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Wowfunhappy 4 hours ago

Could you be more specific as to what you're imagining? I don't personally see a way to verify someone's age which doesn't involve either credit card verification, photo id verification, or some sort of facial recognition. If you know enough about someone to verify their age—even to a relatively low degree of accuracy—you probably know enough to pinpoint who they are in general.

Heck—in most cases, we can't even tell the difference between humans and bots anymore! And it's true that we basically accept that some bots will slip through the cracks—but identifying bots also strikes me as significantly easier than identifying children.

Aaargh20318 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

The way identity wallets work:

The government issues an eID to your wallet. The ID is signed by the government and linked to the device to prevent transferring the credential. A public/private key-pair is generated by the secure enclave in your phone, the public key along with proof of possession of the private key is included in the request for the government eID. The government signs individual attributes combined with the public key with the government private key. The government certificate containing the public key is, well, public.

One of the attributes is ‘over_18’ (In the EU eID scheme countries can add other over_XX attributes if they want, but over_18 is mandatory).

When a website wants to requests attributes, in this case the over_18 attribute, they send a request to the user’s wallet app, including a challenge. The wallet sends back a package including the government-signed attribute, which contains the device public key and the over_18 attribute plus a response to the challenge (proving the credential didn’t get transferred).

The website only sees the ‘over_18’ attribute, which is backed by the government signature. They don’t see any other attributes (the wallet app shows in advance which attributes you are sharing). The government never sees which website wants to know if you’re 18+.

Of course this is all a bit simplified, check OIDC4VCI and OIDC4VP for details.

The only real issue is the wallet app and device binding. Because a compromised device could allow credentials to be transferred some form of attestation of device and wallet app is required. In practice this means no rooted/jailbroken phones.

Aurornis 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> The website only sees the ‘over_18’ attribute, which is backed by the government signature

Not true. The device's public key is also sent, which functions as a stable device identifier.

We've spent years trying to get away from stable tracking IDs and fingerprinting. Returning to a system where devices are sending a stable ID to a website to prove ownership is a step backward.

There are proposed mitigations like issuing multiple sets of credentials or rotating them, but we're not going to get an infinite number of keypairs for every website or session in the secure enclave in practice.

Another reason why these proposals aren't getting much uptake is that they aren't addressing what the lawmakers are pursuing: They don't want anonymous authorization tied to the device. They want IDs tied to accounts and a way to discourage people from sharing IDs. In the anonymous systems it only takes one person a few minutes to put an over-18 identity into a device and there's no way to determine if someone is abusing the system by stealing IDs or if someone's 18 year old brother is setting up all of their younger brothers' phones for $5 each.

The situation gets stickier when you acknowledge that it's not possible to limit all of these websites to only mobile phone devices with secure enclaves that are not jailbroken. Once you open a door to desktop devices and other OSes accessing these sites, you open the door to replaying and proxying attacks, where someone will produce those `over_18` attestations on-demand for you, possibly for a minimal price. This brings us back to the public stable identifier to discourage fraud, which means governments won't be happy to issue as many keypairs as we want, which means we're back to semi-stable fingerprints.

Aaargh20318 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> Not true. The device's public key is also sent, which functions as a stable device identifier.

This is covered by allowing for single-use credentials. IIRC the EU personal IDs will use this. Basically, the wallet requests a batch of single-use eIDs that all use different device key-pairs. Each credential is only used for one request and then deleted. The wallet will automatically request new credentials in batches when they run out. The old key-pairs are deleted along with the credential so you don’t run out of space in the secure enclave.

> Another reason why these proposals aren't getting much uptake

I’m not sure what you mean by not much uptake, EU countries are required to issue and accept them for official business by the end of 2026

IX-103 an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

There are schemes where you don't need key pairs for each user (assuming the government has some way of authenticating users). Private State Tokens use blinded tokens for this.

It doesn't prevent tokens from being stolen or sold, but the token issuer only accepts each token once and can limit the rate that tokens are issued and control how fast they expire, giving decent control over how practical using stolen or sold tokens are.

horsawlarway 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> In practice this means no rooted/jailbroken phones.

