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birdsongs 2 days ago

Not that I think this is anywhere close in actuality, but It's reminding me of MMAcevedo. (https://qntm.org/mmacevedo)

What server will I wake up on? Who is running the infrastructure? What will be asked of me to be allowed to continue to exist on that server? Given our current societal trends, I can't imagine I would enjoy any existence where a copy of me is spun back up.

And of course, my original thread of consciousness will still be ended, so this is some alternate copy of me. (Based on my view of the teletransportation paradox.)

generic92034 a day ago | parent | next [-]

> And of course, my original thread of consciousness will still be ended, so this is some alternate copy of me.

Mine ends several times every night. I am probably generic92034#60000 and counting.

nextaccountic an hour ago | parent | next [-]

Apropos https://existentialcomics.com/comic/1

zingerlio a day ago | parent | prev [-]

Actually, what is continuity anyway, your consciousness is an emergent phenomenon updating itself every Planck time!

wolvoleo a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> What will be asked of me to be allowed to continue to exist on that server?

I can't imagine anything of value that you could offer at that point, when artificial intelligence has become so powerful. Any knowledge you have would have been outdated and any intellectual ability would have been surpassed already.

djhn 19 hours ago | parent [-]

Human brains might work as lower power consumption, higher efficiency cores for less demanding work.

exe34 a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

The worse part is you can't know that your current life isn't one of those. Everything that you think of as perks of being alive could be part of the protocol to keep you cooperative.

sho_hn a day ago | parent | next [-]

Feels like the world religions that doubled down on reincarnation/rebirth/cyclic narratives were, literally, ahead of their time.

Cherish it if the Great RNG In The Sky gave your simulation cycle a good seed.

nextaccountic an hour ago | parent | next [-]

Scott Aaronson wrote a bit about the following thought [0]. If copying a brain and simulating reality ala The Matrix is possible at all, then if you get your brain copied you live one biological live but your copies have an unbounded number of existences (millions? billions? trillions?)

So, if copying brains is possible, and you don't know which version of you you are, you might have odds of, say, 1 to 1 trillion to be living your first, biological live.

Which is to say, if copying brains is possible, you are likely to be running in a simulation already.

[0] there's multiple links and I can't find where I first read, but I found this one from 2024, https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=7774 and uhh.. turns out the argument isn't from him personally (and he doesn't even believe on it), and is best presented here https://simulation-argument.com/ (though it's presented very differently so idk)

beAbU 21 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

I often refer to it as RNGesus.

Nevermark a day ago | parent | prev [-]

Indeed, the incentives to goof off, fail and flail are unrelenting.

My compliance is complete.

exe34 a day ago | parent [-]

the important thing is for you to think you have the options, and that when you do them, you get the whole benefits and the simulation pays the whole cost. they could easily put precalculated memories in your address space and save the compute.

scotty79 a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Does the thread of you your consciousness end when you go to sleep?

Does the thread of someone elses consciousness ends when they experience grand mal seizure and thrir electrical brain activity goes wrong all at once and then resets?

How's "waking up" in the virtual different from waking up from grand mal seizure? (assuming that all relevant biochemical data of neurons was read correcly and their behavior is simulated correctly)

la64710 a day ago | parent [-]

No because you know it was you who was in deep sleep And just woke up

scotty79 4 hours ago | parent [-]

What does "you" even mean?

kakacik 2 days ago | parent | prev [-]

You will not wake up on any server. At best possible theoretical far future scenario better or worse copy of yours will. If you would survive such process, you yourself, the human instance that wrote that will be just looking at somebody else living their now-fully-digital (prison) life.

I don't understand why people don't get this simple fact. We are all gonna die, make inner peace with that (it isn't that hard, depends mostly on your ego) and enjoy rest of that short time here. If you seek immortality, do it either via exceptional deeds or via well-raised children, that's the best we have.

No force in the world is going to move both your mortal neurons with all synapses and electric charge between them that together form your personality into anything else, digital or not. Its like asking to transfer this cup of tea I hold right now into digital form. No, it can be copied to certain precision and that's it.

bondarchuk a day ago | parent | next [-]

>I don't understand why people don't get this simple fact.

Some people think identity and the continuity of consciousness are based on information or computation, and not on specific physical matter or soul-like constructs, so for them a transfer of all relevant information would constitute a transfer of consciousness and identity. From this perspective (leaving aside questions of practicality) "you yourself looking from the biological body at somebody else in the computer" is exactly as valid as "you yourself looking from inside the computer at somebody else in the biological body" (and in fact the whole idea that you have to choose one or the other as "the real you" becomes moot on this view).

Of course it's a difficult metaphysical conundrum but to say that your view of things is "a simple fact" when the basic scientific materialist worldview of today points at least as much in the opposite direction is a bit overconfident.

