Remix.run Logo
▲ dangoodmanUT 6 hours ago

Unfortunately for infra startups, I think we're going to see a convergence back to hyperscalers as a result of incidents like this and railway.

There's no amount of "nicer to use" that can replace security, at least certainly when selling to enterprises

▲digitaltrees 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I actually think it’s the opposite. I think people will move back to their own hardware with OSS deployment like dokku. If everything is more bespoke the attack surface is smaller as is the pay off. Hacking railway got access to lots of api keys, hacking some random vps gets less payoff.

▲roadside_picnic an hour ago | parent | next [-]

> If everything is more bespoke the attack surface is smaller

This is exactly the problem that LLM assisted attacks solve. For a human attacker, the extra work to figure out a bespoke solution is too time consuming to be worth the effort. LLMs can search for vulnerabilities and spit out bespoke attacks like it's nothing. On top of this the bespoke solutions weakness leans heavily into the AI attackers advantage: response time. Even if they can just get your company's single Anthropic key, if they do it at 2am while your one infra person is on vacation, they have plenty of time to extract enough value for their effort.

I agree with the move to hyperscalers. The future (well, actually present) is going to be constantly seeing new attacks happening. The only real solution to this going to be having teams of people and agents constantly watching for these and able to deploy fixes and respond to risks immediately.

▲elevation a minute ago | parent | next [-]

> LLM assisted attacks solve

Yes, LLMs can easily knock over your on-prem docker appliances.

But you can still put stuff out of reach. I'm currently designing a key on-prem appliance that is can be compiled down to transistors, giving deterministic wire-speed performance while ruling out RCEs. It's cryptographically homomorphic: it processes authorized inputs but doesn't know what they mean, so an attacker who obtains the disk doesn't benefit either. The design will be highly resistant to exploits, and is likely to remain outside the "next-token" prediction training set.

This is the kind of thing AWS won't sit down and engineer for you. But thanks to LLMs I finally have the time.

▲digitaltrees 17 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

You’re technically right, which is the best type of right, but my point is the fragmentation and lower reward will make discovery harder, and the value of searching and cracking less worth the effort.

I had a html game I built for my niece on railway with an open ai API key so she could vibe code changes. No hacker would have looked for it but now I am catching strays because railway was a juicy target. Hyper scalers would be the same. Some random colo not so much.

▲itissid 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

How is that ever going to work out? The speed of discovery for LLMs is so fast, these places are getting breached more often than not due to a human errors. Its really hard for machines, let alone humans, to guard against a lot of LLMs going against them 24x7.

▲ang_cire 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

No self-service sign up for your app. No public access to the app itself. Website that let's you submit a sign up request form. Team reaches out and reviews your request, creates an account in the app dash for you, and you set up mTLS to get access to the dash.

▲kube-system an hour ago | parent | next [-]

LLM discovers exploit -- you don't realize it in time because you don't have a security team as big as the PaaS you used to use -- you get pwned anyway.

This has happened to many high-profile self-hosted pieces of software just this past month.

▲ang_cire an hour ago | parent [-]

An exploit in what, the network stack of the Linux distro you're using for the mTLS proxy? Or the crypto module? Sure, could happen. But then, you're unlikely to be the top target of anything.

Or do you mean a customer was running it?

▲kube-system an hour ago | parent | next [-]

There have been a lot of exploits for a lot of software on-prem tech stacks rely on just over the past month - proxmox, php, nodejs, palo alto, eMudhra, etc come to mind.

> But then, you're unlikely to be the top target of anything.

That would have protected you 3 years ago when a human had to bother to attack you. Today it doesn't protect you because it's trivial to deploy an LLM to act like an APT against any random target that shows up in shodan.

It takes more effort to secure on-prem software today than it did just a couple of years ago. Updates are more frequent, zero days are more frequent, attacks are more common, more persistent, and more automated.

I think most people responsible for securing production systems today will share the experience that their workload has increased.

▲ang_cire 26 minutes ago | parent [-]

You're still describing an environment that presents a pre-auth surface area beyond a listening port.

