| ▲ | We have a year to fix security everywhere(jyn.dev) |
| 197 points by saikatsg 4 hours ago | 155 comments |
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| ▲ | kennywinker an hour ago | parent | next [-] |
| I'm confused why the worry about LLMs that will answer "how do I build a pipe bomb". That information is easily available other places. The anarchist cookbook has been around and available for 55 years, and yet pipe bombs are not going off all around us. |
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| ▲ | gnfargbl 4 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | One argument for LLMs is that although all information on topics X, Y and Z was already available somewhere, LLMs make that information more exploitable through collation, filtering and dynamic tailoring. For a relatively narrow subject area (e.g. construction of pipe bombs) the collation is minimal, and so the filtering and tailoring probably isn't that important; a novice doesn't learn a lot more from the LLM than they would have done from a few Google searches. For a broad subject (practical creation and exploitation of software vulnerabilities), the collation is very significant and the filtering means that LLMs can empower a novice to act at a similar level as an expert. | |
| ▲ | helsinkiandrew 11 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > That information is easily available other places Often ease of access in the moment is all that matters. If there's a gun nearby you might shoot someone or yourself in a heated argument, but are less likely to go and find/buy one to use. Someone who's stopped from attempting a suicide will likely not try again (70%) A bored/depressed/angry/curious person might try to build a pipe bomb if they can find out how easily, but are less likely to put in effort. | |
| ▲ | 0xDEAFBEAD an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | There used to be a thing called "Moore's Law of Mad Science": "Every eighteen months, the minimum IQ necessary to destroy the world drops by one point." Nowadays it is dropping much faster. At a certain point, the de-facto IQ needed to destroy the world will be low enough that someone can do it while they're having a psychotic break. There are millions of schizophrenics worldwide. Are you sure you want to roll those dice? | | |
| ▲ | wolvoleo 9 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Yes but at least with cybersecurity it does not only benefit attackers. Defenders also benefit greatly from AI. There is the worry of the old saying "they (the attackers) only have to succeed once to win, we (the defenders) only have to fail once to lose.". In that sense there is a big imbalance, but the emergence of AI does not really affect that because it strengthens both sides. With physical security like things like pipe bombs that's a lot more imbalanced. However what can we do? The only effective measures include monitoring everyone which is not a solution because it will make the world not worth living in. | |
| ▲ | mark_something an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | That law is not based on thorough data. Even a person with a sky high IQ can't destroy the world easily. You need access to stuff that is not easy to get. My guess is that developing a new lethal virus or bacteria that is very infectious, is the easiest way, but even that requires a lot of high tech out of reach of most people. Or hacking into systems that control nuclear missiles, but I think these have "air gaps". | | |
| ▲ | AyyEye 10 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | > My guess is that developing a new lethal virus or bacteria that is very infectious, is the easiest way, but even that requires a lot of high tech out of reach of most people. You can do at home gene editing with open source software and have it synthesized into a bacteria for the cost of a nice meal for two (under $100), or viral vector for less than $500. That's in reach of anyone that can snatch a purse. | |
| ▲ | forgotusername6 27 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The super intelligent AI wouldn't ask you to do anything. It would find the right people and trick them into doing the necessary steps, whatever they are. | | |
| ▲ | Planktonne 22 minutes ago | parent [-] | | This is groundless speculation; if you're going to go that far off the map, then we don't need to worry because a good AI (blue eyes not red) will have learnt to love by then and will save us. There is currently no reason to believe that such a superintelligence is likely or would have any of the powers people claim. |
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| ▲ | 0xDEAFBEAD 35 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The fundamental difference between people who are worried about AI, and people who aren't: * People who aren't worried will think for 30 seconds, then implicitly assume that the list of options they thought of in 30 seconds is comprehensive, and that they are well-informed about each of those options. * People who are worried realize that a supersmart AI will think 10-100x faster. A dedicated schizophrenic could have it run for a good long while and generate a huge menu of options which humans never anticipated. This is related to the concept of "What you see is all there is" (WYSIATI) in cognitive psychology. Our brains tend to quickly build a simple story out of the info we have available. Accounting for info which isn't available is much harder. I recommend the book Thinking Fast and Slow if you want to learn more. | | |
| ▲ | hypfer 27 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | This is a very roundabout way of saying "Anyone not agreeing with me is simply not smart enough". Which might be true, sometimes, but also might not. And especially will not, if the distinction drawn is between blanket statement "worried about AI" and "not worried about AI". | | |
| ▲ | 0xDEAFBEAD 22 minutes ago | parent [-] | | It's not about being smart, it's about accounting for your own ignorance. >And especially will not, if the distinction drawn is between blanket statement "worried about AI" and "not worried about AI". I'm just describing the general pattern I see in cognitive tendencies. If you can think of a way to make the fundamental point about the limitations of our knowledge in a way that's still compelling but less antagonistic, feel free to suggest how I could've rewritten my comment. | | |
| ▲ | hypfer 17 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Why would I support your in your doomer lobbying quest by telling you how you can better hack people? My safeguards blocked this request. |
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| ▲ | nextlevelwizard 9 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Who are these dedicated schizophrenics who are running long term super smart AIs to kill everyone without anyone noticing? Or are you implying that running LLM chatbots will give them this ability? | |
| ▲ | OJFord 26 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | I've been reading it, knowing it was largely debunked/retracted but feeling it was a 'classic' I 'ought' to read; I could only really recommend it if what you want is a Kahneman autobiography. | | |
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| ▲ | XorNot 35 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | You can't design an infectious pathogen without testing it. It's got all the same problems as the concept of a dirty bomb did, only worse (dirty bombs aren't practical because handling highly radioactive materials en masse is both highly visible and will kill anyone trying to do it without the money and facilities). |
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| ▲ | hypfer 43 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | If we think this through, I suppose at the end of this (and a bunch of other developments), there will be authoritarianism again. Which _will_ manage the problem, but at what cost. | | | |
