| > What if there's a god, but he punishes humans for believing he exists, just for fun? Where's your wager now? That's the equivalent of Russell's teapot - an imagined, unfalsifiable proposition. But Pascal's wager was anchored to specific attested propositions: specifically, the gospel of Jesus (repent of sin and call to him, he's paid for it and will save you from judgment and eternal separation from God if you do) rooted in the historical events of his verbal claim to be the son of God, followed by his death and resurrection, witnessed by many. You may agree or disagree, but what you are affirming or denying is at least concrete and specific. |
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| ▲ | roarcher 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > But Pascal's wager was anchored to specific attested propositions: specifically, the gospel of Jesus Right, but that's the problem with it. It assumes that there are only two possibilities: no god, or the god of the New Testament. Betting that Pascal's god exists isn't the safe choice that the wager makes it out to be, because it's equally possible that some other god exists (or just some other version of the Abrahamic god, say Allah or the pre-messiah god of Israel) and your faith in Jesus is just going to piss him off. Believe in Jesus all you want, but Pascal's Wager is a pretty terrible reason to do so. Edit to add: Your description is also not even the only possible New Testament god. Some (myself included) would argue that that particular image of god was painted more by Paul than by Jesus. | | |
| ▲ | TimTheTinker 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | > It assumes that there are only two possibilities: no god, or the god of the New Testament. I don't think so. It isn't concerned with giving any description or shape to the negative case, just an invitation to consider a particular positive case. There are positive cases for other gospels and worldviews... there's nothing wrong with invitations to engage with one or another. As science has shown, the truth is best discerned by considering each theory individually (and continually) against evidence. Not "dark matter sounds cool, I think that's true, not MOND" but rather considering each individually for internal consistency and against observation and predictiveness. "It does not make any difference how beautiful your guess is, it does not make any difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is — if it disagrees with experiment, it is wrong." --Richard Feynman | | |
| ▲ | roarcher 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Sure, you can consider the issue in isolation: If you accept the axiom that there is either no god or the Pauline Christian god, then Pascal's wager makes sense (assuming that that god doesn't care about sincerity, which is certainly not my reading of the gospels, but that's a different issue). If you want to do a fun thought experiment, you might accept that axiom. If you genuinely believe that an eternal future of unbearable torture hinges on your choice, you might want to cover your philosophical bases a bit more thoroughly. | | |
| ▲ | TimTheTinker 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | That may be true, but embodied human life and history provides a base set of axioms by which to evaluate further axioms -- starting with the 5 senses. So yeah, Christianity has some axioms, but it doesn't ask people to merely accept them on faith; that's a mischaracterization. The invitation is to consider (a) how good the evidence really is for your current worldview, and then (b) how good is the evidence for Christianity's truth claims. Pascal goes one further and suggests considering what you have to gain and lose either way -- which may have been helpful for some when the alternative was mere atheism or unbelief in Christianity, but I disagree that it's helpful in all cases. People coming from Islam have a tremendous amount to lose, including their family, community, livelihood, reputation, and the risk of being condemned eternally by Allah for committing shirk in embracing Christianity, if Islam is true. I think a better question to ask, whatever someone's background, is "do you want to know the truth, even if it turns out you don't believe it now, and are you willing to follow it no matter what the cost?" |
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| ▲ | pixl97 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | >just an invitation to consider a particular positive case. The problem is you can't do this with made up bullshit because the creators of said bullshit can create any number of paradoxes to trap you. Reality at least has to be self consistent. | | |
| ▲ | TimTheTinker 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | > you can't do this with made up bullshit Are you saying the case for Scientology can't fail when considering its internal consistency and correspondence to reality? I would think its positive case isn't that strong... it's more like an attack chain with an arbitrary payload (including money extraction) for minds with certain vulnerabilities than a coherent set of truth claims (let alone truth claims with at least some evidence in favor). |
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| ▲ | Maxatar 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Pascal's wager was not at all anchored to any specific attestations, you are taking his wager and reinterpreting it to give it some kind of legitimacy that it never originally held. The entire point of the wager was to justify belief in the absence of sufficient evidence, by appealing to the asymmetry between infinite reward and finite cost. If your now arguing that Christianity is more credible because of historical evidence, so be it and stick to it but you've abandoned Pascal's wager and moved on to an entirely different argument. | | |
| ▲ | anonymous908213 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | > by appealing to the asymmetry between infinite reward and finite cost The supposed asymmetry only holds in a framework that assumes the Christian God as the only possibility. The point is that it's possible for there to be a god that isn't Yahweh, and that god might sentence you to eternal torment for believing in Yahweh, so in fact believing in Yahweh can result in infinite cost, destroying the value of the wager. | | |
| ▲ | Maxatar 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Not at all. The asymmetry holds whenever the other possibilities don't introduce an opposing infinite penalty for belief. There could be countless other gods who are indifferent to Christian belief, reward it, or impose only finite penalties, and the asymmetry would remain intact. The hypothetical god who punishes believers of a Christian God is a legitimate objection to Pascal's wager, but it doesn't establish the original assertion I objected to. You're confusing demonstrating that the asymmetry isn't guaranteed with demonstrating that it requires Christianity to be the only possibility. Those are two entirely different claims. | | |
| ▲ | pixl97 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | >The asymmetry holds whenever the other possibilities don't introduce an opposing infinite penalty for belief. Or in a stronger argument. It only works when you're the only possible infinity that exists with the set of possible requirements. The moment another infinity exists that has even a single conflicting requirement then it falls apart. Using language we can create infinite conflicting infinities which makes Pascals wager a weak argument in a generalized set. Now, if someone vibe coded up Roko's basalisk into a real entity that was copying humans and torturing them for eternity that's a different story, at least until someone made a second incompatible basalisk. | | |
| ▲ | TimTheTinker 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | I agree Pascal's wager is generally weak. But I think the strongest reason it's weak is because people in other worldviews, particularly Islam, have a tremendous amount to lose if they convert to Christianity but it turns out Islam is true. | | |
| ▲ | pixl97 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | >but it turns out Islam is true. I may be misinterpreting this but Lol, wut. | | |
| ▲ | TimTheTinker 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | I'm just saying from the viewpoint of people in Islam (or in Islamic nations)... the tradeoffs look a lot different from that perspective. Almost nothing in common with a 17th century French philosopher in Christian Europe |
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