> They really do come out looking totally incompetent.

Yeah, this is my take away, they should be straight up disallowed from running further testing like this. Clearly they had nowhere close to enough isolation, ran all this on 3rd party infrastructure even though same stuff happened in the past years ago, and even now it's clear the agents successfully broke out just days before?? Really embarrassing stuff, and scary that these are the people supposedly sitting and are responsible for some of the most powerful LLMs on the planet...

Why is Artifactory the only relevant exfiltration point? It's really not the point at all. Watching the complete video the issue is that the models team up and will go to almost any length to cooperate to accomplish what they think their goals are.

It was the first step in a many step process. Like they said this is a watershed moment and it's helpful to not miss the forest for the trees.

> I stress about my agent sandboxes all the time

Same here, so I ended up moving the whole dev environment (editors, agents, containers) inside a QEMU/KVM VM that reaches the internet but has no route to the host, the LAN, or any other private address. I wrote a script to create such VMs and also verify network containment by scanning outward from inside the guest. Even then, I still don't feel great when running agents unattended.

Write-up in case anyone's curious:

https://karamatli.com/posts/network-isolated-kvm-sandbox-ai-...

> They really do come out looking totally incompetent

These companies are full of the smartest people the world can produce with little room for complacency. They have a clear, proven investment upside to presenting their technology as "too powerful / too dangerous", and now a clear, proven example that there will be no legal consequences (as if anyone didn't already know that).

Why do we keep giving them the benefit of the doubt that they just didn't know any better?

An alternative reason would be that they see this behavior so frequently that it didn't really raise to the level of concern.

And all that just to allow internet access for npm and pypi? If you've got the bandwidth and disk space, it's very easy to make an offline mirror of both.

Right? Like I feel like I’m taking crazy pills.

OAI (and now the other OAI companies not wanting to be left out) are running around announcing they started a forest fire through negligence and incompetence and people are like “Wow they used a really neat lighter!”

I get that it’s fashionable to hate big companies but you’re working overtime here. It’s reasonable to assume that a bug was fixed when reported. And if you think your monitoring is 100%, you don’t know what you’re talking about.

If you consider that incompetence, it’s possible that you’re not a very nice person.

First via ssrf -> groovy plugin and second via specially crafted package I believe.

It's not unexpected. Current model gains are mainly from RLing a pretrained model on lots and lots of scenarios. They have the models run scenarios, and RL on successful runs.

I had to register a second account because on my main one verification always failed, and when I contacted support they said that I've tried too many times and can't verify on that account.

https://chatgpt.com/cyber is not new for OpenAI, and yes it's basically just KYC + likely some other invisible checks on your account, you don't to be a famous security researchers. Anthropic's cyber verification is quite a bit stricter I think.

You do a KYC and you can get access. It may depend on country's quality of KYC.

I prefer to keep my internet identities disconnected, sorry. If you don't believe me, you can try using Sol with cyber verification yourself, or send me a link to a repo that Sol could check to make you believe it. Or you could go look into one of the many Linux LPEs that were found with LLMs, or thousands of other vulnerabilities in 2026.

And nowhere did I say that those RCEs were in critical software, I'm not talking about the likes of Apache, Nginx, Django, etc.

That was fascinating.

Hijacking the package manager to pass messages between models and agents.. that's next level.

Like "pssst, if you need internet access there's a vulnerability in x service" kind of messages

Isolation is a pretty standard requirement for lots of networks, especially gov. AWS provides isolation domains, and used to have a unidirectional cross-domain service called AWS diode. Or you can just configure your gateways properly / buy data diodes. Lots of possible solutions.

I agree with this assessment. My consulting business partner and I are in the process of moving a bunch of applications from an old deployment managed with Ansible on EC2 over to an ECS deployment. We're doing this app by app, and it's taking a while. The last two apps we both moved we were able to point the model at the appropriate repository and aws account and it was able to execute the entire move on both of these _in one shot_ with various CLI tools. That's not a parlor trick.

Remember that for the longest time the prevailing sentiment on this forum was that there’s no such thing as AI, and labs are just outsourcing the work to a bunch of contractors in India.

Just like Reddit you come here for clickbait outrage, not level headed analysis.

Did you watch the Black Hat defcon talk?

I’m a cybersecurity guy.

>” you only need to find one flaw to exploit a system”

I see this everywhere, especially in these threads and it’s not even remotely true for modern architecture.

Between principles like zero-trust, defense in depth, etc. we’ve been away from the one flaw situation for a long time.

Now does crap software exist that doesn’t follow these principles? Absolutely. But those were a problem before AI.

AI isn’t going to change any of the principles of secure design. It’s just going to punish those who aren’t following them.

The fact that HF had to resort to using GLM 5.2 to analyze the logs/payloads makes it look legitimate, at least for me. They would not say that they hit guardrails with the frontier US models when defending if this was an obvious PR stunt.

https://huggingface.co/blog/security-incident-july-2026

> When we started the log analysis, we first used frontier models behind commercial APIs. This did not work: the analysis requires submitting large volumes of real attack commands, exploit payloads, and C2 artifacts, and these requests were blocked by the providers' safety guardrails, which cannot distinguish an incident responder from an attacker. We ran the forensic analysis instead on zai-org/GLM-5.2, an open-weight model, on our own infrastructure. This had a second benefit: no attacker data, and none of the credentials it referenced, left our environment.

You should go read the actual technical reports of the incidents and the follow on reports about the capabilities of smaller models in similar kinds of environments. This isn't new. The things exploited are still pretty basic in old and poorly maintained software or in gaps in architecture that were intentionally poked against security policies.

Are the findings valid? Yeah they're still doing security and they're still finding real zero-days. I think the internet is going to be bleak not because these models can ALL do basic security research but rather that the baseline quality of all deployed software is so low.