Well, at some point you have to define what you mean by "proof by contradiction". I was responding to your statement, "prove something by showing that the alternative is unsound". You can prove that something is false that way without needing classical logic.
Mathlib defines `by_contradiction` as a theorem proving `(¬p → False) → p` for any proposition p. ( https://leanprover-community.github.io/mathlib4_docs/Mathlib... ) This does require classical logic.
For what's happening with `¬p -> F`, recall that this is by definition the statement `¬¬p`; classical logic will let you conclude `p` from `¬¬p`, or it will let you apply the law of the excluded middle to conclude that either `p` or `¬p` must be the case, and then show that since it isn't `¬p`, it must be `p`. (Again, not really different approaches, but perhaps different in someone's mental model.)
On the other hand, if you have `p -> F`, that is by definition the statement `¬p`, and if you've established `¬p`, you've already finished proving that p is false.
Something that I find particularly absurd about the hypothetical distinction between intuitionistic and classical logic is that intuitionistic logic is sufficient to prove `¬p` from `¬¬¬p`. (This is quite similar to how 'proof by contradiction' is constructive if you're proving a negative but not if you're proving a positive; it might be the same result.) So for any proposition that can be restated in a "negative" way, the law of the excluded middle remains true in intuitionistic logic. The difference lies only in "fundamentally positive" propositions. (You can do that proof yourself at https://incredible.pm/ ; it's in section 4, `((A→⊥)→⊥)→⊥` -> `A→⊥`.)
There's a fun article on this very blog telling a similar story: https://lawrencecpaulson.github.io/2021/11/24/Intuitionism.h...
> Martin-Löf designed his type theory with the aim that AC should be provable and in his landmark Constructive mathematics and computer programming presented a detailed derivation of it as his only example. Briefly, if (∀x : A)(∃y :B) C(x,y) then (∃f : A → B)(∀x : A) C(x, f(x)).
> Spoiling the party was Diaconescu’s proof in 1975 that in a certain category-theoretic setting, the axiom of choice implied LEM and therefore classical logic. His proof is reproducible in the setting of intuitionistic set theory and seems to have driven today’s intuitionists to oppose AC.
> It’s striking that AC was seen not merely as acceptable but clear by the likes of Bishop, Bridges and Dummett. Now it is being rejected and the various arguments against it have the look of post-hoc rationalisations. Of course, the alternative would be to reject intuitionism altogether. This is certainly what mathematicians have done: in my experience, the overwhelming majority of constructive mathematicians are not mathematicians at all. They are computer scientists.