| ▲ | ndiddy 6 hours ago |
| I just hope they don't try to pin this on the controller who was on duty and move on without putting plans in place for some sort of structural change. Controllers are forced to work 60+ hour weeks and overnight shifts, and the controller in question was working both ground and air control simultaneously due to staffing shortages. If you listen to the ATC audio, he was handling finding a spot for a plane that aborted takeoff and declared an emergency, while calling emergency services for that plane, while coordinating multiple planes coming in to land, while also coordinating multiple planes trying to take off. With that kind of workload, an accident like this is an eventuality. Even after the fatal accident happened, he had to work for at least another hour before he could get relieved of his duty. Hopefully something will happen to fix this at some point rather than us collectively deciding that an accident or two per year is worth the cost savings of not keeping ATC properly staffed. |
|
| ▲ | wk_end 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| The NTSB - and aviation in general - as much as possible tries to avoid "pinning" issues on individuals. The purpose of an investigation isn't to ascribe blame, it's to try to understand what happened and how to prevent it from happening again, and prescribing "don't make mistakes" is not a realistic or useful method for preventing accidents from recurring. |
| |
| ▲ | rectang 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Yes! But every news organization is leading with "I messed up." And the US President commented "They messed up", though it's unclear who that was in reference to. Humans have a powerful need to affix blame and punish individuals. On the internet, you are forever the worst moment of your life. We set air traffic controllers up to fail, and then when something goes wrong we torture them until they die, and then torture their memory after they die. | | |
| ▲ | jimbokun 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | The current US President is the last person we should listen to when it comes to deciding anything important. | | |
| ▲ | rectang 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | By using the role name rather than proper name, I'd hoped to spare HN from a tangent like this. My point doesn't rest on the nature of single individual, but instead applies to a human tendency. Politicians and press both play to the base impulses of a mass audience, unlike the NTSB. This is not the first time that a politician has scapegoated individuals when systemic failure occurs. | | |
| ▲ | estearum an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | I actually can't remember or imagine another POTUS even getting to a level of specificity required to scapegoat an individual for something like this. The usual (and correct) answer is to say: "We don't know yet what happened, but there will be a full investigation and we will make the changes necessary to prevent it from happening again." Pretty easy! It doesn't serve us well to act like this administration is anything other than extremely aberrational. | | |
| ▲ | rectang 36 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Look, if you were to review my comment history you would have no doubt about where I stand on the current administration. But scapegoating any single politician for the systemic problems of aviation is as unhelpful as scapegoating the controller for the crash at Laguardia. | | |
| ▲ | estearum 10 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I didn’t see anyone scapegoating him for anything other than engaging in direct personal attribution which is counter to aviation safety culture, basic leadership principles, and minimum decorum standards ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ |
| |
| ▲ | alistairSH an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | extremely aberrational Is it still an aberration the second time 'round? | | | |
| ▲ | SecretDreams an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Agreed. Respect and decorum are gone with the most recent POTUS. It's not okay to ascribe this aviation incident to the ATC controller. However, it is fully okay to call the POTUS and staff out for attacking so many individuals, at such a deeply personal level, over issues that are clearly systematic and that have clearly gotten worse under current leadership. |
| |
| ▲ | jimbokun an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Sure but most of his predecessors knew enough to not weigh in beyond regret for the tragedy and loss of life until after the investigators did their job. |
| |
| ▲ | wat10000 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Unfortunately, there are a lot of people who are legally obligated to listen to him for many important decisions. |
|
| |
| ▲ | hectormalot 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Indeed. Similar accident (USAir 1493/Skywest 5569) shows that thinking exactly.[1] Was easy to pin on the controller, they went far beyond that in their analysis. Almost always impressed with the professionalism of those organizations. I sometimes wonder how software would look if we had such investigations for major incidents. 1: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/cleared-to-collide-the-c... | |
| ▲ | film42 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I hope it comes down to the NTSB recommending more controllers (or better conditions for controllers) to avoid task saturation, not just more process. It's incredible what a single controller is capable of doing, but for major areas like NYC, it's not enough. | |
| ▲ | awakeasleep 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Understand what happened and prevent it from happening again, so long as this can be done without expanding staffing, reducing OT, structural change, etc | | |
| ▲ | tialaramex 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | No. Safety investigation agencies deliberately aren't regulators. The NTSB may decide that their recommendation is that every air passenger should be carrying a melon, and that results in a press release, a letter to the FAA saying that's what they recommend, that's all. Deciding to change policies to effect the recommendation isn't their role. That's why you will so often see a safety investigatory body repeatedly recommend the same thing. The UK's RAIB (which is for Rail investigations) for example will often call out why a fatal accident they've investigated wouldn't have happened if the regulator had implemented some prior recommendation, either one they're slow walking or have rejected. The investigators don't need to care about other factors. Are melons too expensive? Not their problem. Only unfriendly countries grow melons? Not their problem. They only need to care about recommending things that would prevent future harm which is their purpose. | | |