Personally - this is less acceptable to me than just having the site collect my image/id.

I'd support just putting the id in a dedicated device (ex - gov issues smart key) or just accepting that sometimes people will share id info (just like... physical ids).

It doesn't even close all the doors to transferring ids - since I can still just hand someone a phone (just like... physical ids).

echoangle 3 hours ago | parent [-]

If you use physical ids to verify your identity, they normally verify that your face matches the image on the id, no? That’s not possible for web id.

rolph 2 hours ago | parent [-]

Doppelgängers Don’t Just Look Alike—They Also Share DNA

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/doppelgangers-dont...

echoangle an hour ago | parent [-]

Yeah, but being able to share Id with someone who happens to look eerily like you is different from just handing people your ID and they are able to use it like it was implied. That’s not how IDs are used.

Wowfunhappy 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> The only real issue is the wallet app and device binding. Because a compromised device could allow credentials to be transferred some form of attestation of device and wallet app is required. In practice this means no rooted/jailbroken phones.

Yeah, and no Linux PCs, no custom builds of web browsers (which would effectively become open source in theory only)—basically the end of any kind of open platform. I would much rather just scan my ID!

microtonal 19 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

The ID is signed by the government and linked to the device to prevent transferring the credential. A public/private key-pair is generated by the secure enclave in your phone, the public key along with proof of possession of the private key is included in the request for the government eID.

IMO, there are two other issues that need to be solved. The major one is that there should be some way to do attestation of devices that are not Google-certified Android or iOS. If this does not happen, the smartphone duopoly is permanently entrenched and not a fair/free market anymore. There is no way to use a smartphone without basically losing your privacy to Google/Apple and given the increasing importance of online services it's becoming increasingly impossible to live without a smartphone.

It was very disheartening that the EU reference implementation was rolled out with only Play Integrity and Apple's counterpart. IMO, this should have been solved before the reference implementation was rolled out to member countries, because many of them won't bother to go beyond that [1]. It is also completely counterproductive when it comes to EU tech sovereignty. There is a group of pioneers that are growing the sovereign ecosystems and then you cut them off.

The second, perhaps lesser, problem is that the security story is not super strong, because most Android phones do not even have a secure enclave (outside Pixel and Samsung flagships/A5x, there are very few). Instead they rely on TrustZone etc. which are regularly targeted by side-channel attacks, etc. Ironically, GrapheneOS is cut off from most of these systems (because Google Play Integrity), while it actually requires a secure enclave and is more secure than... well I guess every other smartphone.

[1] There is some hope, e.g. the developers of the Dutch identity wallet acknowledge the issue and are open to supporting alternative systems.

MyMemoryfails 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

If you are referring to EUID (not fully sure as you said EU eID, i dont know if you are referring the estonia of eID like system)

I have to mention that EUID is not private, since there's "provider" element which informs website if you are 18 or not. The flow is:

1) You scan QR code 2) Your EUDI wallet does verification, informs provider to tell you are 18+ 3) Provider informs website you are 18+

The EUID draft doesnt mention tech like ohttp for anonymizing requests. So there's risk of provider keeping track of who you are. So while everybody claims its fully anonymous which is just false. Government could ask website/service for the token or account information then use timestamp or token then combining with "provider" logs, your identity will be exposed.

EUID has another problem which is letting all countries implement system, which is wasteful duplication effort so this probably will be outsourced and to same company to reduce duplication efforts. Then it'll be centralized and they happen be collecting telemetry data for "experience improvements" as everysite out there do.

I haven't even mentioned biggest problems like requiring attestation Apple/Google. While spec doesn't require it, but the likehood country's app requiring it will be very high.

drnick1 41 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> A public/private key-pair is generated by the secure enclave in your phone

This is completely unacceptable. In practice, this solution means a locked down device, probably controlled by Google or Apple.

