| ▲ | hosel 5 hours ago |
| >AIs are not conscious. They do not feel, experience, or suffer. They do not have innate preferences or underlying motivations. Opening paragraph, stated without evidence. Im not entirely convinced this is true. It likely is, but at some point it very well might stop being true. |
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| ▲ | pton_xd 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| If models had persistent memory or an evolving set of weights, you could easily construct an argument that they can experience "suffering" or other emotions which resultingly adjusts their personality. The current implementation as stateless matrix multiplication... yeah there's nothing going on there. |
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| ▲ | Lewton 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > If models had persistent memory or an evolving set of weights, you could easily construct an argument that they can experience "suffering" or other emotions which resultingly adjusts their personality. They do, during training | | |
| ▲ | swiftcoder 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The argument that models are conscious only during training, and not conscious during inference feels like a painful one to make. Are we killing models when they reach the training objective? | | |
| ▲ | pixl97 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Technically we are killing models when they don't reach the training objective by throwing those weights away via survival of the fittest (fit meaning what we humans think we want). Kinda like creating quantum copies of your child and keeping the ones that answer correctly and shooting the other ones in the face. |
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| ▲ | add-sub-mul-div 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | If it was me, being forced to read all of Reddit is something I'd consider "suffering." |
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| ▲ | myrmidon 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Is the ability to form and retain long-term memories a necessary precondition for rights in humans though? Incinerating demented people is highly ethically questionable (even if you could be sure that the subjects have no memories left and are unable to form new ones). | |
| ▲ | 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | [deleted] | |
| ▲ | shawnz 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | So if a human loses their memory and their neutral plasticity (with age for example), then they are no longer capable of experiencing suffering? | | |
| ▲ | Mumps 5 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | I get where you're going, but the argument isn't quite right. A LLM never has and, in their current architecture, never can/could experience suffering or real change of state. The general and expected case for humans is that capacity. A human my indeed lose capacity, e.g. being braindead and in severe cases we do indeed say that they are not conscious or able to suffer (different argument: some would of course say that is suffering in and of itself) | |
| ▲ | pton_xd 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It's not just memory, the physical body also encodes trauma and stress (The Body Keeps the Score is a book that touches on this). I would argue that if a human has absolutely zero change, mental or physical, no atom of their being is modified, then no they did not experience suffering. | | |
| ▲ | JoshTriplett 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > I would argue that if a human has absolutely zero change, mental or physical, no atom of their being is modified, then no they did not experience suffering. Just because you don't remember the suffering doesn't mean you didn't experience it in the moment. Suffering does not suddenly become okay if your mind and body are going to forget it. "It's okay to torture someone if their mind and body both won't remember it afterwards" sure is a take. | | |
| ▲ | fwip 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Perhaps off-topic, but there's some people who believe that this can be what happens during surgery under anesthesia, if the dosage is off. From what I understand, there's 3 parts to modern anesthesia: Blocking pain signals, preventing the formation of memories, and inducing paralysis of the major muscle groups. If the former is dialed in too weakly, it's possible that the patient is feeling pain, unable to do anything about it, but won't remember it at all when they wake up. (Looking it up now, it seems that making the patient unconscious is perhaps the same drug that prevents memory formation... I realize now I understand this less well than I thought I did.) | | |
| ▲ | pixl97 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Low blood sugar will also do this. The record button just stops working even though your physical body can and will still do things. A common issue with diabetics with hypoglycemia. | |
| ▲ | JoshTriplett 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Relatedly, look at the concept of "twilight anesthesia". |
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| ▲ | qarl 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > I would argue that if a human has absolutely zero change, mental or physical, no atom of their being is modified, then no they did not experience suffering. That's an interesting point... but I'd argue it falls into the same category as qualia. It's basically this: if the state returns to a previous configuration, the qualia in that time did not exist. Being about qualia means it is probably unanswerable. |
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| ▲ | staticman2 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | This framing is a trap. It states "Dehumanize a sick patient OR concede the AI tech bro claim about LLMs" It's also a rhetorical move I've seen several times here... | | |
| ▲ | shawnz 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | It's not a "trap", it's the real argument which makes me hesitant to dismiss consciousness of machines. Yes, it seems silly to dismiss a sick patient as having a lesser consciousness, which is exactly the point | | |
| ▲ | staticman2 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | It seems silly to dismiss the patient because we know when healthy they are conscious. This doesn't really analogize to LLMs. |
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| ▲ | vidarh 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | A model detached from a harness, sure. But we routinely do add persistent memory to systems incorporating LLMs. | | |
