| |
| ▲ | tgsovlerkhgsel an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | > propulsion, warheads, arming and safety, QA, traceability, climate and shelf life stability. The further down the list you go, the more optional the requirements get in a sufficiently dire scenario. Shelf life doesn't matter if you are firing them as quickly as you can make them, especially if you actually can make them as quickly as you need them because they're so simple. QA and traceability may matter less if you just accept that you'll occasionally lose a launcher, and even occasionally have a stray missile land in someone's living room because that's better than having a non-stray Shahed in said living room. In terms of safety, I bet it'll still beat "cutting open existing munitions and literally duct taping random other fuzes to them", which seems to be the bar for "good enough". | | |
| ▲ | Animats 40 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Shelf life doesn't matter if you are firing them as quickly as you can make them, especially if you actually can make them as quickly as you need them because they're so simple. Right. High-volume users can skip the thermal batteries with decades-long shelf life, and just spot-weld a few AAA batteries inside the weapon. Just stencil the thing "Best if used by DATE". Good for a year or two at least. Skip the anti-corrosion stuff and ship it in consumer-grade shrink wrap. Ukraine ships drones to the field in lightweight cardboard boxes, not rugged weapons containers. Many US weapons are really old designs. The Patriot went into production in 1980. The Stinger went into service in 1981. There's been progress since then. Consumer-grade parts can do most of what's needed. | |
| ▲ | dgroshev an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | I don't understand your point. Sure, Ukraine can cut a few corners that western militaries are unwilling to cut. They still can't produce a domestic ballistic missile at scale, because it's genuinely hard, and simple terror weapons like Qassams are useless for militaries. "100 rockets for $10k" is off by orders of magnitude. | | |
| ▲ | edmundsauto 35 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I think the point is to look at the US requirements compared to the cost and explore ways that a country could gain strategic advantages by building objectively worse products. (But cheaper/faster, gaining an asymmetric advantage in the offense/defense scaling) I used to think the US dollars were well spent, because we felt it was morally important to deliver precision strikes which had higher cost requirements. Recent evidence demonstrates that is insufficient when the wetware making the targeting decisions is faulty. |
|
| |
| ▲ | regularfry 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Without necessarily disagreeing with your point, the driving consideration for Raytheon's production line is arguably not reliability. It's being able to charge the customer for perceived reliability. It's very hard to know from the outside how much of it is theatre, even if earnestly arrived at. There are incentives for these things to be expensive. | | |
| ▲ | esseph 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | The US military is not "new" at this. There are whole career professions in the military around just this topic. |
| |
| ▲ | kdheiwns 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | If you think shelf life, QA, safety, blah blah blah matters when a rocket is 100 bucks, I have just three words: you will lose. The Ukraine war is being fought with a bunch of cheap toy style drones dropping grenades everywhere. The US got their bases blown to pieces across the Middle East by cheap drones that gently float through the air like a paper airplane in comparison to absolutely any missile. And let's not forget. The US had napalm, helicopters, bombers, incredible logistics, cutting edge equipment of all sorts. Vietnam had a bunch of sticks in a hole covered in poop. Those sticks sent Americans crying home and we still get movies and games with them crying about how bad it was. In war between great powers, yeah, high tech works because it's scary and civilians don't want to have that kind of stuff coming home. In a war where civilians are being targeted by great powers who terrorize them by blowing up schools and hospitals, a lot of people are thinking about how many weapons they can make to defend their home and for cheap. If America thinks an invasion is a good idea, they're going to be bringing their 50 million dollar tanks face to face with a few $100 toy rockets. And those toy rockets will be picking off tanks like fish in a barrel while a drone streams it in 4K live to the internet. I really do not think American who support current happenings are ready for the absolute mental torment they're going to endure if this continues. | | |
| ▲ | computerdork 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | You have a point - cheap drones have changed warfare - but you might be simplifying the issue. As some warfare experts online have discussed, it isn't that cheap drones are the only weapon that is used in Ukraine (or warfare in general), it is one option in vast array of options based on the situation (although, agreed, it is taking on a much bigger significance). Look at the war in Iran. They did a pretty standard playbook and use stealth jets and cruise missiles to surgically take out air defenses in order to gain air dominance. This would be very difficult with just cheap drones. ... but, do agree that cheap weapons are still becoming extremely important. Iran is terrorizing the middle east and strait of hormuz with cheap drones, so they are definitely important. Yeah, in the war of attrition, low cost, high-volume options are clearly very important. | | |
