Here's One Weird Trick™ to avoid being an ideologue: be ok with being wrong.

Flipping that over: aspire to be correct in your beliefs, not in "being right".

Karl Popper (the man behind the Intolerance of Intolerance "paradox) identified it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability

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mapontosevenths 3 days ago | parent | next [-]

I only recently learned that most peoples beliefs are not "factual beliefs". Since most of mine are, I thought that's how other people work. I think Popper may have made the same mistake by assuming "correctness" is always the primary value a belief offers.

The other kind of beliefs are "Symbolic beliefs." Symbolic beliefs are not held because they are true, or because they are useful on their own. They're held because they signal that you belong to the tribe. They are similar to the "Alief", which is an automatic unequestioned belief. Most Symbolic beliefs are aliefs, but not all.

Since learning about this I've been trying to identify my own aliefs and symbolic beliefs and question them. It turns out I have more than I'd realized. We probably all do.

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gghackernewsgg 2 days ago | parent | next [-]

Personally, I consider "belief" from a behavioral perspective: belief is the model of reality one actually operates from.

For example, when I walk on my kitchen floor, I don't have to tell myself: "the floor is structurally sound, it's safe to walk on it." I just walk.

The fact that I just walk can be used to infer an infinite number of implied bleiefs that I've never verbalized until this moment. For example, I believe that:

1. The floor can support my weight.

2. The tiles aren't made of toxic materials.

3. I don't pay $$ by the step.

4. Walking on the floor doesn't cause my wife pain.

5. The floor isn't lava.

To refine my definition: a belief is that which systematically and implicitly guides my expectations, reactions, choices, etc.

In her glass skywalk example, Gendler lays out the definitions roughly so:

1. "I know this skywalk is sturdy and safe" = Belief

2. The hesitancy to cross the skywalk = Alief

But to me:

1. "I know this skywalk is sturdy and safe" = knowledge

2. Hesitancy to cross it = actual belief.

That's why in my vocavbulary it's perfectly fine to say: "I know it. But I don't believe it."

Similarly, if someone says, "I totally believe that planes are safe, but I'm terrified of flying", then I will think to myself: "nope; you totally don't believe that planes are safe."

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mapontosevenths 2 days ago | parent [-]

That's an interesting perspective. It all starts to get a little too semantics oriented for my taste, but I think the basic idea you're proposing is that the beliefs live in what the neuro-folks would call the default mode network, where-as knowledge lives in some higher function part of the brain like the cortex.

Regardless of the mechanisms, I think we're agreed that it's important not just to examine your priors, but to be aware that there ARE priors in the first place.

	▲	gghackernewsgg 2 days ago \| parent [-]
		> I think we're agreed that it's important not just to examine your priors, but to be aware that there ARE priors in the first place. Yes, absolutely. And I think there's a practical extension to my framing that goes beyond semantics. When there's a seemingly irresolvable conflict between knowledge and belief, i.e. reason says “yes" while the heart says “no”, simply doing the thing a few times will often resolve the tension. That's the practical advantage I see in my framing: 1) In Gendler's framing, the cerebral and emotional aspects are presented as two different modes of cognition. Belief is thinking, while Alief is just another type of thinking about some other stuff. Taken too far or misinterpreted, this can encourage overanalysis. 2) In my framing, belief is fundamentally about how I operate. So when my reason has exhausted its arguments but I'm still not convinced, as long as my knowledge seems reliable, I know that forcing a behavioral change could be all that's needed to turn me into a believer.

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pdonis 3 days ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> I only recently learned that most peoples beliefs are not "factual beliefs".

I think this greatly underestimates the number of completely mundane, innocuous factual beliefs that everyone, or at least everyone who is able to get through their lives without serious mishap for any length of time, has to have. For anyone in that position, most of their beliefs have to be factual beliefs, and have to be true at least to a good enough approximation to allow them to function. We tend to ignore such beliefs in discussions like this, but that doesn't mean they aren't there.

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mrguyorama 2 days ago | parent | prev [-]

These unstated beliefs make up a lot of "Common Sense", which is reliably invoked as a means of outing someone for not being in the same "Tribe".

There's no such thing as "Common Sense", and every single niche, culture, demographic, etc has their own set of things that "Everyone knows"

	▲	mapontosevenths a day ago \| parent [-]
		I'm not sure why, but this feels like something Heinlein would have said. It's a solid point either way.

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gfrecvh 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Falsifiability - misunderstood idea that's often used to discredit string theory, for example.

As stated on Wikipedia:

> Falsifiability is a standard of evaluation of scientific statements, including theories and hypotheses. A statement is falsifiable if it belongs to a language or logical structure capable of describing an empirical observation that contradicts it.

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shiandow 2 days ago | parent [-]

If we're doing a meta discussion on the quality of arguments it ought to be pointed out that Popper is not exactly modern any more so like objectivism, falsifiability is not some kind of holy grail any more.

A bigger issue with string theory is that we don't fully know how to make it describe reality, but it still describes some general principles we can test and learn from and I think it's the most successful quantum theory with gravity so far, even if it's not the right quantum mechanics and the right gravity.

Any property like super symmetry that could in theory be tested would prove parts of it. We lack a way of doing so, especially in a controlled manner, but particles have been identified from a single convenient photograph.

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gfrecvh 2 days ago | parent [-]

Without detracting from anything you said, all I meant is that a lot of people make the argument of "we can't test it" when it's likely that the "can't" is purely a technological limitation. If those people knew the definition of falsifiability as stated on Wikipedia, they wouldn't make such a stupid argument.

	▲	shiandow 2 days ago \| parent [-]
		That's a fair point, I'm not even sure I was even arguing against your comment. Mostly just pointing out stuff I thought was relevant.

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card_zero 3 days ago | parent | prev | next [-]

"Correct" is a synonym for "right". What you need is unrefuted.

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pstuart 3 days ago | parent [-]

Sure, the same intention is to not hold refuted or refutable beliefs.

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card_zero 3 days ago | parent [-]

No, they must be refutable! Otherwise you're stuck with them forever. This is all about ongoing error correction.

	▲	pstuart 2 days ago \| parent [-]
		Rereading what I wrote -- I think I misspoke in my haste to respond, but yes, I agree with this.

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regularization 3 days ago | parent | prev [-]

As the article talks about Marx, let us consider the falsifiable predictions of Narx, who died in 1883.

* Economic crises (recessions, depressions) would continue, and becone worse over time (example: subprime crisis of 2008)

* profitability rates would go down over time

* wealth would concentrate more over time

* middle class would be slowly shrunk - say, doctor's losing their own offices and made to see people in 15 minute appointment blocks

* real hourly wages would fall

* proletariat will revolt and displace the bourgeoisie, in the manner the bourgeoisie overthrew the feudal order

These predictions are all falsifiable

	▲	adduced 2 days ago \| parent [-]
		Like all historical thinkers making claims in economics, sociology and history Marx was wrong about a lot of things. So was Smith, Ricardo and countless others. However that doesn't settle the question if there is an updated version of some descriptive or normative claims traceable back to Marx, Smith or Ricardo that is well supported today. Agree? "wealth would concentrate more over time", which it in fact did and keeps doing, on some measures such as the absolute GINI.