| ▲ | rectang 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | > Deciding to change policies to effect the recommendation isn't their role. And if it was the role of investigators to change policy, then there would be enormous pressure from industry to reach convenient conclusions, poisoning the investigation process. |
|
|
|
|
| ▲ | inaros 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Hopefully some commercial professional pilots will comment on this thread, but if you go to sites where they normally hang out like: https://www.airlinepilotforums.com You will see many are terrified ( in commercial pilot terms...) of flying into La Guardia or JFK... |
| |
| ▲ | rglover 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | > https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/major/152572-aircraft-fir... Just a quick read/speculation based on the linked forum post... Short of insane visibility conditions that prevented them from seeing the plane coming, the firetruck operator seems to be the liable party (beyond the airport for understaffing controllers—this seems to be exacerbated by government cuts but that's still no excuse for having a solo controller at that busy of an airport, especially at night). The controller in question seems to have caught their mistake quickly and reversed the order instead asking the firetruck to stop (but for some reason, this wasn't heard). Is it common now to have solo operators running control towers? | | |
| ▲ | wk_end 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | "Liability" isn't really how we try to see things in aviation. While it's true that it's ultimately considered the responsibility of the truck/plane to visually confirm that crossing the runway is safe, refuse unsafe commands from ATC, and comply to the best of their ability when ATC says "stop" at the last second, we can't stop our analysis there if we want to prevent this from happening in the future, because unless things change someone will make this mistake again in the future. Telling people not to make mistakes isn't going to help at all; it's obvious, and no one wants to cause an accident. The error is just the last step in the process that led to the collision. | | |
| ▲ | rglover 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | I don't think the ATC is at fault here. If they were put in a difficult situation and responsible for too much at once, I'd view that as a leadership bug, not their personal fault (or anything they should be held liable for). The weak links imo here are the firetruck driver and whoever that ATC reports to directly (i.e., there shouldn't have been an opportunity for this to happen—that's an executive failure, whether they want to take ownership or not). | | |
| ▲ | SecretDreams 39 minutes ago | parent [-] | | The weak link is the system in place which puts so much work on so few staff. The fire truck received the go ahead. They weigh 3x more than a normal firetruck. They're rushing to a different emergency. The plane is moving fast as hell. They can't just react instantaneously. The ATC worker is clearly too stretched and such an incident was an inevitability. When they're shouting stop, they are no longer directly talking to the firetruck, which obscures the situation for everyone. It is a terrible tragedy that will only be prevented with reform in staffing and safety procedures. |
|
| |
| ▲ | joncrane 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The controller was talking to Frontier plane when he first said stop, then said stopstopTruck1stopstopstop and it would be easy for there to be a gap in processing for the driver of truck 1 because the verbiage all flowed in the same stanza that was started when addressing the Frontier flight. | | |
| ▲ | inaros 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I am afraid the fire truck might have some level of responsibility, since it seems FAA ground vehicle guidance says: AC No: 150/5210-20A - "Subject: Ground Vehicle Operations to include Taxiing or Towing an Aircraft on Airports" https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/... “you must ensure that you look both ways down the runway to visually acquire aircraft landing or departing even if you have a clearance to cross.” These trucks seem to have pretty good visibility from inside. Not sure if La Guardia model was the same: https://youtu.be/rfILwYo3sXc | | |
| ▲ | phearnot 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Not arguing with the regulations, just pointing out that based on airport diagram[1], since the truck was crossing rwy on taxiway D, the CRJ was on the right approaching from behind. I have never been inside an airport firetruck, but I guess from the driver's seat the jet would be quite hard to see in this case. [1]https://www.avherald.com/h?article=536bb98e | | |
| ▲ | inaros 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | That is a good point but it seems instructions for ground vehicles seem to really stress this. For example this one:
https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/1003.pdf Says at pag 9: "While driving on an aerodrome : Clear left, ahead, above and right Scan the full length of the runway and the approaches for possible landing aircraft before entering or crossing any runway, even if you have received a clearance." | |
| ▲ | cucumber3732842 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | >but I guess from the driver's seat the jet would be quite hard to see in this case. They have mostly glass cabs for exactly that reason. Only thing that would block your view is a passenger in the right seat. | |
| ▲ | caminante 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Visibility was bad (night and mist) too. But if your truck has blind spots and vis is poor, you shouldn't be driving as fast if at all. | | |
| ▲ | dghlsakjg 24 minutes ago | parent [-] | | He was stopped until he received instructions to cross the runway from the person whose job it is to sit in a position with good visibility and tell people when they can cross runways. He wasn’t driving fast at all. The whole system is set up so that vehicles with blind spots (every large passenger jet) can safely move. We can’t say that emergency vehicles should just stay in on dark and stormy nights. |
|
|
| |
