| ▲ | OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-121481, CVSS 9.8)(github.com) |
| 175 points by JacobHenner 5 hours ago | 103 comments |
| |
|
| ▲ | amluto 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| On a very very quick read, the bug is that EVP_EncodeBlock malfunctions if the input is larger than ~1.5GB. EVP_EncodeBlock is a function that encodes base64. https://docs.openssl.org/1.0.2/man3/EVP_EncodeInit/ As a seasoned C programmer, I can immediately observe that the whole API is bad: the caller is expected to calculate the buffer length on their own, using a nontrivial formula, and the caller does not pass in the output buffer length, so the implementation cannot validate it. But apparently OpenSSL 4 also implemented it wrong and wrote (possibly far) past the end of the buffer. You should probably assume that, if you are running anything that can be convinced to use this API to encode a very long blob as base64, then you are in trouble. I don’t know why a modern server would do this. BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs. Stay away. edit: Fixed my size threshold, hopefully. I was thinking of unsigned ints, but this is a signed int. I have not looked at the code, just the description. |
| |
| ▲ | socketcluster an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | > BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs. Fully agree with your assessment above that line, but damn, this is a strong statement for a library this ubiquitous. You wonder; how could this happen? And yet, as an open source developer myself, I know how little people care about code quality. | | |
| ▲ | Gigachad an hour ago | parent [-] | | We have known this since at least heartbleed. The answer was that basically no one funds the project and it had only one developer. All these trillion dollar tech companies have been leaching off open source for free and never contributed back to the projects they rely on. | | |
| ▲ | socketcluster 8 minutes ago | parent [-] | | It's insane. I maintain a small open source project with only about 100k downloads per week and so, in terms of funding, it's crickets for me but I assumed projects like OpenSSL which probably every human being on the planet uses daily would get some funding. Then I read articles about billionaires donating millions or even billions to various (sometimes frivolous) charities and I wonder WTF. The numbers just don't add up. It's like there is an invisible force field preventing people from donating money to open source? Crazy to think that the people who post a dumb viral 30-second meme video on YouTube probably get more money than the author of a complex, world-famous open source project which has been at the top for decades and which intermediates every aspect of almost every human's life. |
|
| |
| ▲ | vlovich123 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs. Stay away. We’ve known this for well over two decade since heartbleed yet for some reason Linux distros haven’t migrated off of it | | |
| ▲ | dcrazy 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | For those too young to remember 2014, Heartbleed led to both BoringSSL and LibreSSL being forked from OpenSSL. | | |
| ▲ | stock_toaster 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | And also led to Amazon's s2n-tls and libcrypto being released around 2015 too as I call. EDIT: found the release announcement - June 2015 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/introducing-s2n-a-new-... | |
| ▲ | b112 41 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I wonder. Realistically, Boring and Libre haven't taking off. I measure that by most use and default deploys. But with LLMs, we may be entering a new world. In that world, certainly some projects may be impervious to fixes. We've all seen projects that basically eschew all change, and ignore issue trackers, and are basically dead. But the ones which still live? Eventually this first wave of LLM derived fixes will get through the old churn. Presumably, code will improve dramatically. If that's so, OpenSSL will become "good code". And the same with old legacy projects which are still hanging around. Meaning... will legacy simply exist forever? Our two forks above will likely fade away, if openssl's code becomes clean as can be. | |
| ▲ | morkalork 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | TIL it's 2036 | | |
| ▲ | wahern 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | To be fair, frustrations with OpenSSL long preceded Heartbleed. Heartbleed was just the final straw for those who forked libressl and BoringSSL. And to be fair to OpenSSL, it was one of the first widely used crypto libraries, along with Netscape's NSS. Setting aside the reasonablebess of the initial choices, the rapid uptake meant those choices were difficult if not impossible to completely unwind, particularly the style and typing of parameters and error reporting. Even today debates rage about signed vs unsigned, etc, in C and other languages. (But suffice it to say there are still alot of unforced errors, IMO, such as implicit output buffer sizes.) |
|
| |
| ▲ | DANmode 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Not breaking userspace is more important than security……… | | |
