| ▲ | SoftTalker a day ago | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Thales or Collins or Honeywell or whoever provided the system would. The technician at the airport would only follow a procedure listed on a checklist, which probably includes rebooting the system. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | cyphar 16 hours ago | parent [-] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Ironically there have been a fair few cases of aircraft incidents where components were reported as bad by pilots but the issue couldn't be reproduced on the ground and "it worked" after a reboot and self-test so they just kept using it (with this cycle repeating multiple times). Often there were clear physical problems (cracked solder joints, stuck microswitches, broken insulation) that were only discovered after a catastrophic failure but could've been discovered with a more inquisitive engineering culture. I would argue a "just reboot it" culture leads to more problems -- engineers should be empowered to diagnose problems before they become catastrophic. In the world of software we even have mechanisms for extracting data from failed systems to root cause them later, and yet most people do not take that step before "just reboot[ing] it". [1]: AirAsia 8501, Lauda Air 004, and SmartLynx Estonia 9001 come to mind. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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