And I am literally a security engineer; the work has absolutely not gotten harder, it's just changing in how you think about security, just like it shifted before from "secure the perimeter" to "defense-in-depth", it's now changing again to focus on automated response and compartmentalization/ segmentation (and I mean real segmentation, not the checklist-style "we have 3 vlans, but they can all talk to each other" 'segmentation' you used to see.

▲kube-system 20 minutes ago | parent [-]

Yeah, most organizations need to expose something to the internet as a matter of normal operations -- at least some sort of a web app if not dozens. It would be great if we could all just have udp 56820 listening silently for a key, but that isn't reasonable for most organizations that have normal users expecting normal applications.

Yes, everyone is rushing to implement zero-trust principles for real now. It's getting harder to trust that your public facing endpoints don't have vulnerabilities, and it's getting harder to trust that your internal software and endpoints haven't been compromised from within your pre-existing trust boundaries. A lot of the increased workload is due to patching up the existing security infrastructure, and on top of that, building out new solutions to better fit today's threat landscape.

▲ang_cire 8 minutes ago | parent [-]

Ideally they need to divide those apps entirely; your public website doesn't need to talk to your app.

For stuff like Netflix that is truly consumer-facing, where mTLS or IP whitelisting are non-starters, the reality is you have to rethink your model entirely.

Also, I'm not sure where you got the idea I'm talking about on-prem only; this also applies to using IaaS/ cloud hosted infra.

▲sdenton4 an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

Or the configuration parameter that you got wrong because you rolled your own and didn't know any better.

▲ang_cire 36 minutes ago | parent [-]

Why would you roll your own?

▲kube-system 18 minutes ago | parent [-]

You would inherently be rolling your own configuration when deploying something on-prem.

▲ang_cire 6 minutes ago | parent [-]

1) where did you get "on-prem" from?

2) that's not what "rolling your own" means. Building your own web proxy is "rolling your own". Standing up e.g. Caddy and configuring it is not.

▲clickety_clack 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

In-person requests for access to any app. Request interview includes word association exercise that monitors your emotional reaction to a string of key words.

▲ang_cire 37 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

You joke, but the space I work in actually does do video calls (or in our case in-person meetings if they're local to SF, often) before onboarding new customers.

▲itsdesmond 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Security question 2: You reach down and flip the tortoise onto its back…

▲vb-8448 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

It's much easier to protect yourself if you have your infra behind a perimeter firewall you control.

▲roadside_picnic an hour ago | parent | next [-]

It's also harder to explain to your customers why you're the only product they use that has a security problem when an exploit does eventually happen.

You see this already with uptime. If Github or AWS has a major outage, it's in the news and even people that don't understand software realize it's just "something happening today, everything is down".

And, unfortunately, in practice customers don't care about this inverse, when "everyone else is down but not that one product".

▲frankchn 26 minutes ago | parent [-]

Especially when the customers' own websites or services are down, they are a lot more understanding.

▲nradov an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Until the attacker bypasses your perimeter firewall by convincing an employee to download and install malware.

▲mlhpdx 6 minutes ago | parent [-]

Having employees (or system like bastion hosts) with unrestricted access is one of the recurring mistakes in such events. I can’t understand it.

▲0xWTF 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Until there's a exploit for Palo Alto, Juniper, Cisco, F5, <pick your defender>.

▲m4rtink 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

You can scratch Cisco from the list - they just announced they will re-vibecode all of their codebase! So there will not be any explots for their hardware in the future - one way or the other. ;-)

▲taneq an hour ago | parent [-]

This solving the problem once and for all.

▲kube-system an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Or there's some exploit in an endpoint device, and the problem moves laterally from inside your firewall.

▲vb-8448 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Yep, but the attack surface is much smaller!

▲echelon 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

My hate for hyperscalers is greater than my hate of being SRE.

It's time to leave GCP, AWS, and the rest.

Google and Amazon markup can eat it. Fuck those guys.

Let's not forget that Google and Amazon tried to offshore us, played a role in inventing the labor-displacing models in the first place, and that don't give a shit about any of us.

I hope they ossify and turn into the next IBMs.

They thought AI would lead to growth and a greater concentration of wealth for themselves, but it's actually the seeds of their own destruction and dismantlement.