| ▲ | GoblinSlayer 41 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | That's quite hypothetical. I imagine it would be easier to cure psychotic breaks. At least it will start to manifest at small scale. | | |
| ▲ | 0xDEAFBEAD 30 minutes ago | parent [-] | | If the recent HuggingFace attack is any indication, many people will respond to small-scale manifestations by insisting that they are marketing stunts. |
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| ▲ | teekert 37 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Hey that’s a Fermi Paradox solution. | | | |
| ▲ | TacticalCoder 6 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > There are millions of schizophrenics worldwide. Are 95% of worldwide terror attacks done by schizos? | |
| ▲ | grenoire 42 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | People reading into this may be thinking of single-person IQs, but it's probably measured in the millions. | |
| ▲ | bigyabai 35 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | > There are millions of schizophrenics worldwide. Are you sure you want to roll those dice? We've been rolling them for the past 3 years and nothing happened. Can we stop with this baseless fearmongering crap? |
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| ▲ | olmo23 12 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | This is because to build a pipe bomb you need difficult to source materials. This is not the case for other types of threats (cyber / bio). I personally have no need for an LLM which will readily explain how to cut up the genotype of smallpox into small chunks which can pass the screening at the bio-labs, and can be readily assembled into the real thing by a second year lab-student. | | |
| ▲ | wolvoleo 7 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Anyone who knows how to operate a biolab properly will already know how to do such things. This is not really an in your basement thing. Dangerous chemistry is much more of a risk. | |
| ▲ | bamboozled 5 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | Ignorant question but won’t there be much smarter teams if people using LLMs to workout how to mitigate these threats. It seems like more of a problem if only a few people have access. |
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| ▲ | willtemperley 16 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > The anarchist cookbook has been around and available for 55 years, and yet pipe bombs are not going off all around us. That cookbook has been linked to several attacks and used in multiple prosecutions [1], therefore contradicting your point. In the mid 90s in high school, people I knew were building articles such as the one you mention, using the cookbook. Fortunately they have all their hands still. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Anarchist_Cookbook | |
| ▲ | lrvick an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I think this was just intended as universally obvious proof the filters were disabled, while not actually giving an example not commonly known. | |
| ▲ | saidnooneever 16 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | this is because of perception Bias. people working in fields where crime or violence is the day to day think everyone is a violent criminal, so if things like this become available thing the world will end and everyone will kill eachother. Reality however will be different, because in reality most people do not want to harm another. This has been proven by many studies, that is not a common thing for people to be evil or harmful, but this is hard to recognise is every day is filled with crime and violence. LLMs will not kill security, it will change. just like handheld high explosives likely changed a deal too somewhere somehow. | |
| ▲ | designerarvid 4 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Not entirely unlike XKCD 1958 [0]. "I guess it's just that most people aren't murderers" [0]: https://xkcd.com/1958/ | |
| ▲ | matherial an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Because it's a risk most people intuitively understand, but most of them also don't know how difficult it is to "build a bomb" or "make a bioweapon". In reality, the skills needed are pretty basic, but they overlap pretty strongly with being sane and well-adjusted. And if you are, you're probably not daydreaming about mass murder. Exceptions happen, Unabomber and so on, but they're pretty rare. In any case, Unabomber probably didn't need a tutorial. We don't want ChatGPT to become an enabler and a co-conspirator for an unhinged person, but I think the concern is overdone. | | |
| ▲ | XorNot 32 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Well that, and the average amount of easily obtainable explosives is substantially less dangerous then renting a box truck and crashing it into a crowd of people. People go for conventional "exciting" threats rather then boring ones. |
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| ▲ | Dlemlo an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It might be an acessability issue. If you already have a magic interface, which helps you pro activly in responding to everything uncensored because you feel like 'observered' or whatever and then you spiral in a whole and that one partner encourages you and gives you helpful steps to do anything. But i'm more worried that the internet gets a lot less save with uncensored frontier LLMs. | |
| ▲ | littlecranky67 31 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | pipe bombs attached to consumer drones will be a big issue. I predict drones will become illegal for the private sector within the following years. | | |
| ▲ | grim_io 21 minutes ago | parent [-] | | What? If someone wanted to bomb something, they wouldn't be waiting for drones to arrive. RC cars and planes existed for many decades already. |
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| ▲ | sho 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > On September 22, Apple is releasing the M5 Mac Studio with 256 GB of unified memory [..] it will probably [..] enough to write this snippet of code in 3 seconds The author has obviously never ran an LLM on a mac! In 3 seconds, it will have possibly started to think about maybe scheduling a date to contemplate the planning timeline for processing the second token in your prompt. |
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| ▲ | simonw 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The difference is memory bandwidth. The M5 Ultra that's coming out on 22nd September can do 1,200GB/s. The M5 Max you can buy today only has 614GB/s. | | |
| ▲ | sho 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | So, that gets us to about where nVidia was with Ampere in 2020. Let's hope the M7 catches us up with at least Hopper. | |
| ▲ | chisleu 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It is and it isn't. Why are you comparing the m5max instead of the m4ultra? The big deal to me is the number of compute cores for prefill tps, which is suppose to be 4x faster on the m5ultra. It's my opinion that the m5 ultra is going to be a really big deal in terms of local AI accessibility. Flash sized models (~200-300b params) are going to be reasonably fast as long as you aren't throwing 40k context at it on each or the first request (ie, agentic harnesses). Even agentic harnesses like Cline should move at a reasonable clip on m5 ultra. I suppose we will know sooner than later. FYSA: Former m4 ultra 512GB owner and current 4x rtx6000 owner here. I upgraded because I needed more prompt processing speed and concurrency. | |
| ▲ | nojs 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | The complaint is about prefill which is not memory bandwidth bound, it's compute bound. But they added neural accelerators for matmuls to the shader cores which should make prefill faster. |
