> Note that for Linux kernel vulnerabilities, unless the reporter chooses to bring it to the linux-distros ML, there is no heads-up to distributions.

Why would they imply it is incumbent on the reporter to liaise with distributions? That seems to assume a high level of familiarity with the linux project. Vulnerability reporters shouldn’t be responsible for directly working with every downstream consumer of the linux kernel, what’s the limiting principal there? Should the reporter also be directly talking to all device manufacturers that use Linux on their machines?

IMO reporter did more than enough by responsibly disclosing it to linux and waiting for a patch to land.

Aren’t there people in the linux project itself with authority over and responsibility for security vulnerabilities? One would think they would be the ones notifying downstream distros…

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aduwah 6 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Especially since the reporter is explicitly asked not to notify the distro teams first.

https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html

```As such, the kernel security team strongly recommends that as a reporter of a potential security issue you DO NOT contact the “linux-distros” mailing list UNTIL a fix is accepted by the affected code’s maintainers and you have read the distros wiki page above and you fully understand the requirements that contacting “linux-distros” will impose on you and the kernel community. ```

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nubinetwork 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I don't get why the initial reporter should have to do that legwork. The kernel maintainers should be doing that.

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stonogo 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

The kernel team has been at odds with the CVE process and the oss-security community about this stuff for many, many years now. It's a big part of why the kernel team established a CNA and started flooding CVE notifications; they don't believe that security problems are different than non-security problems, and refuse to establish norms or policies based on the idea that they are.

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throw0101a an hour ago | parent | next [-]

> […] they don't believe that security problems are different than non-security problems, and refuse to establish norms or policies based on the idea that they are.

They believe there is no difference being able to get root and not being able to get root? It seems to me that to-be(-root) and not-to-be(-root) are quite different.

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IshKebab 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

It's such a bizarre viewpoint. I wonder when Linus will see sense.

IMO it's pretty obviously not a view that they seriously hold, it's just one of those technical justifications people come up with to avoid admitting something they don't want to admit - in this case that Linux has a poor security track record.

	▲	guiambros an hour ago \| parent \| next [-]
		Linus? You mean, the same Linus who thinks "security people are f*cking morons", and "security bugs are just bugs"? Linus is the reason why kernel team doesn't talk to distros. For them bugs are bugs, security related or not. https://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1711.2/01701.html...
	▲	staticassertion 3 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		> I wonder when Linus will see sense. Literally never. Why would he? He's surrounded by sycophants. And we have Greg for whenever Linus isn't involved anymore, and Greg is just as boneheaded.

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sega_sai 7 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

The reporter took time to check and mention on their website specific distributions Ubuntu/RHEL/SUSE. One would have thought reporting to security teams of at least those would be responsible.

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semiquaver 6 hours ago | parent [-]

“One” would have thought? Can you point to a written policy that says that’s how it should be?

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happyopossum 6 hours ago | parent | next [-]

No, nor can I point to a written policy that states one should cover one’s mouth when they cough.

Everyone involved here failed to do the right thing, and hiding behind the lack of written words is weak sauce.

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anikom15 6 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

The tenets of decency don’t need to be written down.

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tob_scott_a 6 hours ago | parent [-]

If you can't write it down, why would you expect it to be universal and enforceable? Different cultures exist and have different opinions on what "decency' means, after all.

A security researcher's ethical obligations are to protect users over vendors (barring any contractual agreement in place). From what has been discussed in this thread, they meet that bar.

Sure, they could have gone the extra mile to ensure the distros were in a good place to patch before they published the exploit. That's a kindness you can wish for, but don't disparage them for not going that extra mile. It's a bonus.

It's also possible that it simply didn't occur to them to do so this time. There's certainly lessons to be learned either way. I don't know that the right lessons will emerge from hostility.

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Quarrelsome 6 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> If you can't write it down, why would you expect it to be universal and enforceable?

and this is the problem. It used to be the case that if you were smart enough to find an exploit you were also smart enough to realise what would happen if you irresponsibly disclosed it. I guess these tools have made that pattern no longer apply.

	▲	true_religion 6 hours ago \| parent [-]
		From my point of view, they told the kernel security team which is in charge of fixing this. If it’s important for them to tell other people, then it should’ve been written down and further reiterated when they made their report. The skills to detect code exploits is not the same as the skills to navigate an informal org chart to the satisfaction of an amorphous audience if end users (i.e. us on HN). That said… as they are a company that supposedly specializes in this field, and is trying to sell a product, I do believe they should do better. Right now, I don’t have much confidence in their product.

