>Are you saying that GrapheneOS has the means to allow a user to fully encrypt applications and their files? I mean while allowing login and access to the scanner where there is nothing to see.

No I did not mean that. There's means to fully encrypt applications and files, like on any modern smartphone. There's also user profiles and private spaces which allow you to separate your data and encrypt them differently. Notice "private spaces" and user profiles. There's no "deniable spaces"

There's no means to allow decryption while hiding data. The only deniability feature I'm aware of is the duress password.

>"Initially you suggest deniable partitions."

>That's nonsense because I never suggested a goal of complete deniability.

>"The technical problem here seems to be that GrapheneOS apparently doesn't support logging in to a partitioned empty OS for scanning purposes"

This is what a form of plausible deniability would look like. GrapheneOS isn't going to implement a non-robust plausible deniability feature.

>You keep insisting I [suggested a goal of complete deniability], and attempting to bury the discussion on such grounds

I never insisted that you suggested a goal of effective deniability. I only explained that GrapheneOS isn't going to implement a non-robust implementation of that feature, which is the only implementation that is technically possible right now.

The reason I'm emphasising an effective plausible deniability solution is because that's the only solution that would actually help anybody. It's also the only solution that would ever be implemented. A non-robust solution would give people a false sense of security and would therefore help attackers.

Honeypot operating systems like Anøm are the ones that hide the OS within a calculator. GrapheneOS is not gonna do something stupid like that.

I'm just informing you of the real landscape of the feature you want. I thought it was a nice thing to do.