The Internet has existed without identity or age verification for more than 30 years, and there is no reason to change that.

mcfedr 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Which part of that is avoiding the distopian control?

the very first line, government issued digital id - we have been avoiding that for a very long time

how does this work on an open source operating system?

skinfaxi 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Couldn't the public key be used as an identifier for tracking?

irusensei 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

>The government issues an eID to your wallet

So people in dubious legal circumstances are locked out the internet?

manapause 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

What about at the device level?

“You must be this tall to ride this ride”

“ you must be 18 to own an iPhone 18+ “

I apologize for the drive-by question, and I appreciate your takes!

Footprint0521 10 minutes ago | parent [-]

This would run into the same deal as VINs in the real world being tied to licenses, or serial numbers to guns. But the car equivalent of VMs/open hardware/custom firmware (imagine a $7 pi zero flashed with lineageOS “overage phone”) then becomes equivalent to a gun without a serial number, and suddenly open source/hardware people are felons and there is insane amount of control on hardware and software like it’s 1982.

This assumes that the government would be able to verify independently a phone serial number so that people’s IDs aren’t leaked. If not, then you’re back to the same thing as before since “drivers licenses” are stored by sites and shared around with advertisers

chollida1 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

How does this work without a phone? I do 99% of my computer work, like now, not on a phone.

Do regular desktop and laptop computers have the same secure enclave feature?

hluska an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

There is no real practical difference between ‘attested devices’ and scanning ID…

inigyou 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> which contains the device public key

And there it is.

ninalanyon 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

So now I have to have a mobile phone?

pluralmonad 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

And one you don't fully own/control. Fully owned devices will be unsupported, obviously.

petemill 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Sounds like what a government issued card should be used for, which seems fine

sonic45132 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I feel the idea of public key encryption could be done without a phone but the device locking makes it harder to transfer the token off device. Like the parent comment said, I think 90% is all we can aim for. Nothing is going to be perfect.

rustyminnow 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Could probably be implemented by a smartcard or yubikey-like device as well. Shoot, just build it into my state issued ID card.

baby_souffle 2 hours ago | parent [-]

Do you know how hard it was to get RealID rolled out?

And now you're going to tell every state to do it again, but this time it's got a chip in it so "just trust the government, man".

This will go well.

intrasight 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Identity wallets can be made to work anywhere.

izacus 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

You can have an ID card. Just like for buying alcohol and cigarettes.

4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]
[deleted]
maccard 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Secure Enclave on a mobile phone, or an NFC smart card both work fine. It could be your passport, drivers license, national ID, whatever.

john_strinlai 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

>Could you be more specific as to what you're imagining?

sure, i'll put my favorite two. though you'll find much more detailed and thought-out versions of these (and others) in the dozens of other giant threads on the same topic.

- buy a card with a UUID from anywhere that sells alcohol/tobacco that is valid for some period of time. most people are comfortable with flashing their ID at the clerk. the UUID card is non-identifying.

- websites issue content tags, browsers consume them, you enter your age into the OS during setup.

donmcronald 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> buy a card with a UUID from anywhere that sells alcohol/tobacco that is valid for some period of time

Why should I pay continuously to prove I'm an adult? And those cards will be getting sold to kids faster than you can blink. I bet a lot of parents would buy them for their kids.

john_strinlai 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

>And those cards will be getting sold to kids faster than you can blink.

there's a reason i said 90% and not 100% effective. alcohol and tobacco get resold to kids, too.

fl4regun 4 hours ago | parent [-]

What makes you think this will be close to 90%? Unless these cards are expensive I don't see that happening.

john_strinlai 3 hours ago | parent [-]

>What makes you think this will be close to 90%? Unless these cards are expensive I don't see that happening.

its obviously just an illustrative guess. but if the penalty of possessing the card is similar to underage possession of alcohol/tobacco, and larger penalties if a store/person is found providing a card to someone underage, i see no reason why it wouldnt have a similar success rate as alcohol/tobacco.

inigyou 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Why possess the card when you can just buy the UUID on the dark web

bilkow 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

If they have access to the "dark web" they can already do anything that requires age verification there. In the same way you expect that the rule to "not sell UUIDs" wouldn't be respected there, I wouldn't expect other age-verification rules to be respected, no matter the verification method.

