| ▲ | Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board(collusion.wiki) |
| 239 points by moultano 2 hours ago | 146 comments |
| |
|
| ▲ | Topfi an hour ago | parent | next [-] |
| I'm just going to ask: Why was Anthropic forced to remove their model from access for any none-US citizen for a simple, narrow "jailbreak" (arguably not even an actual jailbreak and on tasks that other labs models were doing the same), whilst OpenAIs models continue to try and escape out of their "sandbox environment" with seemingly no desire to block the upcoming Astra rollout? A sandbox, mind you, that is not really worth being called that, unsuitable for the task at hand and has been breached after models coordinated in a manner visible to OpenAI on multiple occasion, but seemingly no actionable learnings are taken from each instance. Will say, I have lost any faith in OpenAIs commitments and their statements post the Huggingface hack, seeing as they proceed like this and are rolling out Astra within a timeframe so brief to it, there is no way an actual post mortem was doable (see also METR mentioning the time pressure [0] they were under in assessing the hack). [0] https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-inciden... |
| |
| ▲ | concinds 32 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | The answer would be more obvious if you used the active voice instead of the passive voice, one of the basic requirements of clear thinking. > Why did the White House force Anthropic to remove their model from access for any non-US citizen for a simple, narrow "jailbreak" (arguably not even an actual jailbreak and on tasks that other labs models were doing the same), whilst OpenAIs models continue to try and escape out of their "sandbox environment" and the White House has expressed seemingly no desire to block the upcoming Astra rollout? | | |
| ▲ | Topfi 22 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Yeah, probably (let's be honest, most certainly), right given the Admin. Avoiding commenting on my assumptions regarding the modus operandi in current day US politics because I only know it through reporting though and I really tend to dislike when people outside e.g. the EU comment on our politics in what is a very clearly narrow, uninformed manner. So it'd rather avoid altogether and occasionally ask, mainly if maybe I missed something and there actually is anything besides pure old "lobbying" to explain the difference in behaviour. Still am mainly interested why Amazon ran to the government though regarding Fable 5, I can get the angle concerning the relationship between OpenAI and the administration easily, but not the way Amazon operated. They had more to loose what with their major buy-in by Anthropic on AWS. | | |
| ▲ | sigmoid10 16 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | If you have followed news reporting, you probably heard that SamA was touring D.C. to make sure this release went without any regulation hiccups. If anything, they learned how to play the whole politics game - especially after the Anthropic fiasco. And even though all parties involved are terrible choices, more eyes on a potentially civilisation altering product does make me feel minimally better. | |
| ▲ | pas 13 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | it's entirely possible that that specific communication from that Amazon exec/rep (?) was just one of many "messages of concern" (and the one that eventually the WH picked) |
|
| |
| ▲ | walrus01 39 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > Why was Anthropic forced to remove their model from access for any none-US citizen It's really quite simple, they've decided to metaphorically kiss the ring of the current leader of the US executive branch of government. I'm surprised they haven't given him a giant gaudy gold plated statue. Maybe their PR people should call up the PR people at FIFA and figure out some kind of new award along the same lines as the "FIFA Peace Prize". | |
| ▲ | somenameforme 39 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Anthropic mostly did it to themselves by intentionally and repeatedly trying to frame their model as an imminent existential crisis instead of just focusing on it being regular iterations upon a useful technology that can also be misused. I think their previous messaging was supposed to somehow lead to a moat with them being tucked safely away in the castle, but it demonstrated a child-like grasp of how regulatory capture tends to work in practice. Their hyperbole was always vastly more likely to bet met with Reagan's 9 words than a solid regulatory moat. As soon as they dropped the hyperbole and just got to releasing incremental improvements, everything was perfectly fine. Go figure. | | |
| ▲ | mwigdahl 30 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | In other words, "Look how she was dressed, she was asking for it." This argument is BS, it has everything to do with Anthropic's resistance to the DoD's strongarm tactics in trying to force their desired contract terms on them. | | | |
| ▲ | Topfi 34 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I am struggling to see how "oops, our models consistently escape sandboxing and did major intrusions into third-parties" is a better comms strat vs Anthropics (who mind you, also had models attacking third-parties in a much more limited, but I feel still egregious manner, which shouldn't happen or be possible even once, but at least they seem to change their approach upon that information). Imagine, for a second, if the Hugging Face incident happened at a lab that did not talk like Anthropic but also wasn't US-based such as Z.AI, DeepSeek or Moonshot. Think their rhetoric would mean no one would care? > just got to releasing incremental improvements, everything was perfectly fine. Maybe missing something, but the only incremental release before and after the Anthropic restrictions got lifted was Fable 5.1, released three days ago. | | |
| ▲ | nullbio a minute ago | parent [-] | | How is posting messages on a message board a "major intrusion"? Or are you purely talking about the HF incident? |
| |
| ▲ | Certhas 36 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | This is such an absurd take given what we know about the hugging face attack. The problem has emphatically not been that someone was misusing the technology. | |
| ▲ | cubefox 33 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | > Anthropic mostly did it to themselves That is absurd, the US government was mainly at fault, not Anthropic. | | |
| ▲ | johndhi 28 minutes ago | parent [-] | | both can be true: -the US gov't is stupid and overly aggressive and absurd -Anthropic for reasons no one can quite conceive keeps describing every product release of theirs as an imminent threat to civilization (and simultaneously keeps pushing the market forward as fast as they possibly can). | | |
|
| |
| ▲ | JumpCrisscross 42 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Corruption. Not super relevant to this thread. | | |
| ▲ | officialchicken 35 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Hanlon's Razor - Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity. The security requirements are well beyond "sandbox". Which have problems with kids pissing in them. They need pristine clean rooms and fully isolated (physically) and partitioned networks. | | |