| ▲ | Skunkleton 20 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | "not breaking userspace" refers to kernel development. OpenSSL is userspace. | | |
| ▲ | yjftsjthsd-h 12 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Paraphrasing to "don't make breaking API/ABI changes for projects consuming your API/ABI" doesn't materially change a reasonable point. (And I generally agree with that point, although I confess openssl specifically really strains my view) | |
| ▲ | charcircuit 15 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | And this is why the Linux Desktop will never go mainstream. You should never break apps at all, the OS's API surface goes beyond just the kernel. |
| |
| ▲ | vasco 19 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | Yeah, we all know users would rather be reliably hacked than unreliably safe. |
| |
| ▲ | CrimsonCape an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | I just don't get it; this is a task to hand to an LLM, "go rebuild OpenSSL, use Rust (no mistakes)" and have it churn through a greenfield implementation. Then open a PR =). Why hasn't this happened yet? The fact that the LLM will write tests and deal with all the compiler errors probably puts it lightyears ahead. | | |
| ▲ | brianpane 32 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | There’s already a Rust TLS library, rustls, that’s relatively mature (10 years in development, a couple of paid maintainers, robust development and release processes). It’s not a drop-in replacement for OpenSSL, though. There’s a companion project to build an OpenSSL-compatible wrapper API for it, but that’s not as far along. Interestingly, while rustls has a plug-in API that lets you choose your favorite Rust encryption library for the low-level operations (aws-lc-rs, Ring, Graviola, etc), those libraries all tend to contain a lot of assembly … not just for speed, but because it’s easier to avoid side channel timing vulnerabilities in assembly. | |
| ▲ | b112 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | LLMs have a bottleneck, human review. And human review is absolutely required at this stage (the future is unknown). A rust built LLM only reviewed SSL library would be a recipe for disaster. Beyond that, when it comes to exceptionally complex APIs, forward thinking implementation, and revising the 'way things are done'? These are weak points for LLMs. If you don't know how to write OpenSSL(or its replacement), and don't understand all its quirks, and the entire industry surrounding it, you cannot be the human driving the LLM successfully. There is no way for a human to catch all the design mistakes an LLM will make, otherwise. People seem to get upset, when I say this, for reasons I cannot fathom. However, we need to have a mental model of how we trust LLM output, and the 'new junior' is great for that. Especially considering that every day, is a new day for an LLM, its context window always loses yesterday. So consider LLMs as an eager, intelligent, incredibly well read junior, just out of college. And on their third day of work. Zero real world experience. Constant review required. Would you want that junior to design, build, and write test scripts for a library to underpin the entire internet? | |
| ▲ | fock 44 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | you don't get credit for that because it is clear you are not very skillful at what AI-bros value most, namely manipulating other nerds... if you look at the commit history of OpenSSL, you can easily notice how a lot of people started contributing once their clanker got up to speed. They are very happy to rip out weird C and replace it with assembler or intrinsics. Rip out lists of characters formatted as a single string and replace them with array syntax, each char quoted. |
|
| |
| ▲ | teunispeters 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I like to declare that industry coding standards such as MISRA exist precisely because code bases like OpenSSL (specifically) exist, as it's such a good example of breaking every sensible rule in the standards. | |
| ▲ | gspr an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs. Stay away. Well sure, but the world doesn't seem to be able to agree on, or put resources into, a strong contender. I'm usually for heterogeneity and diversity in the software ecosystem, but for cryptography I'd be happy with a single high-quality "anointed path". Because cryptography. | |
| ▲ | octoberfranklin 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | This is really embarrassing because this isn't even ancient code. OpenSSL has been around a long time and has a lot of legacy code, but this is in OpenSSL 4.x only -- stuff that was written in the last ~year. If they don't have the manpower to write new code safely they should just stick to maintaining what they've already written. | | |
| ▲ | fock 42 minutes ago | parent [-] | | and now guess who helped writing this code. the chicken are coming home to roost, but people who are happy about their youthful productivity or stock packages will not be able to notice... the code before this PR included the check. But that was old code! |
| |