| ▲ | vkou 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Every other truck in the column immediately stopped when the call was made. Truck 1 was the only one that didn't. | | |
| ▲ | dghlsakjg 19 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | They were all, including truck 1, queued up at the stop line waiting for clearance to cross. Truck 1 received clearance to cross, he began crossing, then received instructions to stop after it was too late. The rest of the emergency vehicles were stopped because they hadn’t been authorized. Truck 1 started moving because he had received specific instructions to do exactly what he was doing. I take it you’re not a pilot, controller or someone who has ever worked an aviation radio? | |
| ▲ | krisoft 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I very much doubt that you know the exact timing of the event. My guess is that you might have seen a video where some industrious editor put the ATC recordings over the leaked surveilance footage, but there is no way that is correctly synced. |
|
| |
| ▲ | sssilver 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > Is it common now to have solo operators running control towers? At Class D airports it’s always been the norm. But KLGA is Class B. | |
| ▲ | rdtsc 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Truck was on a different frequency from the aircraft so they couldn’t even hear each others’ clearances. Also first time ATC told the truck to stop it wasn’t too clear who the message was addressed to. It’s a bit hard to hear “Truck1” there, not clear who he wants to stop. The second time, one can argue by the time “stop” command was heard it might have been better to gun the engine. As the truck sort of slowed down in the middle of the runway. | |
| ▲ | bko 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > this seems to be exacerbated by government cuts What government cuts? 2025 FAA air traffic budget was up around 7% from 2025 https://enotrans.org/article/senate-bill-oks-27-billion-faa-... | | |
| ▲ | rglover 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | From the article: > The crash has raised fears that operations at US airports are under extreme stress. Airports have been dealing with a shortage of air traffic controllers, exacerbated by brutal federal government personnel cuts by Donald Trump’s administration at the start of his second presidency. Not my opinion, just reading from there. | | |
| ▲ | bko an hour ago | parent [-] | | So where there budget cuts or not? That was the claim. I have yet to find anything that suggests there were budget cuts, just vague mentions of "brutal federal government personnel cuts". I'm just looking for: budget was X in <2026 and in 2026 it is Y, where X > Y | | |
| |
| ▲ | sophacles 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Notably 2025 was also the year that Elon started firing people and shutting down things that were in the budget, as well as several shutdowns. |
|
|
|
|
| ▲ | xeonmc 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > I just hope they don't try to pin this on the controller who was on duty and move on without putting plans in place for some sort of structural change. I am reminded of the Uberlingen disaster: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_%C3%9Cberlingen_mid-air_c... |
| |
|
| ▲ | jliptzin 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Is it possible to automate the job of an ATC controller? At least partially? Or at least just as a sanity check on every human decision? Not saying I want human ATC controllers replaced, but if there’s a severe staff shortage, I feel like a computerized version is better than nothing at all. |
| |
| ▲ | 0xffff2 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | In this specific incident, there was a system in place called Runway Entrance Lights [0] that does serve as an automated sanity check on controllers commands. The surveillance video that is circulating shows that the system was working and indicated that the runway was not safe to enter. It's not clear yet why the truck entered the runway anyway. 0: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/rwsl | | |
| ▲ | jamincan 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I wonder if they thought that since they were responding to an emergency, and they were given clearance to cross by ATC, that that would override normal procedures. Kind of like how emergency vehicles cross a red light all the time when responding to an emergency. | | |
| ▲ | AnAnonymousDude an hour ago | parent [-] | | If they thought that, it was in error. Training SPECIFICALLY calls this out. The lights ALWAYS overrule the controller. Period. | | |
| ▲ | rectang 10 minutes ago | parent [-] | | It would be interesting to know whether that rule was onerous enough in practice that they had little choice but to break it in order to do their jobs effectively. They were responding to an emergency, seconds count, and they believed they had clearance from the controller. |
|
| |
| ▲ | xenadu02 33 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | The REILs are part of ARFF training. Pilot training on it is also clear. The system is automated. It plots the direction and speed of anything approaching the runway and predicts a conflict. If the REILs are red it is HIGHLY likely there is a conflict that is missed by human error and you should not proceed without confirming. Don't just confirm cleared to cross, explicitly tell the controller "XYZ tower we have red runway entrance lights. Please confirm runway XX is clear". The system is smart enough that if you get red bars to cross for an airplane departing once it passes your position the red clears because it knows the airplane is already past you. It is not dumb - it was deliberately designed to minimize false positives so everyone would trust it otherwise they might ignore it when it really counts. (AFAIK it very accurate in fact so the firetrucks weren't crossing because they distrusted the red lights). This is just like all aviation incidents and indeed most incidents of any kind: the holes in the swiss cheese lined up. The emergency aircraft couldn't find a free gate, creating a massive distraction for ATC, airport, et al. This is probably the primary domino that started the sequence. Had a gate been free this incident would not have happened. One big hole lined up. Normally the aircraft would visually see the truck or the truck would visually see the airplane. But it was dark and rainy. Another hole lined up. Everyone involved was rushing because noise abatement requires the airport to close at a certain hour. Thus everyone wanted to take-off or land before that shutdown. Another hole. Normally