You misunderstand. You underestimate the depth of the campaign. The strategy calls for a total dismantling of Iran's infrastructure, including oil generation, fuel processing, electrical generation, and industrial capacity. Similar how the allies won WWII against Germany and Japan by destroying their industrial capacity.

Iran would be paralyzed without fuel and electricity, GDP would collapse by 90%, and within days, there would be large social unrest. The IRGC would be too distracted managing unrest to mount a concerted response.

The US and allies would spend the next few weeks amassing forces, then would invade along multiple axises (from the east and west). Pakistan would join the war, as it is obligated under the Saudi/Pakistani mutual self-defense treaty.

Forces would then remove the nuclear material, clean up Iranian missiles that target ships in the strait, and the US would leave.

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inglor_cz a day ago | parent | next [-]

"You underestimate the depth of the campaign. The strategy calls for a total dismantling of Iran's infrastructure, including oil generation, fuel processing, electrical generation, and industrial capacity. Similar how the allies won WWII against Germany and Japan by destroying their industrial capacity."

Nope, I understand quite well. I also understand that your picture of current US capabilities is too rosy.

The current US military simply does not have enough assets to do that without dangerously overstretching its commitments elsewhere. They already had to withdraw some missiles from the Far East to compensate for what was used during March.

The US armaments industry is nowhere near where it was during WWII in terms of current capacity, and its future capacity ramp-up is slooooow. Not enough qualified people, for starters. Many necessary components are produced overseas. Too much red tape and not enough willingness from the government to commit to large orders in the future.

In order to build a new factory, you need to be sure that the government will be buying the products for ~15-20 years, but the voters don't support this sort of military expenditure. They want more Medicare and Social Security, not unlike Europeans, and less military spending.

Even if the US decided to supercharge spending on its military, the lead-in time to build those factories is at least two years.

BTW your assertion that the Allies destroyed German industrial capacity is flat wrong. This is exactly the shallow understanding of history I was talking about. Dive into some actual historical sources on strategic bombing.

The Allies mostly destroyed living quarters of German workers, but Germany actually reached peak armaments production in 1944 and the occupying forces were surprised by finding the factories in good order and full of new machines.

What really broke Germany's back was physical loss of territory, severe lack of important resources like oil (caused by physical loss of control of Romania), molybden (which made their first jet engines unreliable) and a significant loss of people. But its industry was working quite reliably until Stunde Null. They moved the most critical factories underground and that was it.

One of the reasons why West Germany was so swiftly reintegrated into Europe was that their industrial capacity was necessary for post-war buildup. During the Marshall Plan years, Germany was the only European nation where the average age of industrial equipment was under 5 years.

	▲	tristanj a day ago \| parent [-]
		Nope, you do not comprehend the strategy at all. I don't understand how you could write all that, without comprehending the situation. The strategy, which Trump chose not to pursue, is the total destruction of Iran's energy and fuel infrastructure. This strategy was used against Germany and Japan by destroying their industrial capacity; though to a lesser extent. The allies did not target German electrical production, which was a massive strategic oversight. Post war analysis concluded that if the allies targeted <12 electrical transformer stations in 1943, it would have paralyzed German heavy industry within weeks. The war would have concluded a year earlier. This strategy calls for precision targeting of Iran's electrical and fuel infrastructure. Iran would be paralyzed without fuel and electricity. GDP would collapse by 90%. It is not possible to run a modern economy without fuel or electricity. Communications are largely cut. Fuel will quickly run out. Shortages would rapidly ensue. Protests would begin immediately, and the IRGC would be forced to divert resources to manage the chaos. During this period, the US would launch a ground invasion, and retrieve the buried nuclear material. Iran would not be able to mount a coordinated response, and combat losses would be far lower than if the US mounted a traditional invasion.

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bigyabai a day ago | parent | prev [-]

If that strategy was the only strategy, then it would have already been done, there would be no desire for diplomatic resolution here. Optics-wise, banking on social unrest has failed, and if the US escalates it to a Dresden situation then the Gulf States will have their own critical services attacked in reprisal. Part of the reason why we're even seeing negotiations is because the US has no free win button. The escalation ladder is still wide open for both sides.