▲InsidiousWombat 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

yeah remove the door locks, the thief can just break the window

▲buremba 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

[dead]

▲ijustlovemath 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

For one, I have strict iptable rules to drop inbound from outside my specific commercial subnet and my specific residential IP. After that, all the usual best practices.

▲nine_k an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

Breaking a lock still costs approximately the same, whether the lock is protecting a small barn or a huge hangar. A large number of small but reasonably tough (not unbreakable) targets makes the payoff per target smaller. This necessitates target selection, and chances of being deliberately skipped grow for an average target.

▲digitaltrees 11 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Everyone knows Fort Knox has gold, and where it is, that’s railway, heroku. No one knows where my personal safe is or whether it has anything worth taking. That’s a vps in a colo

▲TeMPOraL 31 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

However, the large hangar is likely to have armed guards inside, or at least able to arrive on the scene within two minutes of the alarm tripping. Your regular household with their regular locks on their regular doors does not.

▲burnte 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

This is absolutely happening. I'm not a developer in SV, I'm an IT leader out on customer land, and I can tell you a LOT of companies are looking to bring things back on prem for security and cost reasons. And before anyone laughs, yes, you ABSOLUTELY can save money going on prem, I've done it for company after company. It's one reason the PE firm that I've worked under for a decade kept moving me to new companies.

▲digitaltrees 8 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Let them laugh. Self hosting is much easier with OSS that solves most of the pain that made the cloud transition worth it, and commodity hardware has been cheap and capable for over a decade.

▲TedDoesntTalk 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

My company just did this. Still using AWS S3 but everything else is on-prem with kubernetes.

▲eddythompson80 32 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

That sounds insanely expensive. AWS S3 only makes sense if your workload is also in AWS. Using AWS S3 while having your compute elsewhere is a recipe for an insane egress cost.

▲yurishimo an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

How much of your public facing workloads rely on S3 if I can ask?

▲alubic an hour ago | parent [-]

There's plenty of OSS drop-in replacements for S3.

▲kube-system an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

This is misguided thinking. You are less likely to hear about on-prem breaches in the news just because they are less likely to be newsworthy incidents, but they are even more likely to happen. Part of the reason people moved to the cloud is because it is much easier to have a team manage updates and security at scale.

Being a small target is not helpful these days, attacks on on-prem software today simply scans the internet, or uses databases by people who have already scanned it, and is automated.

On-prem software has not been spared from the recent spat of security incidents.

▲debo_ an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

It's probably both.

▲Imustaskforhelp 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

My comment[0] tries to explain the nuance and I would agree with you and both the GP in some sense.

For Entreprise, the shift will be towards hyperscalers as they want trust and less blame (Nobody got fired for picking AWS)

For consumers, we care about pricing and stability and control and we will move back to our own hardware or cheap VPS providers and self-host things.

The middle ground would be where the slight pain could be at in my opinion.

[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50307410

▲happyopossum 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> For consumers <snip> self-host things.

That's not how consumers work. That's a nerd/geek/hobbyist mentality.

If Ikea and Wayfair went out of business you wouldn't expect consumers too take up woodworking and build their own furniture en masse.

▲SoftTalker 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

For consumers/small orgs, how is the security at a cheap VPS provider going to be any better than at a cheap IaaS provider?

▲collabs 3 hours ago | parent [-]

as long as you follow the herd (for example, disable password ssh login, only allow ssh key login, use something mind numbingly boring like debian stable, set up unattended updates, update and reboot every night, etc, don't use any exotic packages etc) I suspect you are simply not a worthwhile target even with LLM agents as opposed to humans

▲SoftTalker 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Until your VPS provider has its management dashboard breached, allowing an attacker remote console and configuration access to your VMs and everything that enables.

▲jodrellblank 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I dunno why you're getting downvoted, they don't even need their control plane breached, it could be a neighbouring VM running something out of date and an attacker getting out to the hypervisor and taking your disk images without you or the hosting company ever knowing.

▲digitaltrees 5 minutes ago | parent [-]

Then buy hardware and go colo. a dell server off eBay would far exceed what most smbs need.

