| ▲ | HumblyTossed a day ago |
| If this is true, does it not throw some water on the coals of Apple's "We're so secure" stance? Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages? |
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| ▲ | Barbing a day ago | parent | next [-] |
| As I understand it, the issue on iOS is Siri’s access to screen content. It's useful to be able to e.g. read Hacker News in Safari and be able to say, “Hey Siri, what do these three obscure acronyms in the comment at the top of my screen stand for?” Unfortunately, when iOS 27 was first released, there was no way to exclude an app like Signal from this feature. So if you had Signal open and you triggered Siri to ask an unrelated question, you could inadvertently send a screenshot of your Signal chat to the cloud. Thankfully, Signal pushed and Apple responded pretty quickly. Now we can tighten up our settings via: Settings > Siri > Excluded Apps
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| ▲ | boplicity a day ago | parent | next [-] | | Really should be: Settings > Siri > App Access Permissions
With the option to "always ask," or "always allow," or "never allow." | | |
| ▲ | rolosa a day ago | parent | next [-] | | As long as there's an easy way to get to it that doesn't involve digging through settings. The whole "[app] wants to paste from your clipboard" prompt is so god damn annoying. | |
| ▲ | dylan604 a day ago | parent | prev [-] | | This is one of those obvious situations where should and reality are not any where close to each other. Of course, Apple will want the default to be open and every thing whitelisted so "it just works". When someone wants their new shiny to be accepted, they will never go for the everything must be specifically allowed by user as the default. | | |
| ▲ | AnthonyMouse a day ago | parent | next [-] | | The way they ought to do it is like this: The app specifies the default (which is "allowed" if they don't specify, but then Signal can specify otherwise), the user can then change it either way, and the app is given no means to tell if the user has changed it (so evil corp can't inhibit the user from doing what they want). | | |
| ▲ | TeMPOraL a day ago | parent [-] | | Yes, this. I'm fine with default being "no", as long as it can be flipped to yes (at least per-app, for any app), and the apps having no say or knowledge of it if the user decides to opt-in. |
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| ▲ | dwaite 18 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "Should" depends on the user persona. If the default for Lockdown mode users was to send information to the cloud I'd say that was a not just a bad default but a critical issue. If the general public's first response to "lets put this on my calendar" is "You need to go into 'Settings -> Siri AI -> Security and Privacy' to approve my ability to read from Messages", then that is a huge fail. | |
| ▲ | reactordev a day ago | parent | prev [-] | | Yeah, unfortunately the guy who really championed privacy at Apple, passed away. Jobs would have been furious if AI had access to his chats without his permission. | | |
| ▲ | brookst a day ago | parent [-] | | Apple’s been good (not perfect, but good) on privacy post-Jobs. PCC, PAT, and AVP’s bias toward privacy at the expense of utility come to mind. |
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| ▲ | Barbing a day ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > Thankfully, Signal pushed Meant to credit the EFF there actually, though probably both | |
| ▲ | bilbo0s a day ago | parent | prev [-] | | Hate to be that guy, but why would that option be Siri, or even Signal, specific? If the goal is to ensure security and privacy of a chat screen or an excel window full of bank balances, wouldn't you want to prevent any app, on any OS from getting screen access? Serious question. I mean is there a way to prevent all background processes from taking screen shots while, say, Signal or something else private is in use? Across linux, Windows, MacOS, Android, ios etc? I feel like users should be able to set every OS to operate that way. BTW, I get and understand the failure state that occurs when the person you're talking to is a moron and is running Claude YOLO or something while you're chatting with them. I'm only talking about ensuring security on your own end. | | |
| ▲ | godelski a day ago | parent | next [-] | | I'm going to take a guess. But we'd have to guess unless we are the actual Apple designers. But I'd wager that the thing is that Apple doesn't see themselves as part of the user's threat model. So them being able to see your content is not a privacy issue. There's reason to act that way, after all, they have control of the hardware and core software and that is a high level of access. Even for fully open source systems you still have to have lots of trust. > Across linux
Yes, but you do need to go to great lengths to do this. The reason is because there's so many things that subtly can extract data. If you want to prevent a system that can take screenshots, then you have to disable screenshots entirely. You have to disable screenreaders. That's all possible, but does interfere with user experience, all because you're concerned about someone potentially hijacking that system. Truthfully that's not in most users' threat models. Similarly you'd have to disable all USB ports and capabilities because a USB device can control your system (see rubber ducky). And many more. To give you a small example, go install noscript into your browser (or install the tor or mullvad browser and put on the strict security settings and browse the internet). It increases privacy and security, but it does come at a big UX cost. | |
| ▲ | radiospiel a day ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | If i am not mistaken a user must approve screen access for any apps. By default they don’t have that. What signal asks for is to exclude their windows from the screenshots these other apps make. | | | |
| ▲ | TeMPOraL a day ago | parent | prev [-] | | I reject the assumption that users trying to exercise their right to compute and end-user automation are morons, and truly believe the feature set you're proposing is user hostile. The most secure computing system is an inert rock. It's also not very useful. | | |
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| ▲ | phoghed a day ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Aren’t they implying that the users on the other side of your chats explicitly grant that access to their ai agent? |
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| ▲ | _heimdall a day ago | parent [-] | | I believe the implication is that an OS may give its own AI tool direct access to see and interact with what is on the screen, including messages shown in a messaging app. |
