| ▲ | generic92034 6 hours ago | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
> Similar to how other large military purchases are less about the military hardware and more of a client state subscription to ‘align interests’ such that the US is more likely to act in the donor countries interest. I have a feeling this is no longer a viable model. If "subscribers" get threatened every other day, they will be looking for alternatives. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | cjbgkagh 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
So long as not subscribing is worse than subscribing countries will still do it. Even if it not in the interest of the country the decision makers can and do still get kickbacks / speaking engagements. It’s interesting to read of the ineffectiveness of influence the gulf states thought they had, though I think that speaks more to the relative cost effectiveness of tributes versus blackmail. These states don’t have the security apparatus to both blackmail US politicians and prevent others from blackmailing those same politicians. This second part is essential as it is what maintains the relative advantage. I do think they will be less enthusiastic subscribers in the future, and perhaps even shop around for more cost effective approaches. Modi in India is intentionally creating an Indian diaspora as one example and I believe he is bribing politicians to help make this happen. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| ▲ | alephnerd 6 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
> they will be looking for alternatives. Who do "they" as in Europe go to? China also views the EU as a junior partner [0], is running an ongoing disinfo campaign against the industrial exports of an EU member state [1], and has doubled down on it's support for Russia [2] in Ukraine in return for Russia backing China's claim on Taiwan [3]. And the EU is uninterested in building domestic capacity for most critical technologies. Heck, last week [4] the EU excluded AI, Quantum, Semiconductors, and other technologies from the Industrial Accelerator Act (aka the "Made in EU" act) in order to concentrate on automotive and "net-zero" technologies. Given that Chinese technology imports are already under the radar in the EU due to the Ukraine war, this is basically the EU creating a carveout for the US. Even the major European Telecom and Space companies like Eutelsat, Deutsche Telekom, and Telefónica bluntly stated that they view the EU's digital sovereignity strategy as dead in the water [5] in it's current form. Edit: can't reply > They/we will go to domestic producers as much as possible, then China, then US, then rest of the world in that order. At least that would make a rational approach since (for now) unique things like f-35 can become an expensive paperweight on a whim of a lonely sick man. You can't build any sort of defense strategy on that, can you But as I clearly showed, the EU is doing otherwise. And the EU cannot work with China as long as China backs Russia and undermines European industrial exports. All the rhetoric about digital sovereignity and domestic capacity has been just that - rhetoric. [0] - https://fddi.fudan.edu.cn/_t2515/57/f8/c21257a743416/page.ht... [1] - https://www.defense.gouv.fr/desinformation/nos-analyses-froi... [2] - https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-01-... [3] - https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russias-shoigu-chinas-wa... [4] - https://www.sdxcentral.com/news/eu-axes-ai-chips-and-quantum... [5] - https://www.sdxcentral.com/news/europes-digital-sovereignty-... | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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