| ▲ | kvuj 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > EVP_EncodeBlock() encodes a full block of input data in f and of length dlen and stores it in t. For every 3 bytes of input provided 4 bytes of output data will be produced. If dlen is not divisible by 3 then the block is encoded as a final block of data and the output is padded such that it is always divisible by 4. Additionally a NUL terminator character will be added. For example if 16 bytes of input data is provided then 24 bytes of encoded data is created plus 1 byte for a NUL terminator (i.e. 25 bytes in total). The length of the data generated without the NUL terminator is returned from the function. My god, you only see this type of horrendous API in C don't you. | | |
| ▲ | cesarb 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > My god, you only see this type of horrendous API in C don't you. This is the appropriate place to put a link to this pair of classics on API design: "How Do I Make This Hard to Misuse?" https://ozlabs.org/~rusty/index.cgi/tech/2008-03-30.html "What If I Don't Actually Like My Users?" https://ozlabs.org/~rusty/index.cgi/tech/2008-04-01.html | |
| ▲ | td521534f12 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "No way to prevent this" say users of only language where this regularly happens https://xeiaso.net/blog/series/no-way-to-prevent-this/ | |
| ▲ | userbinator 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | What's "horrendous"? I don't see anything which stands out as being wrong. It specifies exactly the lengths of input and output. gets(), on the other hand, that is "horrendous". | | |
| ▲ | IanCal 2 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | The thing that jumps out to me is that it returns “the size of the output data minus one” but if I’m passing in a pointer it’s on me to make sure there’s enough memory allocated isn’t it? So the caller must make sure it’s calculated this correctly - in which case why return the size? Taking the size as an argument could be safer as you’d be checking the caller calculated enough space too. (Honest questions in this it’s probably been 20 years since I did c) | |
| ▲ | amluto 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Even in C, if you have a function that takes an input buffer and output buffer of differing lengths, the right API has the caller pass both lengths. But yes, gets is worse. | | |
| ▲ | userbinator 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | takes an input buffer and output buffer of differing lengths, the right API has the caller pass both lengths. If there is no fixed relationship between the two, then that makes sense; but in this case there is a very simple and well-defined relationship between them. But to specify two lengths which must always agree; and if not, then what? You've effectively invented an additional artificial error condition, an additional branch, and burdened all the callers up the chain to do something, which is a treacherous path to complexity and the production of even more bugs. Or are you just preaching the same mindless idiocy that lead to Microsoft's memcpy_s() (the "s" is for "stupid")? |
| |
| ▲ | kvuj 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Perhaps I'm just used to having programmed in C# professionally for a little bit, but these sorts of APIs where you have to do a calculation to determine the destination buffer size make me feel like a caveman. A minuscule typo and you get a CVE like this. I know, I know, C is low level and high performance, but surely in the year of our lord 2026, we could have come out with something simpler. Horrendous is a strong word, you're right. | | |
| ▲ | pjmlp 4 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Not even that is usable as excuse, only those that never tried out the systems programming languages that either predated C, or where equally developed during the 1970's outside Bell Labs and UNIX ecosystem. You could have come with something simpler in PL/I. | |
| ▲ | uecker an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | One can abstract buffer handling away in C just fine, eliminating all those problems. I don't know why programmers insist on open-coding low-level buffer management. | | |
| ▲ | eptcyka an hour ago | parent [-] | | Yes, of course, this isn’t C, this is just another case of people writing C wrong. |
| |
| ▲ | JSR_FDED 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | You should be comparing with assembly language, not C#. |
|
|
| |
| ▲ | landr0id 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | >As a seasoned C programmer, I can immediately observe that the whole API is bad: the caller is expected to calculate the buffer length in their own, using a nontrivial formula, and the caller does not pass in the output buffer length, so the implementation cannot validate it. But apparently OpenSSL 4 also implemented it wrong and wrote (possibly far) past the end of the buffer. Many such cases. I expect we'll see some fun libyuv bugs soon in applications which decode media. The APIs are begging for misuse. https://chromium.googlesource.com/libyuv/libyuv/+/refs/heads... | |
| ▲ | baq 17 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | One of the ‘rewrite it in rust’ projects that should really cause anyone to be offended IMHO. | |