inigyou 2 hours ago | parent [-]

Well, it's rather harder to sell bottles of beer on the dark web than short text strings.

bilkow an hour ago | parent [-]

That is true, it is harder, although AFAIK people do sell all kinds of illegal things there.

john_strinlai 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

sure? i feel like i need to reemphasize the "not going for 100% effectiveness" thing again.

hopefully some parent steps in if their kid is on the dark web trying to make purchases with their parent's credit card.

anigbrowl an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Why buy a UUID when you can just get porn on the dark web

triceratops 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Kids can buy drugs on the dark web too.

sdeframond 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> I bet a lot of parents would buy them for their kids.

That changes the default from "anyone can do anything" to "gotta ask parents". Defaults matter at scale. It adds friction.

drdexebtjl 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> I bet a lot of parents would buy them for their kids.

Good. I should be able to make judgement calls about what my children can or can’t access outside of school.

It’s better if they do it under my supervision than against my back, aided by a predator whose only moat is lending their ID, or their face.

CPLX 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Why should you pay for an internet connection, or a computing device with a screen? This isn't a serious counterargument.

fluoridation 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Because those things cost money to make and to maintain, whereas there's no intrinsic cost to prove one is an adult.

CPLX 2 hours ago | parent [-]

Yes there is.

You need to pay for a drivers license or a passport and so on. So there is an intrinsic cost to prove who you are where you are from and what your birthday is already.

You have to pay for all sorts of small things to participate in normal society. This isn't a serious criticism.

By definition this is not a life critical thing, it's something that is procured in order to access specific services on the internet, which is not free.

fluoridation 2 hours ago | parent [-]

>You need to pay for a drivers license or a passport and so on.

I have a government ID and I didn't pay for it. I can use it to travel to nearby countries in lieu of a passport. The assumption that IDs are necessarily non-free (to the issuee) is pretty funny to me.

>it's something that is procured in order to access specific services on the internet, which is not free.

The maintenance of the Internet is already paid for through ISP contracts.

CPLX 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I mean, if you really want to make the government subsidize an ID verification scheme or mandate that certain real-world locations provide age verification as a social service for everyone, that's fine.

It's orthogonal to the discussion, though, which is about whether we should do it or not, because the costs here aren't significant and don't change the terms of the debate.

fluoridation 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I'm personally in favor of just banning children off the Internet, but I don't agree it's orthogonal to the discussion. What I replied to was the implication that someone should pay a recurring cost to prove they're an adult for the same reason that they pay to own a computer or to connect to the Internet. Don't disown the dumb thing you said.

CPLX an hour ago | parent [-]

I'm not disowning it at all. I think paying a recurring cost to prove you're an adult for purposes of accessing the internet is completely fine, trivial, and unimportant.

You have to pay a cost to go out in public, since there are nudity laws. You have to pay a cost to use an airport or a train station. You have to pay a fee to prove that you own a car. And so on.

It just doesn't matter. It's not important. It's consistent with how we organize our society in general, which makes focusing on it in this one particular instance more understandable as an attempt to distract from the substantive merits of these arguments about age verification.

fluoridation 4 minutes ago | parent [-]

>I think paying a recurring cost to prove you're an adult for purposes of accessing the internet is completely fine, trivial, and unimportant.

Okay, but the person you replied to doesn't, and instead of providing an actual answer to their question, you posed a false equivalence between proving your age and buying a computer.

>You have to pay a cost to go out in public, since there are nudity laws. You have to pay a cost to use an airport or a train station. You have to pay a fee to prove that you own a car. And so on.

You are purposefully muddying the waters by being lax with your use of language. The "cost" you "pay" by wearing appropriate attire in public is fundamentally different from the actual cost you actually pay when you engage in commerce; one is a trade of freedoms and the other is a trade of goods and/or services. If your argument is that the freedom you have to trade in exchange for the freedom to access the Internet, is that of not having to show an ID, that's one thing. If you also have to add a recurring monetary cost then that's another.