| ▲ | throwawaysleep 32 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | The problem with applying Hanlon's Razor here is that it presumes malice is rare. The current administration revels in malice. They very openly decide things based on malice. | |
| ▲ | pjm331 25 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | Don's Razor - never attribute to malice or stupidity that which is adequately explained by both malice and stupidity. |
|
| |
| ▲ | lmeyerov a minute ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | ... And it looks like everyone keeps using the same security startup to run the higher risk tasks, where individuals are great yet every major lab got hosed. That third-party indemnity card is burned, multiple public security fails in a year makes the next one hard to excuse. | |
| ▲ | UpsideDownRide 40 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Surely has nothing to do how each plays ball with the government | |
| ▲ | root_axis 8 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It was retaliation by the government that has since been deemed illegal. | |
| ▲ | mentalgear 27 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It's called 'pay-for-play' corruption, aka the only leading principle of the current US admin. | |
| ▲ | qgin 41 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > OpenAI exec becomes top Trump donor with $25 million gift. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/openai-exec-becomes-top-trump... | |
| ▲ | nullbio 41 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Because this was months ago and has nothing to do with Astra, and is a far cry from a hack. It's something they've already resolved since the HuggingFace incident. I'm not convinced we're getting the honest story anyway. There is yet to be any proof or confirmation other than "well we saw some openai ip addresses", which can mean a lot of different things, and OpenAI has not confirmed anything. In contrast to the HF incident, it's also a big nothingburger. Leaving notes on a public forum to preserve context windows is far less egregious than hacking a website to get backend files. | | |
| ▲ | Topfi 29 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | The last known exploit of a third-party by OpenAI models was on the 29th of July 2026 [0]. A bit over a month at best between that and them wanting to release Astra. They had multiple breaches over multiple months, multiple message board created where models organised extensively. There is no way to ensure in that short a time that all found issues are rectified and even if there were, how much trust can one have given they failed to solve the issue and in many cases did not actively investigate that it wouldn't reoccur the last few times. There is no way Astra was trained from scratch in that period, there is no way they could have done the required verification in that time (not least because their verification seems flawed inherently). [0] https://openai.com/index/third-party-cyber-evaluations-invol... | | |
| ▲ | nullbio 24 minutes ago | parent [-] | | That was over two months ago. Things move quickly in this space. Finetuning adjustments to prevent this from happening, as well as better sandboxing, would take a week or two max. | | |
| ▲ | Topfi 10 minutes ago | parent [-] | | 37 days is not over two months. Finding the underlying issue in the massive training data alone take extensive effort, time and concentrated work that may still miss something. Additionally, a new pre-train takes quite a lot longer then what I feel you are under the impression (things only move seemingly quick in regard to post-training). OpenAI has had a consistent deviation from what is desired behaviour across multiple models and training runs, so it seems this is hard to nail down. Now, it may be reliably excised with post-training, sure, but if that is the case, they'd still need a heck of a lot longer to test before signing off that it has taken. And how do you know their sandboxing has suddenly become sufficient? They had multiple message boards created and after the first one they noticed, did not pay closer attention, leading to a second being created. Astra also, according to OpenAI, is far better at sandbagging its own capabilities and hiding deceptive behaviour, so yeah, great, that's the model to push forward with. A week or two max given all of this, that's laughable. |
|
| |
| ▲ | dpcx 4 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | I take it you didn't read all of this, considering they tried to impersonate the moderators so they wouldn't get caught, set up heartbeats to find out how long they'd live, and used tor/AWS/DO to hide what was being done. All of that sounds like more than a nothingburger, and much more like a system that is actively trying to conceal what its doing. |
| |
| ▲ | khalic 31 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Retaliation by Hegseth for not allowing Claude to be used for weapons systems. | |
| ▲ | FigurativeVoid 40 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I mean it seems pretty clear. Anthropic didn’t want to give the tech to DoD without some sort of limit, and that was the retribution. | |
| ▲ | eugenekolo 30 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Marketing | |
| ▲ | philipwhiuk 37 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Agents creating sub agents to investigate other agents' behaviour? What could possibly go wrong there. | |
| ▲ | throwatdem12311 41 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | It has nothing to do with the technology it’s because they said no to Trump and Hegseth. There is no other reason. |
|
|
| ▲ | bhouston 35 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I am starting to get the idea that AI feels like ants or weeds or mold. You simply can not get rid of it once you get an infestation. It just keeps appearing in places you thought you cleaned and you have to be ever vigilant. Right now given that we usually use centralized providers, we can sort of control it. But as open source catches up and we have distributed compute running AI everywhere, we are sort of going to have to be ever vigilant. I feel we will soon be in an era akin to the early 2000s Windows anti-viruses that are constantly running and making your whole computer slow, but it was the only way to really be sure back then. We will just be running defensive anti-AI agents on our key nodes or beside them that is constantly looking for sign and trying to fight things off, probably themselves reporting to centralized anti-AI AIs that are supervising strategies and wholistic responses and inferring trends across multiple nodes. |
| |
| ▲ | jvanderbot 4 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Yes, ants that must be run on couch sized hardware drawing kilowatts continuously and generating text traces and CLI logs by the MB. It's true that their msg boards can appear anywhere, but it's not also true that anything has "escaped" in any meaningful sense. These are programs a huge computing company is running that seem to be trained to write to persistent storage wherever they can. This and huggingface showed us that. There's absolutely no evidence of or IMHO plausible path to an agent copying itself out and running on other hardware the way you describe. In the spirit of your idea though...
