You can't just throw software at this. It's a complex system that involves way more than just an airplane and someone in a tower. Systems engineering, human factors, and safety management systems are the relevant disciplines if you'd like to start reading up. In addition there are decades of research on the dynamics between human operators and automation, and the answer is never as simple as "just add more automation." Increased reliance on automation can paradoxically decrease safety.

CPDLC is already being deployed domestically. It's currently available to all operators in en route segments.

All runway incursions at towered airports are reported, classified according to risk, and investigated.

▲

mlyle 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

On the flipside, look at the success of TCAS. It doesn't have a perfect operational history. It hasn't completely eliminated midairs, either. But it took a relatively rare event and further reduced the frequency by about a factor of 5.

I wouldn't be so quick to rule out that there's some kind of relatively easy technological double check that could greatly reduce incidents. The fact that we've not gotten there despite years of effort to reduce runway incursions doesn't mean that it's not possible.

▲

_moof 2 hours ago | parent [-]

TCAS is fantastic - absolutely stellar example of effective automation.

But calling a replacement of major ATC functions with software a "simple fix" is a perfect illustration of why this is a bad idea. Nothing about human-rated safety-critical software is simple, and coming at it with the attitude that it is? In my view, as an experienced pilot, flight instructor, spacecraft operator, and software engineer, that thinking is utterly disqualifying.

Besides, there already are a lot of "simple" fixes in place for this problem, e.g. RWSL, which didn't prevent this accident.

▲

mlyle 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I don't know. At some point, you need to do all the systems engineering. But "why not just ......" is a perfectly reasonable place to start looking at a problem and sometimes the answers really are that simple.

> Besides, there already are a lot of "simple" fixes in place for this problem, e.g. RWSL

It'll be interesting to hear why RWSL didn't help, as it is supposedly deployed at LGA.

▲

dist-epoch an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

You could put a TCAS on every ground vehicle. It's not rocket science.

Yes, I know it probably costs $300k, surely today you can have a $10k ground version.

You could also show every plane on a screen inside the vehicle and have some loud alarms if they are on a collision path.

You could even just display FlightRadar24, still better than nothing.

You would still get permission for the tower, this would not be an allow system, just a deny system.

	▲	throw0101d 23 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		> You could put a TCAS on every ground vehicle. It's not rocket science. TCAS on planes is disabled below 1000±100' (~300m) AGL (above ground level). ADS-B on vehicles is already a thing (and FAA certified): * https://uavionix.com/airports-and-atm/vtu-20/ There are three categories of runway incursion types: operator/ATC error, pilot error, pedestrian/vehicle. Even if someone 'knows' that they need to "hold short runway 12", they can still have a brain fart and go through the hold short line. Unless you want to argue that all vehicles taxiing have to operate (SAE Level 4) autonomously?

▲

jonny_eh 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> You can't just throw software at this

Ok, let's not try improving systems, how's that working out?