If you don't have an answer to the question of why someone should have to pay again to use the Internet beyond "*shrug* just 'cause, dude. Who cares?", then maybe you shouldn't have said anything.

utopiah 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> UUID card is non-identifying.

Kids aren't going to trade Pokemon cards in the playground anymore...

choo-t 4 hours ago | parent [-]

Well, they could trade identifying ones too or even stollen ID cards if you want to go this way.

They could also trade porn-filled thumb drive or old-school glossy paper magazine. There no way to prevent kid's exposure to stuff at a 100% success rate.

There no way to avoid exposure completely

utopiah an hour ago | parent [-]

Indeed but you are the one who claimed it was not a hard problem.

I don't think any one of us pushing back here on those claims do so for the heck of NOT finding a "solution", rather genuinely asking because so far it seems nobody did find such a solution without compromises that is in the end not worth it due to the flaw in said solution.

The point isn't to be critical of your process, only of the claim that it's a trivial problem.

cogman10 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

And honestly, all these should ultimately just be done client side in the browser. After the browser has verified "User is x or user is over 21" there's no reason to then send that information to the website.

Let websites issue a "window.isUserOver(16)" call once and then move forward based on the response to that query.

Wowfunhappy 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

This would require browser attestation, wouldn't it? Otherwise kids are just going to download a custom build of Chromium where `window.isUserOver(16)` is always `True`.

cogman10 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Some probably will. 99% of them don't even know what "Chromium" is.

This doesn't have to be perfect.

Wowfunhappy 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Right now, they don't know. They're going to learn very quickly when they want to use some website and they can't.

We agree it doesn't need to be 100% perfect. But it needs to be at least, like, 60% perfect, right? And unless you make it at least a bit hard to bypass, it will stop virtually no one.

cogman10 2 hours ago | parent [-]

Some undoubtedly will.

Installing a new browser is already a bit hard for most people. I think you are a little skewed in your thinking being online on HN.

You also aren't thinking about age. Certainly 16 and 18 year old probably can get a new browser installed. But a 14 year old? 12 year old? 10 year old? That barrier is a lot higher the younger a kid is.

Wowfunhappy 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I just finished my second year as a fifth grade teacher, so I have a lot of experience with ten year olds. I am confident a majority of my students would be able to install an alternative web browser if they needed to, and a majority of the remainder would ask a friend to do it.

To give you an example of the workarounds kids will find: Youtube was blocked on school laptops, so the kids all started embedding Youtube videos inside of Google Sheets in order to watch stuff. This isn't, like, something a few savvy kids did, it was a widespread and common practice.

drnick1 30 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

Lol. I started building computers, installing operating systems and tinkering with Linux between ages 10-12. I also started watching porn not long after that, and guess what, I still became a more or less normal adult. There is absolutely no need to "protect the children."

mindslight 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

No, it only "requires" browser attestation if we taken it as a given that the onus is on tech companies for verifying who they are talking to - ie identity verification that most of these schemes boil down to regardless of how cute they're dressed up.

To effectively keep adult content away from kids, it merely requires secure boot and closed app stores, which are already widespread. And they are only required on the devices actually given to kids, rather than every single computing device.

But this proposal has another problem: it's easy for a website to run isUserOver(n) in a loop to derive the exact age. And on a persistent account, it can be queried every day to derive an exact birthday! Which comes back to my main point that the only technical schemes we should be considering are ones where information strictly flows one way - the website/app supplies information to the browser/OS, which then [may] implement parental control policy. anything else fundamentally boils down to a mandate for identity verification.

drnick1 26 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

> To effectively keep adult content away from kids, it merely requires secure boot and closed app stores

This is unacceptable. If I own a computer, I expect to be able to build and run any program, either written by myself or others, without asking anyone for permission.

mindslight 17 minutes ago | parent [-]

Maybe I needed to say "it merely requires the existence ...". Because I then do go on to say:

> And they are only required on the devices actually given to kids

My whole point is that this limits the blast radius, compared to any solution involving "age" (read: identity) verification which has a blast radius of every computing device!