| ▲ | Gibbon1 22 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | What's obnoxious is the WG14 standard committee could have at any time in the last 40 years provided a standard slice and buffer type that would go a long way to discourage trash API's like this one. I swear it's de rigueur in C that if an operation requires 5 parameters to insure the operation is error free than the function shall only take 4 parameters. Rewriting the function with idiot mode disabled int EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX ctx, buffer_t out, const slice_t in); | |
| ▲ | userbinator 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | if the input is larger than ~1.5GB. ...on a system where ints are 32 bits. The bottom line is that this doesn't appear to be easily exploitable and IMHO it should be the callers of EVP_EncodeBlock which need to be inspected to determine the actual risk. using a nontrivial formula It's base64. 4/3 expansion; round it up and add padding. What's "nontrivial" about that? and the caller does not pass in the output buffer length, so the implementation cannot validate it Not necessary, because the caller is responsible for allocation. | | |
| ▲ | sweetjuly 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I am confused why you make out 32 bit int as being rare. Almost all devices that you'd reasonably connect to the internet at this point have int as 32 bits | |
| ▲ | mrheosuper 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The question can be reduce to "who do the length validation". In my case, if i write a public-facing API, i never trust the caller will do the correct thing, thus the caller must provide all the critical parameters, and i must validate all of them. | | |
| ▲ | userbinator 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | The question can be reduce to "who do the length validation". At the boundary where untrusted input becomes trusted. This is commonly known as the sanitisation/validation layer. |
| |
| ▲ | amluto 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > It's base64. 4/3 expansion; round it up and add padding. What's "nontrivial" about that? If you mean ceil(inlen * 4/3) + 1 (even if you use exact arithmetic), then you are passing too small a buffer and you will overflow. Maybe your “add padding” part fixes it? In any case, I think that the fact that this confusion is even possible proves my point. You should not need to read the manpage of a function you are calling in order to determine whether you have passed a large enough buffer to avoid overflow. Reading the manpage to get the function to not return an error would be a different story. | | |
| ▲ | userbinator 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | If you mean ceil(inlen * 4/3) + 1 (even if you use exact arithmetic), then you are passing too small a buffer and you will overflow. If you let untrusted input reach inlen and overflow that computation, you have already failed: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50570319 | | |
| ▲ | amluto 23 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Are you saying that any code that base64’s a string of attacker-controlled length is a mistake? | | |
| ▲ | Pinus 7 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I think userbinator thought that you meant that the calculation would overflow, while I think you meant that the calculation, even if not overflowing, would return the wrong value under some conditions and that subsequent code would then overflow the buffer. (As for what I think about the actual issue, I’m too sleepy to even try. Which is probably an indication of something. =) ) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| ▲ | userbinator 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I think CVSS 9.8 is exaggerated. This is not remotely anywhere near as serious as Heartbleed. It's an internal function which will fail if its input is far too long, but exploitability rests on how untrusted input can reach it; the key word being "untrusted". E.g. if you operate a base64 encoding service on the Internet that just reads all the data into memory at once and calls EVP_EncodeBlock(), that's exploitable. If you have a protocol that involves a block of data with a 16-bit length field which is passed to EVP_EncodeBlock(), that's 100% safe. For those wondering about TLS: speaking as someone who has written a TLS implementation, AFAIK neither base64 encoding nor decoding occurs in the protocol itself, and the longest length field is 24 bits (Hello stream). Certificate processing involves ASN.1 which does support arbitrarily-long integers, but that's a big hint to check that they're within a sensical range. |
| |
| ▲ | tptacek 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | (I'm a broken record on this so I'll keep it brief). The problem here is that the CVSS score is in the headline, as if it meant anything. But CVSS doesn't mean anything. It's a Ouija board; VR people jack it up to get attention, vendors nerf it to chill their customers out. Someone should design something better, and less malleable. | | |