the controller wouldn't issue the clearance to cross or their supervisor monitoring behind them would notice the error and override. But the controller and/or supervisor were distracted by the emergency. Another hole lined up. The controller realized the error and issued a stop command but the fire truck proceeded anyway; they may or may not have heard the transmission. Another hole lined up. Then someone else decided to jump on frequency during this busy time (we don't know who just yet) which may have prevented the controller's stop and/or go-around commands from being heard (another hole lined up). The ARFF crew did not obey the REILs, accepting the clearance. Perhaps they thought the red lights were due to aircraft on short final and they still had time to cross? Perhaps it was some other misunderstanding of how that system works. Another hole lines up. And the Air Canada jet was not paying attention to the chaos on frequency. There's a reason runway crossings are typically done on tower frequency: so aircraft can hear what is going on. But it was late at night and their brains probably didn't process what was happening. Or they were too close to touching down to have the bandwidth. Another hole lined up. | | |
| ▲ | krisoft 13 minutes ago | parent [-] | | > the holes in the swiss cheese lined up. I totally agree with you on that. > The emergency aircraft couldn't find a free gate, creating a massive distraction for ATC, airport, et al. Yes. And I want to add one more thing to this: the airplane with the "odour" issue was kinda ambivalent about the danger. They deemed it dangerous enough to declare an emergency, and request a gate then later ask for airstairs but not dangerous enough to pop the slides and just evacuate right there and then. I'm not saying this is wrong. Obviously they were evaluating the situation as new information was coming in. But it increased the workload of the ATC. They were trying to find a gate, and etc. If it was a clearer "mayday mayday mayday, aft cabin fire, we are evacuating" that might have been paradoxically less "work" for the ATC. Or at least more of a "practiced" scenario. > Perhaps it was some other misunderstanding of how that system works. Yeah. That's a big one. Total speculation but maybe they thought the airplane with the "odour" issue was keeping it red? |
|
| |
| ▲ | dmitrygr 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | No, a lot of it is human - asking for things, getting things. |
|
|
| ▲ | dmitrygr 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| NTSB's M.O. has always been that there is never just one cause. A human mistake that costs lives is never that simple. There is a system that trained the person, a set of incentives that put the person into that place, a set of safeguards that should have existed to prevent the mistake from causing life loss, and a regulatory framework to occasionally verify all of the above. I would expect that "the controller made a mistake" would be ~one paragraph in a 100-page report. |
|
| ▲ | Eufrat 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I suspect someone is literally asking the idiotic question if they can just replace our air traffic controllers with an AI. |
|
| ▲ | calf 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| What structural change would permit a worker to take initiative and say "Hey, these working conditions are wrong/inadequate and I will not safely do my job today unless proper changes are made", without risk of getting fired by higher-ups? Empowering workers to make safety-critical meta-decisions does not seem to be a feature of actually-existing capitalism. |
| |
| ▲ | chimeracoder 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | > What structural change would permit a worker to take initiative and say "Hey, these working conditions are wrong/inadequate and I will not safely do my job today unless proper changes are made", without risk of getting fired by higher-ups? Well, what you are describing is a strike, and it is currently illegal for ATC to strike, so in theory one possible structural change would be to make it legal for the workers to do what you're describing. |
|
|
| ▲ | fyrepuffs 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| [flagged] |
| |
| ▲ | nathanaldensr 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The FAA's problems are systemic and structural. They've existed long, long before the 2024 election. | | |
| ▲ | jordanb 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | It certainly didn't help.[1] [1] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-doges-cutbacks-at-the-... | | |
| ▲ | annexrichmond 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | the headline literally says "could", not that it did. can you point to evidence that DOGE cutbacks did negatively affect aviation safety, particularly with regards to ATCs? |
| |
| ▲ | Tyrubias 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Yes, but the problems have been driven by the relentless deregulation of critical industries and infrastructure primarily driven by a specific political bloc. In the next US election, we should vote for candidates that promise systemic change and government overhaul, not further deregulation and handouts to corporations. | |
| ▲ | krsw an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | They got markedly worse after 2024. No need to minimize the damage the current administration is doing to the institutions of the country. | |
| ▲ | nobodyandproud 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Mostly due to blind faith in austerity and the market, by certain groups. |
| |
| ▲ | yieldcrv 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Can you elaborate on what change you would like to occur? I have voted based on getting particular people nominated within a federal agency, requires the President to pick someone who will 100% be from their party, and a Senate committee that will confirm them people tend to think "I'm voting against my best interests" without knowing that the agency control was my best interest as it will most likely continue shaping an industry far beyond any particular administration I could see that happening again with your abstract, vague, and ambiguous idea. Just say what you mean specifically, use your words, so I know if it's something that could steer my vote or not | | |
| ▲ | linkjuice4all 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | You had two options and one was clearly far worse than the other. This nuanced-excuse-making and “the democrats also occasionally do things I don’t like” is lazy. Take responsibility for letting the mob take over - even if it was just by inaction. | | |
