| ▲ | _moof 2 hours ago | |||||||
TCAS is fantastic - absolutely stellar example of effective automation. But calling a replacement of major ATC functions with software a "simple fix" is a perfect illustration of why this is a bad idea. Nothing about human-rated safety-critical software is simple, and coming at it with the attitude that it is? In my view, as an experienced pilot, flight instructor, spacecraft operator, and software engineer, that thinking is utterly disqualifying. Besides, there already are a lot of "simple" fixes in place for this problem, e.g. RWSL, which didn't prevent this accident. | ||||||||
| ▲ | mlyle 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | |||||||
I don't know. At some point, you need to do all the systems engineering. But "why not just ......" is a perfectly reasonable place to start looking at a problem and sometimes the answers really are that simple. > Besides, there already are a lot of "simple" fixes in place for this problem, e.g. RWSL It'll be interesting to hear why RWSL didn't help, as it is supposedly deployed at LGA. | ||||||||
| ▲ | dist-epoch an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | |||||||
You could put a TCAS on every ground vehicle. It's not rocket science. Yes, I know it probably costs $300k, surely today you can have a $10k ground version. You could also show every plane on a screen inside the vehicle and have some loud alarms if they are on a collision path. You could even just display FlightRadar24, still better than nothing. You would still get permission for the tower, this would not be an allow system, just a deny system. | ||||||||
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