| ▲ | csnover 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | A few years ago I participated in a study[0] about CVSS and apparently was very much in the minority in feeling that these scores are essentially useless. I have no idea what would actually shift the majority’s opinion on this, but I will at least echo your sentiment that everyone deserves something better. [0] https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.15259 | | |
| ▲ | tptacek 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | It's not an out-there opinion among vulnerability researchers, though. |
| |
| ▲ | vasco 15 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | CVSS would be fine if they shared full vector rather than adding up the score. The vector is representative of what. Going from what to "how bad" through making it a single number is where they messed up because the weights usually don't make sense from case to case. | |
| ▲ | userbinator 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I think tiny pieces of isolated code like this function simply cannot be assigned CVSS scores, because it's missing all the context and threat model around how it is used. Then again, given that I once had to respond to a report which assigned a similar amount of severity to the strlen() function claiming that it will read beyond its bounds if its input is missing a null terminator (DUH!), I'm not surprised at the lack of critical thought among a certain population in this industry. | |
| ▲ | solyin 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | At the end of the day, sysadmins care about "how fucked am I" from an email subject line. A replacement system would be "let me run a daemon on your network telling me what you run" with vendors telling me about the vulnerabilies and I'll tell you if you (the sysadmin) give a shit. Technically that's trivial, but who's gonna trust me to run a daemon like that on their network. Maybe you'd have luck with your public history, but that seems like quite the uphill battle. |
|
|
|
| ▲ | ansipunk 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I am not a system administrator, but I am getting a serious vulnerability fatigue, every single day there's at least two new vulnerabilities in major pieces of software, I'm just tired of seeing that everywhere and hearing that everywhere. Fellow system administrators must be having it much worse. |
| |
| ▲ | wry_xy an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | I see bugs being patched, and software improving. Bring em on. | | | |
| ▲ | ImHereToVote 39 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | This will lead to LLMs being embedded 24/7 into critical infrastructure. A "living" firewall and sysadmin. | |
| ▲ | raizer88 28 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | Don't tell me. I work for a bank and we have automated vuln checks on our code and dependencies and we can't release in pre-prod if we don't fix the cves. Basically since last year is 1 day you deploy new code and 2 days you deploy cve fixes. |
|
|
| ▲ | moezd an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| The more I see these posts, the more I'm convinced that "never reinvent the wheel" mentality we had so far in software engineering basically covered up a lot of lazy engineering, and we just pretended everything was fine. It's like these findings cross-pollinate. |
| |
|
| ▲ | VladVladikoff 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| :/
I really need a day off from patching servers. |
| |
| ▲ | roygbiv2 a minute ago | parent | next [-] | | Same! Just did a whole bunch of out of band patching, more on the weekend. Fun times. | |
| ▲ | staplehorse6553 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | If you stopped patching servers, you wouldn't be affected. Always use trusted, 5-10+ years old code. | |
| ▲ | pixl97 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Sorry buddy, back to the server mines for you! And yea, I'd really like a day where I'm not writing an email to customers about what they do and don't need to update regarding our software. | |
| ▲ | txdv 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | call in the agents |
|
|
| ▲ | Panzerschrek 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| That's why it's recommended to use size_t for passing sizes of buffers. It's unlikely to get overflow with it. In this particular case input buffer needs to have size larger than half of address space in order to trigger overflow, which isn't possible (64-bit systems usually have only 48 bits of actual address space, 32-bit systems don't allow allocating so large blocks). |
| |
| ▲ | wahern 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Not everybody recommends size_t. There's a sizeable community of people absolutely convinced most integers, including length and capacity integers, should be signed. And they stick to their guns even for C and C++. They have some very compelling logical arguments on their side, but IMO in languages like C and C++ they're just fatally unrealistic. | | |
| ▲ | uecker an hour ago | parent [-] | | Why unrealistic? I was in the unsigned camp a long time ago and switched to signed types for indexing and sizes, and this made many problems go a way. There was just a nginx issue that highlights how problematic the use of unsigned is in this context: CVE -2026-123007 |
