| ▲ | hnrayst 5 hours ago |
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| ▲ | boston_clone 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| Both of your comments here, posted just one minute apart yet with completely different content, reek of LLM output. |
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| ▲ | dang an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Thanks and please see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46888857. | |
| ▲ | Jensson 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | People probably didn't see the other post, but both posts are several paragraphs and posted the same minute. No human would do that. Its also a new account that only posted these two posts. | | |
| ▲ | coldpie 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Good spot, thanks for pointing it out. I normally don't like the LLM accusation posts, but two posts from a brand new user in the same minute is a pretty huge red flag for bad behavior. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46886472 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46886470 | | |
| ▲ | rob 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | This is another bot I pointed out yesterday: https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=Soerensen Their comment got flagged, but looks like they made a new one today and is still active. That account ('Soerensen') was created in 2024 and dormant until it made a bunch of detailed comments in the past 24-48 hrs. Some of them are multiple paragraph comments posted within 1 minute of each other. One thing I've noticed is that they seem to be getting posted from old/inactive/never used accounts. Are they buying them? Creating a bunch and waiting months/years before posting? Either way, both look like they're fooling people here. And getting better at staying under the radar until they slip up in little ways like this. | | |
| ▲ | josefresco 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | I wonder if it's actual users with dormant accounts who just setup their Moltbot? | | |
| ▲ | hypfer 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Some, maybe, but that's just another nice layer of plausible deniability. The truth is that the internet is both(what's the word for 'both' when you have three(four?) things?) dead, an active cyber- and information- warzone and a dark forest. I suppose it was fun while it lasted. At least we still have mostly real people in our local offline communities. | | |
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| ▲ | datsci_est_2015 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Old account, fresh comments - to make it more clear. Freaky. |
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| ▲ | bradley13 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | So what, if the content is good? Also, some of us draft our comments offline, and then paste them in. Maybe he drafted two comments? | |
| ▲ | tonyedgecombe 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Posting sibling comments is unusual. | | |
| ▲ | crazygringo 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Funny, you're definitely right -- I've done it probably just 2 or 3 times over a decade, when I felt like I had two meaningful but completely unrelated things to say. And it always felt super weird, almost as if I was being dishonest or something. Could never quite put my finger on why. Or maybe I was worried it would look like I was trying to hog the conversation? | | |
| ▲ | xpe 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | I don’t know about the particular claim about the new account — if true, based on what people have said, this would be consistent with an LLM bot with high probability … (but not completely out of the question for a person) … I’ll leave that analysis up to the moderators who have a better statistical understanding of server logs, etc. That said, as a general point, it’s reasonable to make scoped comments in the corresponding parts of the conversation tree. (Is that what happened here?) About me: I try to pay attention to social conventions, but I rarely consider technology offered to me as some sort of intrinsically correct norm; I tend to view it as some minimally acceptable technological solution that is easy enough to build and attracts a lowest common denominator of traction. But most forums I see tend to pay little attention to broader human patterns around communication; generally speaking, it seems to me that social technology tends to expect people to conform to it rather than the other way around. I think it’s fair to say that the history of online communication has demonstrated a tendency of people to find workarounds to the limitations offered them. (Using punctuation for facial expressions comes to mind.) One might claim such workarounds are a feature rather than a bug. Maybe sometimes? But I think you’d have to dig into the history more and go case by case. I tend to think of features as conscious choices not lucky accidents. |
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| ▲ | 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | [deleted] |
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| ▲ | skeptic_ai 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Still go to prison for not showing. So until devices have multiple pins for plausible deniability we are still screwed. What’s so hard to make 2-3 pins and each to access different logged in apps and files. If Apple/android was serious about it would implement it, but from my research seems to be someone that it’s against it, as it’s too good. I don’t want to remove my
Banking apps when I go travel or in “dangerous” places. If you re kidnapped you will be forced to send out all your money. |
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| ▲ | stouset 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Absolutely every aspect of it? What’s so hard about adding a feature that effectively makes a single-user device multi-user? Which needs the ability to have plausible deniability for the existence of those other users? Which means that significant amounts of otherwise usable space needs to be inaccessibly set aside for those others users on every device—to retain plausible deniability—despite an insignificant fraction of customers using such a feature? What could be hard about that? | | |
| ▲ | gabeio 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > despite an insignificant fraction of customers using such a feature? Isn't that the exact same argument against Lockdown mode? The point isn't that the number of users is small it's that it can significantly help that small set of users, something that Apple clearly does care about. | | |
| ▲ | achierius 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Lockdown mode costs ~nothing for devices that don't have it enabled. GP is pointing out that the straightforward way to implement this feature would not have that same property. | |
| ▲ | stouset 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Lockdown mode doesn’t require everyone else to lose large amounts of usable space on their own devices in order for you to have plausible deniability. | |
| ▲ | PunchyHamster 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | now I want to know what dirty laundry are their upper management hiding on their devices... | | |
| ▲ | tosapple 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | The 'extra users" method may not work in the face of a network investigation or typical file forensics. Where CAs are concerned, not having the phone image 'cracked' still does not make it safe to use. |
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| ▲ | billfor 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Android phones are multi-user, so if they can do it then Apple should be able to. | | |
| ▲ | Gud 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | And how do you explain your 1TB phone that has 2GB of data, but only 700GB free? | | |
| ▲ | 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | [deleted] | |
| ▲ | deno 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The "fake" user/profile should work like a duress pin with addition of deniability. So as soon as you log in to the second profile all the space becomes free. Just by logging in you would delete the encryption key of the other profile. The actual metadata that show what is free or not were encrypted in the locked profile. Now gone. | | | |
