Remix.run Logo
▲ CVE-2026-111943: Compromised Intermediate Certificate Authority(nvd.nist.gov)
251 points by keks24 5 hours ago | 78 comments
▲mort96 2 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

What's this link doing here? This page is about the Go update which rejects the bad certificates if they exist in the system trust store

▲keks24 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Gentoo Linux users are adviced to update the package "app-misc/ca-certificates" to version "20260816.3.125" or higher!:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=app-misc/ca-certificates-20260816.3.125"
To check via "curl":

    $ curl --url="https://dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/"
    $ curl --url="https://dv-g3b-aaa-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/"
They should return:

    curl: (60) SSL certificate OpenSSL verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20)
    More details here: https://curl.se/docs/sslcerts.html

    curl failed to verify the legitimacy of the server and therefore could not
    establish a secure connection to it. To learn more about this situation and
    how to fix it, please visit the webpage mentioned above.
---

* GLSA 202610-01: https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202610-01

* https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/

▲ 3 hours ago | parent [-]
[deleted]
▲pelzatessa an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Worth noting that people on RedHat still haven't received proper updates, only a workaround that disables two Comodo root certificates that were used to sign the emudhra certificates.

https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026... - "Ongoing"

▲gilrain an hour ago | parent [-]

RHEL also got the PHP patches hours after Debian.

I chose AlmaLinux last time I needed to, and it's been a great way to access the ecosystem — I heartily recommend it as a free RHEL! — but these past few days have me looking in envy at Debian. Corporate stability hasn't been what I expected.

▲vanschelven 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Python users may need to take their own separate steps, see this discussion:

https://discuss.python.org/t/information-for-python-users-re...

▲rolosa an hour ago | parent | next [-]

This is such a clusterfuck. I use so many containers in my home lab and various local installations and stuff. Honestly, I have no idea what I'm even supposed to do at this point because I'm not a full time developer.

▲ahartmetz 31 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Well, that is what people who have been around the block a few times have been saying about containers since just about forever. "I don't want to be an admin for my n software packages, I'll use containers!" - now you are the admin of n containers, except with worse tools than your distro and no upstream support.

▲Winfred-zz 2 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

I use some rules and a few generated scripts and have a LLM handle the management of the containers. Security through a ssh gateway, allows them to deploy/remove containers and then the rule is to stay at least two weeks behind on releases, unless the latest release is security related, which it figures out by reading the release notes.

I ran watchtowerr before, but I think this is a smarter way to do it.

▲jrmg 7 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

And since before that, when we started turning to additional packages managers installed with package managers. Pip etc. mean that an “apt upgrade” isn’t enough, when it really “should” be (used to be) in a well managed system.

Then we layered _another_ level of package management on top with Flatpak etc.

I don’t think anyone has _really_ been - in practice - able to understand how many versions of Python (or shells or ruby or Perl etc…) are installed on any system for a decade or two now.

[Yes, I use all these things - it’s so hard _not_ to and still use modern software or participate in modern software development…]

▲le-mark 25 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

One could say comeuppance is a dish best served cold. So cold people don’t even know it’s been served. All the old sys admins remember!

▲iririririr an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

don't worry. if you're in this situation with this attitude, you're likely running out of date container base images and whatnot.

i highly suggest you forget about containers, learn about systemd unit file hardening, and then you only have to play sysadmin to your base os and the binary for the program you want to run.

▲ransom1538 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

"Hey claude this is the cve I need you to fix [link]"

Takes about 20 seconds. Depending if you need to hit enter.

▲bigfishrunning 36 minutes ago | parent [-]

cool cool cool. Don't understand what you're doing, and keep not understanding what you're doing. the agents are infallible after all, and who cares about properly verifying certs anyway? that's nerd shit.

▲tesnorindian an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

uv should be your friend.