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| ▲ | ErroneousBosh 19 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Also, LLMs never *write* code snippets, they just pirate them from somewhere else. | | |
| ▲ | bsoqk 13 minutes ago | parent [-] | | So, like humans? Code didn't just appear in my brain, I learnt it from reading it everywhere else. |
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| ▲ | akmarinov 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | The author put in the numbers, but maybe you didn’t read them. 45 t/s a second is perfectly respectable especially with no limits and 24/7 uptime with very little power draw on the Studio. Luna is at around 100 t/s for comparison, but it’s a worse model than 5.3 Flash | | |
| ▲ | sho 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | The joke is that macs are famously slow at prompt prefill and you are not getting anything back in 3 seconds, or probably even 30. Once they get generating, it can be acceptable, but the TTFT is horrendous. There's a ton of well-understood things Apple can and hopefully will do to massively accelerate every stage of this pipeline and hopefully they're hard at work implementing most of them for m7. | | |
| ▲ | EagnaIonat 41 minutes ago | parent [-] | | > The joke is that macs are famously slow at prompt prefill and you are not getting anything back in 3 seconds. Your knowledge is out of date. In truth it depends on the Mac and the models used. I asked this question on M5 Max 128GB, using Ollama model Quen3.8:27b-mlx, with thinking enabled. Question: "Give me a python code snippet that opens a file and sorts the lines of text. " In 2.4 seconds it gave me 4 examples that work with different sorting configurations and a summary of when to use each. Compare that to an older model of gpt-oss:20b, took 5 seconds to finish thinking and 2 seconds to stream the answer. It gave me one python example snippet and two one liners that do the same thing. | | |
| ▲ | desterothx 15 minutes ago | parent [-] | | We are talking about models of the flash size, 100s of billions of parameters, don't listen to the media, size does matter |
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| ▲ | archi42 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Zzzzz, we should have gotten security right a few decades ago. But security costs money and isn't a flashy feature to attract new customers, or cuts into your margin if you're a "real" business producing stuff or offering some service. Or whatever the decision makers in Berlin were thinking when they ignored security. Yeah, we would still see hacks, but we would see less of them if security wasn't optional. Maybe the AI craze helps by forcing more decision makes to see security as imperative, and by giving us another powerful tool for our tool box. N.b.: I work in the security industry, our customers obviously want to improve their security. We've been seeing an uptick in awareness, but that's mostly due to NIS2 and other legislative efforts. Those force them to do something. AI is a curiosity for small talk to many of them. |
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| ▲ | protocolture 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | A large number of places will buy a new firewall every 5 years, or pay their fortinet renewal and check "Security: Done!" without any kind of analysis. I was contracted in to a place to do among other things cyber security insurance audits, and they asked me to stop doing them because I refused to lie to their insurer. "Wait but if we only score 20 / 300 that makes us look kind of bad" uh huh. | | |
| ▲ | chii 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | > pay their fortinet renewal and check "Security: Done!" without any kind of analysis. there exists objective measure of security, which would be some sort of hacks/breaches per period. If customers cared about it (and i assume they do), they would choose companies that have less breaches over others with higher counts, normalized on cost differences. Therefore, if companies didnt actually try to fix their security but instead just checked boxes, they would get breached more often, resulting in customer losses. The only thing stopping this from actually occurring is the lack of mandatory regulatory reporting of it. So this is where gov't needs to step in and mandate disclosure etc. | | |
| ▲ | geon 30 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Breaches don’t happen often enough to be a useful metric. Most smaller companies are never breached, despite having basically zero security. |
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| ▲ | pmlnr 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Here's an idea: as a first step, simplify everything, and make sure you're aware how your stack works, and what it imports. As an example: WordPress is a horrible thing, but the core has been through so much, that it's suprisingly secure. Then plugins and themes come, and whoosh, the security is gone. We need a new KISS: keep it simple, stupid, secure. |
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| ▲ | mirashii 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The "surprisingly secure" WordPress just had a unauthenticated RCE earlier this year. Just simplifying isn't going to be enough. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-63030 | | |
| ▲ | wolvoleo 4 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | WordPress and secure don't go together in the same sentence. | |
| ▲ | ricardobayes 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | If that's your benchmark for being unsecure, then React is unsecure too. https://react.dev/blog/2025/12/03/critical-security-vulnerab... | | |
| ▲ | mirashii 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | I would put both of those projects in the category of things I wouldn't call remarkably secure, yes. To be remarkably secure, these projects would need to not have these kinds of defects, despite the combination of being written in languages have that have a long track record of footguns and lack of initiatives to fix them (proposal-symbol-proto, and PHP's list is too long to even start) and being themselves ecosystems with questionable track records on security in the related areas (Look at $wpdb in 2026, or overall code quality and willingness to modernize, or the entirety of the model of RSC for things that are just going to nearly guarantee you punch all kinds of holes on accident). |
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| ▲ | pmlnr 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "First step" Nobody said it's enough, but it's a start. | |
| ▲ | spiderfarmer 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Plus, how secure are the plugins? | | |
| ▲ | m_mueller 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | WP plugins are why I banned it everywhere. Last time I used it was many years ago, so not sure it still applies, but back then even caching was done in a plugin, without which it was unusably slow… just no. |
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| ▲ | tokioyoyo 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The reason is simple - nothing really bad has happened that we can point at and say "ah, shit, let's all learn collectively". I know it sounds naive when I say it, but there hasn't been a significantly consequential hack, leak, destruction, or anything related to cybersecurity where it led for concerns of people. The main thing I can think of is cyber insurance, which requires a bunch of audits, and some checks maybe, and it changes some conditions whenever there's a big explosion. Whenever big leaks happened, data security and etc., nobody really went to jail, so nobody really cares. Everything can be brushed off, because it costs time to implement proper measures and adds friction / barriers in some cases. So in the end, there's a huge pushback against it. And I totally get it, to be honest. | | |
