-] | | My girlfriends work she is hearing this from office employees. Kind of scary how much the public gets wrong. | | |
| ▲ | b0rtb0rt 2 days ago | parent [-] | | and what evidence do you have that they’re wrong? | | |
| ▲ | aquova 2 days ago | parent [-] | | What evidence do you have that they're right? | | |
| ▲ | b0rtb0rt a day ago | parent | next [-] | | gp confidently claims that people are wrong but no one really knows for sure, i doubt they would publicly announce that it’s a cyberattack yet | |
| ▲ | ethbr1 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | This is 2026, why are we asking for evidence? |
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| ▲ | wmchen 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Not really a big deal, but it is presently 8pm UTC time. I'm curious why their RSS feed seems to be 2 hours off? |
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| ▲ | beowulfey 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Ah no that was a mistake on my part! RSS Feed was in EST and I misremembered the difference | |
| ▲ | fock 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | [flagged] |
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| ▲ | Eji1700 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Day 12: It has been 3 days since the last ping returned, I fear I will not make it back to my family. Give my love to dear Liza. I feel for those stuck in there. The outage going on for this long has got to be fucking brutal. |
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| ▲ | tclancy 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Why do you think this is a problem for Eliza? | | |
| ▲ | Eji1700 2 days ago | parent [-] | | She uses outlook. | | |
| ▲ | dlcarrier 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I though she communicated through RF emissions from CRTs and other monitors. | |
| ▲ | gambiting 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | The astronauts going to the moon reporting "we have two outlooks on the laptop here and neither work" will be funny for decades from now. |
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| ▲ | SubiculumCode 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Gonna have to rebrand as Office364 |
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| ▲ | ArcHound 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| They are turning it off and on again. I don't even. If this works, our industry is cooked as the kids say. |
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| ▲ | onefiftymike 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I worked on multi-million dollar airplanes. If a pilot called me with an issue and hadn't rebooted the plane (on the ground), I wouldn't even talk to them. Rebooting isn't always a bad solution to technology. | | |
| ▲ | ArcHound 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | It's not a bad solution, it definitely should be tried. But I'm still rather shocked to see it in official notes, especially this "late" in the timeline. | | |
| ▲ | mapontosevenths 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | It's not a solution at all. It's a symptom. | | |
| ▲ | NetMageSCW 2 days ago | parent [-] | | It’s not a symptom, it’s a work around until a more permanent fix can be deployed. | | |
| ▲ | mapontosevenths a day ago | parent [-] | | > it’s a work around until a more permanent fix can be deployed. If it "fixes" your problem, then you didn't fix you problem you identified it. It's another symptom of a bloated industry that can't or won't innovate, and I think it's more "won't" than "can't." For example, we still can't patch running Windows, and most of the information technology professionals I know are still convinced it's impossible. Billions upon billions of dollars in time have been lost, probably enough man hours to send men to mars several times over. Yet, you can just buy a version of Windows Server that already does it. It's not only possible, they already have the code. They just don't care enough to integrated it into the product most people use. |
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| ▲ | 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | [deleted] |
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| ▲ | NamTaf 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | In rail, we call it BOBO - battery off, battery on. | | | |
| ▲ | olyjohn 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | If they rebooted it, and it started working again, would you just walk away? Or would you try to figure out why the fuck it needed to be rebooted in the first place? | | |
| ▲ | SoftTalker 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Thales or Collins or Honeywell or whoever provided the system would. The technician at the airport would only follow a procedure listed on a checklist, which probably includes rebooting the system. | | |
| ▲ | cyphar 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Ironically there have been a fair few cases of aircraft incidents where components were reported as bad by pilots but the issue couldn't be reproduced on the ground and "it worked" after a reboot and self-test so they just kept using it (with this cycle repeating multiple times). Often there were clear physical problems (cracked solder joints, stuck microswitches, broken insulation) that were only discovered after a catastrophic failure but could've been discovered with a more inquisitive engineering culture. I would argue a "just reboot it" culture leads to more problems -- engineers should be empowered to diagnose problems before they become catastrophic. In the world of software we even have mechanisms for extracting data from failed systems to root cause them later, and yet most people do not take that step before "just reboot[ing] it". [1]: AirAsia 8501, Lauda Air 004, and SmartLynx Estonia 9001 come to mind. | | |