▲insanitybit 41 minutes ago | parent [-]

uv defaults to its own trust store afaik lol

▲vanschelven 38 minutes ago | parent [-]

maybe they meant it "should" be your friend but actually isn't in this case :-)

▲1gargoyle an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

Welcome to corporate

▲albert_e 33 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

> Failure to do so could result in monster-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against TLS clients, including python.org and pypi.org .

Monster?

▲jl6 22 minutes ago | parent [-]

Gender-neutral variant of man-in-the-middle. They should have just used something less controversial like master-in-the-middle.

▲morkalork 2 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Monkey-in-the-middle would've worked since someone could monkey with your packets and it's already an established name for a children's game

▲riffraff 14 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

To be fair, a monster is scary so it fits. Malice in the middle perhaps would have been less confusing.

▲darkwater 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

This is news for NIST but old news generally speaking, being the eMudhra debacle. Or am I missing something?

▲ale42 3 hours ago | parent [-]

It's the Go version of it, I think.

▲colinmarc 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Go is not vulnerable in the same way software using webpki is, because it generally uses the system trust store. However, this change is about golang proactively blocking the certs, so that even if your OS doesn't update, it still won't trust them.

https://github.com/golang/go/issues/82345

▲darkwater 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

But the Go version is as well old news, actually it was one of the first stories about eMudhra appearing on the HN homepage yesterday.

▲asqueella 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

This seems to be about ‘go’ proactively blocking emudhra certs even though the system trust store is out of date? https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6809

▲philipwhiuk 3 hours ago | parent [-]

"proactively" doing some work.

The problem is Golang has it's own trust store. So you don't benefit from OS patching.

▲sspiff 3 hours ago | parent [-]

That's not the case, Go uses the system store with an additional revoke/deny list in crypto/x509 because it allows updating a deployed application on an out of date or slow moving platform or OS.

This CVE is literally just "versions of the Go deny list don't contain the eMuhdra revokation yet". Older versions of Go will still deny certs signed through the compromised certificate if the system store already has the update.

It's an or situation, not and.

▲freakynit 39 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

eMudhra 1FA OTP Login Bypass: https://mastodon.catgirl.cloud/@49016/117475921584308861

▲wilkystyle 16 minutes ago | parent [-]

[dead]

▲jmclnx 3 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Slackware also updated a-certificates yesterday (Wed Oct 21 00:53:24 UTC 2026). The curl commands keks24 mentioned fails as expected

https://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/slackware/slackware64-15.0/Change...

To check, from keks24:

     % curl --url="https://dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/"
     % curl --url="https://dv-g3b-aaa-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/"
▲vanschelven 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Yesterday's discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50166579

▲zkmon 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Great. The technology has progressed enough to kill the existing technologies. It's like the fish in a pool creating a shark that eats away all the fish while the fish proudly announce that their great creation (shark) as the frontier progress for their fish race.

▲cedilla 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Here a CA derived a secret key from the number 4.

If you think "that's weird to see such a small number in key generation" than you're one step ahead of whoever generated that key.

Unfortunately, unlike with RSA, small primes are not apparent in elliptic cryptography.

▲GreenWatermelon 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Oh my God it's literally this XKCD https://xkcd.com/221/

▲shagie 6 minutes ago | parent [-]

They should have upgraded to 5 (see today's xkcd alt text https://xkcd.com/3314/ )

▲cobychapple an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

RFC 1149.5 FTW

▲jkahrs595 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> Here a CA derived a secret key from the number 4

https://xkcd.com/221/

▲wiredfool 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Nor small composites, apparently.

▲valeg 4 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Create the problem, sell the solution

▲colinmarc 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

The eMudhra CA compromises had nothing to do with LLMs? But I love the vibes.

▲prodigycorp 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Agents have dramatically increased the ability to poke at every single surface out there. I would be surprised if the researcher who found this wasn't assisted by a llm.