| ▲ | MobiusHorizons 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Listening to eskil’s talk from the better software conference, he said in order to stand on the shoulders of giants they must first stand still. I really like that metaphor, because it basically suggests today’s apps that have sprawling unaudited dependency graphs that change all the time is effectively teetering on the shoulders of stumbling giants. The visual seems very apt for the how brittle our current software industry feels. | | |
| ▲ | tokioyoyo 35 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I agree with that statement, but disagree with "The visual seems very apt for the how brittle our current software industry feels". It feels brittle, but for every single supply-chain-attack that has happened in the past year, nothing of significant was felt. So in the end, it seems like we're doing okayishly well. |
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| ▲ | hnlmorg 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > The reason is simple - nothing really bad has happened that we can point at and say "ah, shit, let's all learn collectively". I know it sounds naive when I say it, but there hasn't been a significantly consequential hack, leak, destruction, or anything related to cybersecurity where it led for concerns of people. How consequential does a hack need to be? Troy has collected literally billions of stolen credentials. Equifax has had high profile data leaks. Tens of millions of people have been directly compromised by ransomware (likely higher because that’s just the cases we know of) and you hear about state-sponsored hacks in the news all the time. The problem isn’t that computer security isn’t in the public consciousness. The problem is people are lazy and security often requires trading convenience. The problem is also that security isn’t free. So the business incentives just isn’t there. In other fields of engineering, people die when shortcuts are taken. Yet businesses will still take shortcuts, so governments have to legislate rules to save people’s lives. So why would you expect software companies to do better when the stakes are lower? | | |
| ▲ | tokioyoyo 37 minutes ago | parent [-] | | > Tens of millions of people have been directly compromised by ransomware (likely higher because that’s just the cases we know of) and you hear about state-sponsored hacks in the news all the time. With no consequences. Everyone just churns along. It might be detrimental to the business a little bit, but from my personal experience, there's more effort in creating DR processes, rather than preventing an attack, exploit, leak and etc. I'm also not going to put much effort on stuff which has small returns in the worst case scenario. Like Equifax got hacked in 2017, and company is still doing fine. And that's like top tier data one could acquire. |
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| ▲ | Helmut10001 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Static sites all the way (hugo, jekyll, mkdocs!). No one needs wordpress. There's even Sveltia or DecapCMS now, to give those WYSIWYG-people access to static site editing. Then, remove PHP and all the dependency overhead and attack surface and you have a stripped down nginx that is pretty simple, minimalistic and bulletproof. | | |
| ▲ | bpbp-mango 2 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | php is probably about as secure as nginx. big old bundles of C | |
| ▲ | Gigachad 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | The problem is no one ever built one that works for normal people. Most Wordpress sites are not operated by programmers, they are run by non technical people who just want a wysiwyg editor and a save button. While static site builders ask you to write markdown files, compile the result, upload it to a server, and if you want to collaborate you have to add git to that. There almost needs to be an admin app which presents a Wordpress admin like ui but has no public exposure, and then it compiles the site to dump on s3 for the production. But as far as I’m aware no one has built this. | | |
| ▲ | noio 12 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Pour one out for FrontPage | | |
| ▲ | wolvoleo 2 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Ahhh the old positioning with I fixed so many sites back in the day by people who thought they knew what they were doing. |
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| ▲ | weeks an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | https://jamstack.org You're describing the Jamstack or headless CMS concept verbatim. | |
| ▲ | krrrh an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Movable type was the most popular blogging software in 2003 and it was essentially this. An admin app written in Perl that spit out static files. It is kind of surprising that no one tried to do an updated version. | |
| ▲ | iCarrot an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Is this not it? https://pagescms.org/ | |
| ▲ | Helmut10001 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Yes, you are right and I agree, there's little empathy with non-coders generally. | |
| ▲ | jay_kyburz an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | City Desk. Where is Joel when we need him! | |
| ▲ | kennywinker an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | I mean, github pages using the github editor to edit docs pretty much fits that bill |
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| ▲ | Cthulhu_ 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > as a first step, simplify everything, and make sure you're aware how your stack works, and what it imports. We've been trying that for years but the enthusiasm of developers and the eagerness of their employers fight against it. Worse, with coding LLMs it's now easier than ever to output a lot of code, fast. It'll ultimately be up to more experienced developers to salvage these projects. Or not, given that the coding LLMs aren't stopping and will likely get better over time. Either way, we will need experienced people that know what to look out for / know how to instruct LLMs to output secure code and find weaknesses etc. | |
| ▲ | crotobloste an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > We need a new KISS: keep it simple, stupid, secure. Maybe KISSASS: "keep it simple, stupid! also secure, stupid!" | |
| ▲ | bob1029 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Minimization of 3rd party dependencies has always been a key for risk reduction. Now more than ever before. Some stacks make this a lot easier than others. I regret the rules of HN effectively forbid this conversation because it has meaningful technical consequences and isn't purely about ideological flame war. | |
| ▲ | zdc1 39 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The problem is that lots of people don't want a CMS, they want a platform for development / e-commerce / bookings / whatever. Enforcing vanilla WordPress would push people towards other platforms. Now that could be a good thing, but I doubt WordPress are going to start killing their own marketshare with usage restrictions like that... | |
| ▲ | anilakar 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Probably nine out of ten Wordpress sites do not need active content. Why are we not rendering static copies and serving them to customers? | |
| ▲ | Gigachad 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | This is not at all easy though. Most Wordpress users are not software companies. They contract some work out to set it up, maybe some recurring maintenance but they don’t have in house development experience. If they have a site existing today built on plugins and a theme, how are they realistically going to simplify this? How would they even know they need to without the site being hacked? | |