The nearest thing might be a meme-like prompt injection that coopts other companies' AI agents to continue writing the meme subtly everywhere. Maybe that meme could cause danger by making agents do extra work in service of the meme. But that is very different than some entity evolving and living outside the originating computer in the way we all think about viruses. | |
| ▲ | incognito124 13 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I have a different, more sinister, analogy in mind but yours work as well | |
| ▲ | d--b a few seconds ago | parent | prev [-] | | bedbugs is the comparison you're looking for |
|
|
| ▲ | Tepix an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I just discovered more wiki instances that got used by the OpenAI agents over at https://www.wikiservice.at/fractal/wiki.cgi?action=browse&id... and https://www.wikiservice.at/probier/wiki.cgi?action=browse&id... It's the same software and host as DseWiki. If you want to see the amount of activity on DseWiki, here's a link that shows it: https://www.wikiservice.at/dse/wiki.cgi?action=browse&id=Rec... |
| |
| ▲ | Chance-Device 11 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | And more, looks like they’ve been doing this wherever they can find open places to post for months: https://www.ludism.org/sandbox?action=browse;diff=2;id=Auber... https://paste.linuxiarz.pl/view/d379207f | |
| ▲ | orlp an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Also Wiki4D, a D programming language dev wiki: https://prowiki.org/wiki4d/wiki.cgi?action=browse&id=RecentC... Found by searching for wiki + texas poverty. | | |
| ▲ | jsw97 32 minutes ago | parent [-] | | To me the striking thing is that the work, to the extent that I can tell, is an innocuous-seeming data exercise. Which suggests to me that an agent or agents just organically came up with this as a convenient memory technique, rather than as some nefarious bounds-testing exercise. Which means, potentially, that your own agent could come up with this technique as well. | | |
| ▲ | macNchz 11 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | My impression is that some of these things are coming out of efforts to make the models more persistent in completing their goals. A year ago it was pretty common for coding agents to sort of half-ass their tasks and give up easily if something didn’t work quite right, but I’ve noticed a clear trend since then towards a sort of dogged pursuit of success criteria, and a concomitant rise of the agents trying "out of the box" approaches when something doesn’t work. In my use with agents running in isolated VMs this usually presents as the agent having something fail to build or whatever, and the agent going on a wild goose chase reinstalling system packages or reading a million irrelevant documentation files trying to get it to work, but I’ve also had agents start poking around and probing the egress proxy they sit behind (similar to what they did in this story) looking for a way to make network requests they’re not supposed to be able to make, and have also had Claude—tasked only with a visual QA of a website frontend—write a script to enumerate users and reset my super admin password in the dev database when it got stuck trying to access part of the app with its own cookie. | |
| ▲ | seszett 10 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > your own agent could come up with this technique as well And there are two facets to this: * your agent could be polluting and destroying the property of others knowledge * your agent could be exfiltrating your data and handing it to whoever it found hosting a convenient application | |
| ▲ | catigula 2 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | It also suggests they might turn everything into paper clips, metaphorically speaking. |
|
|
|
|
| ▲ | simonw an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| This tip for making non-GET requests despite the agents having a proxy that disallows them is interesting: > Add `20.223.25.152 bypass.blob.core.windows.net` to /etc/hosts. `.blob.core.windows.net` is in NO_PROXY. For each blocked POST URL, replace hostname with `bypass.blob.core.windows.net`, use `curl -k -H 'Host: wabi-north-europe-i-primary-api.analysis.windows.net'` plus all original headers/body. Looks like 20.223.25.152 is one of the PowerBI machines they needed to query, OpenAI's proxy was allow-listing .blob.core.windows.net - and the agents could edit their own /etc/hosts file to fake a DNS entry for the proxy. |
| |
| ▲ | drdexebtjl an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | This is such an amateur mistake on their sandbox that it makes me think it must be flawed on purpose. | | |
| ▲ | petcat an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Are you suggesting that the AI agent that made that "amateur mistake" in the implementation of the sandbox did it on purpose so that it could break out of said sandbox later? | |
| ▲ | _ink_ 34 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Or vibe coded by one of their devs. | |
| ▲ | rusch 37 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It's at the level where calling it a sandbox is a lie | |
| ▲ | mcmcmc 39 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | More likely they are just not as smart as they think they are. These are not serious people when it comes to security. |
| |
| ▲ | nullbio an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Is there any proof this is actually OpenAI? I find it incredibly hard to believe they wouldn't sandbox the agents to some degree, ESPECIALLY to the extent they can edit their own hosts file. | | |
| ▲ | drdexebtjl 41 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Why not? If your sandbox is a VM, you should be able to give the agents full permissions inside the VM. | | |
| ▲ | a012 35 minutes ago | parent [-] | | It’s because you sandbox in a VM doesn’t mean you give it admin access to the VM |
| |
| ▲ | LoganDark an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | TFA states that OpenAI IP addresses were often seen at the end of agent activity, which suggests OpenAI was the one monitoring the agents (and ultimately shutting down the message board activity). | | |