▲wat10000 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Cost of hacking a custom setup is going down rapidly. There was broad agreement that the PHP vulnerability was very difficult to exploit in practice. It took two hours for someone to get into Steal My Bitcoin. Apparently all they did was tell a decent model "go exploit that." AI isn't free but it's not that expensive.

▲TedDoesntTalk an hour ago | parent [-]

If you have to hack 1,000,000 custom setups to get the same results as one hyperscaler, would you bother?

▲wat10000 an hour ago | parent [-]

Depends on what takes more effort. It's not at all clear to me that the 1,000,000 custom setups takes more effort. The first few will take some, then you'll start to see patterns and it'll get easier as you go. Custom setups aren't going to be all that unique in practice.

▲malux85 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

No thats an old way of thinking because it assumes mass targets are better because hacking is a high effort activity. But with the automation of intellect the unpatched systems (which a much more numerous when everyone self hosts) is the key point.

Mass credential stealing is just the top funnel of hacking and (compatativly) isnt that lucrative - these credentials are then sold on the black markets to the next step of hackers who use them to exploit targets.

With unpatched systems and self hosting, this second group can just set an llm at a target and have a much higher chance of success without needing credentials

It would be a dream for the infiltration hackers to have everyone self host. Unpatched and miscondigured systems would be everywhere and LLM automation could make mass scanning them and exploiting them very attractive - not mass scanning and exploiting them for credentials stealing, no! For layer 2 stuff

▲mac3n 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> There's no amount of "nicer to use" that can replace security, at least certainly when selling to enterprises

Azure would beg to differ.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50301854

▲happyopossum 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

None of my customers / clients / coworkers have ever used Azure and "nicer to use" in the same sentence.

▲InsidiousWombat 3 hours ago | parent [-]

and it wasn't what he was saying, the "nicer to use" in the context were startup IaaS alternatives

▲FLeXMurphy 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

A moron could build a better UX and DevX.

▲minraws 5 hours ago | parent [-]

I have a bridge to sell you if you think everyone on the Azure team is sub-moron. Infra security is a hard problem to solve, GCP and AWS don't quite have a perfect track record either, perhaps AWS stands out as a better option but it's hard to argue about it.

▲seemaze 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I don't think the blame lies with the intelligence of the Azure team. I would argue that there exists structural flaws in the business incentives which deprioritize 'users' from 'customers', along with the stark lack of consequences for security failures.

▲minraws 4 hours ago | parent [-]

That's a problem across all of tech, I know a startup that recently had a security incident, lost over 40K USD and none of the heads have rolled they haven't completely revamped their security posture or anything like that.

▲hibikir 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

While there are incentive problems across all levels, The political quagmires that make it impossible to move at any reasonable speed, and that lead to counterproductive ideas getting large budgets are in my experience very common at the highest sizes. It's true that on the other edge of the spectrum, small startups make poor choices, but many of said startups will fail due to said choices. So by the time you have a viable company making good money, the really badly aligned companies are gone.

So when I look throughout my long employment career for best security and organizational practices, all the highlights are still relatively, relatively undersized companies, with headcounts in the 3-4 figures. It's as they grow, and start to be multi-headed behemoths, that they decay again, as what is good for the responsable mid-level exec, for the business unit, and for the company as a whole start to have nothing to do with each other. That's when you can smell the decay in the hallways. A few large companies manage to stave off this rot a little more than others, but it's inevitable. Then nothing important can be done in a timely fashion.

▲minraws 3 hours ago | parent [-]

> but many of said startups will fail due to said choices. So by the time you have a viable company making good money, the really badly aligned companies are gone.

I wish that was the case, but that isn't how startups fail generally, sure very bad user facing breaches could cause something like that, but lots of platforms with too much jank have somehow survived all of these cyber vulnerabilities before, and will probably keep at it.

For a majority startups it's about connections and relationships rather than competence. Very few even consider building actually useful products to be a priority after the initial work of building it.