| ▲ | morkalork 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The same way when you buy a brand new phone with 200GB of storage that only has 50GB free on it haha | |
| ▲ | davidwritesbugs 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "Idunno copper, I'm a journalist not a geek" | |
| ▲ | heraldgeezer 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | System files officer ;) |
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| ▲ | stouset an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | That is about one fiftieth of the work that needs to go into the feature the OP casually “why can’t they just”-ed. | |
| ▲ | jb1991 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | This is called whataboutism. This particular feature aside, sometimes there are very good reasons not to throw the kitchen sink of features at users. |
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| ▲ | NitpickLawyer 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Truecrypt had that a decade+ ago. | | |
| ▲ | ratg13 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Not sure if you know the history behind it, but look up Paul Le Roux Also would recommend the book called The Mastermind by Evan Ratliff | | |
| ▲ | edm0nd 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | imo Paul Le Roux has nothing to do with TrueCrypt | | |
| ▲ | ratg13 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | He wrote the code base that it is based on in combination with code he stole. The name is also based on an early name he chose for the software. Whether he was involved in the organization and participated in it, is certainly up for debate, but it's not like he would admit it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E4M |
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| ▲ | hackerfoo 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Maybe one PIN could cause the device to crash. Devices crash all the time. Maybe the storage is corrupted. It might have even been damaged when it was taken. This could even be a developer feature accidentally left enabled. | |
| ▲ | greesil 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Android has work profiles, so that could be done in Android. iPhone still does not. | | |
| ▲ | skeptic_ai 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Police ask: give me pass for work profile. If you don’t: prison. | |
| ▲ | reaperducer 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Android has work profiles Never ever use your personal phone for work things, and vice versa. It's bad for you and bad for the company you work for in dozens of ways. Even when I owned my own company, I had separate phones. There's just too much legal liability and chances for things to go wrong when you do that. I'm surprised any company with more than five employees would even allow it. | | |
| ▲ | greesil 43 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | What's the risk? On Android, the company can remotely nuke the work profile. The work profile has its own file system and apps. You can turn it off when to don't want work notifications. | |
| ▲ | PunchyHamster 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | you're surprise corporations are cheap |
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| ▲ | izzydata 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It doesn't seem fundamentally different from a PC having multiple logins that are accessed from different passwords. Hasn't this been a solved problem for decades? | | |
| ▲ | bsharper 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | You can have a multiuser system but that doesn't solve this particular issue. If they log in to what you claim to be your primary account and see browser history that shows you went to msn.com 3 months ago, they aren't going to believe it's the primary account. | | |
| ▲ | inetknght 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | My browser history is cleared every time I close it. It's actually annoying because every site wants to "remember" the browser information, and so I end up with hundreds of browsers "logged in". Or maybe my account was hacked and that's why there's hundreds of browsers logged in. |
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| ▲ | paulryanrogers 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Apple's hardware business model incentivizes only supporting one user per device. Android has supported multiple users per device for years now. | |
| ▲ | compiler-guy 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Multi-user has been solved for decades. Multi-user that plausibly looks like single-user to three letter agencies? Not even close. | | |
| ▲ | izzydata 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Doesn't having standard multi-user functionality automatically create the plausible deniability? If they tried so hard to create an artificial plausible deniability that would be more suspicious than normal functionality that just gets used sometimes. | | |
| ▲ | wtallis 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | What needs to be plausibly denied is the existence of a second user account, because you're not going to be able to plausibly deny that the account belongs to you when it resides on the phone found in your pocket. |
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| ▲ | vlovich123 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | iPhone and macOS are basically the same product technically. The reason iPhone is a single user product is UX decisions and business/product philosophy, not technical reasons. While plausible deniability may be hard to develop, it’s not some particularly arcane thing. The primary reasons against it are the political balancing act Apple has to balance (remember San Bernardino and the trouble the US government tried to create for Apple?). Secondary reasons are cost to develop vs addressable market, but they did introduce Lockdown mode so it’s not unprecedented to improve the security for those particularly sensitive to such issues. | | |
| ▲ | achierius 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | > iPhone and macOS are basically the same product technically This seems hard to justify. They share a lot of code yes, but many many things are different (meaningfully so, from the perspective of both app developers and users) |
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| ▲ | ashdksnndck 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | You think iPhones aren’t multi-user for technical reasons? You sure it’s not to sell more phones and iPads? Should we ask Tim “buy your mom an iPhone” Cook? |
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| ▲ | palmotea 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > Still go to prison for not showing. So until devices have multiple pins for plausible deniability we are still screwed. > What’s so hard to make 2-3 pins and each to access different logged in apps and files. Besides the technical challenges, I think there's a pretty killer human challenge: it's going to be really hard for the user to create an alternate account that looks real to someone who's paying attention. Sure, you can probably fool some bored agent in customs line who knows nothing about you, but not a trained investigator who's focused on you and knows a lot about you. | | |
| ▲ | fluoridation 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | But at that point it turns from "the person refused to unlock the device" to "we think the person has unlocked the device into a fake account". | | | |
| ▲ | ashdksnndck 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Doesn’t matter if the agent believes you. Only matters if the court jails you on a contempt charge. | |
| ▲ | davidwritesbugs 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Background agent in the decoy identity that periodically browses the web, retrieves email from a banal account etc.? | | |
| ▲ | stouset an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Even more complications for a “why can’t they just…”. It’s almost as if this kind of thing is difficult to do in practice. | |
| ▲ | palmotea 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > Background agent in the decoy identity that periodically browses the web, retrieves email from a banal account etc.? No. Think about it for a second: you're a journalist being investigated to find your sources, and your phone says you mainly check sports scores and send innocuous emails to "grandma" in LLM-speak? It's not going to fool someone who's actually thinking. |