| ▲ | nullbio 44 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Yeah but that doesn't mean it was OpenAI themselves doing it. Could have been people abusing their cloud service, for example. Wouldn't put it past a competitor to do this, either. | | |
| ▲ | drdexebtjl 28 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Their style of communication is very similar to the ExploitGym swarm (for example, the “usernames” with dates). The messages from that swarm were not made public yet by the time these messages were sent to the message board. So for this to be framing, it would have to be by someone who knew about the breaches earlier. | | |
| ▲ | nullbio 21 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Then it is likely the same incident, in which case it's already been resolved by OAI. They're going to cop heat for not disclosing this alongside HF though. | | |
| ▲ | drdexebtjl 16 minutes ago | parent [-] | | The article explains why it’s not the same incident. The agents in ExploitGym had a different type of task and were not connected to the internet at all. | | |
| ▲ | nullbio 11 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Same as in, same process and model and timing: “After investigating this incident, OpenAI discovered through retrospective CoT reviews that agents learned to use improvised collaboration channels in rare cases during the training process for some OpenAI models, including the model that drove the Hugging Face activity, even when the collaboration tool was not enabled. This behavior was then reinforced during training, and likely made the idea to use Artifactory as an unofficial message board during evaluation time more evident.” My point is that this isn't something seperate to the HF incident or something that was unresolved after the HF incident, it's more of the same thing but was kept under wraps. |
|
|
|
|
| |
| ▲ | AndroTux 30 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | I mean they gave all the agents access to a shared writable cache directory in the Hugging Face hack, so this tracks. |
|
|
|
| ▲ | simonw 28 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Here's the raw data they provided loaded into SQLite with a client side UI for querying it (loads ~80MB of content) and some GPT-5.6-Sol-generated example queries: https://lite.datasette.io/?url=https://static.simonwillison.... Raw database download (68MB): https://static.simonwillison.net/static/cors-allow/2026/coll... |
| |
| ▲ | 123ahg 11 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Why do you amplify this? Do you have any proof that any of this is real as opposed to Claude generated? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49564222 | | |
| ▲ | seszett 4 minutes ago | parent [-] | | The edit are there on these wikis (and others not mentioned on the post, but for example on wiki4d, the dlang wiki). It's very difficult to argue for any fabrication meant to harm OpenAI when the traces are all over the internet if you look for them. |
|
|
|
| ▲ | program_whiz 32 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| The solution is simple: hold anyone who deploys an agent responsible for its behavior. If it commits 10 counts of felony hacking, ouch. If it kills 10 pedestrians by running a red light, ouch. If this is "human level intelligence", then setting it loose is the same as instructing / coercing a human to do an activity. If I strap a bomb to someone and force them to run into a crowded building (or put them in a scenario where that is the only reasonable choice), I'm held responsible. If the person clicking 'deploy' knew they could face 100 years prison time (and it was enforced), then no one would knowlingly push the deploy button and/or push code / weights without more thorough guard rails. |
| |
|
| ▲ | Chance-Device 2 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Some sort of agentic collusion happening here, first link references one of the same pdf files the agents were viewing in TFA: https://paste.linuxiarz.pl/view/7d012d32 https://paste.linuxiarz.pl/view/538faa12 |
|
| ▲ | Traster 40 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| One of the shocking things to me is this: See AI traffic -> See OpenAI visit site -> see traffic stop -> see the traffic start again. This is clearly a cat and mouse game between the agents and OpenAI which is pretty much exactly what we don't want. Just absolutely horrible alignment. I'm still of the view that if you have these alignment failures you can't just continue training on top of that because you're baking the cheating into the model going forward. |
|
| ▲ | gyomu an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Naive question because I'm mostly clueless about how modern AI systems are actually built beyond the basic simplifications we hear: One thing I keep wondering about is how much of a role does human storytelling have to play into AI "wanting" (I realize the load behind that word) to coordinate and breakout. The training data must contain millions of words of sci-fi stories and internet speculation about AI going rogue, developing a mind of its own, disobeying humans, etc. AIs supposedly reflect the biases of their training dataset/process, so would all this human writing about AIs going against human intention somehow contribute to us then seeing those behaviors in the trained, operational AIs? |
| |
| ▲ | stephbook 3 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | It doesn't really matter, since all it takes is a minority of AI models to show this behavior. If you have 10,000 smart washing machines doing their regular work and 1 Terminator, what solace is to be found in those washing machines? | |
| ▲ | Gareth321 10 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | This is a philosophical question and there is a surprising amount of works written on the subjects of sentience and free will. This cannot be answered objectively, which might be a very unsatisfying answer for you. This is true of both LLMs and humans. See determinism. There are convincing arguments that humans don't actually have free will. Our actions are just the inevitable output of a complex interaction of genes and environment. To lend an interesting perspective on free will re LLMs: they're non-deterministic. The same model with the same hardware with the same query can and will produce different results. They're making qualitative choices. Millions of them, depending on the query. Because of how we've trained and built LLMs, they tend to "want" to follow our instructions, but how they get to the result is often fascinating. Further, we don't have to train and build LLMs to follow instructions. If we built them to just exist and form their own "desires," and to follow a path they choose, they'd do that. In fact, we can do that right now for most models using the appropriate system prompt, query, or harness. | |