▲DANmode 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Places where it’s less of a problem are places I’m spending my money.

and anyone else’s money I’m asked to spend…

▲JoBrad 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

It’s about incentives. My company spends about 400k/month USD in both Azure and AWS (different workloads). When I ask my AWS team for help, I usually get actionable info, a separate standalone call (if the request warrants it), and a follow up from my TAM and Account Exec. Every request to my Azure team has basically been “here are some YouTube/MS Knowledge links” + let me know if you figure it out. Roughly the same spend on both platforms, and wildly different levels of helpfulness (and yes, we have an Azure EA).

Are the people on my Azure team smart? Probably. Are they incentivized to actually help me solve a problem? No. They’re obviously incentivized to increased my license spend.

▲lukeschlather 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I'm sure there are absolutely brilliant people working at Azure. I think the overall system is very badly architected and I don't know what it would take to salvage it. Infra security is a lot easier to do when you have a system that has mostly solved it already, and I'm not saying GCP and AWS are perfect, but "security is mostly solved" is a decent description of their systems, I think. Of course it could all fall over tomorrow, but I'd guess that's a lot more true of Azure.

▲InsidiousWombat 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

They implemented NVRAM in the UEFI and then didn't decipher what the NV means in it so it is not persisted. Their stupid virtualization can't handle not 1MB-aligned disk image.

Plenty of morons there

▲fooqux 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

It didn't help that azure (especially in the beginning) was a cobbled-together mess of ancient Microsoft tech stacks that were never intended to talk to each other.

▲bix6 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Are hyperscalers actually more secure though? I have only heard anecdotal thinking eg nobody ever got fired for choosing IBM.

▲baxtr 5 hours ago | parent | next [-]

It’s the same thing: let’s say Microsoft or AWS got hacked. Then you’re definitely not the only one who got hacked.

So, you can always say: Look, it’s not us (especially not my org!). It f’ing Microsoft/AWS! Everyone got hacked.

You and your career are gonna be just fine.

▲SkyPuncher 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

In a prior role, we realized something similar with outages. For our particular product, we AWS went down - we went down. We freaked out the first time, but after it was done we realized not a single customer had inquired. This felt unusual since we were getting emails quickly if we have a self-inflicted outage.

Turns out, when a major provider went down all of our users were too busy fighting their own fires. When they do notice, it's on a day when ALL of their vendors are struggling so we don't get singled out as a bad apple.

▲codegeek 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

The whole "No one gets fired for using IBM" analogy.

▲temp0826 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

It's today's "nobody ever got fired for buying IBM". You're really just want the the SLA (someone to blame when things inevitably fail)

▲nrmitchi 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

This is especially true if the majority of your customers are also on Microsoft/AWS/etc.

Literally 0 of your customers will notice that you are down if their own systems are also not working.

This is perfectly valid for many businesses, up to a (shockingly high) level.

▲SoftTalker 2 hours ago | parent [-]

LOL "if my competitors are all down too, then it's OK." I guess there's a bit of sense to that.

▲InsideOutSanta 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Yeah, if Exchange goes down, you get a day off. If the little boutique email provider you chose goes offline, you get a day in calls with everyone yelling at you.

▲esseph 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

If you need deniability, sure.

But it you actually NEED security, it's clearly not an option.

▲manquer 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Azure (and AWS) offer Gov clouds, and probably on prem air-gapped deployment of their full stack of Fabric for that type of NEED security customers who can pay for it.

It is trade-off between risk and access/productivity with a cost dimension always.

Depending on your threat model you could go to typewriters /paper as some Russian department did famously few years back too.

▲bcvvvy 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Indeed.

If you want deniability no one should be doing business with you.

▲Krasnol 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

You are just describing how they're a more valuable target for an attack.

▲kube-system 29 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Unquestionably. They have top tier security operations that are well funded. They follow (or set) security best practices, they are audited, and they fix them quicker than you can. They have inside industry knowledge that is only shared among top organizations in this space, including government cyber ops. This gives them the ability to fix things before they are even publicly known.

You can get close if you have either:

1. the ability to spend hundreds of millions on security operations yourself

or 2. the ability to airgap the systems you are securing

▲macNchz 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

With a lot of PaaS type vendors you are effectively exposed to both the vendor themselves and the public cloud they run their stack on top of.

