> This broken safety culture has been around since the beginning of the Shuttle program.

It's broken everywhere. I have worked in some dysfunctional shops and the problem I see time and time again is the people who make it into management are often egoists who don't care about anything other than the financial compensation and clout the job titles bestows upon them. That or they think management is the same as being a shotgun toting sheriff overseeing a chain gang working in the summer heat in the deep south.

I've worked with managers who would argue with you even if they knew they were wrong because they were incapable of accepting humiliation. I worked with managers who were wall flowers so afraid of confrontation or negative emotions that they covered up every issue they could in order to avoid any potential negative interaction with their superiors. That manager was also bullied by other managers and even some employees.

A lot of it is ego along with a heavy dose of machismo depending. I've seen managers let safety go right down the tubes because "don't be a such a pussy." It's a bad culture that has to go away.

A simplistic answer would be to ensure that incentives are aligned with safety and success. Then that leads to the evergreen problem of Goodhart’s Law (when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure).

Even if it can't ever be truly fixed, at least recognizing the issues and shining daylight on decisions for some form of accountability should be a base-level approach.

> people who make it into management are often egoists

> they were incapable of accepting humiliation

I agree mostly but here is a different take on it: I think these are normal human feelings and behaviors - not the best of us, but not unusual either. If we want to get good things done, we need to work with and through human nature. Power corrupts everyone and shame is generally the most painful thing for humans.

Putting people in a position where they need to treat their power with absolute humility or accept humiliation (and a major blow to their careers) in order to do the right thing is going to fail 99% of the time. (I'm not saying people can't do those things and that we shouldn't work hard and aspire to them, but it's not going to happen reliably with any but a few people.) That expectation itself is a culture, organizational and managerial failure. If you see a system in which so many fail, then the problem is the system.

And when I say 'managerial' failure, I include leadership by everyone and also 'managing up'. We're all responsible for and agents of the team's results, and whatever our role we need to prevent those situations. One important tactic is to anticipate that problem and get ahead of it, putting the team in a position where the risk is proactively addressed and/or they have the flexibility to change course without 'humiliation'. We're all responsible for the team's culture.

I think many blaming others underestimate their own human nature, the effect of power on them and their willingness to endure things like humiliation. Rather than criticising others, I keep my attention on the one in the mirror and on strategies to avoid situations equally dangerous to my own character; otherwise I'll end up doing the same very human things.

EDIT: While I still agree with everything I wrote above, there is an exceptional cultural problem here, one which you'll recognize and which is common to many SV leaders, the Trump administration, and others you're familiar with (and which needs a name ...). From the document referenced in the OP by "heat shield expert and Shuttle astronaut Charles Camarda, the former Director of Engineering at Johnson Space Center."

"Instead, the meeting started with his [Jared Isaacman, the new NASA Administrator's] declaration that the decision was final. We would launch Artemis II with a crew, even though the uncrewed Artemis I mission around the Moon returned with a seriously damaged heat shield, a failure in my opinion. I was not going to be allowed to present my position on why the decision was flawed. Instead, the public would hear, through the two reporters allowed to attend, the Artemis Program narrative, only one side of the story. They would be bombarded with technical information which they would have very little time to understand ...

Jared could claim transparency because the only thermal protection expert and public dissenter, me, was present. ...

I was allowed only one-day to review some of the technical documents which were not open to the public and which were classified Controlled Unclassified Information/International Traffic and Arms Regulations (CUI/ITAR) prior to the Jan.8th meeting. ..."

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ddi792xdfNXcBwF8qpDUxmZz...