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| ▲ | skeptic_ai 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Just use an account for “regular” stuff. And only use the “secret” account as needed. |
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| ▲ | ryanmcbride 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It's more a policy problem than a phone problem. Apple could add as many pins as they want but until there are proper legal based privacy protections, law enforcement will still just be like "well how do we know you don't have a secret pin that unlocks 40TB of illegal content? Better disappear you just to be sure" For as long as law enforcement treats protection of privacy as implicit guilt, the best a phone can really do is lock down and hope for the best. Even if there was a phone that existed that perfectly protected your privacy and was impossible to crack or was easy to spoof content on, law enforcement would just move the goal post of guilt so that owning the phone itself is incriminating. Edit: I wanna be clear that I'm not saying any phone based privacy protections are a waste of time. They're important. I'm saying that there is no perfect solution with the existing policy being enforced, which is "guilty until proven dead" | |
| ▲ | Cthulhu_ 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | How does "go to prison for not showing" work when a lot of constitutions have a clause for a suspect not needing to participate in their own conviction / right to remain silent? A detective can have a warrant to search someone's home or car, but that doesn't mean the owner needs to give them the key as far as I know. | | |
| ▲ | SoftTalker 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | It does mean that. You can't be forced to divulge information in your head, as that would be testimonial. But if there are papers, records, or other evidentiary materials that are e.g. locked in a safe you can be compelled to open it with a warrant, and refusal would be contempt. | | |
| ▲ | Steltek 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | They need to prove that those materials exist on the device first. You can't be held in contempt for a fishing expedition. | | |
| ▲ | SoftTalker 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | You need "probable cause to believe" which is not as strong as "prove" but yes, it can't be a pure fishing expedition. |
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| ▲ | lostlogin 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | FaceID and TouchID aren’t protected by that as I understand it. | | |
| ▲ | plagiarist 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | That's correct, they are not. A complete failing of legislation and blatant disregard of the spirit of the 5th Amendment. So do not have biometrics as device unlock if you are a journalist protecting sources. | | |
| ▲ | SoftTalker 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | They are considered to be more like keys to a safe than private knowledge. They also can't be changed if compromised. A sufficiently unguessable PIN or passphrase is better than biometrics. |
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| ▲ | parineum 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I know it seems like an incredibly dubious claim but the "I forgot" defense actually works here. It's not really that useful for a safe since they aren't _that_ difficult to open and, if you haven't committed a crime, it's probably better to open your safe for them than have them destroy it so you need a new one. For a mathematically impossible to break cipher though, very useful. |
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| ▲ | jibe 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Hannah Natanson is not in prison though. | |
| ▲ | Zak 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Assuming the rule of law is still functioning, there are multiple protections for journalists who refuse to divulge passwords in the USA. A journalist can challenge any such order in court and usually won't be detained during the process as long as they show up in court when required and haven't tried to destroy evidence. Deceiving investigators by using an alternate password, or destroying evidence by using a duress code on the other hand is almost always a felony. It's a very bad idea for a journalist to do that, as long as the rule of law is intact. | | |
| ▲ | dboreham an hour ago | parent [-] | | I think it's pretty clear at this point that rule of law isn't functioning. Perhaps it never was. It was just rule of law theater. |
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| ▲ | Blackthorn 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | They are willing to kill people and then justify it by calling them terrorists. Plausible deniability is pointless. | | | |
| ▲ | cr125rider 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Fourth and Fifth amendments disagree | | |
| ▲ | twelvedogs 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I don't think we're doing amendments any more | | |
| ▲ | ddtaylor 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | And if we are it will be a new one with a high number and it will be pure insanity |
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| ▲ | lm28469 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Sure but in the real world it can take months or years, Francis Rawls stayed 4 years in jail because he didn't want to unlock hard drives. | |
| ▲ | kyrra 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | People are jailed for contempt of court for failing to provide passwords. https://reason.com/2017/05/31/florida-man-jailed-180-days-fo... | | |
| ▲ | fluoridation 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Wow, so US judges are just making it up as they go along, huh? It's like every case is a different judgement with no consistent criterion. >Doe vs. U.S. That case centered around whether the feds could force a suspect to sign consent forms permitting foreign banks to produce any account records that he may have. In Doe, the justices ruled that the government did have that power, since the forms did not require the defendant to confirm or deny the presence of the records. Well, what if the defendant was innocent of that charge but guilty of or involved in an unrelated matter for which there was evidence in the account records? |
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| ▲ | eviks 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | There is no plausible deniability here, that's only relevant in a rule-of-law type of situation, but then you wouldn't need it as you can't be legally compelled to do that anyway. "We don't see any secret source communication on your work device = you entered the wrong pin = go think about what your behavior in jail" | |
| ▲ | AdamN 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Even if this worked (which would be massively expensive to implement) the misconfiguration possibilities are endless. It wouldn't be customer-centric to actually release this capability. Better for the foreseeable future to have separate devices and separate accounts (i.e. not in the same iCloud family for instance) | |
| ▲ | 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | [deleted] | |
| ▲ | snowwrestler 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | “Plausible deniability” is a public relations concept. It doesn’t confer any actual legal protection. | | |
| ▲ | dkarras 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | It absolutely offers some legal protection. If it is implemented correctly, no legal framework for it is required. Government forces you to enter your password. You comply and enter "a" password. The device shows contents. You did what you were asked to do. If there is no way for the government to prove that you entered a decoy password that shows decoy contents, you are in the clear. Done correctly (in device and OPSEC) government can't prove you entered your decoy password so you can't be held in contempt. And that is the entire point. It is not like asking the government to give your "plausible deniability" rights. It is about not potentially incriminating yourself against people that abuse the system to force you to incriminate yourself. | | |