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| ▲ | GuB-42 a day ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Apple priorities are: 1-profits, 2-convenience, 3-security, 4-privacy. Same as most mainstream companies like Google and Microsoft. The difference is that there is less of a conflict between 1 and 4 in Apple than in the others because they make most of they money from hardware sales. AI agents sure are convenient. By looking at your messages they can tell you that there is an accident on the road to the airport your flight is departing from and that you should consider leaving early. So it gets prioritized over privacy. For people who are against that tradeoff, Apple can make your device less convenient (lockdown mode), I guess that's an advantage over competitors. |
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| ▲ | _heimdall a day ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I expect the risk vector would primarily be related to OS-level AI tools being given to see whats being rendered on screen and interact with it. Signal can encrypt at rest and between devices, it can't encrypt when actually rendering text to the UI tree. |
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| ▲ | georgemcbay a day ago | parent | next [-] | | > I expect the risk vector would primarily be related to OS-level AI tools being given to see whats being rendered on screen and interact with it. Signal can encrypt at rest and between devices, it can't encrypt when actually rendering text to the UI tree. Yeah, it is likely this. A decade ago I worked for a company that provided secure communications apps (email, IMs, etc) for both Android and iOS and (as one of the Android developers) I remember pointing out to higher-ups that it was trivial to write an app on Android that would tie into the accessibility APIs Android provided to bypass all of our app's network and storage security (the accessibility APIs would allow you to automatically read the text out of any standard OS text controls of any installed app while running as a background service to provide alternative means of presenting the data, like text to speech, etc). But instead of providing accessibility, an attacker app could just take all that data and silently upload it somewhere. This did mean the attacker would have to physically access the phone one time to install the accessibility logger service (or they'd have to phish a user to install it themselves), but after that initial install they could forever bypass the security on our app with absolutely no way for the user to know data was being exfiled unless they are the type that is meticulously auditing which apps are installed on their phone. Destroying accessibility is unfair to people who need it, but I recommended we add a feature to our app that would default to notifying the user with a clear warning whenever another running app had accessibility read access. My recommendation never got followed, at least for the remainder of my time at that company (they got bought up by Blackberry about a year later and the office I was working in got shut down). | | |
| ▲ | _heimdall 18 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Yep, I ran into similar concerns around 15 years ago while working for Windows Phone, though at the time we didn't actually expose accessibility tree access. I both don't understand why LLM providers want agentic use via screenshots or screen scraping and am grateful that they didn't decide to just use browser accessibility trees for browser use features. I don't expect we'll be that lucky on mobile where a11y features don't require industry agreement and standard implementations. | |
| ▲ | a day ago | parent | prev [-] | | [deleted] |
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| ▲ | j45 a day ago | parent | prev [-] | | Maybe signal can change how they render text on the screen. Nothings perfect, but maybe render it themselves? | | |
| ▲ | _heimdall 18 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Any protection against this requires OS support. Screenshots, for example, can be prevented only if the OS provides an API for apps to use to prevent screenshots being taken of sensitive information. Similarly, if an OS gives LLM(s) access to content as rendered on the screens, via accessibility APIs or similar, that will leak any information made readable to the user unless and API is provided to opt out of that access. | |
| ▲ | RunSet a day ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Screenshots tend to capture a black rectangle instead of the screen area rendered using a hardware overlay.[0] Perhaps Signal could use that. Although there are likely ways to circumvent it. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_overlay#Screen_shots | | |
| ▲ | dwaite 18 hours ago | parent [-] | | The operating system controls the hardware channels, as well as memory access, and in the mobile space often the ability to restrict distribution of software. It is far simpler to try to convince the OS vendor to work with you than to pretend you can fight them with technical means while in the sandbox they gave you. |
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| ▲ | zugi a day ago | parent | prev [-] | | Like render all your chats as Captcha text so the AI can't read it? | | |
| ▲ | j45 a day ago | parent [-] | | Maybe, or just render it as an image. Or render it as individual pixels. Things might not be perfect but it would be a start. :) Rust / WebAssembly can do a lot. | | |
| ▲ | warkdarrior a day ago | parent [-] | | > or just render it as an image. Or render it as individual pixels. OCR is automatic, high quality, and dirt cheap nowadays, even on device. |
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| ▲ | godelski a day ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages?
How do you think those toast notifications work? That has to integrate with the iOS system, which needs to be able to read (at least part of) the message. While that's default behavior, you can disable, but that requires you not being able to preview your messages. Though different levels of security/privacy for different preferences and threat models. So pick your own. |
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| ▲ | solyin a day ago | parent | prev [-] |
| You wouldn't, but someone you're talking to has connected the desktop app to their signal account, and is also using Claude in YOLO mode. |
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| ▲ | TeMPOraL a day ago | parent [-] | | That would be me, except I'm not using Signal because of its philosophy being completely opposite to mine :). |
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