| ▲ | wartywhoa23 a day ago |
| Might as well merge them all and call FSBank, for they will be sure as hell MITMing all the communication between clients and backends. |
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| ▲ | whosdat 12 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| I have very little reason to believe that NSA is not doing, and had been doing that, more or less for as long as there had been CA.
And on a global scale.
If you don't find this plausible, it is because usually americans believe their predator state to be some kind of a "lion king" (aka superman, spiderman. etc), while it is more of a laughing hyena. |
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| ▲ | wartywhoa23 7 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Russians would often fend this off by saying "the CIA major is farther than the FSB one". But of course there's little reason to doubt that all public-facing separation between world's secret services is but a spectacle, just like the idependence of CAs. Not only that, but also all encryption running in OSes that run above lower level, battery-powered SoCs with full network stack like Intel ME, AMD PSP and ARM TrustZone. | | |
| ▲ | whosdat 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Oh, really? That's interesting. But as they say, the chain is as strong as its weakest link. |
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| ▲ | inigyou 10 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | You can verify this for your own domains by using certificate transparency. | | |
| ▲ | whosdat 9 hours ago | parent [-] | | Wouldn't that be true also for the Russian CA? | | |
| ▲ | inigyou 9 hours ago | parent [-] | | Yes, the banks can verify it for their own domains - unless Russia is sanctioned out of the CT logs or the government forces Yandex Browser not to check CT. They can also just load the site from a separate internet connection and see if it has their certificate. | | |
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| ▲ | inigyou 21 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| They don't need to. These are politically connected entities. |
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| ▲ | fuoqi a day ago | parent | prev [-] |
| Nope, MitMing will be done by the SORM system [0] using certificates signed by the Ministry of Digital "Development" which will be trusted the Yandex Browser, which will be widely installed out of necessity by ordinary Russians to access banks and subsequently other Web resources. Surely this will improve user security and trust in the existing Web PKI system in non-Western countries. /s [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SORM |
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| ▲ | altairprime 21 hours ago | parent [-] | | > Surely this will improve user security and trust in the existing Web PKI system in non-Western countries. /s I recognize that Russia is making this change for MitM spying, but this particular sarcasm seems incorrect. Given Verisign's willingness to bend the knee to Texas courts, one could reasonably lose faith in US PKI issuers such as Digicert. I certainly hope the EU is studying the problem US-controlled EU-trusted issuers — the EU age verification systems hinge critically on them, much less the entire web. So I empathize with the sarcasm, but best not to offer MitM proponents (whether in Russia or the U.S. or elsewhere!) an argument that could be used against your viewpoint. | | |
| ▲ | fuoqi 20 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | >I recognize that Russia is making this change for MitM spying Nope, they do it primarily out of necessity, because of the mounting pressure on the previously used CAs. The MitM capability is just a nice side bonus. >So I empathize with the sarcasm, but best not to offer MitM proponents (whether in Russia or the U.S. or elsewhere!) an argument that could be used against your viewpoint. If browsers truly cared about user security they would've provided reasonable conditions for supporting national CAs: - Limit its authority only to respective national domain zones. - Mandate use of Certificate Transparency handled by an independent third party to prevent MitM. But this debacle only shows that western-controlled (especially financial) systems can be and will be used as a pressure tool, so any large sovereign nation will not trust them as they would in the past. And the taken actions only contribute to further fragmentation of the Internet across national and block borders. | | |
| ▲ | altairprime 20 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I’d be totally onboard with TLD-locking them to legal jurisdictions they’re comfortable being bound to, except that this would underserve a great deal of the Internet. Don’t really have a great solution yet, either. Perhaps as each TLD operates DNSSEC they could sign authorized issuers by publishing TLD CAA records, which would create some legal zone accountability that’s lacking today (and give the EU a lever by which to cut off U.S. registrars from their zones). But I have no idea how to effect any of that change, and Let’s Encrypt is truly screwed in this model as a worldwide entity. The endgame might actually be “to operate a domain registrar you must be a PKI”, which would ravage the segment and probably permanently kill off Namecheap (one can dream). So, yeah, I agree: I think instead we absolutely will see fragmentation, at both software (PKI) and, eventually, hardline levels, rather than see domain registrars and PKI issuers be forcibly merged by policy. | | |
| ▲ | inigyou 10 hours ago | parent [-] | | We should let each country specify trusted CAs the way they specify their DNS signing keys. Or we should just implement DANE already and then the same key serves both purposes and we can delete WebPKI from the world. |
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| ▲ | drysine 14 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | >Nope, they do it primarily out of necessity, because of the mounting pressure on the previously used CAs. The MitM capability is just a nice side bonus. So the West essentially helps Kremlin to control Russian citizens. Why is that? Incompetence or something else? | | |
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| ▲ | orbital-decay 20 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | >I recognize that Russia is making this change for MitM spying Not really, banks do this. FSB would love to spy on everyone of course, but all was working fine until the CAs started revoking the certificates recently, directly aiding the FSB. From the article: >The banks first moved to GlobalSign in 2022. This June, GlobalSign began revoking certificates held by sanctioned Russian companies, and they moved on to HARICA, the Greek academic authority. >A month ago, HARICA refused to revoke: its issuance is self-service and domain-validated, so its certificates identify a domain and nothing else; it was not, it argued, “the competent authority to make these legal attributions.” However, on July 27, Greece’s eIDAS supervisory body appeared to confirm the disputed certificates had been revoked and referred the case to the national financial sanctions unit. |
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