| ▲ | electroweak 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | But these intermittent failures lead to delays and worse. The sheer cost of repeat events leads to action. If deferrable at all the standard troubleshooting is mostly remove and replace. The repair and reliability processes identify these rogue units fairly fast and the actual rates of that in a well functioning airline are very low. | | |
| ▲ | SoftTalker 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Yes, I remember a flight that sat at the gate past departure time, the explanation to the passengers was that some essential piece of equipment wasn't functioning, they had tried restarting it, and it was going to be replaced. About 30 minutes late, we were on our way. |
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| ▲ | hgomersall 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Right, rebooting only really makes sense if you understand why the reboot is going to fix the problem. As in, corrupted volatile state is reasonably fixed with a reboot. Any hardware issues or persistent state problems could well get worse. | |
| ▲ | Merrill 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | The following is a few decades old -- A physicist, an engineer, and a computer programmer are driving down a steep mountain pass when the car’s brakes fail. The car speeds out of control around sharp turns, nearly flying off the edge before they miraculously manage to skid to a stop at the bottom. Shaken up, they discuss what to do next: • The physicist says: "We need to calculate the friction coefficients in the brake pads and model the temperature rise to figure out why they failed." • The engineer says: "I have a few tools in the trunk. I’ll take a look underneath and see if I can fix the mechanical failure." • The programmer says: "Why don't we get back in and see if it's reproducible?" |
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| ▲ | onefiftymike a day ago | parent | prev [-] | | The vast majority of the problems were a system that missed the time window to report it's self test. A reboot got things in order. It was a small fleet, so we had a pretty good idea if the same problem kept popping up so we could look more into that system. A few fault codes were well known enough that if you called with that one the answer was to shut down and find a hotel, you aren't going anywhere and no reboot will take care of it. (bad detectors in the engines for about 10 years until a redesign) |
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| ▲ | cyberax 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Yeah. It works, almost always: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia_AirAsia_Flight_8501 | | |
| ▲ | onefiftymike a day ago | parent [-] | | I was thinking of that one as an example of why we don't do it in the air... |
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| ▲ | thisismyanon2 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Rebooting is also the only solution for some problems. looks at the Boeing 787 | |
| ▲ | boomlinde 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | What makes sense for something that is used for 20 hours at a time is different from what makes sense for a service that literally has "365" in its name. | |
| ▲ | taftster 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | (on the ground) is probably pretty key, though. Ha ha. I can imagine the conversation if this was in the air. |
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| ▲ | justonceokay 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | In maintenance, sometimes the dumb solution is the best. The servers that ran amazon.com had a memory leak and were subsequently restarted. This hack continues for years because it was the most cost-effective thing to do. Put another way, if they didn’t turn it off and on again, I would think less of them because that’s the first thing you should always do unless you know better | | |
| ▲ | jimmaswell 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I suppose you might want to first rule out a break-in, and if there is one, recover evidence that won't survive a reboot. | |
| ▲ | jamesfinlayson 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | Yeah, a place I worked at years ago had a cron job to restart some critical service at midnight because it leaked memory all day. That was there for years. | | |
| ▲ | ninalanyon 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | We had a mail server that ran on an old DEC minicomputer. I rebooted it every six months because it had a slow memory, or possibly resource, leak somewhere. It was the only thing running on that box so it wasn't a big deal to reboot. | |
| ▲ | Rantenki 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | Another real world example: to this day, it's a good idea to limit requests per PHP process using the MaxRequestsPerChild(apache)/max_requests(php-fpm) config option to some sane limit. After that configured number of requests, the PHP worker is terminated and restarted to... "fix" memory leaks. I remember setting that in the late 90s on Apache... I am happy to no longer use PHP for anything. | | |
| ▲ | jamesfinlayson 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Oh, it's been a while but I remember that. I've used PHP in two previous jobs and certainly the stuff that I was in control of had it set to 0 because we made sure we didn't leak memory. Other departments... I'm sure at least one had the limit set to something non-zero. |
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| ▲ | icameron 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Powercycling is a designed method to bailout Cisco routers. If you botch a configuration command and lose connection, you can have someone powercycle it to restore you last good configuration. Its not just a joke it really works more often than I'd like to admit. | | |
| ▲ | macintux 2 days ago | parent [-] | | ~25 years ago I was a firewall administrator, and the Cisco PIX we used was notorious for gradually running out of memory, effectively cutting off the entire company from the Internet when it went down (and it was a very big company). We absolutely should have scheduled reboots during off hours. Lessons learned. |