| ▲ | snowwrestler 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | > You comply and enter "a" password. The device shows contents. You did what you were asked to do. No, you did something fake to avoid doing what you were asked to do. > If there is no way for the government to prove that you entered a decoy password that shows decoy contents, you are in the clear. But there are very effective ways to find hidden encrypted volumes on devices. And then you’ll be asked to decrypt those too, and then what? This sort of thing is already table stakes for CSAM prosecutions, for example. Law enforcement can read the same blog posts and know as much about technology as you do. Especially if we are hypothesizing an advertised feature of a commercial OS! | | |
| ▲ | dkarras 17 minutes ago | parent [-] | | >No, you did something fake to avoid doing what you were asked to do. Yes, that is what plausible deniability is. >But there are very effective ways to find hidden encrypted volumes on devices. And then you’ll be asked to decrypt those too, and then what? I emphasized "done right". If existence of hidden encryption can be proven, then you don't have plausible deniability. Something has gone wrong. My point was: OP claimed plausible deniability does not apply in legal cases which is a weird take. If you can have plausible deniability, then it can save you legally. This does not only apply to tech of course, but encryption was the subject here. In all cases though, if your situation is not "plausible" (due to broken tech, backdoors, poor OPSEC in tech, and / or damning other evidence in other cases as well) then you don't have plauisble deniability by definition. Having ways of definitively detecting hidden encrypted volumes might be the norm today, might be impossible tomorrow. Then you will have plausible deniability and it will work legally as far as that piece of "evidence" is concerned. |
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| ▲ | pluralmonad 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I always wondered if this was the feature of TrueCrypt that made it such a big target. LUKS is fine, I guess, but TrueCrypt felt like actual secrecy. | |
| ▲ | lm28469 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Yep, you need an emergency mode that completely resets the phone to factory settings, maybe triggered with a decoy pin. Or a mode that physically destroys the chip storing the keys | |
| ▲ | bitexploder 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | You do not. We have this thing in our constitution called the 5th amendment. You cannot be forced to divulge the contents of your mind, including your pin or passwords. Case law supports this. For US citizens at least. Hopefully the constitution is still worth something. | | |
| ▲ | John23832 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/legal/man-who-refused-... | |
| ▲ | lm28469 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | That's in the fantasy world of constitution maximalists. In real world it doesn't work like that and you might still lose money/time/your sanity fighting a system who cares less and less about your rights | | |
| ▲ | bitexploder 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The case law on this specific topic is convincing. If you are ever in that situation it is usually going to be worth your time and money to assert the right and see it through. Case law supports this. The general maximum “penalty” is being held in contempt of court. And if the government is wrongly persecuting you, it is lose / lose if you divulge. | |
| ▲ | carlosjobim 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Do you think this is for fighting parking tickets? It is for journalists to not reveal their sources, whom might be at risk of severe consequences including death. That's a whole lot more to loose than your money and time. | | |
| ▲ | lm28469 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | That's not what we're discussing here, you can't just say "I plead the fifth" and walk away if the people in charge decided you wouldn't walk away, no matter what's right or "legal" Francis Rawls stayed 4 years in jail despite pleading the fifth all day long | | |
| ▲ | bitexploder 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | That case also established 18 months as an upper limit. If you are in that situation it is usually better to simply jot divulge. Especially if there is incriminating evidence. Or you are a journalist being harassed by the DOJ. It can only bring you more pain. They will always find something. | | |
| ▲ | lm28469 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Yeah well that's what I'm saying... "just plead the fifth" is nice on paper, in practice you're going to suffer for a long time. |
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| ▲ | lostlogin 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > You cannot be forced to divulge the contents of your mind, including your pin or passwords. Biometric data doesn’t need the password. And good luck depending on the US constitution. | |
| ▲ | stackghost 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | You're forgetting about the Constitution-Free Zone within 100 miles of all points of entry including international airports that covers essentially all of the 48. | | |
| ▲ | Zak 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | This is a misunderstanding. That's the area in which the border patrol has jurisdiction to can conduct very limited searches of vehicles and operate checkpoints without individualized suspicion in order to enforce immigration law. It does not allow searches of electronic devices. There is a separate border search exception at the point a person actually enters the country which does allow searches of electronic devices. US citizens entering the country may refuse to provide access without consequences beyond seizure of the device; non-citizens could face adverse immigration actions. To be clear, I do think all detentions and searches without individualized suspicion should be considered violations of the 4th amendment, but the phrase "constitution-free zone" is so broad as to be misleading. | | |
| ▲ | lostlogin 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | With ICE on the prowl, I’d have thought ‘Constitution Free Zone’ a fitting description of how they operate. |
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| ▲ | bitexploder 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I am not. You can still assert your rights at border points. It is very inconvenient. I have done it. If you are returning from international travel there is little they can do. If you are trying to leave the country they can make that difficult to impossible. Otherwise your rights still apply. |
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| ▲ | eduction 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Completely separate decision with a higher legal bar for doing that. It's one thing to allow police to search a phone. Another to compel someone to unlock the device. We live in a world of grays and nuance and an "all or nothing" outlook on security discourages people from taking meaningful steps to protect themselves. | |
| ▲ | frogcommander 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Why are you on a website for programmers and software developers if you arent a software developer and you know nothing of the subject? | | | |
| ▲ | DamnInteresting 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > What’s so hard to make 2-3 pins and each to access different logged in apps and files. I've been advocating for this under-duress-PIN feature for years, as evidenced by this HN comment I made about 9 years ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13631653 Maybe someday. |
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| ▲ | pc86 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Serious question: What are the "valid concerns" about people securing their computing devices against third parties? |
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| ▲ | hypfer 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | This (I think) refers not to the people securing their devices against third parties but the vendors "securing" the devices against loss of profits. Essentially, the question referenced here is that of ownership. Is it your device, or did you rent it from Apple/Samsung/etc.