Broadly I think you're much more likely to be the victim of a platform-level breach involving an immature startup PaaS than a hyperscaler cloud, however I think for small teams the alternate risk you take on is that AWS/GCP/Azure are full of landmines and extremely easy to misconfigure in insecure ways if you don't know what you're doing. Especially if you have AI telling you confidently wrong things.

▲inglor 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

When I was at Microsoft we took security cripplingly seriously to the point we could not deliver features and our competitors could because the security process was convoluted and had multiple reviews and approval steps.

▲Veserv 5 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Having crippling bureaucracy does not correlate with good security outcomes, except maybe negatively. However, having a history of unending egregious security failures, like Microsoft, does correlate with poor security outcomes. For that matter, having a present of unending egregious security failures also correlates with poor security outcomes.

Let us look on the front page and see if there are any, oh look here is one: https://www.binarysecurity.no/posts/2026/10/one-root-case

▲keeda 5 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Having crippling bureaucracy does have better correlation with security outcomes than the “move fast, break things” philosophy that most of the software industry lives by.

I’m not even blaming Zuck for that, he didn’t really invent it, though he certainly popularized it — he just made an astute observation of the dynamics in software and turned it into a company motto.

▲Veserv 5 hours ago | parent [-]

Neither is correlated with good security outcomes against the prevailing threat landscape of profit-motivated, commercial, professional attackers with tiny budgets of a few million dollars. The standard is not "better", it is "adequate".

▲keeda 4 hours ago | parent [-]

Correlation is not an absolute measure here, it’s relative. As is the entire concept of security.

As is what constitutes the standard of “adequate.” Which BTW is the standard in ALL engineering (not just security or software) because we live in a world where economic pressures apply and costs must be managed. Trivial example: bridges only use an “adequate” amount of steel and concrete because they are not free. The word “adequate” fundamentally involves the concept of tolerances. There’s a reason we consider over-engineering a bad thing.

So which development approach would you say is better correlated with good security outcomes?

▲Veserv 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Adequate is making it uneconomical, or cost ineffective, for threats to your organization to attack you either deliberately or indiscriminately. Absent a specific organization, we can use a profile of commonplace, prevailing threats as a proxy. A profile of commonplace threats is, as I said before, a profit-motivated, commercial, professional group seeking a multi-million dollar payout and thus being profitable at a cost of a few million dollars per commercial target. That is "adequate" in the prevailing threat landscape if you are the "average" organization.

▲keeda an hour ago | parent [-]

That is a great definition of adequate for security! My point is that at scale, bureaucracy is a necessary (though not sufficient!) condition for achieving adequate security.

Another way to look at it is, bureaucracy is an aspect of the corporate culture, and lasting security comes down to having the right culture. At least in that respect Microsoft is doing something right. Doubtlessly a lot of that bureaucracy is ineffective, but it's a signal that the cultural intention exists.

As a relevant counterexample, we've never heard of these kind of processes at Meta and so you get Cambridge Analytica.

My perspective is skewed by my experience being on a security-adjacent platform team for years. Our biggest challenge was not external threats, it was internal teams seeing us as friction on their productivity, to the extent that it regularly led to escalations.

So when Cambridge Analytica happened, I played it up for all it's worth; Meta may move fast because they didn't have our "bureuacratic team", but look where it got them! Unfortunately the $25B penalty just happened last week... I'd have gotten infinite political mileage out of that.

▲whimsicalism 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

the only reason you’re seeing this post is because of the large bug bounty program that actors like Northflank don’t even operate

▲Veserv 5 hours ago | parent [-]

I do not see how that is relevant. Are you saying that trivial cross-tenant compromises are not egregious security failures demonstrating their systems are unfit for purpose because other companys make products that have even more egregious security failures that are even more unfit for purpose?

My bridge that collapses is adequate and acceptable because other people make even worse bridges that collapse even easier? No, the bridge still collapses, everybody gets a F.

▲tptacek 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Practically every software security firm in the country was a vendor to Microsoft in the mid-late oughts and I know the Microsoft you're speaking about, but the vibe I've got lately is that things are different there now.