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| ▲ | bawolff 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | Amateur hour. Everyone knows professionals say "power cycling" instead to make it sound complicated. | | |
| ▲ | red-iron-pine 2 days ago | parent [-] | | the layman understands both of those words and their meaning together. we "bounce" the servers when on calls with customers. |
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| ▲ | martinald 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Absolutely bizarre wording of these updates. Strangest corporate speak with urgency turned up to the max. |
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| ▲ | red-iron-pine 2 days ago | parent [-] | | copilot, make this doom and gloom situation sound better. assume you're using the voice of a friendly but intensely focused sysadmin. use only neutral language. |
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| ▲ | dudus 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| So the servers are ok but many of the health checks are failing and so the servers are taken off rotation, increasing load on other servers. I'm sure it's more complicated than it seems but from my POV this looks like amateur hour at Microsoft. |
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| ▲ | shermantanktop 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Amateur hour? Not sure if you've lived through one of these cascading failures, but they are hard to design against, hard to load/chaos test for, and hard to recover from. The key is that this is a dynamic load, not a static load; and it's normally amplified by uncontrolled retry behavior by clients. In retrospect, the cause and cure are obvious to everyone. | | |
| ▲ | YZF 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I have lived through and debugged cascading failures and large scale distributed systems. The problem is amateur hour is the entire industry. Nobody specs anything, nobody tests overload conditions, nobody thinks failure modes. The stuff that every engineer does when building anything else other than software doesn't happen. The orgs are bloated. Too many teams. Too many silos. Incentives are stacked the wrong way. People are motivated to not think about systems but stay in their lane. Responsibilities are split in weird ways. Yes. Big systems are hard. But we can build, manage and understand big systems with the right approach and people. Even one computer is complicated and many people get stuck trying to debug a piece of software running on one machine. At the end of the day it's not magic. All of humanity is big systems but when I have a power failure the power company is generally able to understand why and resolve it and the water in my tap doesn't stop flowing and the cell towers still work (generators, who would have thunk). A friend who is really good had to leave Microsoft because of how AI was pushed. Before that he was telling me some other stories that make the culture seem pretty not great. Heard similar stories from other people. It used to be a great place filled with great people until at some point it's just another big company. | | |
| ▲ | publlus_enigma 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | We took some of the hardest problems in computer science: distributed systems, scale, concurrency and networking, and made them the standard for every To do app. This is the inevitable consequence. When I look across the scale of all the failures that have occurred in big tech over the past few years, my self-hosted solutions have been cheaper and more reliable. They are simple. They are small. They are easy to fix and diagnose. Because they're not trying to solve all the world's problems. | | |
| ▲ | Arbortheus 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | People expect software to be feature rich, complex and solve all the world’s problems. And if you don’t do that, the vibe coded competition will beat your cleanly architected product commercially. | | |
| ▲ | cowlevel 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | It's not even better though. It doesn't have more features because it's a distributed system. It isn't faster because it's a distributed system. Maybe it has a bit higher uptime but nobody was paying too much attention to that anyway, except when it's down. And it's much better for your PR if, when it's down, it isn't down for everyone at once. | |
| ▲ | gpvos 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Indeed, it's an expectation problem, and it's even worse in higher management. | |
| ▲ | shermantanktop a day ago | parent | prev [-] | | Users don't expect infinite features. Managers and marketers are the ones asking for all those useless features. And god forbid they run out features to ask for, because then they start asking for architecture v2.0 projects. |
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| ▲ | roamerz 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | I think scale is the keyword there.. |
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| ▲ | torben-friis 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I'll be the downvoted comment, since HN doesn't like to hear this, but the other flavors of engineering do stuff we don't because they're regulated. My bet is we'll eventually get there. Planes kill people when they fall, software used to not be as dangerous, but it's been a while since it became critical infrastructure. | | |
| ▲ | bigDinosaur 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I can't think of any other engineering discipline where demand might increase by a factor of a million in a few seconds because some DNS record was propagated incorrectly or something - regulation won't magically solve the issues unique to software. Maybe it's doable with vastly increased costs (a classic would be running fully redundant 1:1 warm failovers, which nobody could economically do at the cloud provider level.) That's not to excuse incompetence or whatever, just to note that the benefit of software is precisely how easy it is to change, which will always lead to more problems. | | |
