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▲ vlovich123 4 hours ago

> BTW, OpenSSL seems to be a rather low quality implementation of a very low quality set of APIs. Stay away.

We’ve known this for well over two decade since heartbleed yet for some reason Linux distros haven’t migrated off of it

▲dcrazy 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

For those too young to remember 2014, Heartbleed led to both BoringSSL and LibreSSL being forked from OpenSSL.

▲stock_toaster 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

And also led to Amazon's s2n-tls and libcrypto being released around 2015 too as I call.

EDIT: found the release announcement - June 2015 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/introducing-s2n-a-new-...

▲b112 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I wonder. Realistically, Boring and Libre haven't taking off. I measure that by most use and default deploys. But with LLMs, we may be entering a new world.

In that world, certainly some projects may be impervious to fixes. We've all seen projects that basically eschew all change, and ignore issue trackers, and are basically dead.

But the ones which still live? Eventually this first wave of LLM derived fixes will get through the old churn. Presumably, code will improve dramatically. If that's so, OpenSSL will become "good code". And the same with old legacy projects which are still hanging around.

Meaning... will legacy simply exist forever? Our two forks above will likely fade away, if openssl's code becomes clean as can be.

▲morkalork 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

TIL it's 2036

▲wahern 3 hours ago | parent [-]

To be fair, frustrations with OpenSSL long preceded Heartbleed. Heartbleed was just the final straw for those who forked libressl and BoringSSL.

And to be fair to OpenSSL, it was one of the first widely used crypto libraries, along with Netscape's NSS. Setting aside the reasonablebess of the initial choices, the rapid uptake meant those choices were difficult if not impossible to completely unwind, particularly the style and typing of parameters and error reporting. Even today debates rage about signed vs unsigned, etc, in C and other languages. (But suffice it to say there are still alot of unforced errors, IMO, such as implicit output buffer sizes.)

▲DANmode 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Not breaking userspace is more important than security………

▲Skunkleton 35 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

"not breaking userspace" refers to kernel development. OpenSSL is userspace.

▲yjftsjthsd-h 26 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Paraphrasing to "don't make breaking API/ABI changes for projects consuming your API/ABI" doesn't materially change a reasonable point. (And I generally agree with that point, although I confess openssl specifically really strains my view)

▲charcircuit 30 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

And this is why the Linux Desktop will never go mainstream. You should never break apps at all, the OS's API surface goes beyond just the kernel.

▲vasco 34 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

Yeah, we all know users would rather be reliably hacked than unreliably safe.

▲CrimsonCape an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

I just don't get it; this is a task to hand to an LLM, "go rebuild OpenSSL, use Rust (no mistakes)" and have it churn through a greenfield implementation. Then open a PR =). Why hasn't this happened yet? The fact that the LLM will write tests and deal with all the compiler errors probably puts it lightyears ahead.

▲brianpane an hour ago | parent | next [-]

There’s already a Rust TLS library, rustls, that’s relatively mature (10 years in development, a couple of paid maintainers, robust development and release processes). It’s not a drop-in replacement for OpenSSL, though. There’s a companion project to build an OpenSSL-compatible wrapper API for it, but that’s not as far along. Interestingly, while rustls has a plug-in API that lets you choose your favorite Rust encryption library for the low-level operations (aws-lc-rs, Ring, Graviola, etc), those libraries all tend to contain a lot of assembly … not just for speed, but because it’s easier to avoid side channel timing vulnerabilities in assembly.

▲dralley 6 minutes ago | parent [-]

The side channels issue is where rust crypto libraries are currently the weakest

▲b112 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

LLMs have a bottleneck, human review. And human review is absolutely required at this stage (the future is unknown). A rust built LLM only reviewed SSL library would be a recipe for disaster.

Beyond that, when it comes to exceptionally complex APIs, forward thinking implementation, and revising the 'way things are done'? These are weak points for LLMs. If you don't know how to write OpenSSL(or its replacement), and don't understand all its quirks, and the entire industry surrounding it, you cannot be the human driving the LLM successfully.

There is no way for a human to catch all the design mistakes an LLM will make, otherwise.

People seem to get upset, when I say this, for reasons I cannot fathom. However, we need to have a mental model of how we trust LLM output, and the 'new junior' is great for that. Especially considering that every day, is a new day for an LLM, its context window always loses yesterday.

So consider LLMs as an eager, intelligent, incredibly well read junior, just out of college. And on their third day of work.

Zero real world experience. Constant review required.

Would you want that junior to design, build, and write test scripts for a library to underpin the entire internet?

▲fock an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

you don't get credit for that because it is clear you are not very skillful at what AI-bros value most, namely manipulating other nerds...

if you look at the commit history of OpenSSL, you can easily notice how a lot of people started contributing once their clanker got up to speed. They are very happy to rip out weird C and replace it with assembler or intrinsics. Rip out lists of characters formatted as a single string and replace them with array syntax, each char quoted.