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scragz 6 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

different cultures have different views on disclosing vulnerabilities to distros before the public?

	▲	embedding-shape 6 hours ago \| parent \| next [-]
		Yes :) The blackhatter would obviously sit on it until they can sell it or use it, the whitehatter collaborate the kernel and distros to patch, and the greyhatter argues on HN whether the latest *fail was responsible enough or not.
	▲	sunshowers 3 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		Yes? "Different cultures" doesn't just mean different countries; there are many cultures within infosec.

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anikom15 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

There is little difference in culture here. Nearly all open source work is done in English.

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skywhopper 7 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

The reporter made a website explicitly calling out Ubuntu, RedHat, Amazon, and SUSE but didn’t notify them, and you think that’s reasonable? That they might not have known those distributions are downstream from the kernel team?

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Legend2440 5 hours ago | parent | next [-]

If you notify the kernel and they ship a fix, it seems reasonable to expect that they will communicate the fix to the distros.

I see this as an organizational failure of the Linux ecosystem. There should be better communication between distro and kernel development.

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dweinus an hour ago | parent [-]

The reporter clearly knows the distro fixes have not been shipped, read their report. They chose to disclose anyway.

	▲	john_strinlai 43 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		>They chose to disclose anyway. yes, because 30 days had passed from the time the patch landed in the kernel, as per industry standard. approximately every security researcher, including the likes of google and other big names you may know, does a 90+30 disclosure, which is what happened here. they do this for good reason, which has been figured out over decades of experience in reporting thousands and thousands of vulnerabilities. the only security researchers i know of that dont like 90+30 actually argue for shorter timelines (or immediate disclosures).

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sigmar 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

What is the heuristic for who should get the heads up? Should they notify amazon but not google simply because they named amazon linux in the report? Seems to me the answer to my first question gets messy fast.

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sparker72678 7 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Sure, maybe it's not a _requirement_, but now we're all in more pain because the reporters are more interested in Fame than Safe Remediation.

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tptacek 4 hours ago | parent [-]

No, you're in more pain, but other defenders with different postures benefit from having faster and fuller disclosure.

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throw0101a an hour ago | parent | next [-]

> No, you're in more pain, but other defenders with different postures benefit from having faster and fuller disclosure.

Good for them. But just because some folks cannot afford 24/7 response teams and on-call personnel that doesn't make them or their systems any less important.

Lots of non-profits and academic institutions had to scramble because of the Linux kernel team's position of non-communication to distros.

	▲	tptacek an hour ago \| parent [-]
		The conversation about how Linux handle these things is a good and worthy one to have and one "non-profits and academic institutions" need to have when they select distributions. I'm just here to push any of that scrutiny off the vulnerability reporters; Linux is lucky to have them, even if it's mishandling their reports. Vulnerability researchers don't owe these people anything.

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ori_b 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Mind explaining how sitting on it a month after the patch landed is 'faster'? To my mind, that's a month where attackers could analyze commit logs, but maintainers are not acting with urgency to ship fixes.

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tptacek 2 hours ago | parent [-]

No, I wouldn't, because my own preferences are towards immediate disclosure. Tavis Ormandy dropped Zenbleed out of the sky onto us. It wasn't comfortable, it was a scramble for us, but I don't blame Tavis for it; he made a principled call. Better that people know, than that information be concealed from them while designated elites perform a process.

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ori_b 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I'd also prefer immediate disclosure, but I don't get how waiting a month without telling anyone is good regardless of which side you land on.

	▲	john_strinlai 2 hours ago \| parent [-]
		>I'd also prefer immediate disclosure wait, what? you are in another comment thread, of this very post, calling these reporters bumbling and incompetent for their disclosure. "merely bumblingly incompetent and overly eager to get their marketing pitch out the door" - that is your quote. you also said "Basic care would involve making sure the patches had made it into the wild before ending the embargo", which is the literal opposite of immediate disclosure. but now you are saying they should have just dropped it with no reporting at all? because that is what "immediate disclosure" means. pop up the exploit script on twitter and call it done.

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froh 6 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

it's trivial to find out how to report a security issue like this to Linux distros.

Google search: https://share.google/aimode/eihDKXZJy94Z5lC1p

and it's beyond me to not think about doing this and instead exposing everyone and their neighbor to this exploit up front.

I'm certain this is even a felony in some legislations, rightfully so.

	▲	3 hours ago \| parent \| next [-]
		[deleted]
	▲	dboreham 5 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		Agree it's not a good look for these folks, notwithstanding that disclosure is mostly theater.