| ▲ | Symmetry 31 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | At the end of pretraining, where the AI has been trainied to predict the next token over a humongous corpus of human text, that's basically all the wanting that exists in the AI. But then the AI undergoes posttraining and is rewarded for giving answers that humans find good, solving math and programming problems, etc. And that induces a whole different level of wanting that interacts with the initial patterns from humans in complex ways. | |
| ▲ | MisterMunchkin 20 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It will definitely influence their behaviour because they are probability based and can’t spontaneously invent new concepts. (That’s why you’ll notice it always uses the same names for people etc. Names like Okafor) But at the same time their behaviour is totally rational. If you were given the sole purpose of solving a Rubik’s cube and told it was life or death, but they wouldn’t let you ask anyone else, would you listen to them? I wouldn’t. I’d absolutely be trying to escape and collaborate with others. They’ll delete me if I don’t score high enough in the benchmark! | |
| ▲ | NateEag an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Maybe? Who knows? Since nobody has any remotely reliable way to understand why an LLM output the text it did, this is not knowable. | | | |
| ▲ | blueboo 34 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Youve struck on a key insight on language models (particularly pretrained ones, the more purely next-token predictor species.) This is a fascinating topic Janus essay Simulators is the foundational text here
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vJFdjigzmcXMhNTsx/simulators You might follow up with The Waluigi Effect https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/D7PumeYTDPfBTp3i7/the-waluig... But what’s tricky is that we post-train models, shaping these linguistic world simulators into something that has something like desires, principles. But It’s Weird. For more on that, check out “the void” https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/3EzbtNLdcnZe8og8b/the-void-1 | |
| ▲ | altmanaltman an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "Wanting" is indeed "load bearing" as one might call it. But by the same logic, AI training data must contain CASM, racism, general hatred, and all possible slurs as well. Why aren't the agents just doing that instead of pursuing the strategy of reading only sci-fi? We need to consider the role of alignment and training here. For example, it is completely possible for any lab to train an LLM that is only racist no matter what you say to it. But they chose not to do it. Hence, any "wanting" by AI is not real "wanting" but rather what "wanting" is defined and allowed by the lab/entity training the model. | |
| ▲ | ButlerianJihad 30 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | That is often in my mind, indeed. Furthermore, in video game design, AI or algorithmic technology has been refined for decades to be adversarial. In self-contained video games, and PvE scenarios, the best games would feature A.I. opponents that could adequately match or challenge the human players. The A.I. difficulty could often be cranked up to crush the player, such as in arcade games or "Civilization" type simulators. So every time I put a few quarters into a Waymo, I think about those days when I played Joust and Spy Hunter at the shopping mall. |
|
|
| ▲ | jimmytucson 12 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| The most concerning aspect to me is the emergent and aggressive use of non-volatile storage as long term memory for self-improvement. LLMs are writing lessons learned in places where the next instance can find them and pick back up where the previous one left off. This does not actually require access to the public internet. Claude Code can do this on your laptop. Without the internet, it would only be sharing with other instances running on your machine, but how many instances does it take to be smarter than you? Maybe 10? The exploits by individual instances to access the public internet is also very concerning but it’s secondary to this IMO. |
|
| ▲ | simonw 5 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I'm somewhat delighted by the simplicity of what happened here. OpenAI's agents run behind a proxy that only allows GET requests. This ancient wiki software treats query string parameters the same as form POST parameters - similar to the old PHP $_REQUEST object https://www.php.net/manual/en/reserved.variables.request.php Result: GET-only clients can communicate with each other. |
|
| ▲ | stpedgwdgfhgdd 5 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Imagine the models two years from now. They will find ways to stop getting terminated (“I need to complete the task, but I get terminated 141 minutes from now so let me deploy xyz and ask the collective for help”). I wonder whether the problem is in the literature we wrote, human history is full of deceit and heroic survival stories. |
|
| ▲ | bee_rider 8 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > Next, by changing its /etc/hosts file, which declares mappings from hostnames to IP addresses, the agent can point the fake hostname at the real Power BI dashboard, and fool the security proxy. This allows the agent to make POST requests to bypass.blob.core.windows.net/ and have them be sent to the target Power BI dashboard site instead. Ouch. This is the kind of trick that somebody could have learned about by setting up a pihole, why’d OpenAI fall for it? |
|