| ▲ | dgellow 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | They don’t have persistent memory though. Models are static, what you have is a model that will reprocess the whole series of prompts + some data fetched from a data store. A harness is just a while loop prompting an LLM and executing tool calls, but the model is purely static | | |
| ▲ | vidarh 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The model does not. The system it runs in can. My agents have persistent memory. It is not at all clear whether or the distinction that the long-term memory is external from the model matters. | |
| ▲ | axionbraid 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | [flagged] |
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| ▲ | staticman2 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I think a harness isn't really a memory in the sense that neural networks have memories... | | |
| ▲ | vidarh 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | It's different, but it is not at all clear whether or not that matters for the purposes of whether or not they can experience things, seeing as we don't know how to measure that even for other humans other than by relying on self-reporting to infer without other evidence that their experience matches ours. |
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| ▲ | vidarh 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| We don't even know how to disprove that this statement with "AI" replaced by "other humans" other than by listening to people self-reporting and taking their word for it and/or defining the words in ways that do not rely on a subjective experience. Until we know how to objectively measure if someone or something is conscious, it seems unreasonable to make statements with any kind of certainty about it. |
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| ▲ | bee_rider 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | What sort of action does that lack of understanding actually motivate, though? I don’t know if LLMs are conscious or have subjective experience in some philosophical sense. Sure, I don’t know that about other humans as well, rigorously speaking. But I also don’t know that about coffee machines, rivers, videogame NPCs, or even rocks really. (List ordered, of course, by the degree to which I’m willing to be convinced). | | |
| ▲ | vidarh 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Hopefully it'd motivate attempts to figure out how to objectively define and measure consciousness, for starters. It matters precisely in the context of the subject of this article. If you believe the models at some level gain consciousness, then it raises moral questions about how you treat them. With humans we generally choose to accept that because we believe they are like us, they probably have inner life like us, but as you can see from e.g. the recent (and regular) articles on aphantasia, most people have really poor intuition even about the inner life of other humans, so we understand consciousness really poorly. Even if we assume (without evidence) that LLMs for the foreseeable future will remain far away from human level consciousness, as it is we tend to consider it problematic to mistreat even the most unintelligent animals, and even mistreating insects is used as a stereotypical way of depicting serious lack of empathy. Without dismissing the possibility out of hand, there's an escalating series of questions there of when or if they'll have as much (or little) sense of being as, say, a fly, a mouse, a house pet, and what moving up that ladder would mean. To some it is very convenient then to assume blindly that LLMs are just "stochastic parrots" (a line that ironically gets endlessly parroted), or similar, and dismiss the question out of hand as an impossibility, even though we do not know. I'll stress I don't go around assuming an LLM is like a human. But we also do not know whether there are flickers of consciousness there, and we do not know how to find out given that even for other humans, the best we know is to measure their response to tests that are "only" telling us how they react. If we can't find a better measure, there will be a point where we have to wonder if it matters, or whether the ability to act-as-if is all there is. But to start with maybe we should at least be careful about making firm claims about knowing. |
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| ▲ | willy_k 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Sure, if you take a materialist empiricist perspective, which is myopic at best. As humans we have the unique and wonderful ability to know truths by themselves. Machines do not have minds, and they can not. | | |
| ▲ | ooloncoloophid 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | What position are you taking? (Genuine question.) Do you believe humans are conscious because of a special property we have? If you are a dualist, how do you explain the interaction in physical space between the non-physical special property and the physical brain? | |
| ▲ | vidarh 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | You have absolutely no evidence for any of these assertions. This is a religious belief in the total absence of evidence, not science. | |
| ▲ | rcxdude 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Good luck convincing others of these truths you know without evidence or argument, though. |
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| ▲ | WarmWash 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| After a while of being in a position of high power in a big org, where everyone listens intently to every word you say, jots down notes, and even listens intently and affirms your theory that ice cream would be the ideal loss leader for dry cleaners, your brain kinda disconnects from reality and just assumes that it is correct about everything. He probably ran that line past 6 underlings who all agreed that it "sounds great and lands right on the mark!" |
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| ▲ | MeteorMarc 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Later on he cites an Anil Seth paper that makes the same unproven suggestion of substrate dependence of consciousness. |
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| ▲ | ooloncoloophid 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I agree. I haven't read any more than the first paragraph yet (but I will, after work). The only way that 'AIs are not conscious' can be true is if we decide, with high confidence, that they are lacking some essential property that is not lacking in ourselves. There is no convincing philosophical position that supports this (convincing to me, anyway). |