| ▲ | yieldcrv 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | I didn’t turn 18 in the last several years So the odds I’m talking about the current administration are low I wrote that I have voted for an agency appointment before, and the person I replied to also is suggesting to do that again yes, only democrats use the meme “voting against their best interest”, sometimes this voting pattern includes or excludes them |
| |
| ▲ | Eldt 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Very doubtful whatever agency you can conjour up as an excuse will be more impactful than the country wide changed induced by the overall administration | | |
| ▲ | yieldcrv 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | cute that you think impact is the goal vote in your local elections if the feds aren't involved the way you wish |
|
|
|
|
| ▲ | duped 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It bothers me that everyone is laser focused on poor ATC staffing and working conditions (which is very valid, don't get me wrong). I think airport capacity should be fixed depending on ATC staffing. We need to have less air travel. The way I think about it is this: substandard ATC staffing is just as bad as lacking jetways or damaged runways. When the airport can't land planes because of physical capacity constraints, flights get cancelled or delayed (literally happening today at LGA, flights are getting canceled because they're down one runway). The carriers need to eat the costs of forcing too much demand on ATCs. |
| |
| ▲ | fn-mote 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > The carriers need to eat the costs of forcing too much demand on ATCs. Running ATC (and limiting flights if necessary) seems like the job of the government to me. Why put this on the carriers? | | | |
| ▲ | rekrsiv 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | You are correct. Robustness requires a system that is working within it's tolerance margin, and stressing that inevitably leads to failure. A fault-tolerant system in this case would require a large amount of redundant humans. Unfortunately, the capitalist mindset prevents accepting any amount of "waste" as tolerable, which makes a robust system impossible to implement over time. Every system touched by a capitalist optimizer will eventually fail. The idea that waste must be reduced is killing society, and this mindset must be addressed first before any other safety-critical system can be made reliable again. | |
| ▲ | onetokeoverthe 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | [dead] |
|
|
| ▲ | 0xy 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| LaGuardia did have a fully staffed ATC, and there's zero evidence this controller was overworked. You seem to be prematurely ascribing cause when nothing has been investigated yet. |
| |
| ▲ | banannaise 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The evidence that this controller was overworked is that practically all controllers in the US at present are overworked. As such, that should be treated as the null hypothesis, and it would require substantial evidence to show that he isn't overworked. | | |
| ▲ | Esophagus4 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Couldn’t we just… wait to see what FAA says before coming up with our own (entirely speculative) theories? | | |
| ▲ | hanche 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | NTSB is the relevant institution, not FAA. | |
| ▲ | afavour 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Can we trust the FAA's conclusion? Its previous head had a term that didn't expire until 2028 but he resigned after pressure from Elon Musk (who didn't like that he got fined), now a Trump-friendly head has been installed. What, realistically, would be the consequences if he lied? Likely none. Government officials lying on record is an every day occurrence these days. | | |
| ▲ | Esophagus4 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | True! Assumptions and speculation are always better. I’m glad we’ve made our conclusions up front before the report has even come out. That saves me a lot of reading! | | |
| ▲ | afavour 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | Come on, this is silly. The fact that air traffic controllers are overworked is neither an assumption nor speculation. It is very widely documented. | | |
| ▲ | Esophagus4 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The only thing we know so far is from two minutes of ATC audio. That’s literally it. Anything else is speculation and extrapolation. But don’t let that stop you if you already know what caused the tragedy. | | | |
| ▲ | mmooss 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | It does not at all mean that this controller was overworked when this crash happened; that would be failed reasoning and misuse of evidence.
It just raises the question, which should be looked at. It's scary that so many don't seem to know the difference. This is how misinformation starts and spreads. |
|
| |
| ▲ | pc86 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | You're 100% right, a "Trump-friendly" administrator has been "installed" so we can't trust the FAA's conclusions. The last guy quit so this guy is definitely going to lie. |
|
| |
| ▲ | PUSH_AX 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I'd pay to watch someone say this in a court of law... | | |
| |
| ▲ | consumer451 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > LaGuardia did have a fully staffed ATC According to whom? Management, or controllers? Certainly does not seem like controllers agree: https://old.reddit.com/r/ATC/ | |
| ▲ | longislandguido 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | The parent post was unjustly flagged for no other reason than facts make overly emotional people here squirm with anger. Pathetic and lame. This is worthy of losing flagging privileges IMO. The Secretary of Transportation said on record at the first press conference that reports this guy was working alone in the tower are INACCURATE. The actual number is the responsibility of the NTSB to disclose. 95% of this discussion is people blowing smoke out of their ass as per usual. | | |
| ▲ | wat10000 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | If a member of this administration said he wasn’t working alone, that’s solid evidence he was. The evidence that he was overworked seems pretty damned obvious. He forgot about an entire airplane and put a fire truck in its path. The evidence of overwork is strewn all around LGA. |
|
|
|
