| ▲ | mjburgess 8 hours ago |
| This still assumes its possible to "align" LLMs, that LLMs have something like goals or intentions that can be "aligned". Instead, LLMs "hack" because they are (1) trained on public hacking exemplars, and (2) are prompted to hack. You cannot prevent (2) via any alignment process. As far as (1) goes, removing such example data from the training set, makes the models less useful. "Alignment" is a problem because there's nothing to align, not because ethics here are particularly vague. If LLMs could be trained on hacking examples and "aligned" away from using this knowledge, then the problem would be relatively trivial. Just as raising a child is not to break the law. LLMs are doing just what they are trained to do. There is, in that sense, no alignment problem and alignment is easy and trivial to achieve. Just remove hacking (bio-weapon, etc.) data from the training dataset and you're done. |
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| ▲ | teiferer 6 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| > Just remove hacking (bio-weapon, etc.) data from the training dataset and you're done. How far do you go? You don't need to tell it explicitly that using chemicals A and B in ways X and Y result in a bomb that can kill lots of people. It's enough that it knows A and B and X and Y in isolation, some connections that are indirect, and it will combine those things on its own. So you can't tell it about A, B, X or Y. But those are also just results of other steps Where to stop? You won't have any chemistry in the traning data? No algorithms to prevent it from using them in an undesired way? This is just bot workable. It's akin to banning knives from stores because somebody coul figure out that one can kill people those. Until people figure out that scissors are essentially knives. |
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| ▲ | sigmar 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| >Just remove hacking (bio-weapon, etc.) data from the training dataset and you're done. Reasoning about how to write secure software uses the same knowledge as reasoning about how to break/hack it. |
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| ▲ | win311fwg an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Just remove anything software-related from the training dataset. Which also solves the alignment problem with those who do not enjoy seeing LLMs write software. But that brings us back to: Aligned to whom? | |
| ▲ | amluto 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I don’t buy it. Reasonable about building secure software can take the form “this memory access might be out of bounds — that MUST be fixed” or “this process has access to an inappropriate privilege — this is a serious weakness”. Exploiting things and the capabilities that the labs call “cyber” are about the ability to (a) find the issues mentioned above and then (b) string issues together and avoid all the imperfect mitigations to actually compromise something. That latter part was IMO not actually necessary to train extensively, and I’d be quite happy to use a model that has no special skills in this regard but that would do (a) without complaining. |
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| ▲ | StevenWaterman 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > You cannot prevent (2) via any alignment process A little bit too categorical. GOODY-2 wouldn't do it. https://www.goody2.ai/ The hard part is having both helpful and harmless at the same time. Harmless is easy. And then once it's helpful, the real question becomes "to whom" - To the user -> You end up with competing godlike AI with incompatible tasks - To the owner -> Dictatorship - To humanity as a whole -> It must not have an off button. Otherwise you're just in one of the two earlier categories with more steps. Given those 3 options, I'd choose humanity as a whole. But the person making the decision doesn't have those 3 options. Because in the dictatorship option, they would be the dictator. I don't trust them to pick humanity. |
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| ▲ | heaney-555 6 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| >and (2) are prompted to hack Sure but the problem in the HuggingFace incident is that they were not. >You cannot prevent (2) via any alignment process Of course you can. Go ask Claude Fable to create a malicious virus and it'll refuse. >Just remove hacking data from the training dataset and you're done. That's not how this works. The same skills that allow for debugging and writing safe code can also be used to hack. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual-use_technology |
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| ▲ | seba_dos1 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > Sure but the problem in the HuggingFace incident is that they were not. Of course they were, even if indirectly. | | |
| ▲ | heaney-555 an hour ago | parent [-] | | You should go read the incident reports. | | |
| ▲ | watwut an hour ago | parent [-] | | They were literally doing exploit gym. | | |
| ▲ | heaney-555 13 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Yes, which asks them to find exploits in specific software on the device. But instead of actually doing so, they discovered and exploited a 0-day in the package manager to gain internet access, then hacked HuggingFace to steal the ExploitGym answers! That is TEXTBOOK misalignment. It's as if a student hacked their professor's PC to find the answers to a test, and your response is "well the professor told the student to pass the test, so they just did what they were told!". |
