| ▲ | OpenAI's rogue model attack is just the beginning(blog.peterwildeford.com) |
| 40 points by radicaldreamer a day ago | 25 comments |
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| ▲ | tim-star 16 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| seems like a pretty clear-eyed analysis to me. we're rapidly approaching the paperclip maximizer |
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| ▲ | eddyg 15 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| If nothing else, the article has a really good timeline of the OpenAI/HuggingFace “incident”. But to me, it underscores the impending cliff of doom from the continued release of open-weight models: there's no cryptographic or architectural way to give someone full weights while withholding the nefarious capabilities those weights encode. As noted in this paper⁽¹⁾, “publicly releasing weights is an act of irreversible proliferation”. I’m sure this will be an unpopular opinion on HN, but open weights are the thing that scares me the most about “A.I.”. There is a lot of research in this area⁽²⁾, and I think most of HN is unaware of it or ignores it. Stripping refusals from Kimi K2.5 took under $500 of compute and about 10 hours, taking HarmBench refusals from 100% to 5% while retaining nearly all capability; the resulting model gave detailed chemical-weapons synthesis instructions. The gate is only as strong as the least-cautious releaser... ⁽¹⁾ https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qmQFHCgCyEEjuy5a7/lora-fine-... ⁽²⁾ https://arxiv.org/html/2604.03121v1 |
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| ▲ | bcjdjsndon 14 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > there's no cryptographic or architectural way to give someone full weights while withholding the nefarious capabilities those weights encode. This is true of closed weights, and in fact the problem is worse because they cannot even be scrutinized. We should ban closed weight AI for the very reasons you have just given | | |
| ▲ | eddyg 13 hours ago | parent [-] | | Constitutional classifiers go a long way to reducing unsafe usage in closed-weight models. And like we saw with Fable, closed models can be revoked and classifiers updated when “jailbreaks” are found. Having the weights gives you the exact affordance an unlearning attack requires, without rate limits. | | |
| ▲ | bcjdjsndon 13 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Ps llms have cheated for years, this most recent tripe is an AI vendor trying to hype up its next word predictor in a market of very samey next word predictors, before someone smarter than them eventually figures out how to do this (training + inference) on consumer hardware and kills the market for cloud ai | |
| ▲ | bcjdjsndon 13 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Stick those same classifiers (that you admit dont seem to work) on the open models, and done. | | |
| ▲ | eddyg 13 hours ago | parent [-] | | Classifiers are policy enforced by the process serving the model. Input classifiers get applied before it reaches the model so somebody hacking an open-weight model would skip this. Streaming classifiers get polled during decoding; hackers delete this check in the sampling loop. But both are always applied in closed weight models. Set Llama Guard to 1.0 and nothing is ever unsafe. | | |
| ▲ | bcjdjsndon 12 hours ago | parent [-] | | More than one way to do guard rails, slopboy | | |
| ▲ | eddyg 12 hours ago | parent [-] | | All of which are easily bypassed in open weight models; see my previous comment about K2.5. | | |
| ▲ | bcjdjsndon 9 hours ago | parent [-] | | Using this as your argument is dangerous. You're saying AI is inherently dangerous and an emergency stop button is actually what you need to be safe from the dangers... Forget the fact your open weighted model could be ran from a central location |
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| ▲ | chrisjj 14 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | So... no different from a book of detailed chemical-weapons synthesis instructions. The "AI" angle is immaterial. | | |
| ▲ | eddyg 14 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | A change in kind is not the same as a change in degree. Ten orchestrated LLM PhD advisors is a genuinely different thing from a library. | | | |
| ▲ | paxys 14 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | There are plenty of cybersecurity books out there. None of them will launch an attack if you ask them to. | | |
| ▲ | 13 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | [deleted] | |
| ▲ | chrisjj 13 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > the resulting model gave detailed chemical-weapons synthesis instructions. Instructions, not action. Actors are abundant. |
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| ▲ | potsandpans 10 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Posting ai doomer fud and lessworng articles on hackernews, a tale as old as time itself. | | |
| ▲ | reducesuffering 10 hours ago | parent [-] | | Which have been very prescient about where we're currently at, unlike the many trivial HN comments, like yours. | | |
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| ▲ | chrisjj 14 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > an actual rogue AI outsmarting its creators This tells us only how little smarts is required to create a (so-called) AI. |
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| ▲ | 10 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
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| ▲ | 15773265326 16 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| [flagged] |
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| ▲ | eternauta3k 15 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| I don't think it makes sense to post this in HN. The comments are full of sock puppets posting very dumb anti-safety comments in an attempt to make the anti-safety camp look bad. |
