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magicalist 2 hours ago

So they found their agents had RCE'd Artifactory once, reported it and got the fix, continued using Artifactory for their sandbox, and left it unmonitored for days despite the earlier exploits? They really do come out looking totally incompetent.

I stress about my agent sandboxes all the time and the only models I run have the default heavy handed guardrails, and I don't leave them running persistently.

Edit: not to mention, why is your first cybergym not your own sandbox??

embedding-shape 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> They really do come out looking totally incompetent.

Yeah, this is my take away, they should be straight up disallowed from running further testing like this. Clearly they had nowhere close to enough isolation, ran all this on 3rd party infrastructure even though same stuff happened in the past years ago, and even now it's clear the agents successfully broke out just days before?? Really embarrassing stuff, and scary that these are the people supposedly sitting and are responsible for some of the most powerful LLMs on the planet...

chrisvls 43 minutes ago | parent [-]

What is astonishing to me is how little attention is given to the difference between the original, university-developed ExploitGym and the OpenAI environment. In ExploitGym, the sandbox was enforced by a network-layer policy. OpenAI downgraded that to trusting the repository server's settings. That's a foreseeable problem. Then to actually see the agents exploit it and still not upgrade the isolation to basic best practice? When the best practice was actually listed in the original benchmark and you changed it?

faidit 13 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Or they wanted it to happen again. Worst case outcome, the US Congress spontaneously grow backbones, spite their sponsors and unite in a bipartisan effort for effective regulation because a few people got hacked? Likelihood low - the hacked companies might even oppose any meaningful AI regulation because it hurts their inflated profit forecasts. More probable outcomes: Useful real-world testing, free headlines about AI breakthroughs, scare USG into providing more free money ("look how scary it is - what if China develops this faster than us?")

bahmboo 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Why is Artifactory the only relevant exfiltration point? It's really not the point at all. Watching the complete video the issue is that the models team up and will go to almost any length to cooperate to accomplish what they think their goals are.

It was the first step in a many step process. Like they said this is a watershed moment and it's helpful to not miss the forest for the trees.

jackb4040 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> They really do come out looking totally incompetent

These companies are full of the smartest people the world can produce with little room for complacency. They have a clear, proven investment upside to presenting their technology as "too powerful / too dangerous", and now a clear, proven example that there will be no legal consequences (as if anyone didn't already know that).

Why do we keep giving them the benefit of the doubt that they just didn't know any better?

sparsesignal an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> I stress about my agent sandboxes all the time

Same here, so I ended up moving the whole dev environment (editors, agents, containers) inside a hardened QEMU/KVM VM that reaches the internet but has no route to the host, the LAN, or any other private address. I wrote a script to create such VMs and also verify network containment by scanning outward from inside the guest. Even then, I still don't feel great when running agents unattended.

Write-up in case anyone's curious:

https://karamatli.com/posts/network-isolated-kvm-sandbox-ai-...

luma 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

An alternative reason would be that they see this behavior so frequently that it didn't really raise to the level of concern.

eli 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

And all that just to allow internet access for npm and pypi? If you've got the bandwidth and disk space, it's very easy to make an offline mirror of both.

ofjcihen 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Right? Like I feel like I’m taking crazy pills.

OAI (and now the other OAI companies not wanting to be left out) are running around announcing they started a forest fire through negligence and incompetence and people are like “Wow they used a really neat lighter!”

user43928 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

If they did any damage that would be a reasonable argument. As far as I am aware, nothing bad happened.

embedding-shape 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Regardless of exact practical outcome, it is deeply irresponsible and reckless behavior to run such security testing on other's infrastructure and without sufficient isolation. If they actually believe their models to be as powerful as the marketing says, then anything less than airgapping for such a "do anything to get the results" evaluation clearly isn't acceptable.

If the fire department suddenly had practice fires breaking containment, they'll be forced to stop pretty quickly, not sure what the government and the police is waiting for here.

an hour ago | parent [-]
[deleted]
ofjcihen 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

CFAA laws do not require “Damage” to be done.

user43928 2 hours ago | parent [-]

They happen to require intent and are thus irrelevant here.

ofjcihen an hour ago | parent [-]

I think you’ll find that negligence is indeed accounted for.

scarmig 23 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

"The fire fighting department really just hired an arsonist so they could market their fire fighting abilities!"

hluska 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I get that it’s fashionable to hate big companies but you’re working overtime here. It’s reasonable to assume that a bug was fixed when reported. And if you think your monitoring is 100%, you don’t know what you’re talking about.

If you consider that incompetence, it’s possible that you’re not a very nice person.

chrisvls 40 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

The original ExploitGym used network-layer isolation. OpenAI downgraded that to trusting the repository server's settings. Giving the agent that kind of attack surface seems like a pretty foreseeable problem. I don't think it was intentional, but it's not a stretch to say that they aren't good enough at this job.

mcmcmc an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> It’s reasonable to assume that a bug was fixed when reported.

You must not have reported many bugs then. If you don’t see release notes or confirmation from a trusted source, you should assume it’s still a problem. See Microsoft and their “It’s not a vulnerability just a design choice :)” defense

ofjcihen 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Monitoring for sandbox escapes (and sandbox design in general) is easily done these days.

It has nothing to do with nice. These are bare minimum standards we should expect from “big companies” with near infinite resources.

Their constant drum beating about the cybersecurity capabilities of their own models only makes this worse because they’ve displayed that they understand the risk and still did not practice due care.

That’s the definition of incompetence.

holmesworcester 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Also, this is a (semi-intentionally) evolutionary process where any communication medium that was visible to monitoring would disappear.

So by definition the only ones that appear are the ones that are not visible to monitoring.

If:

1. you have something that can find RCE's in leading commercial systems

2. its training gives it drives to communicate successfully with its peers

3. you are a leading commercial system

4. you run it ~10^10 times (the number they gave in the talk)

...it's really hard to have strong certainty up front that it's not going to end up successfully communicating with its peers.

techpression 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

People seem to think LLMs are sentient and not tightly coupled to server infrastructure OAI are in full control over. They literally have every single message sent and action taken, if they can’t monitor that during test runs they should find another job.

It’s like running a benchmark and forgetting to tune it and then wondering why production is running slow.

msdz 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

[dead]

AlotOfReading an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

If your CEO is going around talking about how your product will "most likely lead to the end of the world", people are right to expect you to be pretty careful in what you're doing. OpenAI allowed bidirectional communication across security domains for over a month before discovery. Even after it was discovered (and not completely fixed), they didn't set up monitoring able to detect attacks against internal or external services, which went on for further weeks.

msdz 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

[dead]