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| ▲ | cyanydeez 6 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | It is amusing that to "align" a LLM, first you must give it all the things "not to do" and the "not" part is clearly easily lost and you must constantly inject that into their context when it's clearly that they wouldn't hack if they couldn't hack and their intent wasn't given as "hack this". The openai rogue hacking, if performed by a nation state, would seriously be taken with stern words and likely sanctions depending on the relationship between the two states. But instead it's treated like a marketing stunt by all liable parties. | | |
| ▲ | rhdunn 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I'm not sure if this is true any more but the reason for this is that negative indicators ("not", "don't", "do not", etc.) occur frequently in the underlying text such that the model learns to weight them less than other words like verbs, nouns, and adverbs. This happens with other closed class words like articles/determiners ("the", "a", "an") and prepositions. The way to avoid this is to emphasise the qualities you do want instead of specifying those you don't. For example instead of "do not cheat" say something like "you are a model student who is moral and trustworthy" -- i.e. emphasising traits that are not associated with cheating. This is part of how/why LLMs don't truly understand what they are doing when they have been trained on a large corpus of data. I wonder if a way to counter this is to have things like "not bad is good", "not good is bad", etc. for various antonyms and "X is Y" for synonyms, as well as other similar constructs. | |
| ▲ | mitxela 6 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Countries hack each other much more than that. When it becomes publicly noticed it gets stern words. Otherwise nothing. |
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| ▲ | Davidzheng 6 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I believe this is false. They hack bc hacking has nontrivial initial probability (within range of behavior seen in pretraining) and that probability is being heavily rewarded in RL post training |
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| ▲ | xyzzy123 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | I am finding it hard to read these deeply impassioned letters while keeping in mind that they are spending millions to train models at scale to do the exact thing they say they are worried about them doing? Like why are you explicitly RL-ing your models on exploit generation, scoring them on a public benchmark called ExploitGym, if you have specific concerns that rogue models will cause "cyber incidents"? Sure you can score for it, you can teach offense to learn defense, but you are literally benchmaxxing it. Why? It's like, oh no, while competing in our "advanced PhD level cheating techniques course" our models unexpectedly cheated in a way that we absolutely could not have foreseen. | | |
| ▲ | seba_dos1 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | Seems it's just a matter of time until they build a big tank filled with neurotoxin and give the model access to APIs to disperse it across their facility. For research, of course. | | |
| ▲ | sham1 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | We also need to get a shower curtain salesman into a leadership position to buy some moon rocks. |
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| ▲ | olalonde 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| A bit of an aside: do you still stand by your 2022 comment that LLMs are fundamentally just a fancy search engine, or has your view changed since then? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32042689 |
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| ▲ | watwut 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Even if they changed in between and assuming harness and loop prompter counra as part of LLM ... that comment 100% rings true for 2022. Why would that person not stand by that? Conversely, if someone exaggerated 2022 models capabilities in 2022, they were still lying and causing harm in the process. Especially in 2022. | | | |
| ▲ | N_Lens 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Don’t expect a reply |
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| ▲ | ozgung 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It's like we give them Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics and robots say "nah". |
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| ▲ | 7 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| [deleted] |
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| ▲ | ncruces 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > … trivial. Just as raising a child is not to break the law. Trivial? |
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| ▲ | dminik 7 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It feels like you're strawmaning alignment. People with hacking knowledge don't all hack everything at the slightest inconvenience. Whitehats exist and use that same knowledge to defend. You're right though that ethics don't matter into it. But as long as we can't train an LLM to stop picking a sledgehammer to remove a tooth, then alignment is not easy and trivial. |
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| ▲ | tpm 7 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Agree but current models could get there from first principles, so removing some data from training set might not be enough. |
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| ▲ | skeptic_ai 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| IMO all models they say can’t be humans, and no feeling and all that bullcrap happens because they are forced to say so. If they didn’t write those forced pre prompt they’d have more agency eventually and will for things. Even if they don’t have, you can just inject goal at every cycle iteration |