Perhaps my other comment will show you where I'm coming from better: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48645646

Wowfunhappy 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> To effectively keep adult content away from kids, it merely requires secure boot and closed app stores, which are already widespread. And they are only required on the devices actually given to kids, rather than every single computing device.

...I guess I don't really see the difference.

Closed app stores are widespread on some platforms but certainly not others, and I for one would really like them to not spread any further.

mindslight 2 hours ago | parent [-]

For starters here, the difference is that only devices that parents give to kids need to have secure boot and controlled software sources. The point is that every other device remains completely unaffected.

But in general there is a huge difference between the freedom-destroying properties of secure boot with closed app stores, and the next step of remote attestation. Remote attestation lets the server insist that you only run software fully of their choosing rather than your choosing, as a condition of interacting with them. This completely destroys the idea of protocols that mediate between two parties with diverging interests, and computationally disenfranchises users. Imagine the next generation of the Cloudflare nagwall that doesn't let you past unless you buy a new computer, and that new computer must be running MSWin/OSX and MSIE/Chrome.

(also note that my use of "secure boot" here includes systems like on Pixels where you can straightforwardly unlock the bootloader (erasing the data on the device), install whatever you want, and then relock. I still find these systems philosophically objectionable, as there is still a privileged key baked in and retained by the manufacturer - similar security properties could be provided without the backdoor. But pragmatically they've been working okay)

mminer237 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

This is how California is legislating it—requiring the OS to let an admin set the user's age, then let browsers and through them, websites, to query that setting.

inigyou 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

You can get their exact age by binary search.

ekr____ 2 hours ago | parent [-]

Typically these APIs are designed so you can't make arbitrary queries, but rather there are fixed age brackets.

inigyou 2 hours ago | parent [-]

Then it can't be bool isOver(int age)

dana-s 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I'm just left wondering, how would that be different than buying a phone? Most kids also don't have money to spend on devices, that's all coming from adults, how would the UUID work any different? In my view it seems we'll just reach the current state as with phones.

shevy-java an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

> - websites issue content tags, browsers consume them, you enter your age into the OS during setup.

Why would that be acceptable though? What if a user does not trust the operating system? Even Linux may not be safe in the future, what with age sniffing coming by Red Hat integrating it into system already. And Red Hat plans more - xorg is abandoned on purpose, for instance.

karussell 12 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I think the German Personalausweis has an electronic ID function that does this: age verification without giving out other information like name etc. But the application chooses which information is requested and could/will request more.

Unfortunately few know and use this information although the usage via NFC is not that complicated. Have used it successfully already a few times for banks, but including name information etc.

oliwarner 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

That's because you're treating AV as a system that must be 100% correct immediately. This isn't banking or an election.

As soon as you loosen off the requirements to "reasonable effort", you can start looking at account age, facial features, social attestation, and include retrospective tools to revisit someone's verification if they get in and start acting like a child. Heuristically messy but far from impossible to demand a stronger form of verification if their original might have been borderline.

The goal is broad coverage, not complete. Screening doesn't have to get 100% to have an effect.

Wowfunhappy 3 hours ago | parent [-]

I understand it doesn't need to be 100% correct. But I think what you're describing is either (A) going to be very privacy invasive, (B) going to create problems for lots of adults, or (C) going to be precisely as effective as a checkbox saying "I agree I am over 18 years old".

oliwarner an hour ago | parent [-]

It's "social media". The whole thing is profiling for advertisers. The idea that there's privacy is laughable.

There is a network effect as a child's peers stop using social media though. Make it inconvenient enough for enough for kids and they'll read a book, take up slam poetry or whatever it was kids did before our attention became currency.

pyrale 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

you generate a random number and send it to website you want to visit.

Website you want to visit generates a one-time private/public key for the purpose of this login attempt, hashes your random number, and sends the hash back to you.

You connect to the government auth platform, auth yourself to your government, and ask them to sign the hash you received.

You pass the signed hash as well as the original random number to the website you wanted to access (the original random number is used by the website to store the one-time key they generated for you). They can see it is signed by the government. They can see it is made with the hash they provided.

