| ▲ | politelemon 9 hours ago | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
I'm missing the nuance or perhaps the difference between the first scenario where sending inaccurate time was worse than sending no time, versus the present where they are sending inaccurate time. Sorry if it's obvious. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | opello 9 hours ago | parent | next [-] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The 5us inaccuracy is basically irrelevant to NTP users, from the second update to the Internet Time Service mailing list[1]: To put a deviation of a few microseconds in context, the NIST time scale usually performs about five thousand times better than this at the nanosecond scale by composing a special statistical average of many clocks. Such precision is important for scientific applications, telecommunications, critical infrastructure, and integrity monitoring of positioning systems. But this precision is not achievable with time transfer over the public Internet; uncertainties on the order of 1 millisecond (one thousandth of one second) are more typical due to asymmetry and fluctuations in packet delay. [1] https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/internet-time-se... | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | BuildTheRobots 9 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
It's a good question, and I wondered the same. I don't know, but I'd postulate: As it stands at the minute, the clocks are a mere 5 microseconds out and will slowly get better over time. This isn't even in the error measurement range and so they know it's not going to have a major effect on anything. When the event started and they lost power and access to the site, they also lost their management access to the clocks as well. At this point they don't know how wrong the clocks are, or how more wrong they're going to get. If someone restores power to the campus, the clocks are going to be online (all the switches and routers connecting them to the internet suddenly boot up), before they've had a chance to get admin control back. If something happened when they were offline and the clocks drifted significantly, then when they came online half the world might decide to believe them and suddenly step change to follow them. This could cause absolute havoc. Potentially safer to scram something than have it come back online in an unknown state, especially if (lots of) other things are are going to react to it. In the last NIST post, someone linked to The Time Rift of 2100: How We lost the Future --- and Gained the Past. It's a short story that highlights some of the dangers of fractured time in a world that uses high precision timing to let things talk to each other: https://tech.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=7132077&cid=493082... | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | throw0101d 7 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
> […] where sending inaccurate time was worse than sending no time […] When you ask a question, it is sometimes better to not get an answer—and know you have not-gotten an answer—then to get the wrong answer. If you know that a 'bad' situation has arisen, you can start contingency measures to deal with it. If you have a fire alarm: would you rather have it fail in such a way that it gives no answer, or fail in a way where it says "things are okay" even if it doesn't know? | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||