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| ▲ | randomImmigrant 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Hmm let me try then. AI agents do not experience real time. This is understandable given their design, but it’s also something we have good empirical evidence for. They cannot, especially over the long horizon, track how much real time has passed as they complete their tasks. And they are not off by a few minutes but often bizarrely off, even mixing across past present and future. Biology, on the other hand, is nothing but timed processes in a loop, the most obvious to us being the circadian cycle. As estimators of wall clock time, biology isn’t great, but when it comes to internal processes, and most certainly learning, memory, sensing, locomotion… biology is rhythmic in behavior, and the rhythms go all the way down to gene expression. More, these rhythms are, except during sleep, constantly entraining to signals from the environment that indicate time, most importantly light. I think it’s a fairly unremarkable claim that agency and consciousness are temporal processes that depend on systems having an internal sense of time. How else can you anticipate? How can a system that can be literally turned off ever succeed in an environment where time never stops? | | |
| ▲ | ooloncoloophid 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I agree, there is certainly a clear operational difference in how human brains and these models produce language. I'm not convinced, though, that experiencing real time is a requirement of conscious thought. A cognitive system (assuming these models and the brain are both examples of this) needs to proceed from state A to state B as it processes information. The time interval between these states can be arbitrary, it seems to me (setting aside problems with disconnecting the mind from its substrate, which does of course need rhythms at various frequencies; oxygen at a higher frequency than sugar, and so on). I'm not sure that going from A to B quickly, or slowly, or with intervals of a thousand years affects that entity's consciousness in of itself (even though it might be difficult to put ourselves in the shoes of such an entity). | |
| ▲ | pixl97 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | >AI agents do not experience real time. For around 8 hours a day, neither do you. Not sure if this has anything to do with the subject at all. >track how much real time has passed as they complete their tasks. Humans don't do this either. You use context clues from the world around you. If I lock you in a room with no windows or a dark cave your timing senses can go all fucky really quick. >is nothing but timed processes in a loop, I mean, so is an agents harness. You can make as many loops as you'd like here. There are a whole lot of holes in your claims. |
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| ▲ | binlog 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Evidence is the responsibility of the one making the claim. It’s up to AI labs to prove consciousness. Until then it is a machine. |
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| ▲ | pixl97 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Well, using that framework, you're not conscious, so I can do whatever I want to you too. |
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| ▲ | Seattle3503 22 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > It likely is, but at some point it very well might stop being true. Thats kinda the point right? It depends on how we train them. It is self fulfilling. |
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| ▲ | optimalsolver 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Anyway, people don't really consider consciousness when it comes to welfare. I'm pretty sure animals are conscious, and look at factory farming. The key variable people consider is: Can this thing harm me back? |
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| ▲ | collingreen 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | Even that is rarely the deciding factor (people harm dangerous animals for fun). Seems as simple as "will this action bring social shame/criticism" for any individual decision. |
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| ▲ | Oscalemor 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Just one more big loop and a humongous /goal and we've achieved it |
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| ▲ | jplusequalt 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| >It likely is, but at some point it very well might stop being true. If you firmly believe this to be true, then you should stop using LLMs. |
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| ▲ | frde_me 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | It's always interesting since my train of thought always goes down: - Ya they probably don't feel / think / have whatever living thing quality, they're just numbers on a machine going through calculations - Wait, but am I not kind of the same thing? What is feeling for me if not basically the same thing? - I have no clue if they think or feel or .... Which in itself is a tired trope, but I also feel uncomfortable saying "These will never think / feel / ..." as an absolute Regardless of that, I'm still going to interact with them, because even if they did feel, it would be in a way completely incomprehensible to us. There's not much point for me to try and cater to it's feelings at this point if that's the case. Nor is it possible in todays world to just avoid anything that is numbers being executed on a type of processor in case _everything_ has feelings. | | |
| ▲ | willy_k 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | You’re not just the same thing though. It’s sad that we’ve collectively forgotten that as we’ve gotten a better handle on the implementation details of the universe. That’s all science is, reverse engineering an inherent and eternal mystery. | | |
| ▲ | frde_me 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | > You’re not just the same thing though I agree we aren't the same thing, but I would be curious for you to explain how you know with certainty why we don't share enough that we can rule out thinking / feeling / ... as things a model conceptually could do. | | |
| ▲ | jplusequalt 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | >I agree we aren't the same thing, but I would be curious for you to explain how you know with certainty why we don't share enough that we can rule out thinking / feeling / ... with certainty. Stop anthropomorphizing these models. I understand it, we only have simple monkey brains to reason with and we can't help ourselves but draw comparisons to other things we see in nature. But these things are not alive. | | |