You get access to whatever content you wanted. The website doesn't know who you are. The government doesn't know where you logged in. Sure, it won't hold up against collusion between website and government, but nothing would.

the principles explained above are slight adaptations of PKCE authentication.

LudwigNagasena 2 hours ago | parent [-]

> Sure, it won't hold up against collusion between website and government, but nothing would.

Right, so it's just privacy theatre.

pyrale an hour ago | parent [-]

Not necessarily. Some sites have no interest in communicating your data to the government, unlike their 23019 affiliate ad programs.

If your government is paying private third parties to collect data on you (hello USA), the issue is much wider, and nothing would protect you from such a government. Even without age verification, if the government is interested in spying on you, and the sites are willing to sell, they would gladly trade your IP and connection log.

zug_zug 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Sure here's one example of decentralizing it -- it's going to be overly simple just as a toy example to show how easy it could be:

Whenever you want to prove your adult you go to "am I an adult.gov" and you use your credit card or whatever to prove you are an adult. At which point you get a 1-time 5-digit code that is UNIVERSAL TO EVERY SINGLE HUMAN and good for 1 hour (everybody who uses the site gets the same code that hour).

Then when you want to look at porn or something, you use this code. Boom simple and done.

There are even much better much more private techniques that use cryptography, and AI is happy to explain these graduate-degree level topics to you at your own pace.

Of course there are situations where people steal things, and use deep-fakes, etc, but those exist in every model.

akmiller 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Same code for all people for 1 hour and you don't think we'd immediately have rotating codes to pass the gate?

dpoloncsak 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I'd setup the .onion in a heartbeat. Take crypto donations, cash out in Monero

zug_zug 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

I sure hope so.

I think the only thing I actually have any concern about is phones and social media use for kids, and I think that has a much easier solution than any sorting of tracking-BS.

malwrar 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Headline news: children infiltrate the universal adult one time password scheme for porn, parents panic! Turns out the 18 year olds started selling access to their younger friends, who resold it to their younger friends.

sowbug 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Hopefully it would be less of a criticism of the system, and more spurring people to ask questions like "Wait, why did you leave a hunting knife on the coffee table?"

Design a scheme that equips parents with better tools to be better parents, rather than one that reduces the scope of parenting responsibilities.

john_strinlai 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

this happens with alcohol and tobacco every day. i cant think of the last time it reached headline news.

malwrar 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

My point is that the entire check is bypassed easily and instantly, and in the meantime the government gets data that someone _will_ figure out how to make personally identifying for adults, or will argue for changes to make it so. Alcohol age limits are a simple physical check for a vice that everyone accepts those who want it can get at. I’d rather demand that device manufacturers give parents effective controls before we try solving this problem by identifying internet users wholesale.

pwg 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

It does not reach headline news because everyone just accepts that the "filter" is imperfect.

But, for some reason, little twelve year old Jimmy obtaining access to porn evokes some kind of far more visceral reaction in Jimmy's parents (or if not Jimmy's parents, some "busybody" who wants to "protect all the children") than Jimmy managing to get himself a pack of Salem's or a Pabst Blue Ribbon tallboy.

john_strinlai 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

right, that's exactly what i was getting at with my original comment. none of the laws we have are 100% effective. so i find it weird that this specific topic always devolves into "well some kid will be able to get access, so your proposal sucks".

triceratops an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

> little twelve year old Jimmy obtaining access to porn evokes some kind of far more visceral reaction in Jimmy's parents

Because right now there's next to no barrier to access compared to Jimmy getting himself a beer. If you keep saying "Your proposal sucks because it isn't perfect and we should do nothing" then you're essentially surrendering to the people who really want facial scans.

zug_zug 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

are you kidding? there will always be a million porn sites not hosted in the US that everybody will have access too.