| ▲ | tarsierscripter 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Electrical engineering of the power grid has the exact same failure mode: cascading failures of interconnected power grids can cause loads to increase by factor of a million in a few seconds. I remember a power outage in 2003 that knocked out power for 55 million people and took over a week to restore in many places. | | |
| ▲ | cowlevel 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Also known as *the* blackout. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northeast_blackout_of_2003 Note that buggy software was a major contributing factor! The software was designed to, and would have, detected a deteriorating system an hour before anything broke, which would have provided ample time to intervene. However, a race condition caused the whole monitoring system to display stale data and then crash, including the redundant backup. This wasn't the only problem by far, but it was one layer of swiss cheese. Also note the power companies have clear procedures to reboot the grid, known as a "black start[up]". And they test these procedures, though without taking down the grid. | | |
| ▲ | cowlevel 17 hours ago | parent [-] | | I found out they have prepared, in advance, a list of which disconnects have to be open at subatations in order for power stations to supply each other's startup needs (for stations that are not capable of unpowered startup) while supplying no or minimal actual load. There must be a software analogy to this. Does your company have a plan to bring up the system on a rackful of blank servers and a database backup? I doubt it. |
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| ▲ | jimnotgym 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | Which is the kind of exceptionalism that really creates these problems. Software is the only industry that allows people untrained in running global infrastructure to run global infrastructure. | | |
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| ▲ | matwood 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > My bet is we'll eventually get there. Until the cost is mentioned. People love free or nearly free software. | |
| ▲ | byzantinegene 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | i think it'll go the other direction with vibe-coded software. | |
| ▲ | mschuster91 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | > My bet is we'll eventually get there. Given that people on reddit claimed that in the entirety of New Zealand no real estate transactions can be settled, causing cascading failures [1]... I think this might actually be the incident pushing governments to designate large online services such as MS 365, Gmail et al as critical infrastructure and force companies to massive, yet-unseen levels of transparency and regulation. The EU is already itching to act ever since the Trump admin forced US Big Tech to terminate service to the ICC judges, and this here was a square own goal for Microsoft. [1] https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/1xus565/comment/1... | | |
| ▲ | don_esteban 2 days ago | parent [-] | | The other option is to not outsource everything to the cloud. Yeah, it is more convenient ... but in these times, being a bit more self reliant is not a bad thing. | | |
| ▲ | NetMageSCW 2 days ago | parent [-] | | In these times, paying more for that is not an option. Servers with lots of RAM are 5 times what they cost a couple of years ago. Cloud is a huge bargain today compared to running your own infrastructure. |
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| ▲ | Anon1096 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The problem is that you are only as strong as your weakest link. At some point, something somewhere will be architected poorly and it will one day line up perfectly with 2 other bugs that were incredibly hard to predict and then you're stuck in Microsoft's current situation. Also, power grids are a poor example. There's been multiple instances of absolutely catastrophic failures so hoity toity capital E Engineers also make mistakes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Iberian_Peninsula_blackou... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northeast_blackout_of_2003 | |
| ▲ | danaris 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | This is the same as what's been happening with entire industries: Build for the critical path. Eliminate redundancies. Eliminate resiliency. Lean staffing. Just-in-time manufacturing. Single-vendor mandates. In the name of efficiency and profit, we have stripped away all the safeguards that should prevent cascading failures after the first domino falls. Anything that doesn't return profit now, today, every day, must be purged. Because what if that domino never falls? Then you wasted your money! Think how much you can save if you don't need to make backups! (And every dollar saved is a dollar in my pocket!) Etc. And torben-friis is right: the only solution to this, demonstrably, is regulation. Require multiple vendors for every major component. Require staffing sufficient to cover a third the company being on vacation. Require resilient systems, that can take a single disaster and keep on trucking, because they are the backbone of our economy. | | |
| ▲ | NetMageSCW a day ago | parent [-] | | Regulation will just make a bad situation worse- complicated things rarely get good regulation. | | |