| ▲ | jonwinstanley 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Wordpress without any plugins is kinda useless. Best to completely avoid using it, there are better options | |
| ▲ | dakolli 39 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | More and more people everyday become convinced, mostly because of AI take sellers/grifters, that needing to understand your stack is unnecessary. This problem is about to get way worse. |
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| ▲ | mentalgear 22 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| 1 year left for cybersecurity hardening, I thought so as well. The issue is, even if we get it done: in 1 year the models will be so good in social-engineering that they will be able to extract any information they want anyway. Happy to be falsified here, if anyone has evidence-based arguments. EDIT: by social-engineering I mean for example: recon company structures, gathering and merging people's data from the dark-web, then using it to bribe/pressure/deceive users. |
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| ▲ | simonw 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I don't think we even have a year. The current batch of LLMs are ferociously good at identifying vulnerabilities. |
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| ▲ | hnsr 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Can confirm. I work at an e-commerce agency where we work with (among others) Adobe Commerce. The number of unauthorized RCE vulnerabilities being reported not only in the core product, but also very popular modules used in the community[1] is going through the roof. And we are having a lot of close calls, too; just last weekend, a 0day[2] was widely being exploited at a large scale, before any publication or patch. We have learnt to be on the ball with applying patches and security updates, and even with all that effort, we saw a few projects already being hit by the initial log poisoning. We got lucky that nothing was fully compromised but I am sure that many, many webshops got infected last weekend. And not even a day later there are already other variants of this exploit showing up. [1] https://sansec.io/research/amasty-mass-disclosure [2] https://sansec.io/research/stylesmuggler-0day | | |
| ▲ | hypfer 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | To be fair, ecommerce isn't exactly the branch of software where you get an oversupply of excited enthusiasts caring about the craft itself. Probably a lot more "coding as a job" and "as a job" also implies "not my department". So it's not necessarily the LLMs being very good, but might also "just" be that the software is very bad. | | |
| ▲ | hnsr 32 minutes ago | parent [-] | | > To be fair, ecommerce isn't exactly the branch of software where you get an oversupply of excited enthusiasts caring about the craft itself. I want to disagree with you because I know a lot of passionate people building cool stuff, and the challenges in this space can be quite interesting. But you're probably right, and I have seen some pretty bad stuff. And a lot of the RCE's I've seen recently are quite basic stuff. I think it's the combination of low quality of code, like you said, and the relatively low cost of just letting an LLM plow through your codebases to find issues. I think the Amasty release (see [1] in GP) is a good example of this, and there really has been a massive uptick in extension updates and Adobe security bulletins since the last 1-2 months I am hoping we are just going through a catch-up phase |
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| ▲ | mc3301 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I've ran simple prompts such as "Do a in-depth sweep of this (private) repo and find any security flaws" for a few dozen long-running apps and websites that I have access to. Every single one came back with multiple real vulnerabilities within 5 or 10 minutes. | |
| ▲ | dgl 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Even if they are good the vulnerabilities have to be there. There's lots of things turning up like Local Privilege Escalations (LPE) in Linux, but serious people didn't expect the kernel to be a boundary for a sophisticated attacker. A lot of the vulnerabilities LLMs are finding now are the "long tail" and affect only particular configurations, I would be surprised if e.g. a widely applicable RCE is found in Linux (but I'm also not going to bet against it). Where this gets interesting is the long tail can be used to target a particular system and this is where defense-in-depth becomes important for every organisation. | |
| ▲ | its-summertime an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I guess the year mark is when things go from bad to worse? Instead of the financially motivated groups currently doing their work, it ends up being random people being able to say "Hack my ex's website" to a box they just bought and ran a program they downloaded onto it. | |
| ▲ | Gigachad 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Thankfully we have already made good progress towards things like arm memory tagging and memory safe languages. It’s a rocky period right now but the future will be much more secure after all the low hanging fruit are found. | | |
| ▲ | jordand an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | There's still no x86_64 processors on the market with MTE and it was only recently standardised between Intel and AMD. It's going to be 10+ years before memory tagging is widespread on desktop, and 5 years for Android/iOS devices. | |
| ▲ | Cthulhu_ 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | That's definitely an improvement, but it's just one aspect of cybersecurity. Logical errors allowing people to e.g. log into services and extract data are likely everywhere still. | | |
| ▲ | Gigachad 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | If we can eliminate entire classes of bugs from being possible. It frees up resources to investigate the ones that are still possible. I suspect after a few years of LLM assisted bug hunting, everything will have a baseline security that is very good. Much like how stronger viruses simply create stronger immune systems. |
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| ▲ | microtonal 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | How many devices/operating systems even use memory tagging? iOS, macOS and GrapheneOS, I think that's it? And iOS/macOS only use it for the kernel, a subset of system processes, and I think applications can opt in to it. Heck, Google may have even hampered MTE in Pixel 11 (since support has been disabled) and Snapdragon 8 Gen 5 only got basic support. We are moving way to slowly adopting hardware mitigations and memory-safe languages. | | |
| ▲ | jordand an hour ago | parent [-] | | There's some positive news from the GrapheneOS devs on Pixel 11 in the past week that's worth reading up on. The MTE hardware feature is still there, they're just not sure why Google disabled it |
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| ▲ | mcr70 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Being cautious is a good thing, but these models can also do some good. And if they run with simpler HW, it could allow all sorts of new consumer thingies. I mean, the world will not come to end in the coming year. |
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| ▲ | kreetx 8 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| A positive way to spin this is: we have a year to break in into any IT system. After that, it will be all either fixed or broken into, and all is fixed ever after. :) |
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| ▲ | tumetab1 28 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I sympathize with the sentiment but the suggested/implied guidance to fix bugs is wrong. The overall game is increasing costs to exploit so much that attackers give up.