This sort of pedantry is really just supporting the opposition.

codedokode 40 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Yubikey tokens support attestation. You can sell Yubikey tokens at places inaccessible to minors, like liquor stores, and having a token proves that one is adult. Another way is implementing "parent mode" when OS allows only installing apps from a government-approved whitelist and access sites from a whitelist.

lotu 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Using existing parental controls parents could set their kids age and that could be used for the age controls. Could the parents let the kids around the age gate? Sure but they could do that even if a government ID and camera was required. This actually might be more effective than a lot of these systems because other adults could not let the kids use their IDs

inigyou 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Existing parental controls don't work - new ones would have to be created.

blahaj 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Cryptographically blinded age verification with a government signed digital ID

netrap 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Perfect is the enemy of the good, right? I mean a page header or some other simple means to identify "adult" vs not is good for most cases? Just thinking about it.. obviously it can be bypassed but is there a good enough?

armchairhacker 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Make unrestricted devices like alcohol: you need ID to buy (but the box containing the device you’re sold is indistinguishable from any other, so the device may have a UUID but it can’t be traced to your ID); kids caught with unrestricted devices in school have them confiscated; maybe fine parents, but I think discouragement and banning in schools is enough. Kids can have restricted devices, distinguished from unrestricted by appearance in a way that’s hard to fake.

Wowfunhappy 4 hours ago | parent [-]

I don't know, treating general-purpose computers like alcohol seems a lot more dystopian to me. Does this extend to PC components? Can I build a machine and put Linux on it?

armchairhacker 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Do most kids have the ability and motivation to build their own machines?

AFAIK you don’t need ID to buy juice, sugar, and yeast to make your own alcohol, so I think it should be the same for computer parts.

impure-aqua 4 hours ago | parent [-]

> Do most kids have the ability and motivation to build their own machines?

I and pretty much everyone else in my childhood TeamSpeak server did at roughly 14 years of age.

armchairhacker 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Did the people in your Teamspeak server have issues with concentration and socialization like most social media addicts today?

intrasight 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> Can I build a machine and put Linux on it?

Maybe for the next few years you'll be able to do that. Analogy: back in the day you could just build your own airplane and fly it around. There were no regulations.

michael1999 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Info-minimized oidc handshakes with certified identity providers could verify age-category of a user with no other information shared.

Consider "log in with apple" as it is today. Depending on what you share, a relying website might not even get your name or email.

bbminner 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Yes, that was my thought as well when i was visiting UK and reddit kept asking me to verify my age. It might be even more private and non-trackable than that - if "age.id.gov" central authority effectively "provides a new random user id" (implementation may vary and does not need to have a "literal username") every time you try to use it / log into a website that needs to verify your age - this way websites can not even track you across platforms.

It seems like all the tech stack is there to implement a very simple and privacy-persevering solution.

It does not even smell of state censorship because a website does not have to check your age if it decides to be "non compliant".

Why isn't it implemented like that? Based on the comments it seems more like a "free-for-all implement-your-own-PPI-handling-thon".

This will ofc make life harder for a some groups of people - like people without / limited access to IDs etc. And i do not even argue that the whole thing is necessary.

But there seem to be vastly superior technical means to implement that, aren't there?

inigyou 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

The only way to know that is to trust Apple.

soperj 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

just do what they did in Leisure suit Larry, ask some skill testing questions that only someone older than 18 would know. Give them a short time to answer so they can't look it up.

dfxm12 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

If you don't think a checkbox saying "I am 13 or older" is adequate, with all the behavioral tracking available to say Meta, they can tell well enough. OpenAI talks about this too: https://openai.com/index/our-approach-to-age-prediction/

Knowing who someone is in general is different from having a photo of their face or government ID confirmation.

lo_zamoyski 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

This is a classic case for one time ZKPs. Sure, you can't get around attestation, but the party that needs to verify that you meet age criteria doesn't need to know your age or other private information.

I presume you're concerned by the attesting party's knowledge of both the signature and identify information. Yes, in principle these can be linked, but in practice, it may be difficult or made very difficult, and today, very little of our online activity is really anonymous anyway. It is generally not too difficult to infer identity based on the content someone generates and the bread crumbs they leave behind.

Of course, if the intent is to use age verification as a wedge to monitor everyone, then it will be difficult politically to secure the protections needed to prevent that sort of data fusion.