Author here, that's a good idea. A straightforward way to exploit an implementation differential like this is if you have a software system that contains two different implementations of IDNA 2003 processing user input. One part of the process processes the domain correctly, the other incorrectly, and in this case you can have one part of a system (such as a policy/filter) "see" the data one way and the other part of the system (such as, taking an action as a result of the data) see the data in another way.

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) is an example of such an exploit targeting a differential in implementations of URL parsers, which is similar to this implementation difference.

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jerf 36 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

I wouldn't call this a "vulnerability", I'd call it "a thing that can potentially turn into a vulnerability, more often it can turn into an obscure bug, and most often it is just a quirk".

In particular, if my corporate security team started just mass-flagging all instances of "str.lower" as "security bugs" I would be having a talk with their manager about their threshold for what constitutes a "security bug". Their job is arguably to be more sensitive to that than most engineers, but not that sensitive. It would be like flagging all instances of string concatenation as a vulnerability... and I say that as the guy who would like to eliminate simple string concatenation from programming languages, already a very extreme position on that operation, because of it being at the root cause of so many vulnerabilities... but simply flagging every use as a "vulnerability" is way too sensitive. A demonstration of the ability to use it to bypass some sort of security barrier is necessary to call any specific instance a "vulnerability".

And string concatenation has caused orders of magnitude more actual, verified vulnerabilities than incorrect case folding has.

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gcr an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

That would be a vulnerability in the IDNA filter that they’re responsible for fixing.

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AgentOrange1234 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

"if you have a software system that contains two different implementations of IDNA 2003 processing user input"

Is that a real thing though? Is someone doing that?

	▲	kccqzy 4 hours ago \| parent \| next [-]
		It could be an implementation written in the buggy Python and another written in a different language. For example you might use a ready-made WAF written in a non-Python language in front of a Python app.
	▲	rcxdude 3 hours ago \| parent \| prev \| next [-]
		With web applications it's not particularly unusual, because the whole system stack can be quite heterogeneous. If one part of the system is doing authentication and the other part is actually doing the action then it can be a real problem when they interpret the input differently. Differences between proxy and web server interpretations of HTTP headers have been a source of multiple vulnerabilities, for example.
	▲	cwillu 3 hours ago \| parent \| prev \| next [-]
		Consider the case where your system has components in python and another language without the bug, both of which process that input.
	▲	gchamonlive 4 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		It isn't until it is, until during a crunch someone adds a package with that condition and eventually that gets exploited or halts the system. It's never a nitpick to shed your system from undesired state because of how complex systems behave.