If it is locked down so that you can't do anything you want with it, then you might not actually be its owner. ___ _Ideally_ you wouldn't need to trust Apple as a corp to do the right thing.
Of course, as this example shows, they seem to actually have done one right thing, but you do not know if they will always do. That's why a lot of people believe that the idea of such tight vendor control is fundamentally flawed, even though in this specific instance it yielded positive results. For completeness, No, I do not know either how this could be implemented differently. | | |
| ▲ | pbhjpbhj 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | We don't know if they did the right thing here. With a previous case it seemed (to me) like Apple might have pushed an update to give access ... they presumably could do that, remotely copy all the data, then return the device to the former state. One can't know, and this sort of thing seems entirely tenable. FBI don't have to tell anyone they accessed the device. That maintains Apples outward appearance of security; FBI just use parallel construction later if needed. Something like {but an actually robust system} a hashed log, using an enclave, where the log entries are signed using your biometric, so that events such a network access where any data is exchanged are recorded and can only be removed using biometrics. Nothing against wrench-based attacks, of course. | | |
| ▲ | GeekyBear 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > With a previous case it seemed (to me) like Apple might have pushed an update to give access You're going to have to provide a cite here, since Apple has publicity stated that they have not and will not ever do this on behalf of any nation state. For instance, Apple's public statement when the FBI ordered them to do so: https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ | | |
| ▲ | bigyabai 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | > Apple has publicity stated that they have not and will not ever do this Apple has also said that the US required them to hide evidence of dragnet surveillance: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/12/apple-admits-to-... Apple has since confirmed in a statement provided to Ars that the US federal government “prohibited” the company “from sharing any information,” but now that Wyden has outed the feds, Apple has updated its transparency reporting and will “detail these kinds of requests” in a separate section on push notifications in its next report.
Apple statements are quite distinct from what they do behind the scenes. | | |
| ▲ | GeekyBear an hour ago | parent [-] | | Providing a copy of push notification data (or any data) that you host on your server in response to a warrant is not what we are talking about. No company can refuse to do that. |
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| ▲ | hypfer 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I mean arguably, we do not even fully know if even if they did as claimed, they did the _right_ thing. The underlying assumption we base our judgement on is that "journalism + leaks = good" and "people wanting to crack down on leaks = bad".
Which is probably true, but also an assumption where something unwanted and/or broken could hide in. As with every assumption. Arguably, in a working and legit democracy, you'd actually want the state to have this kind of access, because the state, bound by democratically governed rules, would do the right thing with it. In the real world, those required modifiers unfortunately do not always hold true, so we kinda rely on the press as the fourth power, which _technically_ could be argued is some kind of vigilante entity operating outside of the system. I suppose it's also not fully clear if there can even be something like a "working and legit democracy" without possibly inevitable functionally vigilantes. Lots of stuff to ponder. ____ Anyway, my point is that I have no point. You don't have to bother parsing that, but it might possibly be interesting if you should decide to do so. It might also confuse the LLM bots and bad-faith real humans in this comment section, which is good. |
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| ▲ | mschuster91 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > Essentially, the question referenced here is that of ownership. Is it your device, or did you rent it from Apple/Samsung/etc. If it is locked down so that you can't do anything you want with it, then you might not actually be its owner. Both goals actually are possible to implement at the same time: Secure/Verified Boot together with actually audited, preferably open-source, as-small-as-possible code in the boot and crypto chain, for the user, the ability to unlock the bootloader in the EFI firmware and for those concerned about supply chain integrity, a debug port muxed directly (!) to the TPM so it can be queried for its set of whitelisted public keys. | | |
| ▲ | pbhjpbhj 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | The TPM can be programmed (ie designed) to lie about the whitelist though. |
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| ▲ | nicoburns 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | One valid concern about "locked down computing" is the potential for 3rd parties to secure computing devices against their owners. | |
| ▲ | zuminator 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | In this case I think "valid concerns about locked down computing" is referring to the owner's use of the phone being restricted, so that they can't download applications they want to use, they don't have unrestricted access to the filesystem, they are forced to pay an Apple commission to engage in certain forms aloft commerce, etc. These may be acceptable tradeoffs but they're valid concerns nonetheless. | |
| ▲ | bayindirh 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I don't have to have any concern to be able to secure my device against third parties, it's just good operational discipline. I don't do anything classified, or store something I don't want to be found out. On the other hand, equally I don't want anyone to be able to get and fiddle a device which is central to my life. That's all. It's not "I have nothing to hide" (which I don't actually have), but I don't want to put everything in the open. Security is not something we shall earn, but shall have at the highest level by default. | |
| ▲ | shaky-carrousel 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Corrupt government officials gunning down inconvenient people. | | |
| ▲ | pc86 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | I'd love to hear what you think that has to do with this? | | |
| ▲ | shaky-carrousel 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Sure you will. | |
| ▲ | nutjob2 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | If we've learned anything from this administration it is that the government can ignore the law longer than you can stay alive. Arming yourself against lawless government in every legal way is advisable. | | |
| ▲ | pc86 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | I'm not even saying you're wrong, I'm saying what does that have to do with a valid search warrant being executed? | | |
| ▲ | macintux 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | There's a fair bit of dispute about whether this is valid. The active criminalization of journalism is worrisome. | | |
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| ▲ | buckle8017 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Lockdown mode significantly effects the usability of the phone. It completely disables JIT js in Safari for example. | | |