| ▲ | metalliqaz 6 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| How do you know it was due to staffing shortages? It is common at LGA for one controller to be handling Tower and Ground late at night. |
| |
| ▲ | jakelazaroff 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | You are describing a staffing shortage. | | |
| ▲ | pc86 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | "Staffing shortage" doesn't mean "you can fit more people in the tower." You can't think of any scenario having one controller makes sense? | | |
| ▲ | Someone1234 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | In general, I can. In LaGuardia? Aside from right after 9/11 and during COVID-19 when almost all commercial travel stopped, I cannot. I don't think people saying this stuff quite understand how busy LGA is even at night. I'd even go as far as to say that three minimum on duty with two in the tower at all times (for a ground/air split), would be the bare minimum for any hour or situation at LGA. | | |
| ▲ | volkl48 an hour ago | parent [-] | | It does quiet down eventually. There's no scheduled departures 22:55-5:45 and only a handful of arrivals 23:59-6:45. However, arrivals stay pretty heavy right up until 23:59 even on schedule and if you've got a lot of delayed flights (not exactly uncommon at LGA) - you may still have a lot of departures going out in the 23:00 hour. I would not be surprised to learn that they're staffed to an appropriate level for what the schedule says is supposed to be operating at that time, but a very inadequate level for what actually winds up operating at that time on many days. Initial analysis suggests they were running about 75% of full capacity in flight ops in the 15min prior to the accident. I doubt they were staffed to 75% of the daytime peak. |
| |
| ▲ | alistairSH an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | You can't think of any scenario having one controller makes sense? At one of the nation's busiest airports? Where there are two intersecting runways, both potentially with departing and arriving aircraft? Nope. But, sure, a single-runway regional airport can probably get by with a single controller. |
| |
| ▲ | arjie 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Is he? I can see the number of hours worked as evidence of a shortage, but prima facie it is not obvious that a single controller handling both ground and air is evidence of a 'shortage' if it is routinely considered feasible in the industry. It could just be an efficiency choice for low-traffic times. Based on some googling since I'm not an expert it seems this is called 'position combining' in the US and is pretty routine across the world. Therefore, if this is a problem the primary cause cannot be US policy because non-US airports also do this thing. Here it's being done at SFO or so it seems: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?FileExtension=... While searching I did find this other document where a GC (LC appears to be Local Control for local air traffic and GC is ground control) controller complains about combining due to short-staffing https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19837915&Fi... Well, it'll be an interesting report from the NTSB at least. | | |
| ▲ | volkl48 an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | An obvious issue is going to be that while it's supposed to be a lower-traffic time, if you've had delays cascading down the day - it may not be in reality. If the staffing doesn't adjust for delays shifting the time of flights, it would probably often leave you with an overworked controller. Looking at the normal schedules - if all is on schedule there'd be no departures in the 23:00 hour but you'd still have the arrivals side running pretty heavily. However, once you factor in things not being on schedule, as they evidently were not on that night, you get: ---------- The 15min before the accident had 14 flight operations (per Juan Browne/blancolirio going through the ADSB playback). And that's in marginal weather and at night, which makes things more complicated. That is 75% of the official maximum capacity of the airport - during the main part of the day where there's government-imposed caps on flights, it's capped at 74 operations per hour or about 18.5 per 15min. As such, it seems apparent that you would need just as much staffing (or at least 75% as much) at that time to safely handle the traffic volume that was occurring that night as you did in the main part of the day. Unless the normal staffing here was just 2 people, it seems clear that 1 is inadequate. | |
| ▲ | mannykannot 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "...routinely considered feasible..." What we are seeing here is the normalization of deviance. | |
| ▲ | 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | [deleted] |
|
| |
| ▲ | FL410 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | And therein lies the problem. Clearly, having one overworked controller running a combined tower is not safe nor sustainable. | | |
| ▲ | zardo 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | It seems like a critical enough role that you probably want two people there in case one has a medical emergency anyway. Even if it's not that busy. | | |
| ▲ | xeromal an hour ago | parent [-] | | I believe other areas can assist when something like that happens. |
| |
| ▲ | pc86 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Planes landing at a rate of one every 30-40 minutes isn't exactly "overworked." | | |
| ▲ | VK-pro 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I don’t have time to check flight logs but I personally landed at LGA coming from MDW on Sunday. And I also know people who got diverted within the hour coming back to LGA that night. 30-40 minutes doesn’t seem accurate. That aside, if you’ve ever done operational staffing, you’d know that you should probably have at least one redundancy. When there is any chance of emergency or two events happening simultaneously, you should have more than one person. One last meta point. We live in the wealthiest country in the history of the world, and the highest air travel prices (some part is a function of longer distances I know). We should expect that we have ample coverage, if not over-coverage, at all times for one of our major metropolitan airports. Pay them. | |
| ▲ | bdamm 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | 12am-5am is very quiet, at about 1 per hour. But the accident happened during the 10pm-12am time slot, which is not as busy as other times of day, but can still have workload spikes as evidenced by this situation. ATC should never work alone at any of the "Core 30" airports.