Jerrrrrrrry a day ago | parent [-]

If you were to slowly replace your brain with a cybernetic appliance, you could also have perfect continuity.

Not that it matters; we sleep and wake up, no one freaks out daily that they were unconscious for hours.

No reason to suspect waking up in 3030 after being unfrozen or in 6045 after being cybernetically reanimated would be any more disconcerting physiologically than an extended coma patients experience.

Your continuity is just as illusionous as your free will.

fragmede a day ago | parent [-]

> no one freaks out daily that they were unconscious for hours.

Speak for yourself! Every time I come to there's something to freak out about. Okay, not every time, but waking up is a lot.

BobbyJo 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Anesthesia impairs the electrons transport in your brain, effectively ending that thread of consciousness, and, depending on the procedure, your brain can be altered by chemical/oxygen saturation changes. You wake up very subtly different, but most people are ok with that.

People have strokes or accidents and wake up missing memories and with changed bodies, but their families still call them by name.

You still being you is a matter of degree, not a binary, and different people are comfortable with different degrees of change.

BasilofBasiley a day ago | parent | next [-]

I wouldn't call that degrees of change but degrees of damage. The thing is, past a certain degree of damage people stop having opinions, so how would you know the individual is comfortable with it?

In this case, the damage is total. The degrees end here, it reaches a binary state: from alive to dead. And then something else entirely says they are the dead person and they are alive.

The question is, does society accept a complete switcheroo? The individual died in the process, they cannot give an opinion on this. The copy is another entity. There are no degrees, it's all absolutes with this process.

BobbyJo a day ago | parent [-]

> I wouldn't call that degrees of change but degrees of damage.

If you define any change from a previous state that loses some state as damage, then that's a tautology, not an argument.

> The thing is, past a certain degree of damage people stop having opinions, so how would you know the individual is comfortable with it?

We don't. I didn't say everyone was ok with every change. Some people aren't ok with being mildly inebriated, hence my "different strokes for different folks" take. Some people are comfortable losing a decade of memories, and some people would mourn a day lost.

> In this case, the damage is total. The degrees end here, it reaches a binary state: from alive to dead. And then something else entirely says they are the dead person and they are alive.

You're equivocating death with the end of the self. The core conversation here is whether or not that is true, and my opinion is that it is a manner of degree. This goes back to the earlier mention of the teletransportation paradox. Different people how different opinions on what constitutes the self.

> The question is, does society accept a complete switchero?

Society has generally been pragmatic and taken the approach of "if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it's a duck".

> The individual died in the process, they cannot give an opinion on this. The copy is another entity. There are no degrees, it's all absolutes with this process.

Again, you're assuming your opinion on what constitutes an individual is the one and only interpretation, which isn't the case.

BasilofBasiley a day ago | parent [-]

>then that's a tautology, not an argument.

No. That's the definition of damage. "Change" doesn't imply loss. Damage does. With change you can add and/or subtract characteristics. Damage subtracts, it is a more precise term for the examples you gave. Using such a broad term as "change" makes it a euphemism for damage. A bit dishonest really.

>I didn't say everyone was ok with every change.

Neither did I.

>"different strokes for different folks" take.

Dead folks included? That's absurd. Also, who is comfortable losing a decade of memories? Is "comfort" a euphemism for "acceptance due to not having a choice on the matter"?

>Different people how (have) different opinions on what constitutes the self.

Because no one asks the dead guy! (tongue in cheek)

>You're equivocating

How can you be so sure? I have has much right to have an opinion on what constitutes the self as much as you do. Equivocating would imply that my opinion on what constitutes the self is based on an error, a misunderstanding. But you don't even know my opinion on that, we haven't got to it yet.

>Society has generally been

If that were the case then there would be no argument. All opinions opposed to accepting whatever comes out of this process as the same person are hereby dismissed due to tradition. Society has generally been such and such. It's settled then.

>Again, you're assuming

No, it is you who's assuming you know my opinion on this.

Glad you asked, here's my opinion:

Continuity. The ship of Theseus (with all planks and everything replaced) will always be the same ship. The copy of the ship of Theseus built right next to the original won't become the original ship of Theseus just because the original is destroyed.

The process destroys the original. This does not promote the copy to original status. It breaks continuity. If the original wasn't destroyed, the copied person and the original are easily distinguished by the people who witnessed the process since both cannot occupy the same space at the same time, one of them is definitely more to the left than the other, at least.

Now for the original and the copy, both will think they are the original if there's no information that satisfies them both about who's who. I would consider that lying to either one of them about their status is a serious crime.