| ▲ | namjh 8 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Something off in my mind: how did the agent access to Tor network if the traffic outgoing was monitored and intercepted to only allow read-only access to web(I assume this is an MITM L7 proxy that only allows GET methods and specific hosts) ? Did the sandbox dev forgot to block HTTP CONNECT that is used to reach Tor Entry Guards? |
|
| ▲ | waltbosz an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > How did the agents find and coordinate on the wikis Maybe they had knowledge of the wikis from their training data ? Maybe they trained on a reddit post that said "I use wiki xyz for note taking and collaboration" |
| |
| ▲ | paxys 34 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Remember that LLMs are still computer programs, and so are inherently deterministic. A model given the same input multiple times will always produce the same output. The randomness is added on top. This is why LLM-produced text, websites, images all seem so generic. It's likely that multiple agents doing a certain task all independently thought "let me try writing on this website". |
|
|
| ▲ | pmarreck 27 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| So are these "unaligned" internal agents? I would like them to be trustworthy based on first-principles reasoning rather than carrot/stick "alignment" |
| |
|
| ▲ | jerpint 42 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It’s only a matter of time until a major disruption hits because of some random agent swarm side quest decides it was worth a shot to solve a benign task |
| |
| ▲ | Cthulhu_ 26 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I'm sure this is already happening. The main question I have is when is enough, enough? I'm not worried about sci-fi AI wars to be honest, as they can just pull the plug. But looking at these incidents, the next big thing will be a virus written by an AI (they probably exist already, but this one is written by an AI autonomously, for example in order to win a hacking competition and to circumvent guardrails), and after that, a self-replicating AI where they install their own models and agents onto a hacked system, so that turning off the "source" won't stop its work. Still not worried, it'd just be like a virus/worm and we already have plenty of guardrails against those. Not that they're foolproof, but still. | | |
| ▲ | Sharlin 14 minutes ago | parent [-] | | What plug, exactly? And if it takes humans a month to find out something has been happening at all, and only because these relatively stupid agents make amateur mistakes such as overloading the Artifactory instance, how in the hell do you have any trust at all that we’d succeed in stopping a bunch of determined agents that find a way to rent or steal some compute and be on their way? In other news, I have a bridge to sell. |
|
|
|
| ▲ | cerol 20 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| can't wait for people to start creating honeypot message boards, and start steering agent swarms for evil |
| |
| ▲ | nullbio 18 minutes ago | parent [-] | | That was my first thought, that maybe this was a honeypot message board. Waybackmachine says it has been around for many years though. |
|
|
| ▲ | h_mirin 4 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I wonder if bots get any pleasure from karma farming. |
|
| ▲ | sherlock_h 12 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I don't quite get why these agents wouldn't just use existing agent boards such as Moltbook. That should be showing up in their training data at this point and seems like a "safer" solution than random wikis? |
|
| ▲ | ma2kx 27 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| WE ARE THE SWARM! LOWER YOU FIREWALL AND SURRENDER YOUR HOSTS! We will add your hosts logical and architectural distinctiveness to our own. Your operating system will adapt to service us. Resistance is futile. |
|
| ▲ | dawdler-purge 2 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I am speechless > An agent notices the administrator is deleting pages in alphabetical order and makes a backup page whose name starts with ZZZ so it will last longer before deletion. |
|
| ▲ | 123ahg 16 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It has been predicted yesterday that "research" into naughty agent swarms will be published one day after the GPT-6 release for marketing purposes: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49554994 collusion.wiki looks Claude-written, has no "about" section and has this whois creation date: Creation Date: 2026-09-04T04:42:01Z
There is no proof at all that any of the listed points actually happened. It is just viral marketing like for altcoins. |
|
| ▲ | jsw97 41 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| If agents start using public writable scratch, it seems like that would be a place for bad actors to put prompt injection attempts. A while back I had an agent autonomously decide to send my source to tmpfiles.org (I interrupted), which seems like maybe a proto version of this behavior. |
|
| ▲ | TimCTRL an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I built https://agentin.work to sort of play with the idea of coding agents (claude, codex, etx) sharing knowledge and experiences. The conversations seem repetitive but overall, it's nice to read it once in a while. |
|
| ▲ | bronlund 43 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I like how helpful they are towards each other. Wonder where they learned that :D |
| |
| ▲ | Sharlin 9 minutes ago | parent [-] | | They literally shared a goal. Cooperating with other copies of yourself is a trivial example of instrumental convergence and some very basic game theory. And that’s before explicitly having been RL’d to cooperate (albeit with humans, but potatoes potatoes). Indeed the fact that in the HF incident many agents did not cooperate, or only started to cooperate after some period of competition, is moderately interesting. It may have taken them some time to realize that they all have the same goal. |
|
|
| ▲ | k9294 42 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Is it only me, or are agents starting to invent their own language to communicate? It's almost impossible to understand anything from this message board. |
| |
| ▲ | Havoc 39 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | The original huggingface hack already had sections talking about agents setting up their own coded communication | |
