▲ | comex 3 days ago | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
“Play Games. Win Big.” seems to be their current website’s slogan. In your archive link the same text instead reads “Banking for Winners”, which helps explain why people would be putting their life savings into this thing. In the small text below, they did say “Yotta is a financial technology company, not a bank.”, but that was immediately followed by: “Banking services provided by Evolve Bank & Trust and Thread Bank; Members FDIC.” And they weren’t lying about that. This isn’t some cryptocurrency rug pull. They really were operating under the regulated financial system, in concert with banks. It isn’t even a situation where someone stole the money, as far as anyone can tell. Sure, perhaps customers should have avoided the company for independent reasons, like the bad interest rate or the risk of it being an outright scam. But it’s hard for me to blame them when the actual failure mode was completely different and unexpected. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
▲ | UltraSane 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The core issue seems to be that a company named Synapse was a middleman to a lot of fintech startups and spread money around various banks but didn't actually keep very accurate records of balances. Evolve bank noticed this and hired a fancy consulting firm named Ankura to reconcile 100 million transactions. But most of the money is still lost in the various banks that Synapse used. The core issue is why is it so hard to use Synapse's records to find where the money is? And the various banks that Synapse used should be able to work together to reconcile the money. I wonder if most the missing money was just embezzled. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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▲ | K0balt 3 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
In finance, you should never assume incompetence over malice. It very rarely works out that way. Malicious incompetence maybe. This is probably a rug pull in a system designed for money laundering. They can’t figure out where money came from or who it belonged to…. I don’t think that happened out of the blue using standard accounting practices. By mixing non-bank money companies and traditional banking services, you can construct an effectively opaque and ultra efficient system to obfuscate the origins of funds, all without deviation in an obvious way from what looks like standard accounting. All of the best money laundering happens in plain sight within the banking industry through clever constructions. AML rules are just there to eliminate the competition. My guess is that it was time to shut down and the fingerprints had to be burned. Maybe no customer money was stolen, but the data of who has what money and who it belonged to might be hopelessly obfuscated in the process of obfuscation of their primary activities. This is not likely an example of sloppy accounting, but rather of very, very clever accounting and orchestrated fraud to make money disappear out of an otherwise well designed system of accounting. The real question is where did the fraud propagate out of? What was the exploit, what was the systemic vulnerability, and who exploited it? There is a huge incentive in fintech to create “legitimate products“ where John Q. Public deposits funds that just happen to be very useful for money laundering when combined with some other, apparently unrelated activity or similar lever that only an insider knows how to pull. It works fundamentally like a cryptocurrency coin mixer, without the hassle or suspicious profile. Shifting burdens of documentation often have gaps where things can “get lost” and shell companies that act only as conduits and never hold funds can evaporate with little accountability. Often, “unknowing” accomplice banks are left holding the bag…but all you have to figure out is where to repatriate the money that people will come looking for, the flows you know no one is going to come asking about effectively never happened. Meanwhile it’s very easy to take a margin of 10 percent or more of the flows. And they aren’t small flows. It’s a multibillion dollar market. The demand and the incentives are absolutely spectacular. For the most part, these crimes are invisible to the public, very difficult to prosecute, and effectively impossible to garner the political support to even launch an investigation into, for reasons. I hope the hapless victims at least get their money back some day. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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▲ | dehrmann 3 days ago | parent | prev [-] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
> bad interest rate That link shows 2.7% in Sept., 2023. It should have been more like 5%. The yellow flag should have been the sketchy "win prizes" part of their offering that the article didn't really mention. What's this pseudo bank's innovation? A raffle? I still agree that weren't actual signs of sloppy accounting customers should have seen, and as it really does look like customer funds were supposed to get deposited in an actual bank. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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