It doesn't take a four star general to understand why a ground invasion sucks. By the time Marines land in Bandar Abbas, the HEU is halfway to an underground vault in Magnitogorsk. The remaining job of securing UF6 rubble, locating spare centrifuges and dismantling their enrichment loop is pointless. There is no option to "remove the nuclear material" that reasonably deters Iran from attaining nuclear weapons. The JCPOA was a more workable framework than this blockade has proven to be.

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tristanj a day ago | parent [-]

Lots of issues

> If that strategy was the only strategy, then it would have already been done

No, it's not done because the US is averse to combat losses. The US will win a ground war against Iran, there's no question here. But it will do so at significant loss, in the thousands of lives.

Trump is politically savvy enough to not desire this option.

> banking on social unrest has failed

The social unrest strategy was never implemented. It was hinted at happening, Iranians were told to wait until told to resume protesting, but the green light was never given.

> By the time Marines land in Bandar Abbas

The marines can't land at Bandar Abbas, a cursory look at the geography shows it makes no sense to land here; a ground invasion would start from Pakistan or Iraq.

> the HEU is halfway to an underground vault in Magnitogorsk.

Why would Iran voluntarily give up its Uranium stockpiles to Russia? There is no strategic benefit.

> The remaining job of securing UF6 rubble, locating spare centrifuges and dismantling their enrichment loop is pointless.

False, it is not possible to build a nuclear weapon without a significant amount of accompanying infrastructure; there is enormous strategic value to destroying Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

> There is no option to "remove the nuclear material" that reasonably deters Iran from attaining nuclear weapons.

False, doing so would set back the Iranian nuclear program by ten to twenty years; which is long enough for another president to revisit the issue.

While in the country, the US would also dismantle the Iranian missile stockpile, destroying thousands of missiles that could target neighboring countries.

And JCPOA has its own issues, JCPOA was fundamentally flawed, it never addressed the Iranian missile problem, which is equally as large an issue as the Iranian nuclear problem.

	▲	bigyabai a day ago \| parent [-]
		> Trump is politically savvy enough to not desire this option. Every single preceding president before him is "politically savvy" enough to not desire it. Trump is unique in that he is actively considering it, when Iran does not legitimately threaten the United States with their nuclear weapons or ballistic missile program. Regardless of how you feel, the allegations of this being a proxy war are hard to write off. > The social unrest strategy was never implemented. It was certainly implemented at least once, the Mossad admit to abetting the protests in Tehran. The effectiveness of this strategy is called into question now that many of those high-profile dissidents are jailed or dead. And we know for a fact that the Kurds want Trump to pound sand, so they're not some sort of ace-up-the-sleeve as many expected. > The marines can't land at Bandar Abbas That wasn't the point I'm making. How will the US amass troops for any invasion without triggering flight risk for the HEU? > Why would Iran voluntarily give up its Uranium stockpiles to Russia? Because they've already done it once before? https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/world/middleeast/iran-han... > it is not possible to build a nuclear weapon without a significant amount of accompanying infrastructure Like the tens-of-thousands of centrifuges that Iran manufactures domestically? I don't think the US can stop them from building those without some form of diplomatic understanding. They can tear up their underground facilities, but those can also be rebuilt around shorter cascade loops and simpler, weapons-oriented enrichment. > doing so would set back the Iranian nuclear program by ten to twenty years I do not see any citation or explanation for this. It might set back parts of their civilian program, but it wouldn't prevent them from developing their HEU into a dirty-bomb style of weapon. > While in the country, the US would also dismantle the Iranian missile stockpile > it never addressed the Iranian missile problem That's Israel's issue. Iran has not targeted the continental United States once, nor do they have any apparent intention to. Iran has domestic solid fuel production, metallurgists and steel presses that all have to be removed, which is a huge undertaking that doesn't prevent them from making more. Simple MLRS style rocket artillery can be made out of scrap, in an invasion scenario it wouldn't prevent Iran from building and deploying new missiles. It's very easy for the United States to document and enforce a diplomatic solution to Iran's missile attacks, if the goal is stopping them. The JCPOA did not include missiles because it's a separate issue altogether - this would have been an opportunity for Trump to find a politically savvy solution to this, but now we're creeping towards a forever war.