| ▲ | dgroshev 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | It's fairly important to distinguish what kind of drones are we talking about [1]. Iran's using Group 3 drones. The GP is confusing Iran's neighbours not being ready to counter group 3 drones with the drones being inevitably effective. These drones are by necessity large and slow, because they need a lot of energy and aerodynamic efficiency to get their range. That means that they are vulnerable to cheap counters, which Ukraine is demonstrating very convincingly: even though Russia is now launching 800+-drone raids, the vast majority is shot down. Even when those drones do get through, they are extremely inefficient. It's not just that they can't carry a heavy or sophisticated payload (more complex warheads are more effective, but way more expensive), the extremely high attrition ratio forces the enemy to try to target way too many drones per aimpoint. Instead of serving a few hundred aimpoints, the 800-strong raid is forced to concentrate on just a few, otherwise most aimpoints will get no hits whatsoever. But also the only reason 800-strong raids can even be launched is Ukraine lacking the capability to interdict the launches. 800 group 3 drones have an enormous logistics and manufacturing tail, which a Western force would have no problem destroying way before the raid can be launched. For example, Iran in its current state can't launch such raids. So in practice Iran's neighbours would need to intercept only a handful of drones, which is hardly an insurmountable challenge. [1]: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/FL1.jpg | | |
| ▲ | srean 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | How resistant are these drones to electronic countermeasures ? | | |
| ▲ | dgroshev 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | GPS denial is a mixed bag. After about two years of efforts and counter-efforts, the Russians seemingly managed to build GPS receivers that are pretty resistant to jamming. | | |
| |
| ▲ | esseph an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | > Iran's neighbours would need to intercept only a handful of drones, which is hardly an insurmountable challenge. It's a big challenge when you run out of interceptors... | | |
| ▲ | dgroshev an hour ago | parent [-] | | We're absolutely not running out of APKWS. They are manufactured by tens of thousands, and Hydra 70s are even more numerous. |
|
|
| |
| ▲ | smileysteve 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It's even worse when your goal is commercial viability of carrying a relatively flammable liquid. Tankers moving at a slow speed, across a narrow strait. They don't have to sink to not be commercially viable; a few deck fires negatively impact your days at sea without incident. | |
| ▲ | sofixa 6 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > The Ukraine war is being fought with a bunch of cheap toy style drones dropping grenades everywhere This hasn't been true for 3-4 years now, most of the combat drones being used now are purpose built kamikaze drones. Notably the Russians are using Iranian designed Shahed 136s, while the Ukranians have the similar Liutyi. Among many, many, many other models in various roles. > And let's not forget. The US had napalm, helicopters, bombers, incredible logistics, cutting edge equipment of all sorts. Vietnam had a bunch of sticks in a hole covered in poop. Those sticks sent Americans crying home and we still get movies and games with them crying about how bad it was. While the Americans absolutely lost in Vietnam really bad, the Vietnamese regular army (PAVN) was extremely well equipped with some of the latest Soviet and Chinese equipment. Hanoi was one of the most densely defended anti-air spaces in the world (because the Americans insisted on trying, again, to kill civiliasn to get them to surrender, which never works), with top notch systems. The PAVN had mechanised batallions with tanks, armoured personnel carriers, anti-tank missiles, even amphibious tanks. The air force also had pretty good quality fighters. The VietCong on the other hand was a guerilla force equipped only with light and mobile equipment. | |
| ▲ | littlestymaar 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | So much this. Reliability and durability only matters because the thing costs a million dollar a piece. When you have stuff with a mere 5-digits price tag or less, you simply don't care if half of them miss their mark or doesn't fire 10% of the time. | | |