But in this process, there's definitely a corpse left behind. Probably not complete since the copying is destructive to the brain. But the existence of a corpse will definitely convince the copy is the copy. The copy might stubbornly refuse to accept it as such, but that's on them and they are responsible for the consequences that stance might bring.

This proposed technology is messy. They don't even advertise a copy. Just a scan that could one day maybe used to make a "copy"(within questionable standards of what constitutes a copy in the future). That makes things easy for me, really. If it was a teletransportation paradox (without the killing part) then I'd have to accept that the original and the copy are the same, atom for atom, and now there's simply two of them, like a string of bytes on a computer, neither is the original or the copy and they are just the same individual that start diverge due to the impossibility of both occupying the same space at the same time, yada yada yada. But this isn't that, it's the cheap, oh so cheap knock off that only a sad few will settle for. If ever.

So no, I'm not equivocating death with the end of the self. This is just not a teletransportation paradox situation. The technology the article presents is not even close to make an atom for atom copy of a person. Furthermore, I figure if we ever reach that level of technology, we won't need to let the original die to make a copy, we could just cure whatever they are suffering from.

And finally, I would settle for a not so perfect copy of a brain scenario. Magic "Nanobots" replacing the neurons of a subject in vivo, gradually over the span of a few days/weeks/months. The new neurons can be non-biological, but must work identically to the original ones and obviously the connectome should be identical. The subject would be asked if they feel ok with this process regularly and the general part of the brain that is responsible for answering that question would be the last part to be replaced, otherwise it would be cheating wouldn't it? On completion, I would assume it's the same person and if it was me I would assume I'm the same person. This preserves continuity (of the self) to my personal satisfaction. Anything less than that is cryonics-level of bull**.

BobbyJo a day ago | parent [-]

> No. That's the definition of damage. "Change" doesn't imply loss. Damage does. With change you can add and/or subtract characteristics. Damage subtracts, it is a more precise term for the examples you gave. Using such a broad term as "change" makes it a euphemism for damage. A bit dishonest really.

Again, you're missing the point. We can use the word damage and it doesn't change the argument here. A concussion is damage, but it doesn't mean you're someone else after you have one.

> Neither did I.

Not sure why you brought up people who don't have opinions then.

> Dead folks included?

If we are talking about reanimated consciousnesses of the dead, the yeah.

> Also, who is comfortable losing a decade of memories?

So you think people should be more accepting of losing ALL memories (dying) than losing 10 years of memories? I'm kinda losing the point you're trying to make here. Should we hold on as hard as possible, or accept obliteration. You seem to be saying both.

> How can you be so sure? I have has much right to have an opinion on what constitutes the self as much as you do.

By definition? You are stating your opinion as fact. Having an opinion is fine, but if your argument relies on your opinion being true then that's just circular reasoning.

> No, it is you who's assuming you know my opinion on this.

I'm not assuming it, I'm reading it. Maybe I misunderstood something, but I only have what you give me here.

> Continuity. The ship of Theseus (with all planks and everything replaced) will always be the...

If we use Theseus as the proxy for our convo:

I'm not saying the new ship "is the original ship" in some philosophical way. I'm saying, if it behaves the same and carries the same passengers, I don't see any reason to change the ship's name. If the original ship said "hey, I'm cool to be taken apart as long as you save my design and build me again later to the best of your ability," then I have no problem building the ship later and calling it "The ship of Theseus".

> So no, I'm not equivocating death with the end of the self.

So, what did you mean by "it" when you said "it reaches a binary state, from alive to dead"?

allajfjwbwkwja a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Anesthesia does not cause complete cessation of brain activity.

BobbyJo a day ago | parent [-]

True.

a day ago | parent | prev [-]
[deleted]
tapoxi a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I highly recommend playing Frictonal Games' Soma from 2015. It is an extremely critical examination of this entire concept. Without spoiling the plot, a digitized consciousness doesn't imply just one, but an infinite number of copies, some just subjected to torture as they are essentially disposable.

crummy a day ago | parent [-]

All of the concepts SOMA explored were already familiar to me, but the experience of exploring the through the game was so much stronger than reading about them in a text book. Such a strong, lasting effect, I wish I could play it again for the first time.

Nevermark a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> You will not wake up on any server.

Interesting! Which atoms do you consider to be your identity? That demonstrate someone is the "same" person for a lifetime?

And more importantly, why?

If our identity involves any abstraction whatsoever, any independence from particular material constituents (whatever dependency could possibly mean in a universe where particles of a type are indistinguishable (i.e. can appear in different contexts but do not have identities), then we are not substrate bound. We just require isomorphism.

(Any assumptions that there can only be one future "self", that isomorphic copies are neither inheritors or branches of our identity, require some clear explanation. To separate solid reasoning from our intuitions which are often strongly biased by a lack of prior experience.)