| ▲ | danaris 21 hours ago | parent [-] | | So what's your answer? Just ask the giant megacorporations siphoning billions of dollars a year into the pockets of oligarchs to pretty please stop ruining things for everyone else while they enrich themselves? This attitude of "regulations don't work" "taxes will just cause wealth to flee" "increasing the minimum wage will just be inflated away" is all propaganda. Propaganda meant to make us believe all we can do is give in to the megacorporations and the oligarchs who lead them, and let them do whatever they want. |
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| ▲ | CWuestefeld 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | We learned the hard way that there's a very non-obvious inflection point in large distributed systems, where the your design needs to change from accommodating load resiliently via queueing, auto scaling, and such, to a posture of actively scaling back certain features and even shedding load when in a defensive situation. It's really not intuitive, and at least for me, the need to admit that we couldn't just comp-sci our way out of some conditions was painful. | |
| ▲ | UltraSane 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The best defense against cascading failures is limiting the blast radius, which is something AWS seems to do well but Azure does not. | | |
| ▲ | venzaspa 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Exchange Online and Microsoft 365 in general doesn't run on Azure. | |
| ▲ | sire-vc 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | How did that AWS DNS incident go recently? Unplanned outages are unfortunate but common, and hubris is the problem when everyone assumes that they (or their pet vendor) are immune. | |
| ▲ | dboreham 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | From this we can tell where Jim Roskind works. |
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| ▲ | llama052 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Except for the fact that it seems like most Microsoft outages are self owns. I'm not sure how many times we've had outages due to bad deployments that somehow made it to their global infrastructure and only got noticed when customers notified. Plenty of internal accounts from previous employees highlight this. | | |
| ▲ | motionlessveloc 2 days ago | parent [-] | | To be fair to Microsoft (and I'm having trouble believing I just wrote that), the vast majority of everybody's outages are "self owns". If you don't change anything, you're not going to break anything, and major external events (fires, cable cuts etc) are rare and can usually be worked around. |
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| ▲ | rimliu 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | so, Bedlam 4? | |
| ▲ | infamouscow 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | Many of us insist upon not building Rube Goldberg machines that cannot be reasoned about precisely for this reason. Most of the time we get demonized by resume-driven developers job-hopping every few years (seems like the lack of deep expertise is working out). Today we get to laugh at their expense. These problems were entirely foreseeable and avoidable. | | |
| ▲ | EFreethought 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | In my experience it is always the "business" people that do not want to take the time to do it correctly. | |
| ▲ | lebuffon 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Isn't a complex computer system, at the lowest levels, an example of a Rube Goldberg machine ? If we could see the memory bits and the CPU internals, I think it would be good candidate, particularly branching and branch prediction. | | |
| ▲ | YZF 2 days ago | parent [-] | | There are methods for building complex systems our of smaller pieces. Humanity has done this forever. An internal combustion engine is very complex. An airplane is very complex. You put a boundary around your system, you build it to a spec, you test it to a spec, you define the behaviour across anything you can see. When two engines fail on the airplane it can maybe still at least glide. Maybe there's an ejection seat. Because someone is doing the system thinking with some level of discipline. A brick is very complex. A bearing is complex. A bolt and a nut and a washer are complex. An integrated circuit is complex. We build stuff out of that. Like buildings that don't fall when you sneeze on them. In software we use duct tape - at best. But that's not just Microsoft, that's pretty much everyone. With maybe few exceptions. | | |
| ▲ | AIorNot 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Software systems are by nature more complex than physical systems. They also lack any tangible interfaces beyond code and diagrams and collective knowledge in the minds of the humans who build and maintain them.. The rapid evolution of software is no help either..if anything AI is accelerating that rapidity as well. |
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| ▲ | Den_VR 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | > building Rube Goldberg machines that cannot be reasoned about What a great phrase!, can I use that in conversation? |
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| ▲ | mminer237 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Newest update says that wasn't the issue after all. They say relatively small loads are actually causing servers to become unresponsive and have to be restarted. They still don't know why this "core process" is maxing out the processor for no reason. | | |
| ▲ | SoftTalker 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I'd start with "what has changed" but surely they've looked at that. | | |
| ▲ | jamesfinlayson 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Could be something adjacent - the last time I majorly blew up a release was because something had changed (which was fine) but it caused a list of items to be broken over two pages, but only in prod. Me and a team mate were scratching our heads for the longest time because "what had changed" was quite mundane itself. | | |
| ▲ | sire-vc 2 days ago | parent [-] | | The classic 'database is smaller in testing than in prod' problem which is responsible for some outages IME.