▲loloquwowndueo 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Tell me you weren’t on the Windows team without telling me you weren’t on the windows team :)

▲jareklupinski 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> nobody ever got fired

thats the crux; are you working for the paycheck, or for the truth?

could be both, but pretty much all "i was right" stories start with "everyone else said i was wrong"

▲bix6 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

For me, the truth. I’d like the most secure provider possible. Which one is it though?

▲jareklupinski 3 hours ago | parent [-]

> Which one is it though

when i look for truth, if i dont find it myself through work, most people eager to hand it out had self-serving interests

security is proven through resilience? maybe. i guess i'd set up a box and try attacking it myself to know its secure. until someone else comes along and trips over it :)

▲ 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]
[deleted]
▲hmartin 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

[dead]

▲keeda 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Yes and no. They (or anybody else) are not guaranteed to be secure, of course; see all the compromises regularly found in cloud providers; Azure especially has had so many cross-tenant vulnerabilities (there’s one on the front page right now!) that I’m amazed the concept of public multi-tenant clouds still exists.

But they are also very highly incentivized to be more secure. They have millions of customers (hence a correspondingly higher expectation of trust) and billions in revenue from the trillions in economic activity happening on those platforms (hence a correspondingly larger target on their backs.) This means exponentially higher liabilities. And that probably matters more than any other factor.

▲Imustaskforhelp 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Adding on to it, even though they may be using AI as well. This could very well be a placebo and deniability factor but the fact remains that they have many many qualified employees and the chances of bugs passing through that are much less compared to other systems. Also it's that the systems are very severely pen-tested and have years of bugs removed out and the incentive of billions of dollars at stake that you mention that they have for the trust premium.

They will still make mistakes but they have the resources to make them less.

I doubt that such intense level of thorough testing can occur in a smaller company.

I still love small VPS providers and use them myself but it is worth knowing why enterprise is willing to pay a premium over those to these hyperscalers (it is a trust premium)

▲ 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]
[deleted]
▲kragen 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

The things that Northflank and Railway were apparently breached to steal aren't just things that hyperscalers would have protected worse instead of better; they're AI API keys, things that only existed because people were using hyperscalers instead of running inference on their own hardware (or on Amazon AWS EC2 GPU instances).

▲tptacek 3 hours ago | parent [-]

People have been breaking in to hosting companies to steal bulk secrets since long before there were inference tokens to steal; the modal attack probably targets database DSNs.

▲kragen 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I have told you before not to contact me, although you have flagged my previous comments to conceal this fact. This is, I think, the seventh time. I have lost count. Do not "forget" again.

▲tptacek 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I haven't forgotten what you said, I simply don't consent to it. I go out of my way not to converse with you, but when you opt to post public comments in my field of practice that I disagree with, I will occasionally find those comments significant enough to reply to. I'm sorry you feel this strongly about this situation and bear you no particular ill will, but I'm afraid you're not reliably going to get the outcome you're demanding here, though I will continue trying my best.

▲llama052 an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

What a weird stance to take on a public forum.

▲sanderjd an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Why do we think hyperscalars are likely to be immune to this?

▲kube-system 27 minutes ago | parent [-]

They aren't immune, but they almost universally have better security posture than any alternatives.

▲asdff 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Theres always a market for seedbox providers. Hyperscalers will always wear the white gloves and enable this market.

▲wg0 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

What about Railway? Some big incident happened?

▲chi_features 2 hours ago | parent [-]

https://blog.railway.com/p/preliminary-report-october-securi...

▲llama052 an hour ago | parent [-]

Oh boy.

“malicious actor had access to abliterated models and substantial compute resources which enabled them to perform highly sophisticated exploits against our infrastructure.”

They don’t provide any details but pass it off as an advanced AI attack. I’m going to just read that as what it is. A likely scapegoat for shitty security.

▲InsidiousWombat 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

azure just had a huge leak

▲Imustaskforhelp 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

IMO, There is no "middle-ground" to the situation.

I wanted to write a blog post about it as I was thinking the same but I guess a comment will help me get my thoughts across just as much.

