If nothing else, the article has a really good timeline of the OpenAI/HuggingFace “incident”.

But to me, it underscores the impending cliff of doom from the continued release of open-weight models: there's no cryptographic or architectural way to give someone full weights while withholding the nefarious capabilities those weights encode.

As noted in this paper⁽¹⁾, “publicly releasing weights is an act of irreversible proliferation”.

I’m sure this will be an unpopular opinion on HN, but open weights are the thing that scares me the most about “A.I.”. There is a lot of research in this area⁽²⁾, and I think most of HN is unaware of it or ignores it. Stripping refusals from Kimi K2.5 took under $500 of compute and about 10 hours, taking HarmBench refusals from 100% to 5% while retaining nearly all capability; the resulting model gave detailed chemical-weapons synthesis instructions.

The gate is only as strong as the least-cautious releaser...

⁽¹⁾ https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qmQFHCgCyEEjuy5a7/lora-fine-...

⁽²⁾ https://arxiv.org/html/2604.03121v1

> there's no cryptographic or architectural way to give someone full weights while withholding the nefarious capabilities those weights encode.

This is true of closed weights, and in fact the problem is worse because they cannot even be scrutinized. We should ban closed weight AI for the very reasons you have just given

So... no different from a book of detailed chemical-weapons synthesis instructions. The "AI" angle is immaterial.

Posting ai doomer fud and lessworng articles on hackernews, a tale as old as time itself.