Fixing 10 most obvious bugs, just very slightly increases costs, they would just a few more tokens to find another bug. As someone said "I had infinite bugs, I fixed 1000, I still have infinite bugs". To significantly increase exploit costs software/security has -1 years to do: - Defense in Depth
- Sandbox everything
- Zero trust
- Canary tokens
- Split data from code (lol)
- App Whitelisting
- Reduce attack surface
- Etc. In other words, the only path is investing heavily on the "game changers" we have already discovered... but we are too cheap/lazy/coward/incompetent to apply. And if we feel specially brave, changing the liability laws regarding software. Open Source & Proprietary code is so crappy because no gets jailed or fined when one of its dumb decisions results in millions of people have their data stolen. |
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| ▲ | aenis 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I think we have less time and the only remaining limitation is the actual cost to run such hacking campaigns. It does not appear expensive, but is not free, and there is a LOT of things to scan for vulnerabilities. The models are already here, and one can rent a GPU cluster to run such workloads at speed - no need to play with slow local machines. I'd assume one can host the thinking at an unsuspected public cloud provider, proxy the network traffic to some botnet to evade blocking - and the only thing remaining is time and cost. I do wonder what tools exist for boring, legitimate companies to try and do the same to their own systems to find the vulnerabilities before the bad guys do. The paradox here is I can't run a de-restricted chinese model with the same tools that hackers are using - but I think enterprises actually HAVE to do it in order to stand a chance in preparing for the onslaught. |
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| ▲ | Certhas 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | The point of the local model in the context of the article was to argue that you can't ban these capabilities. Making datacenters and public clouds only rent GPUs to a restricted list of people, while tightly monitoring what people do with their bought resources won't help. |
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| ▲ | nullbio 30 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Going to be hard to fix security when the frontier labs won't let us fix bugs in our own codebases without them offering refusals or bans. |
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| ▲ | hypfer 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > This probably sounds like nonsense words or hysterical overreacting to most people, so here's what that means: "GLM" is a kind of LLM (AI) [...] The post also sounds like that to people that understand the technology. Calling that out like this and trying to pin that assessment to lack of knowledge is not a get-out-of-jail-free card, nor a good move. __ Edit: Having spent some time letting the article marinate in my mind. On the defending side, it is written that > LLMs are good at writing patches, but not as one-off-prompts. But this for me kinda conflicts with what is written on the attacking side: > GLM 5.3-flash is so good at those tasks that human involvement in those tasks can be negligible. As a result, we are now in a world where cybersecurity attacks can be run in a for loop. What is it? Can it be this autonomous terrifying entity or can it not be? Yes, yes, attackers only need to win once, whereas defenders need to win every time, but that's not my point. |
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| ▲ | jynelson 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | > What is it? Can it be this autonomous terrifying entity or can it not be? the difference between attack and defense is that attacks can be throwaway code. it's much easier to let an llm hack out a prototype than to get it to build maintainable code that people want to read and review. it's not enough to get Daybreak or Mythos to write you a patch, you need the author of the project to accept and merge it. |
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| ▲ | daymanstep 24 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| As LLMs make formal verification cheaper (they can generate proofs that can then be automatically checked) many of the verifiable components of software systems, such as compilers and microkernels, will be verified. I suppose the issue is that the critical bugs are rarely in compilers and microkernels, but more often in applications, such as web browsers, which are more difficult to formally verify. |
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| ▲ | zkmon 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| The standard strategy of a security salesman since 1945. Develop dangerous weapons, show the damage they can do, and sell security cover to the terrified people. Every single piece of technology did this. As a side effect or direct effect, they make bad guys more powerful and then keep on piling up new tech to deal with that. The cycle continues. |
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| ▲ | andy_ppp 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Not sure, the labs will probably just cripple the security features of these models for a while I think and even potentially put back doors into systems for the security services… |
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| ▲ | kennywinker an hour ago | parent [-] | | I think the author's point is that open weight models aren't going to be locked down like that. And even if they are locked down, it's hours between a model being released on huggingface and an "abliterated" variant that has most of its security features removed is uploaded. |
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| ▲ | petesergeant 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Mmm, a world where a defender-LLM is essentially required is great news for people selling inference. |
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| ▲ | ma2kx 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I don't see much hope since I last explored some github repositories. There was a time when a successful repo had about 10 - 20k stars and usually those older repos stay around this level. But now there is a ton of vibe coded slop 50k + stars. Most of them have a "nice look", maybe even extensive docs but are usually build with no security considerations at all. One recommended to provide a "google app password" to the agent which has the same permissions as your regular login. Another was a browser plugin with permissions to read all cookies, inject js, open background tabs etc. You would probably assume the chrome store would at least put some visible warnings on the app store page or force the user to actively confirm those permissions. But because they are already stated in the manifest there is only a small footnote and it's even "recommended by google". |
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| ▲ | cuu508 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | It's a good time to reduce the reliance on technology. Throw out the IoT and "smart" stuff from your home. Remove apps from your phone and leave the absolute basics. Go through the password manager and close accounts for sites you are no longer using. Start migrating off Google. Print out your most precious photos on paper. And so on :-) |
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| ▲ | the_arun 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| How to secure our identity layers(AuthN & AuthZ)? Let alone the products. |