| ▲ | pc86 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | "Don't secure your phone it might mess up JavaScript" is not something I had on my 2026 bingo card. | | |
| ▲ | odo1242 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | JavaScript is actually the only reason that the iPhone has runtime code generation capabilities at all, so it kinda makes sense | |
| ▲ | buckle8017 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I mean I tried it for a bit and I have to say it was a significant compromise. All kinds of random things don't work. | | |
| ▲ | Marsymars 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | I find all kinds of random things already don't work on mobile Safari - the web is effectively unusable without an adblocker, and over the past few months I've seen an explosion in the use of sites using "AdShield" which, if they detect ad-blocking, breaks websites (and lies to the user about the cause). Desktop browsers are able to handle this still, but on mobile Safari it just results in a bunch of the web being broken. |
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| ▲ | prophesi 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | You can choose to exclude Safari from these protections[0]. Honestly, looking at the list of "limitations" you'll have while running Lockdown mode, I'm surprised most of them aren't the system default. [0] https://support.apple.com/en-us/105120 - under "How to exclude apps or websites from Lockdown Mode" | | |
| ▲ | buckle8017 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Sure but the JIT js disable and limiting of image/video decoders are combined basically all the security from lockdown mode, so disabling it seems pointless. | | |
| ▲ | prophesi 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | I do wish it worked more like GrapheneOS, but the other protections outside of web browsing seem to make it worth enabling lockdown mode. Personally, I'm only reading articles on my phone's browser so I'd wonder if I'd be fine with disabled JIT and crippled decoders. |
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| ▲ | peterspath 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I do have it enabled and webbrowsing is still fine, the things I use are or websites or simple web apps that aren't javascript heavy anyway... when I want to do something for longer I will pickup my MacBook anyway. | |
| ▲ | blibble 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | you can enable it for certain trusted websites |
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| ▲ | reactordev 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Pegasus. Jedi. SKyWIper. Rogue Actors. Rogue thief’s. Rogue governments. Your spouse. Separating corporate IT from personal IT. There’s plenty of reasons. | |
| ▲ | blitzar 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Oh, come on. Don't look at another man's Portal Gun history. We all go to weird places. | |
| ▲ | whynotminot 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I get so annoyed by this Socratic line of questioning because it’s extremely obvious. Terrorist has plans and contacts on laptop/phone. Society has a very reasonable interest in that information. But of course there is the rational counter argument of “the government designates who is a terrorist”, and the Trump admin has gleefully flouted norms around that designation endangering rule of law. So all of us are adults here and we understand this is complicated. People have a vested interest in privacy protections. Society and government often have reasonable interest in going after bad guys. Mediating this clear tension is what makes this so hard and silly lines of questioning like this try to pretend it’s simple. | | |
| ▲ | anonymous908213 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The better rational counter argument is that "privacy is a human right enshrined in international law". Society has zero business knowing anyone's private communications, whether or not that person is a terrorist. There is nothing natural about being unable to talk to people privately without your speech being recorded for millions of people to view forever. Moreover, giving society absolute access to private communications is a short road to absolute dystopia as government uses it to completely wipe out all dissent, execute all the Jews or whatever arbitrary enemy of the state they decide on, etc. You do not get to dispense with human rights because terrorists use them too. Terrorists use knives, cars, computers, phones, clothes... where will we be if we take away everything because we have a vested interested in denying anything a terrorist might take advantage of? | | |
| ▲ | whynotminot 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Who decided absolute privacy in all circumstances is a fundamental human right? I don’t think any government endorses that position. I don’t know what international law you speak of. You’re basing your argument on an axiom that I don’t think everyone would agree with. This sounds like a Tim Cook aphorism (right before he hands the iCloud keys to the CCP) — not anything with any real legal basis. | | |
| ▲ | anonymous908213 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Article 12 of the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights: > No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy [...] which has later been affirmed to include digital privacy. > I don’t think any government endorses that position. Many governments are in flagrant violation of even their own privacy laws, but that does not make those laws any less real. The UN's notion of human rights were an "axiom" founded from learned experience and the horrors that were committed in the years preceding their formation. Discarding them is to discard the wisdom we gained from the loss of tens of millions of people. And while you claim that society has a vested interest in violating a terrorist's privacy, you can only come to that conclusion if you engage in short-term thinking that terminates at exactly the step you violate the terrorist's rights and do not consider the consequences of anything beyond that; if you do consider the consequences it becomes clear that society collectively has a bigger vested interest in protecting the existence of human rights. | | |
| ▲ | whynotminot 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | > No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy “Arbitrary” meaning you better have good reasons! Which implies there are or can be good reasons for which your privacy can be violated. You’re misreading that to mean your privacy is absolute by UN law. | | |
| ▲ | anonymous908213 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Admittedly "arbitrary" is something of a legal weasel word that leaves a lot of room for interpretation. I lean towards a strong interpretation for two reasons: the first is because it is logically obvious why you must give it a strong interpretation; if the people responsible for enforcing human rights can arbitrarily decide you don't have them, you don't have human rights. The second is because we have seen this play out in the real world and it is abundantly clear that the damage to society is greater than any potential benefits. The US in particular has made an adventure out of arbitrarily suspending human rights, giving us wonderful treats like Guantanamo Bay and the black sites across the Middle East. I don't know what part of that experiment looked remotely convincing to you, but to me they only reinforced how clearly necessary inviolable human rights are for the greater good of society. | | |
