| ▲ | bigyabai a day ago | |||||||
If that strategy was the only strategy, then it would have already been done, there would be no desire for diplomatic resolution here. Optics-wise, banking on social unrest has failed, and if the US escalates it to a Dresden situation then the Gulf States will have their own critical services attacked in reprisal. Part of the reason why we're even seeing negotiations is because the US has no free win button. The escalation ladder is still wide open for both sides. It doesn't take a four star general to understand why a ground invasion sucks. By the time Marines land in Bandar Abbas, the HEU is halfway to an underground vault in Magnitogorsk. The remaining job of securing UF6 rubble, locating spare centrifuges and dismantling their enrichment loop is pointless. There is no option to "remove the nuclear material" that reasonably deters Iran from attaining nuclear weapons. The JCPOA was a more workable framework than this blockade has proven to be. | ||||||||
| ▲ | tristanj a day ago | parent [-] | |||||||
Lots of issues > If that strategy was the only strategy, then it would have already been done No, it's not done because the US is averse to combat losses. The US will win a ground war against Iran, there's no question here. But it will do so at significant loss, in the thousands of lives. Trump is politically savvy enough to not desire this option. > banking on social unrest has failed The social unrest strategy was never implemented. It was hinted at happening, Iranians were told to wait until told to resume protesting, but the green light was never given. > By the time Marines land in Bandar Abbas The marines can't land at Bandar Abbas, a cursory look at the geography shows it makes no sense to land here; a ground invasion would start from Pakistan or Iraq. > the HEU is halfway to an underground vault in Magnitogorsk. Why would Iran voluntarily give up its Uranium stockpiles to Russia? There is no strategic benefit. > The remaining job of securing UF6 rubble, locating spare centrifuges and dismantling their enrichment loop is pointless. False, it is not possible to build a nuclear weapon without a significant amount of accompanying infrastructure; there is enormous strategic value to destroying Iran's nuclear infrastructure. > There is no option to "remove the nuclear material" that reasonably deters Iran from attaining nuclear weapons. False, doing so would set back the Iranian nuclear program by ten to twenty years; which is long enough for another president to revisit the issue. While in the country, the US would also dismantle the Iranian missile stockpile, destroying thousands of missiles that could target neighboring countries. And JCPOA has its own issues, JCPOA was fundamentally flawed, it never addressed the Iranian missile problem, which is equally as large an issue as the Iranian nuclear problem. | ||||||||
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