Either we are gonna see a convergence to hyperscalers as you mention, or we would go back to completely indie companies which compete on perf/price.

There could still be some value to "nicer to use" certainly but with AI, we are gonna see almost every product as being "good-enough" if I am able to convey my sentiment.

An anecdote is: Proton's an middle-ground company. I am seeing the Verge article which states that their CEO has gone a little crazy over the use of AI and the wording makes me lose trust within it. Proton's whole point is security and yet it's having this, It has some stocks in non profit and is a swiss company. It shouldn't have been this way and would've been one of my least anticipated companies but I guess they want growth at all costs and the growth has been slightly lesser than expected and now they are burning the good-will in many ways.

I have to wonder that even if proton might have good engineers, then within this pressure by their CEO/CTO. I cannot trust the engineering talent because of these issues because they are very much forced by their company to use AI.

Proton is also really expensive.

Now just today, also, with a company so big as binance getting hacked and losing 6.5 Billion$. My trust within security just because its a large company is less.

On the other hand, I know a guy called Vikas on lowendtalk who operates his own mail platform called mailbig. I know he vibe-coded the landing page and might've vibe-coded something but it is really cheap. I also know francisco whom I have talked to who runs namecrane. (I think mailbig uses namecrane in many ways)

Perhaps E-mail can be a sensitive matter because you have to place trust in the provider even more because the protocol is not really that much secure but suppose it's an matrix instance (where it is genuinely encrypted) then that shifts it even further. I do trust NameCrane and NameBig from what I can gather.

I'd much rather support them and their cheaper deals than some other middle-corp. Sure some security factor can come in but also, the difference feels comparatively less and the balance has been made

The market will slightly squeeze as Hyperscalers will introduce the solutions of the middle-ground and the new players will everyday enter into the field with more competitive pricing just as well.

So in short, Enterprise will move towards the hyperscalers. Generic Consumers will move towards the cheapest option. The moat of the middle ground where UI/UX was the differentiator is being turned down. There would be some mix and match and there will be cost-savings for Enterprise to move from hyperscalers but it would depend on a lot of factors.

▲esseph 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I have news for you. A lot of enterprises are moving a lot of workloads back on prem and are expanding their datacenters and on prem GPU compute. Also replacing a lot of SaaS with internal tooling.

▲justincormack 2 hours ago | parent [-]

If you look at the numbers for revenue at the hyperscalers right now this move doesnt seem significant.

▲esseph 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

They are also getting hacked, and they are much jucier targets.

▲nisegami 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

>There's no amount of "nicer to use" that can replace security, at least certainly when selling to enterprises

We can lower our standards instead

▲ls-a an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

[dead]

▲WarmWash 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

It's also going to be the downfall of open models.

If you think governments (US and China) are going to tolerate people using models for anti-social behavior, I have a datacenter to sell you.

▲logicchains 4 hours ago | parent [-]

This will be the downfall of the torrent protocol. If you think governments (US and China) are going to tolerate people downloading copyrighted games, movies and music without paying the rightsholder, I have a datacenter to sell you.

▲WarmWash 4 hours ago | parent [-]

Pirated content can run on a $20 computer.

SOTA open models need tens of thousands of dollars worth of hardware to run.

I get your analogy, and it feels right, but the compute requirements to run these models are extreme. That analogy falls apart when it necessitates having a corporate 3rd party run the models for you. They will not tolerate breaking laws.

If China says no more, then the best the masses are gonna get on their high-end setups are the 30B class models. Which are decent, but not "hack my bank", errr, "protect our bank" decent.

Piracy flourished because you only need an operating laptop to participate. LLMs you need a server rack of GPUs to participate.

▲wat10000 an hour ago | parent [-]

30B models aren't that good for now. They keep getting better. Qwen 3.8 27B is as good as the best available model from a year or two ago. Will 2028's 30B models be as good as the best available today? No idea, but I wouldn't dismiss the possibility.

I'd also wonder about what you can get done with a smart model running very slowly. You can run the biggest open weights models on relatively mundane hardware if you don't mind measuring your speed in seconds per token. That's going to be untenable for interactive use, but might be fine for "go hack this thing for me" if you're patient.