| |
| ▲ | m00dy 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | never say never :) |
|
|
| ▲ | asveikau 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Seems like only OpenSSL 4 is impacted? What distros and systems use that? I feel like in the post heartbleed era, a lot of people are not including new features of upstream openssl as much as they used to. |
| |
| ▲ | agilob an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Arch pacman -Q | grep openssl
openssl 4.1.0-1
openssl-3 3.5.9-2
| |
| ▲ | daemonologist 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Well, Fedora 45 (with which I am composing this message). Fortunately it doesn't look like I need to patch anything at work though. |
|
|
| ▲ | globular-toast 22 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| So what's the timeline here? About a week ago (damn UIs that don't easily let you see the actual date) someone submitted a PR, but only two days ago the CVE was public. The PR is still not merged. Was the team let know in advance but ran out of time to patch or something? |
|
| ▲ | jerf 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| So, uh, like, any word on what the "9.8" actually means? Is this "an obscure feature nobody has on could with a bit of luck and a cosmic ray strike allow arbitrary code execution if you're one of the few people using it" or is this "if you have a socket with OpenSSL exposed to the internet you're already compromised" or what? |
| |
| ▲ | fulafel an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | This was possibly a rhetorical question but apparently it goes something like this - just a simple formula someone came up with that tries to model badness: # Hardcoded weights for AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
attack_vector = 0.85 # Network
attack_complexity = 0.77 # Low
privileges_required = 0.85 # None
user_interaction = 0.85 # None
confidentiality = 0.56 # High
integrity = 0.56 # High
availability = 0.56 # High
impact_sub_score = 1 - (1 - confidentiality) \* (1 - integrity) \* (1 - availability) # -> 0.91
impact = 6.42 \* impact_sub_score # -> 5.87
exploitability = (
8.22 \* attack_vector \* attack_complexity \* privileges_required \* user_interaction) # -> 3.88
score = impact + exploitability # -> 9.76
(using Github's values from https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-83xj-7xh4-4p7x)Interesting that the impact calculation treats C, I, A as equal. And of course a lot of those inputs are just human(?) supplied vibes and/or context dependent in your use case. | | | |
| ▲ | pixl97 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | So this might be very similar to Java4shell, though will need to be verified. This is another base64 encoder where it takes a blob and coverts it to base64. I'm assuming an attacker control bit of data could be passed to the function which then overflows. Not sure if it can attempt to control a valid address or not, but unlocked AI likely could pretty quick. |
|
|
| ▲ | shepherdjerred 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It feels to me the only way to beat LLMs finding vulnerabilities is to have LLMs (or LLMs paired with other AI methods) constantly monitor your infrastructure, traffic, database, etc. to ensure that nothing out of the ordinary is happening |
| |
| ▲ | tptacek 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I think so too; I think apart from pushing vulnerability research forward (which is important on its own merits just for computer science reasons), the major engineering challenge of this moment is figuring out how to make platforms resilient without rewriting everything; that could be better live-patching, it could be some weird monitoring thing, it could be automatic segregation and workload isolation. It's not "just keep up with the patches". That's going to be a losing strat. | |
| ▲ | fauchletenerum 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I'm not sure how cost effective or even viable that option would be. I think the only practical defense is some kind of baseline hardening at the OS or application level. Something like eBPF rules i.e. what Cilium Tetragon policies provide. Basically it seems like there's no way to guarantee that your application code can't be exploited in some novel way so your best option is to restrict them as much as possible. | | |
| ▲ | shepherdjerred 2 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I'm really just talking as a layman here. My feeling is that if we use traditional security approaches that seems like a losing strategy. You cannot just keep patching. I mean obviously you should, but that is not enough. LLMs are finding zero days in operating systems, language runtimes, everything. They will definitely be finding holes in your API. It is not a question of 'if'. |
| |
| ▲ | leptons 25 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | When Plex got hacked and my linux server had a cryptominer installed, I had no clue where to start fixing it. I loaded up Claude to analyze the system logs, and it told me what commands to run (and why) and the infection was gone in about 10 minutes. There's no way I would have known the many things I needed to do to fix and secure the system. I'm fairly new to Linux, and without the AI I would be helpless with some of the tricky things. | | |