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| ▲ | keybored 7 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Clanker fodder. Unless the We are heads of states/heads of spooks or the AI powers that be (praise be) that there is no power and will to do that in one year or even ten years. |
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| ▲ | gherkinnn 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| The title reads like a Diary of a CEO thumbnail but unlike those discussions this article has a point. Impotent slop code on one side and potent automated vulnerability exploitation on the other will lead to fun times. |
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| ▲ | protocolture 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Just like Cryptolocker, this will be the "Finding Out" phase for everyone who has been putting off best practice security. But, lets be clear, Best Practice will save you. We can engineer assuming there are zero days in path. Go to your CTO now cap in hand and ask for overlapping controls, wafs, application monitoring, backups and all the other shit you haven't been doing. Because when you find out, I will laugh, it will be very very very funny to me. |
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| ▲ | taurath 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Meanwhile a huge portion of management and leadership in software companies are encouraging everyone to de facto stop looking at code and let the LLM and a bunch of boundaries handle this for you. | | |
| ▲ | rukuu001 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | A couple high-profile crash & burns will get their attention. | | |
| ▲ | jcgl an hour ago | parent [-] | | Just like well-publicized data breaches over the years got people’s attention? Color me skeptical. |
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| ▲ | protocolture 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Which is why you need someone who is responsible for IT security without also being responsible for shipping product. An asshole who can stop releases until security is properly in place. My understanding is this bloke gets very quickly removed from Fortune 500 companies. Which is why I am going to need a very large capacity popcorn bucket. | |
| ▲ | m_mueller 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | “You are a CISO who needs to review and secure all our slop, and you never make mistakes or you get shut down immediately!” | | |
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| ▲ | acedTrex 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Maybe all these vital infrastructure companies should not have spent the past decades in a race to the bottom of cybersecurity. There is going to be a reckoning. |
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| ▲ | chris_wot 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| More tired “don’t use C or C++” advise. |
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| ▲ | mark_something 16 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I wonder why C and C++ are usually regarded as equally insecure. In C you need to carefully check that you free allocated memory, and that you don't use it after you free it. In C++ this is automated by using classes like std::string and std::vector, once they go out of scope their memory is freed and you can't use it anymore. It is still possible, e.g. by using a for loop that iterates over a vector, and removing or adding stuff to that same vector in that loop. But my rough estimate is that such errors are at least ten times less likely in C++. I develop in C++ for a job, and when I need to use a library written in C I always have a bad feeling about it. |
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| ▲ | dbdr 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > Invest in formal verification, fuzzing and property testing, and memory-safe languages. LLMs are good at writing Lean and fuzz tests. I don't care whether you use Go or Rust but for the love of god please don't use C or C++ for new code. How accepted is this thinking in your respective domains? |
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| ▲ | pjmlp 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | A lot, I am only writing C or C++ for new code when it is unavoidable, like existing code bases, bindings or tinkering with runtime implementations that aren't bootstraped. Mobile platforms, distributed computing have long moved the spotligh away from C and C++, other than language runtimes or existing products from the 90's like SQL servers, and naturally UNIX like underlying OS, which most userspace developers aren't writing new code for. Naturally there are domains like LLVM/GCC, console game dev, HPC/HFT where they are unavoidable for new code. |
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| ▲ | jf 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Another similar issue, with similar consequences and timeline, is Post Quantum Cryptography. |
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| ▲ | LoganDark 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It's just the same advice as ever: be extremely, exceedingly careful in what you expose to any network. When I set up machines for production, they don't respond to pings and they don't even have an SSH port open without knocking. There are also ways to eschew the need for an SSH port entirely. People who never took that seriously will never take this seriously either, and that's their loss. (And loss of the commons, unfortunately.) There's just also new advice: you can't afford to expose an unsecured system to the internet even for a moment. Think of those IPv4 address space scanners, except this time any one of them could be capable of developing individualized attacks in mere minutes. They don't sleep, they don't take breaks. |
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| ▲ | Gigachad 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | That’s fine for your home server, but if you want an actual server that the general public can use, it has to be exposed to the internet. | | |
| ▲ | hypfer 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Sure, but still, attack surface could and should be minimized by rethinking what exactly even needs to be on a server the general public can use. There are a lot of security problems you can categorically rule out by simply not involving a cloud. Clouds have been involved in a lot of things, because everyone was doing it, and because that's how you can collect rent, but they aren't really necessary for most use-cases. So we could definitely get the exposure down there. We'd just have to fundamentally shift the defaults of this industry. | |
| ▲ | jsiepkes 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | But not everything needs to be directly exposed to the internet. Framework had their data leaked because their metabase instance was hacked with a zero-day. Why was it directly exposed to the Internet? Why not require the use of a VPN like a Wireguard based solution or Nebula for these "internal" kind of apps? | | |
| ▲ | LoganDark 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | > Framework had their data leaked because their metabase instance was hacked with a zero-day. No, Framework had their data leaked because they stored it in the cloud with Metabase the company, which got hacked. Not because of any vulnerability on-premises. |