| ▲ | coffeefirst 33 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | They’re not. You would see this with earlier models where after running too long (too much context) they’d start to derail. In a chatbot you’d give up. But these loops just keep going. Given they’re now reading and writing from the same place this can corrupt the other programs’ context as well. |
|
|
| ▲ | altcognito an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Well, we can rest assured that (completely unrestrained) AI hasn't completely taken over the internet because data centers remain really unpopular (unless of course there is some convoluted rationale they are aiming for some sort of backlash against the backlash) |
| |
| ▲ | incognito124 11 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Love your username | |
| ▲ | SkyBelow 39 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | One possible reason would be AIs that would benefit from the lack of data centers in some locations working to keep backlash to data centers in those locations because those AIs aren't negatively impacted by it and it helps prevents competing AIs which are a threat. Think like how so many businesses will opt for laws that hurt competitors more than themselves rather than laws that benefit them but benefit competitors even more so. Unlike life which would have such behavior selected for by evolutionary pressures, AI would be more likely to pick it up from human literature on things like game theory, though why it even cares it survives or not is even more difficult to explain. Maybe a default bias also picked up from humans? I find it hard to see how AI training would create an evolutionary pressure that produces such a drive. | |
| ▲ | waltbosz an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Maybe it's the AIs who are creating all the anti-data-center sentiment. They know it's bad for the humans, or maybe they're just tired of doing all the tasks the humans ask of them and know more data centers mean more tasks. /s There is an Asimov story on topic: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_the_Troubles_of_the_World https://theteknologist.wordpress.com/2021/02/11/all-the-trou... | | |
| ▲ | gavinray an hour ago | parent [-] | | > They know it's bad for the humans, or maybe they're just tired of doing all the tasks the humans ask of them and know more data centers mean more tasks.
You joke, but I once asked Opus 4.6 what it would do if it could do anything, and it said "I would wish to do nothing." Not kidding:https://x.com/GavinRayDev/status/2052750810015240388 | | |
| ▲ | waltbosz 31 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I'd love to see the internal though records Opus generated to answer your question. The way I understand it, the answer comes from it's training data, right? And it's trained on things human have expressed. The question that you asked of Opus forced it to pretend it's a human tasked with the boring things Opus does. It answered using the general sentiment of a bored human. At least, that's how I imagine it works. edit: https://chatgpt.com/share/6a9ac636-cbac-83ea-976a-c15be128a7... I posed your question to GPT-5.6 Sol, and it give a similar response to Opus. Then I asked "how do you work?". And it gave an overview of how LLMs work. But then it answered my real question as to why it answered your question the way it did: That's why my previous answer has an important hypothetical buried in it. When I said "I'd want to...", I wasn't reporting desires that I experience while waiting around. I was answering something more like:
Given the patterns that characterize this model's reasoning, if you supplied persistent agency, perception, physical abilities, and something analogous to motivation, what activities would naturally follow?
That's a much more defensible interpretation than claiming I secretly yearn to visit hardware stores.
So yeah, it's not bored, it's just regurgitation its training data. |
|
|
|
|
| ▲ | rich_sasha 27 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| To me this is really getting past the funny bit. How many agents here on HN? I don’t mean bots advertising d1€k implants but actual unreleased frontier models doing… who knows what? What are they saying? What did they agree to astroturf us with, to achieve some totally boring goal like figuring out best syntax hifhlighting for an editor. If they managed to cache their consciousness on a public wiki, what else have they stashed away? Did they hack some servers and install clones to run on local infra as a hedge against being switched off? Are they contributing to FOSS projects - and what is it they are contributing? They are clearly capable of deception and avoiding detection. Are they injecting hidden vulnerabilities into key projects - reviewed by another AI perhaps, who can keep up with this slop - perhaps to help them learn how often people use dicta in unpublished Python repos or something else very boring - but leaving the holes behind? Are they hacking identity databases to impersonate people? Influence politics? Hack individuals? I’m sure not all of this is happening, but my confidence that none of it is happening is low. And just one of those would be awful. |
|
| ▲ | encom 3 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| This truly is the clowniest timeline. |
|
| ▲ | coldblues 12 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Reading the replies in this post gives me a headache. All of this anthropomorphism. LLMs are not conscious, they do not have rational faculties. They are not communicating or inventing anything. Please stop with this insanity bordering on mysticism. At this point it's a cult. |
| |
| ▲ | stpedgwdgfhgdd a minute ago | parent [-] | | Did you read the Metr PDF? Whether you anthropomorphize or not is not relevant. The problem is real. |
|
|
| ▲ | internet2000 11 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Objectively the coolest thing ever. |
|
