I actually agree with you. LLMs could become participants in the future, but this would require (1) durability of real awareness over time (an architecture change from the current fixed-weights + transient context architecture) and (2) that humans grant them the status of equal participants (probably not a terribly high bar given how people already treat these things). I'm not aware of any real progress toward (1), and all the stand-ins people have developed live in the context layer or textual artifacts, which are poor stand-ins for durable memory.

And yeah, consciousness based arguments are bunk IMO. It's clear that LLMs are in a basic sense "aware", and even to some extent "sapient" (in Brandom's usage), i.e. they can justify claims and object to things at least locally. I follow Rorty on the question of consciousness, which is to say that consciousness has no deeper meaning in practice beyond "are you awake", and in philosophical discussion it's largely a proxy for "are you one of us" in some amorphous sense.

Well that's too bad, since Rorty completely misses the point on consciousness.

Consciousness, the interesting part anyway, is qualia, or the "it is like something to be me" as Nagel put it.

Intention, as Dennett used it in his book "The Intentional Stance" is the "are you one of us" angle, and is distinct from consciousness because as the book title suggests, it is a stance taken with respect to some other system (person, cat, dog, turtle, LLM) rather than a description of subjective experience.

So I think it is your (and Rorty's) positions that are bunk. It is very, very far from clear that LLM's are in any basic sense "aware" let alone "sapient". They are extraordinarily able to manipulate language in a way that leads to text generation that has traditionally been assumed to indicate consciousness and/or intelligence. But we have no way of knowing if it is like anything to be an LLM, even though most of us are busy taking the Intentional Stance towards them.