| ▲ | dgroshev 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Half of munitions missing means doubling the logistical burden of delivering the munitions to where they need to be employed. The trucks/plains/ships that carry your munitions need to be fuelled and protected, too, so the expense is super-linear, especially when it's a distant war and not a war fought on the country's own soil, like in Ukraine. Cheap munitions sometimes explode before they are launched, killing crews and destroying platforms. Cheap munitions mean that CAS is a roulette. You waited for ten minutes for a support fire mission? Sorry, wait for ten more, whatever we launched has failed. Or maybe you're dead because the munition has hit you instead. Cheap munitions can pin you down. Those cheap FPV drones that are supposedly cheaper than Javelins require dedicated immobile units to launch and guide to targets. Javelins are organic to infantry squads. Cheap munitions are either very expensive or impossible. There's no cheap anti-ballistic missile and no cheap missile that can sink a warship in the Taiwan strait when launched[*] from Guam. [*]: alright alright an LRASM would need to be flown closer by an F-35 but the point still stands |
| |
| ▲ | dgroshev 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I'm just not sure what to even say when you're both so assertive and completely wrong. Please stop relying on twitter/reddit to inform your takes. The war in Ukraine is being fought with all tiers of systems, ranging from Zircons and PAC-3 on the high end to booby traps on the low end. All of them are essential, and shortcomings on any of the tiers is ruthlessly exploited by the other side. Saying that it's only the small drones that matter betrays over-reliance on the gory FPV kill footage. "QA, safety, blah blah blah" get implemented on every level as soon as it's feasible. You can just look at photos from Yelabuga and see how their assembly lines are not fundamentally different from Raytheon's. Ukraine is standardising their drone manufacturing. This is inevitable, because faulty munitions lead to - killed friendly soldiers if the munitions explode pre-launch - wasted logistic resources if they don't launch - wasted time and targeting opportunity or friendly units not getting fire support when they fail after launch The cost of faults is severe and much higher than just the cost of the munition itself. It seems that you're misinformed about the real cost of modern FPVs used in Ukraine. Reports of sub-$1000 drones are years out of date and heavily relied on salvaged munitions, but there are only so many RPG warheads you can get for "free". Current FPVs are heavier, more capable, and cost a few thousand dollars. Further, it's reported that it takes dozens of FPVs to kill a single "hedgehog tank", which brings the total cost of one kill to a rough parity with "classic", "expensive" systems like the Javelin, except Javelins can be carried by a mobile squad, and launching FPVs requires a dedicated immobile unit with a long logistical tail. Don't mistake forces not being ready to counter low-tier threats immediately with the threats being impossible to counter. Group 3 drones are very effectively countered in Ukraine, to the extent that it takes hundreds to deliver maybe a few TLAMs worth of payload to the target. There are mature systems being rolled out right now across western armies, from various gun-based solutions to APKWS. Group 2 drones are decimated with cheap anti-air drones. Group 1 drones are being handled with APSes, which work pretty well even in urban environments, as Israel has (very unfortunately) demonstrated lately. |
| |
| ▲ | vidarh 7 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | TFA is literally about a $96 rocket. > propulsion, warheads, arming and safety, QA, traceability, climate and shelf life stability. You're entirely missing the point. These do not need to be reliable for the scenario I hinted at. They also do not need to be armed. They need to be large enough that if one of them is a higher quality rocket (not part of the $10k) that contains actual explosives, you have serious destruction on your hand. Maybe something that looks large enough for that will drive the cost up and we're talking $20k or even $100k instead of $10k. The precise cost is largely irrelevant, as long as the total cost is a tiny fraction of the cost of a missile interception. The point is you'd be multiplying the cost assymmetry by forcing a massively outsized response. Because if you don't try to intercept them, every future barrage will include a real rocket. If you do try to intercept them all, you'll be burning through massively expensive interceptors to take out a bunch of cheap toys. If I was ever considering an insurgency, or a war, I'd be stocking up on vast quantities of toys, with the intent of making every radar constantly lit up by a number of possible threats. | | |
| ▲ | dgroshev 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | > TFA is literally about a $96 rocket It's a firework-grade rocket with no payload that can't even ignite reliably. To imitate even a TBM or a MBRM, you need similar kinematics, even if you're running without a payload. Maybe your solid rocket motor would be a touch smaller because you're not delivering hundreds of kilograms of explosives, but it still has to be large because of the rocket equation. With a large motor you're looking at a lot of damage if it explodes at the launch point, so you need quality casting. You can't really save much money on the motor. Then, you need a TEL. Because the motor is large, the launcher has to be comparable to the real thing. You probably don't want to have two different vehicles, so you keep the same vehicle; it needs to be armed, driven around, and set for launch. Not that different from the real thing. So you've done all of that, and then you realise that your empty warheads are too light and the missiles (or warheads, if you split) don't interact with the atmosphere in the same way as non-decoy missiles do. What's worse, modern radars are perfectly capable of noticing that and discriminating the decoys. All of that effort, and you didn't win anything. Might as well add the payload. The US and the UK spent vast amount of money chasing exactly your line of reasoning with nuclear warhead decoys. Chevaline is a culmination of the effort, and it's retired for 30 years. In the end, relying on decoys doesn't really work, they are too expensive. Fancier CPUs change very little of this calculation, because compute is a very little part of the cost to begin with. | | |