| ▲ | shepherdjerred a few seconds ago | parent | next [-] | | This is very reactive though -- imagine you were a business. You'd be screwed. Your data is already gone. | |
| ▲ | kryptiskt 3 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | The right thing to do in that case is to save whatever data you need from the server and then nuke it thoroughly, which means all the disks should be wiped, don't keep the old UEFI partition around, and reinstall. It would preferable to skip the first step and get the data from a source that wasn't compromised, but sometimes you have bring out the hazmat suits to recover stuff from compromised systems. |
|
|
|
| ▲ | sippingabonedry 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I see the OpenBSD guys are all over the PR (deservedly) shitting all over the proposed fixes so I assume LibreSSL may be impacted? Or are they just providing free advice and color commentary? |
| |
| ▲ | collinfunk 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I'm not really involved in OpenSSL, aside from a few tiny changes and commenting on a few things that affected GNU coreutils. However, I have seen Bob, whom I assume you are referring to based on the profile picture, participate in many discussions. I wouldn't infer too much from it. | | |
| ▲ | bentley 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Bob is a member of the Engineering & Standards team at the OpenSSL Corporation. https://openssl-corporation.org/leadership.html | |
| ▲ | sippingabonedry 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Do the projects collaborate closely since the split? My history is admittedly fuzzy. Sometimes the fix can be worse than the bug. Like patching a hole in the wall. | | |
| ▲ | wahern 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Yes, they collaborate. BoringSSL and libressl especially, which IIRC share some of the same developers. But OpenSSL has it's own priorities and vision, which sometimes (often?) clashes with the sensibilities of the BoringSSL and libressl developers. Because OpenSSL is still the de facto standard bearer and developer target, it can get frustrating for the libressl and BoringSSL developers, especially when they zig and OpenSSL decides to zag. |
|
| |
| ▲ | aaronbwebber 36 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Describing the comments on this PR as "shitting all over the proposed fixes" seems wildly out of proportion? This is direct, productive feedback on a PR that led to a consensus and approval on an appropriate fix in ~a week, we don't need to make the OS process sound worse than it is. | |
| ▲ | bvttf 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I think the second, LibreSSL was forked before OpenSSL v3 and this only impacts OpenSSLv4. |
|
|
| ▲ | m00dy 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| >>I am really worried about the negative return value being added. Existing third party callers might not be ready to handle this correctly (i.e. if they cast the return to size_t without checking). Could we instead return 0? (In all the added error returns in this PR.) Rust fixes it. |
| |
| ▲ | sippingabonedry 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Be sure to let us know when your equivalent Rust crypto library is available. | | |
| ▲ | m00dy 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | we don't need many crypto libraries, maybe just one for the whole world, written in Rust and then all functions are math-proofed. | | |
| ▲ | uecker 28 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | A crypto library written in Rust would not be available everywhere, so can not be the only one. And if you formally verify the code, you can also formally verify that it is memory safe, so there is not much point to have it in Rust.
Crypto has properties which may be difficult to verify though. If you want a safe interface that does not require passing random sizes around in extra arguments, this can also be done in C. | |
| ▲ | _ache_ an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It's not just "math-proofed".
You need a lot more to be a crypto library. Like time-constant, and it's hard to be time-constant in a performance optimised language like Rust. LLVM is doing some magic, and you don't want any magic in a crypto library. | |
| ▲ | td521534f12 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | You'd probably need a second one for FIPS. | |
| ▲ | staplehorse6553 an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Does the alpha-stage WIP code you call 'Rust' compile for 32-bit yet? No? Ok. |
| |
| ▲ | cyberax 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | You rang? https://github.com/rustls/rustls |
|
|
|
| ▲ | vasco 20 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] |
| If the first replies I got from maintainers were those I'd tell them to fuck off then and keep having a broken library. They are like stackoverflow curmudgeons and it's not surprising other libraries appeared - who would want to deal with this. |