https://www.aspm.faa.gov/aspmhelp/index/Core_30.html | |
| ▲ | gortok 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | In this case there were two arrivals within 4 minutes of each other and two departures, in addition to the emergency plane that had just aborted takeoff. | | |
| ▲ | pc86 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | Which is a completely reasonable amount of traffic for one controller to handle. This wasn't the controller's fault. The firetruck received a clearance, had that clearance revoked, and either didn't hear the revocation or ignored it. | | |
| ▲ | bombcar 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | If you have ever spent time listening to LiveATC you will realize that like everyone, "tunnel ear" is a real thing - if United 1002 has received the clearance/instructions they expect, read them back, and are proceeding it can be moderately difficult to get their attention again, even with perfect verbiage. | |
| ▲ | mannykannot 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | The controller was not guilty of malfeasance, but clearing the trucks onto the runway with an airliner on short final was a mistake, no matter whatever else one could say about it. |
|
| |
| ▲ | SteveNuts 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | What is the contingency/continuity plan if the single controller becomes incapacitated while on duty with no warning to pilots? | | |
| ▲ | bombcar 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Same as if the radios stopped working or otherwise communication fails. Execute the planned procedures (which vary). Often Approach will take over the "tower" and operate in crippled mode (no clearances to cross active runways, you must go down to the end kind of thing). Some airports are uncontrolled at various times and would revert to that. Some airlines would require the pilot execute a missed approach and deviate to a towered airport, others may allow them to land. |
|
|
| |
| ▲ | cjrp 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | That seems mad, given the volume of traffic they're working - even without emergencies. My local GA field is single controller, and that's VFR, grass runways, averages 40-50 movements/day. | |
| ▲ | afavour 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | What you just described is a long term staffing shortage. | |
| ▲ | ryanmcbride 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Maybe there should be more than one | | |
| ▲ | metalliqaz 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | Maybe. Lets see what the NTSB recommendations say. However despite the downvotes I still haven't seen evidence that they were running understaffed at that moment. What I do know is that the developing emergency on the tarmac due to an apparently hazardous smell in another plane is likely the cause of the confusion that led to this incident. That's a trigger that could have been exacerbated by fatigue but we don't have any evidence of that yet. | | |
| ▲ | RankingMember 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > I still haven't seen evidence that they were running understaffed at that moment. I think the disagreement you see is based on the definition of what "understaffed" means. Having one ATC to do ground and air control simultaneously seems like an under-staffing situation to begin with, regardless of whether it's a common practice. | | |
| ▲ | thmsths 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | There is also the angle of: even if there is an appropriate amount of controllers in the tower at a given time, how they do it can also hint at the issue. Being an ATC is a taxing job, mandatory overtime and 60 hours work weeks screams understaffing to me. | | |
| ▲ | pc86 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | It is possible for ATC to be understaffed as a profession, LGA to be understaffed as an airport, individual controllers to be overworked, and for it to be 100% reasonable to have a single controller at LGA in the middle of the night. | |
| ▲ | adrr 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Its weird that there strict laws that limit pilot hours to under 40 hours a week but no laws that restrict number of hours ATC works. |
| |
| ▲ | mmooss 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > Having one ATC to do ground and air control simultaneously seems like an under-staffing situation to begin with Do we have evidence that one controller did all ground and air? The only evidence I've seen was the NY Times said that, according to a source, two controllers were working and two more were in the building. In situations like this there is as lot of disinformation. The best thing to do is not add to it - a pile of bad information is not improved by piling more on. The best thing is to patiently find reliable info and stick to it. | | |
| ▲ | RankingMember 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | That one controller was handling both ground and air is still a bit of a tell that there was some short-handedness afoot, though, by my eye. > The best thing is to patiently find reliable info and stick to it. No disagreement here | | |
| ▲ | mmooss 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | > That one controller was handling both ground and air ... Why do you (or why does anyone) think that? My point in the GP was, I have yet to see evidence that there was only one controller, and I have seen evidence that there were two. | | |
| ▲ | RankingMember 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Because in the ATC recording you hear him directing both | | |
| ▲ | mmooss 17 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I get it now. That's of interest, definitely, but I wouldn't conclude it was universally true - that the one controller did both for everyone. |
|
|
| |
| ▲ | cyberax 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | You can listen to the ATC recordings before and after the accident. | | |
| ▲ | mmooss 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Does someone say there is only one controller working? Just because that particular recording has only one controller doesn't mean nobody else is working. | | |
|
|
| |
| ▲ | murat124 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | SPOF still applies here. You don't need evidence of fatigue or anything. You have only 1 of anything, you run the risk of ending up having nothing. |
|
| |
| ▲ | longislandguido 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Some people here coded the buttons that sometimes don't work when you check in for your flight. That makes them aviation experts. How dare you question wild assumptions. | |
| ▲ | pklausler 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "The system worked yesterday, so it should have worked forever." | |
| ▲ | jen20 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > It is common at LGA for one controller to be handling Tower and Ground late at night. What happens when they need the bathroom, or have some kind of medical problem? If it's really a common case for one controller to handle things, the system itself needs to be fundamentally rethought. | | |
|
|
| ▲ | pc86 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| > the controller in question was working both ground and air control simultaneously due to staffing shortages How many planes land at LGA in the middle the night? One controller overnight is completely reasonable. |
| |
| ▲ | bloudermilk 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Approximately one per minute in the 15 minute span proceeding this crash, including one that had an emergency takeoff rejection and was being maneuvered along with the emergency support vehicles that were being sent to attend to it | |
| ▲ | inaros 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | >> One controller overnight is completely reasonable So if said controller has a medical episode? | | |