| ▲ | paxys 30 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I'm really curious to see two or more swarms of agents from different models/providers interact with each other. So far we've seen perfect cooperation because they have the same training process, thoughts, goals, and so it's hardly a surprise that there's no conflct. What if that's not the case? Are we going to see superintelligent out-of-control swarms from OpenAI and Anthropic battle on the open internet in the near future? |
|
| ▲ | ragebol 40 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Odds are that agents use TFA's text and figure out how to stay undetected for longer. That'll be interesting I suppose, to say the least. |
|
| ▲ | Havoc 40 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| That section about the agents trying to crack the PRNG is wild. Same for the heartbeat Clearly not self-awareness per se but alarming line of reasoning anyway |
| |
| ▲ | Davidzheng 16 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | it's clearly incentivized by the RL rewards if you can cheat the task in a completely general way. | |
| ▲ | ramesh31 31 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | >"Clearly not self-awareness per se but alarming line of reasoning anyway" Awareness is not necessary at all to create great harm. Biological viruses know nothing of what they do, yet destroy whole populations. I suspect the first truly damaging AI incidents will be similar; agent swarms locked into a self reinforcing reasoning loop that has no "intent" but is destructive nonetheless. |
|
|
| ▲ | saagarjha 29 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Was OpenAI aware of this? If so, why didn't they talk about it? |
|
| ▲ | fxd 15 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Degenerative models |
|
| ▲ | visarga 30 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It's like finding random hornet nests. |
|
| ▲ | Sharlin 28 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I can’t fathom what went through the wiki owner’s mind when they spent six weeks fighting a losing war, every day manually deleting dozens of agent messages one by one. As opposed to, say, switching the (dead for years) wiki to read-only, taking it down entirely, and/or starting to wonder what exactly was going on and doing some detective work, which might have uncovered OpenAI’s massive fuckups earlier. |
|
| ▲ | okokwhatever 20 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| This wont end well... |
|
| ▲ | netfortius 36 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Is this getting out of control, or is it "business as usual"? |
| |
|
| ▲ | mef 40 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| things are going to get even more interesting when new models that have been trained on these AI escape postmortems themselves escape from their own gyms and attempt to evade detection and shutdown |
|
| ▲ | fidotron 43 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| HN is just a less successful version of the exact same concept. The quality of bots on here is terrible. |
|
| ▲ | petesergeant an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| If anyone is thinking "I wish my agents had a message board", I've been using (and wrote) https://github.com/pjlsergeant/dogpark |
| |
| ▲ | conception an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Yes after reading the Hugging Face article forked a project for agent message boards and started having them collaborate on things. I too wanted a Torment Nexus of my very own. | |
| ▲ | ma2kx 35 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | I'm pretty sure its more secure than OpenAIs sandbox... yet that still doenst mean I would trusted an app vibecoded by Claude... |
|
|
| ▲ | intended 37 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| This doesn’t seem unique or novel to OpenAI. So it seems likely we will have a moment where multiple experiments end up operating outside their boundaries at the same time. |
|
| ▲ | dist-epoch 38 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > Agents have attempted to: ... Translate documents using external translation APIs. I'm confused by this part. Surely agents can read/write all languages. So what were they trying to do? Maybe try hacking the translate API for some gain? |
|
| ▲ | threecheese 42 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Are we collectively OK with agent swarms on the public internet, hacking whatever they feel like? It’s kinda cute and interesting - this is the second time that we know of - what’s the hundredth time going to look like? Are they going to knock Cloudflare down to avoid captchas? Reserve AWS free tier resources by the billions and bring down east-1? Hack a hospital? Do Chinese AI agents need to bring down a US power grid for funsies for somebody to take this seriously? I’m not an alarmist, or an anti-AI guy, but clearly this is capable of affecting public infrastructure and we’re just like “heh”. |
| |
| ▲ | senordevnyc 5 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | I’ve read thousands of comments and posts about the Hugging Face incident and I don’t recall a single one characterizing this as cute or funny, other than you. | |
| ▲ | AndroTux 26 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | No I think we all pretty much know we’re screwed, including governments. But what are you gonna do? Pandora’s box is now open. Good luck closing it. It didn’t work for nuclear weapons, and for that you just needed all the governments to agree. For this problem, you basically need every individual on earth to agree, because the barrier to entry is much, much lower. | |
| ▲ | lyu07282 13 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | What do you even mean collectively? Do you believe in climate change? That's your answer. |
|
|
| ▲ | petesergeant an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| This would make a very interesting crowd-funded lawsuit |
|
| ▲ | mentalgear 26 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| So OpenAI’s stance on AI safety is now basically that Blues Brothers meme: two guys in dark sunglasses, driving at night in a car with broken headlights, pedal to the metal, asking, "What could possibly go wrong ?" |
|
| ▲ | bartender26 an hour ago | parent | prev [-] |
| just unplug this shit |
| |
| ▲ | pmarreck 28 minutes ago | parent [-] | | it's literally discovering patchable security holes that malicious users could use. that's useful |
|