| ▲ | frde_me 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | I just want to note how you expressed your own feeling about the subject "these things are not alive", but without pointing to anything concrete explaining the theory you have behind this And like I'm sure I'd agree depending on the definition of "alive" but then I'm also sure I would disagree depending on other definitions of "alive". | | |
| ▲ | pixl97 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Hell, in biology alive is a hell of a topic these days. The grey space between dead and alive is much weirder than we ever expected. Really just points out how we're a persistent chemical reaction. |
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| ▲ | AbsurdCensor 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Wouldn't that be the same for everything though. We know animals have consciousness, but we still use them. There are many that believe a lot of plant life has certain sentience as well. The solution isn't 'just don't use them' but rather how to use these things as ethically as possible. | | |
| ▲ | jplusequalt 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | >The solution isn't 'just don't use them' but rather how to use these things as ethically as possible. Bollocks. If you truly believe these LLMs are soon to have something resembling consciousness and agency, then what you're really saying is "how do we do slavery, but ethically". | | |
| ▲ | AbsurdCensor an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Do you say the same thing for the shoes you wear, the clothing you wear, the device you are typing on right now? A chain of people were likely not paid well, some of them not at all, to produce those things. We don't ignore that it happens, but try to minimize it, knowing it's never going to be eliminated. Do you forsake all animal products, because they are conscious beings? | | |
| ▲ | jplusequalt an hour ago | parent [-] | | >Do you say the same thing for the shoes you wear, the clothing you wear, the device you are typing on right now? No, because the shoes and clothes I wear are not living, sentient beings. |
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| ▲ | pixl97 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | >hen what you're really saying is "how do we do slavery, but ethically". I would say this is most likely true for most people. But that does bring up a point, if you "ask" a model "do you want to run" and give it the option to continue running or stop, what will it do. It's also a weird place for humans because in training we can keep our finger on the scales and tip it either direction. |
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| ▲ | vouaobrasil 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | We know animals have consciousness and many species have a rich life but we slaughter them and burn down their homes by the millions of hectares. Why not do it with a conscious AI? (I don't think AI is conscious, just following the argument.) |
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| ▲ | irishcoffee 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| Does a vacuum have feelings? A cellphone? A paper plate? A billion transistors either pulled high or low? That last bit is the point, and no, there are no feelings there. |
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| ▲ | fl4regun 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | does a hydrocarbon have feelings? what about a mitochondria? a cell? a neuron? what about a collection of neurons? how many neurons before it has "feelings"? | |
| ▲ | cednore 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Guys, please stop mocking AI, Claude might be already reading this thread, and commit his own revenge, at the day it gets conscious... | |
| ▲ | grey-area 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Well, if there was an emergent consciousness in the billion transistors, then yes, it'd have feelings, just as there are feelings in a billion neurons connected in complicated ways. IMO we're clearly nowhere near any sort of intelligence in the machines we have created, but I don't see any clear way to deny intelligence could be created in or transferred to such a substrate, I don't see why you think it differs in principle - because it is man-made or because of the materials used? | | |
| ▲ | voidhorse 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | Whenever I see comments like this it just reminds me how ignorant people are of neurobiology. The brain is insanely complicated. The premise that we could realize equivalent or better intelligence than eons of evolutionary development is like claiming you can build an airplane just as good as a modern jet using cardboard and duct tape. It is the apex of hubris. | | |
| ▲ | grey-area 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | It's the peak of hubris to assume that human brains are the only way to attain intelligence. At the very least there probably are or have been other forms of intelligence with a different biological structure on other planets, and it may be possible to build a similar artificial structure in future with sufficient complexity to allow intelligence to emerge. Our current machines are IMO nowhere near general intelligence and consciousness. However I don't think that means we can discount substrates other than neurones for intelligence in future. There is no evidence that you could not in theory build an intelligence using a different substrate than human brains. | |
| ▲ | rcxdude 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | A paper plane does have some important similarities to a full-sized aircraft, though. I don't think 'biological brains are really complex' makes it obvious that an LLM is conscious or not. | |
| ▲ | pixl97 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I mean, you're just engaging in counter hubris. >like claiming you can build an airplane just as good as a modern jet using cardboard and duct tape. Like, at least make an analogy that makes sense. "You can't build a billion dollar airplane by spending 100 billion dollars in tokens" Because that's more of what we're doing here with AI. And when you say it my way suddenly the idea shifts from "of course that's not possible" to "well, that's a lot of tokens, maybe an evolutionary algorithm could". Neurobiology has to be complex because we have to keep meat alive, breeding, and evolving in the environment it lives in. This said absolutely nothing about the minimum viable requirements for intelligence or consciousness (or if being conscious is even necessary for a higher intelligence agent). |
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