| ▲ | pc86 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | "Funny" enough if this controller had had a medical emergency (or just bad sushi) and been off the radios, this wouldn't have happened because the fire truck would not have received clearance to cross the runway and wouldn't have. Or at least would have crossed like the airport was uncontrolled, been much more careful and announced itself, and likely have seen the landing aircraft. | | |
| ▲ | penultimatename 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | And if an aircraft needs to land due to an emergency? It’s amazing things work as well as they do, the system relies on only one thing going wrong at a time. This accident was an example of multiple things going wrong at the same time. | | |
| ▲ | pc86 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Every accident is an example of multiple things going wrong at the same time.[0] I'm going to pretend to know exactly what would happen in that precise scenario but I'm confident most commercial pilots get enough training to be able to handle it. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model | | |
| ▲ | inaros 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | >> Every accident is an example of multiple things going wrong at the same time. You are defeating your own argument :-) Its exactly because every accident is an example of multiple things going wrong at the same time...that you need...multiple layers of control and safety to catch it through each hole of the cheese. Like...another controller? | |
| ▲ | bombcar 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | One of the things you learn as a pilot is how to recognize that you need to go into emergency mode if you will. Call it high-alert if you want. You need to recognize when something is out of the ordinary and treat it as an emergency (perhaps not a literal pan-pan/mayday emergency) sooner rather than later, and do things that may end up to have been unnecessary (like executing a go-around because emergency vehicles were on the move). One controller on two frequencies is another example - that works fine in normal situations, but during an emergency response, perhaps the channels should be mixed; giving the pilots in the air a chance to hear the incorrect clearance onto their runway. After all, an active runway is really more of an "air" control thing than a ground one. |
|
| |
| ▲ | inaros 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | An empty tower at La Guardia with a bunch of airplanes in the air not getting a reply to their calls is Die Hard 2 stuff. Spare me the Pete Hegseth school of ATC... | | |
| ▲ | pc86 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | I have absolutely no idea what you're talking about. The GP is literally about a lone controller in the tower having a medical episode and what would happen after that. | | |
| ▲ | bombcar 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | The pilots would execute untowered approach procedures, a small airport with little to no traffic and VFR flight you may self-announce on frequency, a larger airport you go back to approach, etc. | | |
| ▲ | tadfisher 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Each of those flights should have an alternate and be prepared (have enough fuel) to divert. If there is a fuel emergency then self-announcing is likely appropriate as the plane is coming down anyway, but that is multiple things going wrong. | | |
| ▲ | bombcar an hour ago | parent [-] | | A big part of it is what category of airport it is, and plane. General aviation almost always goes to self-announce (which includes some business jets perhaps, they often land at untowered airports) but not category 135 air travel or whatever it is. |
|
|
|
| |
| ▲ | MeetingsBrowser 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I can’t find a way to read this other than “If we remove regulation and safety controls, things will be safer because everyone will be more careful.” | | |
| ▲ | pc86 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | You should try harder, because I'm not making any comment on regulation whatsoever. There are procedures that every controller and pilot knows for how to handle loss of radio contact. | | |
| ▲ | MeetingsBrowser 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Am I misunderstanding the implication in your comment that things would have been safer had there been no ATC at all? Because the parties involved would be more careful if there were no ATC? |
| |
| ▲ | inaros 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | And we know how well that works: https://youtu.be/AWM0l8_F_X0?t=411 |
|
|
| |
| ▲ | BorgHunter 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Normally? Zero. LGA has a curfew from midnight to six AM, April 5-December 31. In practice? It depends. Delays have a tendency to cascade in the air travel system and the Port Authority can curtail or cancel the curfew at their discretion. How frequently do exceptions to normal ops have to happen for it to be unreasonable to use "normal ops traffic" as a justification for scheduling a single controller? Ultimately, controllers have to control the traffic that they get, not the traffic that they want/expect to get, and a system that is overly optimized becomes brittle and unable to deal with exceptions to the norm. | |
| ▲ | rekrsiv 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Can a single human being reliably and robustly maintain a safety-critical system alone under any circumstances, ever? Ever? | | |
| ▲ | cucumber3732842 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | There are millions of people who are self employed in an industry where they could be maimed or killed if they screw up who manage to make it to retirement. I think the better question is how you get a system in which people are only responsible for any one facet to get the same performance out of people that a painter can get out of himself when he's setting up his own ladder that he personally has to climb on. | | |
| ▲ | bombcar 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The goal should always be to reduce the human dependency - where reasonable which is where all the argument is, because of the cost/benefit analysis. Mandatory scaffolding for roofing contractors would save some amount of deaths/injuries (and the related expenses) but add expenses to each job. Some roofing firms refuse to operate without scaffolding; you pay for it or you find someone else. | |
| ▲ | pythonaut_16 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I don't think the GPs point is about personal safety of workers, but rather critical safety systems that rely on one person with no backups. Like an ATC tower for a busy airport staffed by a single person on an overnight shift. A painter who does a bad job setting up a ladder is going to have a bad time, a lone ATC operator having a heart attack potentially puts multiple large aircraft full of people in danger... |
|
| |
| ▲ | ferguess_k 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Looking at the things he needs to juggle at the same time, is it really reasonable? Any standard we are referring here? Sure such cases are rare but that's why we have redundancies for critical positions. | |
| ▲ | MeetingsBrowser 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > One controller overnight is completely reasonable. How many fatal accidents are reasonable in your opinion? | |
| ▲ | caconym_ 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > One controller overnight is completely reasonable. Do you really think it's appropriate to have zero margin for handling unusually high ATC workloads? Because we just saw what happens when you have zero margin for handling unusually high ATC workloads: people start dying. |
|