| ▲ | mosura an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | > The US and the UK spent vast amount of money chasing exactly your line of reasoning with nuclear warhead decoys. Chevaline is a culmination of the effort, and it's retired for 30 years. OTOH if you built a successful decoy system that is exactly what you would want people to believe. | |
| ▲ | 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | [deleted] |
|
| |
| ▲ | pjc50 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > price floor is not dictated by the electronics (which did get cheaper), it's dictated by the rest of the system: propulsion, warheads, arming and safety, QA, traceability, climate and shelf life stability. I wonder how much of that Ukraine is bothering with. Or Iran. Certainly Hezbollah are building down to a budget. | | |
| ▲ | hermitcrab 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I wonder how many Hezbollah rocket operators get blown up by their own rockets? A not insignificant number, I suspect. | | |
| ▲ | halflife 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Last week they launched 200 rockets in the span of one day, about 40 of those fell inside Lebanon border, that’s not counting the number of rockets that did not fire at all. | |
| ▲ | coredog64 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | And then as a follow-up question, how many civilians next door to a Hezbollah launch site get blown up by poorly manufactured rockets? | | |
| ▲ | WaxProlix 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Probably some fraction of the civilians blown up by Israeli terrorist phone strikes and bombing raids; there's a reason Hezbollah maintains some level of support in the region. |
|
| |
| ▲ | dgroshev 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Ukraine does bother with all of that when they can afford it. I'd even say that FPV drones are the main exception, and only because Ukraine was so pressed for immediate results and had stockpiles to repurpose. There are only so many old RPG warheads you can reuse with a detonator made of live wires, and maiming your own launch crews because someone made a tiny wrong movement arming their thirtieth drone of the day under artillery fire gets old fast. Hezbollah is a terrorist organisation, they don't need their contraptions to work reliably. GMLRS serves an entirely different purpose to rockets made of repurposed telephone poles, and is much more useful for a military force. Also, don't forget the distances. Ukraine is fighting a war in their own country, with direct ground lines of communication to the frontline. On the other hand, you can fit three Ukraines just between Guam and Taiwan. | | |
| ▲ | cuu508 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > maiming your own launch crews because someone made a tiny wrong movement arming their thirtieth drone of the day I was thinking about that. Wouldn't you be able to make it so the detonator gets armed by the operator remotely only once in the air and away? | | |
| ▲ | dgroshev 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | That's entirely possible, but doing so reliably and safely is difficult and expensive enough that for a very long time Ukrainians were accepting the risk instead. The risk appetite countries in existential conflicts have is quite different from what we're used to. For example, there are plenty of videos of Ukrainian soldiers angle grinding cluster munitions open to extract submunitions to put on drones, but that's not a strategy that western armies can rely on. |
| |
| ▲ | Mars008 an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | > Hezbollah is a terrorist organisation That depends from which side you are looking. From the other side they are patriots and defending their people and land, sacrificing their lives. Looks like in NATO you haven't seen that. The same in Vietnam, Iraq,.. there is a long list of 'terrorists' of this sort. Almost like 'suffering minorities'. | | |
| ▲ | dgroshev an hour ago | parent [-] | | It's an objective statement of their tactics, not something relative. Modern precision guided weaponry is meant to selectively destroy military targets. WW2 style strategic bombing was targeting civilian populations mostly trying to disrupt industrial production in support of military action. Randomly firing a few unguided rockets into civilian population centres can't possibly achieve either. The only goal is to provoke terror in the civilian population, therefore it's a terrorist organisation. You can see similar tactics in the "human safari" the Russians are running in several Ukrainian population centres. |
|
|
|
|