▲renhanxue an hour ago | parent [-]

The researcher in question has publicly stated[0] that he wanted to try Google's paranoid_crypto tool[1], so he ran it on some roots as a quick proof-of-concept, and the first thing that happened was that it detected these intermediates. He also states he's been running a lot of certificate linters so this was just the next logical step I guess.

[0]: https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-polic...

[1]: https://github.com/google/paranoid_crypto

▲Sophira an hour ago | parent [-]

That was an enlightening read. I find it incredible that apparently Google themselves don't use the existing corpus of certificates as a test for paranoid_crypto.

▲palata 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> It's like the fish in a pool creating a shark

What a weird comparison...

▲RazorX 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

This is basically the whole idea of the novel War with the Newts

▲gilrain an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

What are you talking about?

▲galadran 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/

▲imeron 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

It's down for me, are they on PHP? :D

▲tom1337 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I'd assume hugged to death

▲keks24 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Try this: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-111943

▲ColinWright 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Up for me, but slow to load.

▲asimovDev 2 hours ago | parent [-]

it's been slow for me since yesterday, i chalked it up to PHP CVEs + throttling a VPN user

▲charlieyu1 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

We are in the era of 6 digit CVE now

▲xacky 2 hours ago | parent [-]

A lot of software is going to be forced to update or retire soon, all unpatched software should be retired off the internet immediately because AI agents are in waiting.

▲chrisco255 an hour ago | parent | next [-]

The death of security by obscurity

▲edot 32 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

Yeah, the entire internet is a dark forest now.

▲accountrequired 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Related (2 days ago): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50160877

▲alt227 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Im guessing this only affects Go? But I am guessing that from the nist page as none of the headlines mention it at all.

▲grey-area 3 hours ago | parent [-]

No it affects everybody, but most browsers/OSs etc have updated already. This is just a workaround Go put in case the underlying OS has not been updated. Not sure why this link is on the front page as it duplicates previous posts and confuses people, I think it should be merged.

Here is the original story: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50166579

▲alt227 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Thanks for clarifying

▲blandflakes 2 hours ago | parent [-]

As of last night the AWS Corretto JDK still ships a trust store that trusts those compromised certs, too.

▲dathinab 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

It's a bit surprising that this took ~1.5days to end up on HN.

▲EwanToo 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

It didn't

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50166579

▲vultour 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

It was here yesterday, this is just another good opportunity to farm some points.

▲contingencies 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Fix for OSX - put this in ~/.zshrc:

  export CURL_CA_BUNDLE="$(brew --prefix)/etc/ca-certificates/cert.pem"
To verify, log in to a new shell and run

  curl https://dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
▲colinmarc 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

TL;DR:

The very urgent uv/certifi/etc releases (and yet-to-be-done bun release) are about removing the compromised CAs as described here:

https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/

In other words, that software bundled the compromised certs into the binary, so upgrading it is the only way to remove them.

This is about Go proactively blocking intermediates. Which shouldn't strictly be necessary as long as your OS has removed or distrusted the CAs (on my laptop, macOS has done that, although it seems like it did so in a way not all tools have access to; for example, rustls-platform-verifier respects it, but rustls-webpki still loads the bad CAs from the system trust store).

edit: forgot I can't use code blocks on HN

▲t_mahmood 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> edit: forgot I can't use code blocks on HN

  You can, two space at the start of each line
▲fabioborellini 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

I wonder if they made this change with an assumption that the root CAs wouldn't be distrusted later same day, too.

▲speedgoose 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Cock-up or conspiracy?

▲dspillett 2 hours ago | parent [-]

Any sufficiently advanced stupidity is indistinguishable from malice.

▲charlieyu1 an hour ago | parent [-]

I have seen way more malice pretending to be just stupid than the actual stupidity

▲ritiksanfy 42 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

[flagged]

▲fr2029r 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

[dead]

▲couldbe 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

[dead]

▲ 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]
[deleted]
▲ 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]
[deleted]