Often the 'query was not optimised but that didn't show until prod' one. |
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| ▲ | NetMageSCW a day ago | parent | prev [-] | | They did look at recent changes but none seemed to be related, but it turned out recent network changes triggered a failure mode in a much older network change. Dependent or cascading issues remain hard to diagnose or find. |
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| ▲ | waz0wski 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | There was an article posted by a former MS / Azure person earlier this year that described the dumpster fire of node management and their cloud control plane https://isolveproblems.substack.com/p/how-microsoft-vaporize... HN discussion - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47616242 | | |
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| ▲ | semiquaver 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The people writing these updates are very obviously not technical and are least one step removed from the actual work being done to fix this. | | |
| ▲ | EvanAnderson 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | To be fair: I want the people who can speak most competently to a problem to be working on it versus writing commentary. Those highly-technical people can shine in the postmortem report. | | |
| ▲ | skeeter2020 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I disagree; the communication aspects - including external - are a hugely important part of any incident response. IME the biggest challenges in these situations are the many levels & combinations of communication and coordination. You don't need your best DevOps person doing it, but there should be plenty of competent technical product managers or engineering managers who could do this well. | | |
| ▲ | NetMageSCW a day ago | parent [-] | | And how do those product or engineering managers get information on what’s being tried and what is being discovered without slowing down the process of fixing the issue? |
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| ▲ | cyberax 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | Microsoft is not a small startup where the CTO is getting pulled into firefighting. They should have established procedures for large-scale events, and they must include a coordinator whose entire job is to manage the external and internal communication. |
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| ▲ | codingdave 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | And that is a good thing. Well, maybe not good. But the last thing you need in a crisis is to pull people away from fixing the problem and make them type up status updates. Admittedly, having tech knowledge would help the writers - a technical incident management team would be better. But ain't nothing wrong with letting the PR folks write up words while the tech folk work on problem solving. Actual tech write-ups can come later. |
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| ▲ | burningChrome 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | This sounds suspiciously what occurred when I was working at a large motor sports company. We had a major release of new year models coming out on the website. The deployment went super smooth and then in about 30 mins the site was crashing. Since we were a huge MS client, almost everything we ran was all MS top to bottom. Site was taken offline, war rooms ensued. 48 hours later, an Ops team from Redmond was flown out. Another three days and they determined it was several legacy servers were going down and the load balancing servers were getting hit so hard, they also failed. It was a cascading effect that killed everything. CIO was pissed. The company got absolutely lit up on every social media channel for their ineptitude. The CIO vowed it would never happen again, they were upgrading the entire network and infrastructure to avoid it happening again. Fast forward six months to the next major release. Same thing, same panic, same cascading failures because servers were collapsing under the traffic to the website. Another war room, another Ops team flies out. Two days later they figured out it was some buggy code that was causing it. This after 8 rounds of load balancing testing to the tune of 10X the amount of traffic the site sees on these major release dates without so much as a hiccup. I left two months later, but the overall feeling was the same - total amateur hour from Microsoft after our company was gifted major discounts to go all in with their hardware & network gear. The company found out the hard way it wasn't a smart decision. The scary part was this some 20 years ago - seems like not much has changed considering how frequently Github is down now too. | |
| ▲ | NoPicklez 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I can't stand it when I see armchair analysts making claims like this. I'm sure it's more complicated than that.... but from my POV, which is extremely limited and informed by what others online tell me.... that this is amateur hour What would it take for it to be professional hour? | | |
| ▲ | TheOtherHobbes 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Professional hour would be invisible. Outages don't happen because they were anticipated and prevented. You can't do much to work around nuclear war or a major asteroid strike, but keeping important things working under normal operating conditions should not be a high bar. |
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| ▲ | 6031769 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | At Microsoft every hour is amateur hour. | | |
