What a coincidence, I've also picked up inferentialism but never really got into it.

I'm interested in the reversal that Sellars proposes - it seems clear to me that "representation" is not prior to the space of reasons, despite how unintuitive it is.

> An LLM encodes the normative regularities of our linguistic/conceptual games into its weights, but it cannot be a real participant in our games because it is incapable of staking durable commitments or changing its dispositions over time.

I see no reason why this can't be the case in the future, even though I think inferentialist-based theories are generally strong. Can't you force LLM's (or whatever AI architecture will exist in a decade) to stake durable commitments itself, then? They're at least autonomous enough to run computers. I agree that that is a core part to true meaning & autonomy, but nobody just lets them yet. I don't think inferentialism is a consciousness-based argument, either, so that escape hatch isn't available. I also don't think this is a necessary condition to engage in the space of reasons (but maybe then I'm misunderstanding it, or retreating to a more Sellarsian understanding). Could you explain on this more?

Though again, I only have the book sitting on my desk, and I haven't cracked it open...

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RGS1811 4 hours ago | parent [-]

I actually agree with you. LLMs could become participants in the future, but this would require (1) durability of real awareness over time (an architecture change from the current fixed-weights + transient context architecture) and (2) that humans grant them the status of equal participants (probably not a terribly high bar given how people already treat these things). I'm not aware of any real progress toward (1), and all the stand-ins people have developed live in the context layer or textual artifacts, which are poor stand-ins for durable memory.

And yeah, consciousness based arguments are bunk IMO. It's clear that LLMs are in a basic sense "aware", and even to some extent "sapient" (in Brandom's usage), i.e. they can justify claims and object to things at least locally. I follow Rorty on the question of consciousness, which is to say that consciousness has no deeper meaning in practice beyond "are you awake", and in philosophical discussion it's largely a proxy for "are you one of us" in some amorphous sense.

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PaulDavisThe1st 4 hours ago | parent [-]

Well that's too bad, since Rorty completely misses the point on consciousness.

Consciousness, the interesting part anyway, is qualia, or the "it is like something to be me" as Nagel put it.

Intention, as Dennett used it in his book "The Intentional Stance" is the "are you one of us" angle, and is distinct from consciousness because as the book title suggests, it is a stance taken with respect to some other system (person, cat, dog, turtle, LLM) rather than a description of subjective experience.

So I think it is your (and Rorty's) positions that are bunk. It is very, very far from clear that LLM's are in any basic sense "aware" let alone "sapient". They are extraordinarily able to manipulate language in a way that leads to text generation that has traditionally been assumed to indicate consciousness and/or intelligence. But we have no way of knowing if it is like anything to be an LLM, even though most of us are busy taking the Intentional Stance towards them.

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RGS1811 4 hours ago | parent [-]

I guess I'd say that your qualia aren't a something, but they're not a nothing either. We can't say what they are. They're not publicly describable, and therefore not publicly attributable. As Wittgenstein would say, "They cancel out."

And as I think Dennett himself would say, qualia are just Sellars's Given rearing its ugly head again.

	▲	PaulDavisThe1st 3 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Well, while I love much of Dennett's work, I emailed him after "Consciousness Explained" was published to say that I was disappointed that it appeared to describe what we are conscious of, not how we are conscious. He sent back a short note to say "You're probably right".