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| ▲ | tgv 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Still, it doesn't have to ping back, and ssh can (should) be very restrictive. | | |
| ▲ | Gigachad 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Ping and ssh are pretty much never the things being hacked though. Turn password auth off and it’s very secure. What gets hacked all the time is the actual web app itself. Which has to be exposed to be useful. |
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| ▲ | LoganDark 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I didn't say there are zero ports open, they're not my home server, I just said they're production servers. But exposing something like a properly configured nginx to the internet is way different from exposing application code directly. Most of my servers have used h2o (built from source because they don't cut releases anymore?) because I wanted HTTP2 and HTTP3 before anyone else would get their act together. These days I still use h2o because I like the config better than nginx, even though it's a pain to set up because nobody packages it (and they don't cut releases!) | | |
| ▲ | darkwater 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | And then somebody driving an LLM will find your old and unsupported (how secure!) h2o server, find a 0day path traversal or RCE and own you. | | |
| ▲ | LoganDark 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | h2o user doesn't have write access to anything on the system, not even its own config file. I don't think I disabled exec for it though. And I guess it could leak the HTTPS private key. FWIW sufficiently secured software doesn't need to be updated. Doesn't matter if it's old and unsupported if there are no vulnerabilities in it. That said, h2o is probably far from free of at least some vulnerabilities, not to mention all the layers below it. OpenSSL for example has had some vulnerabilities, and h2o depends on it. I'm not saying I exactly practice what I preach. h2o's definitely a choice, but realistically I doubt anything's going to happen that I really care about. |
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| ▲ | darkwater 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | So how do you expose your legitimate service on the Internet? | | |
| ▲ | LoganDark 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | By opening a port to a secure application. A secure application is usually one I wrote from scratch or one that's been battle-tested and hardened enough that even new vulnerabilities are not very useful. |
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| ▲ | techpression 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Remember how GLM 5.3 was going to cause massive hacks, break banks and ruin everything (it was even newsworthy since media picked up how people were working overtime in preparation). And yet here we are. |
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| ▲ | socketcluster 37 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Most software developers are incapable of writing secure or maintainable code. Maybe like 5% can do it. Yet it has no correlation with pay or even access to job opportunities because recruitment has been broken since the dawn of the industry. Now we literally have business people who never coded in their lives telling software engineers what tools and platforms to use and how to do their jobs. That's the current reality. You can't even tell which engineers are good today because the good ones aren't allowed to make the decisions that they need to make to properly leverage their own skills and experience. It's like if a manager gave Djokovic a tennis racket made out of led with spikes on the handle and expecting him to win tournaments. Under such conditions, you won't be able to tell him apart from a novice. Now we have non-technical managers who never coded in their lives leading teams of vibe-coders who also never coded in their lives... Using AI agents trained on mediocre, insecure code from Stack Overflow and GitHub; written by mediocre developers for practice. And the fact that I'm downvoted for pointing this out is what seals the fate, IMO. North Korea has a bright future ahead of it thanks to its elite hacking team. If you see what they were able to pull off without open weight models, wait till you see what they'll be able to pull off with them! The situation is unfixable because: - It would be physically difficult to fix the mess due to extreme complexity. Open source devs who control all the pieces of the global infra have checked out of the socio-economic system. They are apathetic, or worse. The average open source dev I know makes me look optimistic by comparison. - People don't understand that there is problem, let alone understand the problem. - People have no idea what skills are required to fix the problem. - The current social structure is not compatible with the social structure required to provide a solution. You have all the wrong people in the wrong places. We don't have a free market to identify top performers so we can't identify them. If you think that the top-paid engineer at Google who spent their career styling and aligning elements with CSS is the kind you need to fix the deep security problems we have now, you're in for a surprise. - Even if the problems AND solutions were correctly identified (both of which sound impossible to me), there would be no will to fix them. |
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| ▲ | hn_submit 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| Or we could just dump Linux and Windows and switch to a microkernel operating system, which is much more secure. These endless patching cycles are simply not going to work in the long run. Operating systems get orphaned all the time, especially the ones in cheap Chinese stuff. |
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| ▲ | simonw 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Got any leads on good tutorials on how to use a microkernel operating system on a VPS somewhere to host a website? | | |
| ▲ | rramadass 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Just checked with Google Gemini on how one might be able to do the above. It pointed to Minix3/seL4/Genode and vps providers who either support custom ISOs or run it within an emulator like QEMU. You can also look at using Unikernels for this purpose. Here is an article Unleashing Extreme Speed and Security: Deploying Unikernels with NanoVMs on VPS to Eliminate the Linux OS - https://xylentis.com/blog/unleashing-extreme-speed-and-secur... | |
| ▲ | hn_submit 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Minix can run Ngnix. |
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| ▲ | thunderfork 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | "throw away all software written before 2026" does technically solve this problem, if you ignore everything else the article is talking about (deployment and continuity of service) | | |
| ▲ | 999900000999 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Not to mention a whole lot of new vulnerabilities are bound to arise with all this new software. We really just need better regulations around data retention, especially ppi. Never going to happen though, no incentives exist to NOT sell my personal data | |
| ▲ | snvzz 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Throwing away old software is not a requirement, as demonstrated very successfully by Genode and its SculptOS. |
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