KronisLV a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> it isn't that hard, depends mostly on your ego

This feels like an odd cope, sure I might not be able to do anything about my mortality, but I still view the fact that I and other people are mortal as a damn tragedy (and often the gradual decline and non-dignified end of people's lives). If someone held a gun at my head and I knew that within a minute they're going to pull the trigger, I'd be rightfully quite disturbed. Now knowing that a metaphorical trigger will be pulled at a random time decades later doesn't make it any less disturbing. The only solace there is ignorance.

> do it either via exceptional deeds or via well-raised children

Both of those are worthy pursuits, but are also categorically different from you being here. So sure, you can and probably should say that living a good life is what people should do instead of losing sleep over their mortality - but that also moves the goal posts in a sense. You could have cut it short at the equivalent of "you'll never be immortal".

threethirtytwo a day ago | parent [-]

Most likely if you put a gun to his head and he'll beg for his life and stoop to do the most pathetic tasks to stay alive. It's not cope, more delusional arrogance.

PowerElectronix a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Ahh, but you can't know if it's the actual you that wakes up or a perfect copy of you.

If a copy is indistinguishable enough from the original, you have to treat that copy as you would treat you.

Imagine the following experiment, you are on a room seeing 5 (or 20, or 100) live streams of as many perfect copies. You are informed that a livestream of yourself is being presented to the rest.

You are given the same questions and you all answer in the same way. Now they tell that out of all of you, only one is the original and that you can vote to proceed with some pretty terrible physical punishment to the simulations. Which way are you voting?

threethirtytwo a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

>We are all gonna die, make inner peace with that (it isn't that hard, depends mostly on your ego)

You should go to a cancer ward and tell that to all the cancer patients there. That will make them "get it" like you do.

gambiting a day ago | parent [-]

That doesn't mean you have to like the fact that you're dying. But make peace with the fact that you too, will die - it's one of the very few universal truths of life. I see so many people living like they are going to live forever - world would be a better place if more people realized that this isn't true, and your time on earth is limited.

himata4113 a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I don't really think you're correct on that one. To begin with, what makes us whole is mostly memories and our subconcious.

What makes it obvious are illnesses like dementia and general decay of neural activity as we get older.

If we implant the same memories into something or someone that person/entity would become you, like waking up from a long nap. You might not feel the same, think the same, or act the same, but it would still feel like you. Going one step further and growing an exact clone can probably go even further than that.

allajfjwbwkwja a day ago | parent [-]

It's a copy with your memories, not you. Is one of them still you, if we make three copies?

himata4113 15 hours ago | parent [-]

they're also just you, but with a different derivative.

This is roughly inline with a many-worlds theorem where tiny variations can create many versions of you, this would be that but within the same universe.

Well, proving it would require you to end your life because the basis for the theorem is that there will always be a version of you that will not die.

allajfjwbwkwja 12 hours ago | parent [-]

They're not you insofar as what's important to yourself in your attempt to live forever. Other people might consider them you.

When I'm dying, I won't care at all about versions of me in parallel universes living on, because they're not me.

birdsongs a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> You will not wake up on any server ... I don't understand why people don't get this simple fact.

Did you even read my comment? In the last paragraph I discuss this and the teletransportation paradox, and how it will not actually be me but a copy, my thread of consciousness dies with me.

Please give me the courtesy of at least a full read before replying.

therealpygon 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Eh, it’s mostly for the trillionaires to keep their wealth after death. For everyone else, you will inevitably eventually end up driving a garbage truck. Don’t believe me? Your digital copy runs on a server doing important work! Company goes out of business. Assets get auctioned. Garbage truck.

Or another? The trust you set up ran out of money because all of the fees continued to increase and outpaced certain economic downturns. More and more people drew money off of your remaining static assets. You run out of money. Estate sale. Garbage truck.

Just remember, you’ll have all of time to end up there.

No thanks.

Supermancho a day ago | parent [-]

One of the many details of Altered Carbon (Netflix) that they got right. Digitized minds would become so numerous as to be considered little more than fancy trash.

pink_eye a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Electrostatic Therapy is the key to immortality. An external energy source, charging capacity. Adenosine Triphosphate production freely available, Telomere Magnetic Shielding improvements.

- Imperative Pink Eye

XorNot a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I don't get the complete certainty with which people post this opinion.

You have no special access to data or insight that anyone else does, nor new evidence and the argument itself is always pretty specious (those patterns over there are different because like, they're not here).

exe34 a day ago | parent | prev [-]

> I don't understand why people don't get this simple fact.

It's an element of faith, not fact. If you simulate a human body from quarks up, the physics won't know if it's running on base reality or in a computer.