| ▲ | pbhjpbhj 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | >if the people responsible for enforcing human rights can arbitrarily decide you don't have them, you don't have human rights But the "arbitrary" there is too account for the situation where the democratic application of the law wants to inspect the communications of suspected terrorists, and where a judge agrees there is sufficient evidence to grant a warrant. Unfortunately, that law does nothing against situations like the USA/Russia regime where a ruler dispenses with the rule of law (and democratic legal processes too). You can't practically have that sort of liberalism, where society just shrugs and chooses not to read terrorists communications, those who wish to use violence make it unworkable. |
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| ▲ | danaris 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | But if you want to make it possible for the Feds to break into a terrorist's secure phone, you have to make it impossible for anyone to have a secure phone. That is arbitrary interference with all our privacy. |
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| ▲ | 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | [deleted] |
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| ▲ | PatentlyDC123 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Usually such "international laws" are only advisory and not binding on member nations. After decades of member nations flouting UN "laws" I can't see them as reliable or effective support in most arguments. I support the policy behind the privacy "laws" of the UN, but enforcing them seems to fall short. | | |
| ▲ | anonymous908213 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Enforcement mechanisms are weak, but they still exist to set a cultural norm and an ideal to strive towards. Regardless, I have also laid out an argument at length as to why society would logically want to have this be a human right for its own good, regardless of any appeal to existing authority. |
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| ▲ | Brian_K_White 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | This means there are no valid concerns. There are just things some people want and the reasons they want them. So the question that you are so annoyed by remains unanswered (by you anyway), and so, valid, to all of us adults. @hypfer gives a valid concern, but it's based on a different facet of lockdown. The concern is not that the rest of us should be able to break into your phone for our safety, it's the opposite, that you are not the final authority of your own property, and must simply trust Apple and the entire rest of society via our ability to compel Apple, not to break into your phone or it's backup. | |
| ▲ | pc86 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | At the risk of being kind of ass, which I've been trying to be better about lately, I'm going to offer some advice. If you can't even respond to a question about secure computing without bringing American presidential politics into things, perhaps you need to take a break from the news for a few weeks. The reason I asked that question is because I don't think it's complicated. I should be able to lock down my device such that no other human being on the planet can see or access anything on it. It's mine. I own it. I can do with it whatever I please, and any government that says otherwise is diametrically opposed to my rights as a human being. You are more likely to be struck by lightning while holding two winning lottery tickets from different lotteries than you are to be killed by an act of terrorism today. This is pearl-clutching, authoritarian nonsense. To echo the sibling comment, society does not get to destroy my civil rights because some inbred religious fanatics in a cave somewhere want to blow up a train. Edit: And asking for someone to says "there are concerns!" to proffer even a single one is not a Socratic line of questioning, it's basic inquiry. | | |
| ▲ | adleyjulian 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The line of reasoning is more like this: if you make and sell safe-cracking tools then it would not be unreasonable for the government to regulate it so only registered locksmiths could buy it. You don't want people profiting from the support of criminal acts. The government could similarly argue that if a company provides communication as a service, they should be able to provide access to the government given they have a warrant. If you explicitly create a service to circumvent this then you're trying to profit from and aid those with criminal intent. Silkroad/drug sales and child sexual content are more common, but terrorism would also be on the list. I disagree with this logic, but those are the well-known, often cited concerns. There is a trade-off in personal privacy versus police ability to investigate and enforce laws. | |
| ▲ | whynotminot 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | This article is about the Trump admin seizing a reporter’s phone. The politics was here from the start. |
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| ▲ | hypfer 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > I get so annoyed by this Socratic line of questioning because it’s extremely obvious. Yeah after seeing the additional comments, my gut also says "sea lion". Truly a shame | |
| ▲ | handedness 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > ...the Trump admin has gleefully flouted norms around that designation... One would have to hold a fairly uninformed view of history to think the norms around that designation are anything but invasive. The list since FDR is utterly extensive. | | |
| ▲ | whynotminot 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | I didn’t say he was the first to abuse powers. Indeed it’s kind of silly to even have to clarify “but other administrations…” because that’s fairly obvious to anyone old enough to have seen more than one president. But the article is literally referencing the Trump administration seizing a reporter’s phone so the current administration’s overreach seems relevant here. | | |
| ▲ | handedness 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | But that's not what I said. My point was that your stated assumption of what the norms are is inaccurate. If nearly every modern administration does it, that is literally the norm. The present administration, like many before it, is following the norm. The norm is the broader issue. Which makes the rest of it (and your followup) come across as needlessly tribal, as both major parties are consistently guilty of tending to object to something only when the other side does it. | | |
| ▲ | whynotminot 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Frankly I really don’t care about both sides-ism anymore. I can agree with you that a lot of administrations have been irresponsible on this point while also believing that the current administration is particularly dangerous in this area. If I lose you here because of “needless tribalism” oh well. |
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| ▲ | Joel_Mckay 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Some platforms will side-load anything the telecom carrier sends. It is naive to assume iOS can be trusted much more than Android. =3 | | |
| ▲ | pc86 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Let's assume for the sake of argument you're making a valid point. What does that have to do with my question? | | |