| ▲ | mapontosevenths 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I'm not thrilled with what they've done to Windows lately myself, but this is just rude. You know a lot of talented people who work there also post here, and it's not fair to insinuate that they aren't talented because some vastly complex system somewhere in the world had a bad day. Stuff happens, things break. That's why lots of nines cost a lot of money. It doesn't automatically mean that anyone is incompetent. | | |
| ▲ | eddythompson80 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Individual talent is irrelevant when you have a company culture that rewards the opposite of that. Any talented person working at Microsoft knows that they are dealing with structural problem that force MS products to be massive piles of shit. There isn't much an talented individual can do about that. | | |
| ▲ | hyperhello 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | An organization can become fundamentally opposed to the purpose for which it was created. Organizations simply don't follow the same laws as the individuals inside it do. A company can be made of geniuses and be totally ineffective; it can be full of talented go-getters and be completely unable to fix problems. | |
| ▲ | sznio 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | [flagged] | | | |
| ▲ | buttslut5099 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | Satya sock account found | | |
| ▲ | mook 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I realize I'm responding to somebody who isn't paying much effort, but still… Isn't that comment saying the direct opposite? If it's a cultural problem, its precisely Satya's fault for not fixing it; that's the executives' job. | | | |
| ▲ | gred 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | ButtSlut5099, the finest detective since Sherlock Moans. |
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| ▲ | ifwinterco 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Stuff happens and things break everywhere but right now at Microsoft they break badly and often, that points to actual issues. Almost certainly not the fault of individual people, it's a management failure of course | | | |
| ▲ | fyrabanks 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | i agree with everything you said here except the last part. lots of nines means not having significant downtime. we passed 99.99% hours ago, and we're on the way to 99.9% | | |
| ▲ | codingdave 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Lots of nines means they have SLAs of no significant downtime. It does not guarantee that the SLAs can never be missed, just that there will be consequences when it is missed. Lawyers and accountants and sales folks will sort out the compensation payments that come back to the customers and try to negotiate relationships back to a healthy state. | | |
| ▲ | NLips 2 days ago | parent [-] | | That’s purely a choice by those claiming the nines. I’ve worked in companies selling software with more than 6 nines uptime (so that we can be more confident about the 5 nines). Not 4 nines uptime plus some money back for the other one. |
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| ▲ | imglorp 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The enshitification of Windows was not technical incompetence; it was intentional product direction. They transformed Windows from a useful OS to a banal surveillance and advertising platform. | |
| ▲ | TheOtherHobbes 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Microsoft's superpower has always been hiring smart people and making them work under dumb management to create flimsy, mediocre outcomes. | |
| ▲ | taysco 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I'm not actually sure this is true anymore. It seems most of their talent has left. | |
| ▲ | zmgsabst 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | There are lots of talented amateurs. What separates professionals is standards, quality, teamwork, etc. I agree there are many talented people at Microsoft, but I don’t see the professionalism in this incident. |
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| ▲ | bradleyjg 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Don’t worry, I’m sure it’ll get better after they layoff 60,000 people. | | |
| ▲ | ahartmetz 2 days ago | parent [-] | | Don't worry, their replacements will receive very clear instructions instructing them to make no mistakes. |
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| ▲ | freetanga 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | A few weeks ago I saw a clip of a lady walking us through a day at her Microsoft life. Between breakfast, 1-hour lunch, 15-min ice cream break, 30-mins chill, 30-mins foosball games I think she worked 4 hours max. At that point she caught some flak since it was timed with the layoffs. And I get that is not necessarily representative of the MS culture… … but talk about timing and poor choices! | |
| ▲ | 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | [deleted] |
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| ▲ | steve1977 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | Copilot hour! |
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| ▲ | jenimac926 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| They rolled back the 7:52 UTC update to the 730 one now....guess it didnt work |
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| ▲ | indigodaddy 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] |
| So just reboot shit |