| ▲ | Joel_Mckay 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Location telemetry, listening devices, and exfiltration of protected sources. A 3rd party locked down system can't protect people from what the law should. =3 |
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| ▲ | ambicapter 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Think of the children | | |
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| ▲ | ExoticPearTree 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > It's a real world example of how these security features aren't just for "paranoid people" but serve a legit purpose for people who handle sensitive info. Because they're in the US things might be easier from a legal standpoint for the journalist, but they also have precedent on forcing journalist to expose their sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Branzburg_v._Hayes In other parts of the world this applies https://xkcd.com/538/ when you don't provide the means to access your phone to the authorities. It just depends on how much a government wants the data that is stored there. |
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| ▲ | nickff 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Which countries actually grant reporters immunity from having to reveal information related to criminal investigations (where others would be compelled to, and without criminal penalties)? Such immunity may be desirable (at least in some circumstances), but I am not aware of any jurisdiction that actually grants it. | | |
| ▲ | jampekka 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | At least in Finland there's a specific law about journalistic source protection (lähdesuoja) explicitly saying journalists have the right to not reveal sources. In serious crime cases in some circumstances a court may order a journalist to reveal sources. But it's extremely rare and journalists don't comply even if ordered. https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A4hdesuoja Edit: the source protection has actually probably never been broken (due to a court order at least): https://yle.fi/a/3-8012415 | | |
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| ▲ | Joel_Mckay 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Indeed, likely as secure as the VPNs run by intelligence contractors. 1. iOS has well-known poorly documented zero-click exploits 2. Firms are required to retain your activity logs for 3 months 3. It is illegal for a firm to deny or disclose sealed warrants on US soil, and it is up to 1 judge whether to rummage through your trash. If I recall it was around 8 out of 18000 searches were rejected. It is only about $23 to MITM someones phone now, and it is not always domestic agencies pulling that off. =3 |
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| ▲ | quesera 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | > 1. iOS has well-known poorly documented zero-click exploits PoC || GTFO, to use the vernacular. If you're talking about historical bugs, don't forget the update adoption curves. | | |
| ▲ | Joel_Mckay 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | No one will hand over the several $1m 0-day as PoC for free, as there are grey-market products based on the same tired exploits. "Not My Circus, Not My Monkeys" as they say. =3 | | |
| ▲ | quesera 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | My understanding is that there is current consensus that active iOS 0days are not likely to be available at the LE level. |
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| ▲ | sigmoid10 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| With the US descending more and more into fascism (as this case highlights yet again), I wonder what will happen to these features in the future. Especially now that the tech moguls of silicon valley stopped standing up to Trump and instead started kissing his ass. Tim Cook in particular seems to be the kind of person that rather is on the rich side of history than the right side. What if the administration realizes they can easily make Apple et al. give up their users by threatening their profits with tariffs and taxes? |
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| ▲ | vincenzothgreat 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | How is it turning into fascism? | | |
| ▲ | text0404 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | - Concentration of power in the executive, dismantling checks and balances - Hyper-nationalism and white supremacist messaging - Scapegoating of minorities - Attacks on the press - Attacks on constitutional rights - Militarization of police, violence normalized - Expansion of surveillance state - Combination of state and corporate power - Strongman authoritarianism - Historical revisionism - Interference in elections Cheers! | | |
| ▲ | shermantanktop 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | - State-aligned media outlets, where media consumption choice is a political act - Grandiose architecture projects for historically important sites - Obsession with massive monuments - the tallest, the most gold, the most expensive - Military parades and lionization of the military, while demanding political support from military leadership - A population which become keenly interested in whether something does or doesn’t benefit the leader personally I think the terms fascism or authoritarianism are close enough to be helpful, even if some of the specifics don’t align perfectly. But the ones that do align are oddly specific sometimes. |
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| ▲ | pbhjpbhj 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It turned. | |
| ▲ | thatswrong0 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/01/america-fascism-tr... This article goes through point by point. | | |
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| ▲ | learingsci 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| Apple seems to strongly discourage the use of lockdown mode. Presumably it is in conflict with their concern over share price and quarterly earnings. |
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| ▲ | robot_jesus 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Citation needed? Apple does a lot of things I don't agree with in the interest of share price (like cozying up to authoritarian governments) but this seems like a reach to criticize them for a feature they have put extensive effort into, rather than applauding that they resist spying and enhance customer privacy. Sure, it's an optional feature and maybe they don't push broad acceptance of it, but it's important for those that need it. | | |
| ▲ | learingsci 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Indeed. It maybe the best reason to use their products, but then why not make it default or do more to encourage its use? |
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| ▲ | groundzeros2015 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Didn’t they make it? | | |
| ▲ | learingsci 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Is it supported in iOS 18? They seem to suggest in their own documentation that very few people need or should use it. They could do much more to encourage and support its use. Even the naming “lockdown” vs “secure” is a big tell. |
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| ▲ | Analemma_ 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | How do they discourage it? It’s a clearly-labeled button in the Settings app, which brings up one modal sheet explaining what will change if you turn it on, then one more button press and it’s on. |
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