How do all the people involved, IRL, cope with the reputational impact of being part of such an event? Do people change name, move, cut off ties with their past etc? Or never tire of telling the story?

Edit to add: I was wondering about the emotional angle as well as the career angle.

For example there is the The Mizuho Securities "Fat-Finger" Error in 2025 that cost a Japanese bank $340M. According to management anecdotes the employee was kept by the bank and the bank chief said that they will never find a more careful and diligent employee in the future. However, quick ask of an AI says that the anecdote ending is probably a urban myth told to demonstrate a management principle, so we don't know what happened to the employee nor how they feel.

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TrackerFF 5 days ago | parent | next [-]

The ships captain / commanding officer was kicked up in the system.

The officer of the watch, as is military tradition, received all the blame. But it should be said that the commanding officer was ready to take all the blame...but the court eventually found the officer of the watch to be responsible. And that is correct. When you work/serve in the military, at least in Norway, the hierarchy of responsibility is very strict. Even the lowest ranking officer can end up being responsible for a billion dollar vessel / station / etc.

The names of these people are not made public, and it is fairly simple to write your resume in such a way that it will obfuscate your role. The only people that know, are those intimately familiar with the case (from the inside), or know someone that does.

When I worked in the military, albeit in a civilian role, one of my co-workers had been a sailor on this ship around the time this happened.

	▲	aoki 4 days ago \| parent [-]
		In the modern US military, it’s a truism that if anything seriously goes wrong on a ship, the captain has ultimate responsibility and will be fired. (Whereas before WW2, future admirals like Nimitz ran their ships aground and were not fired.) This leads to a zero-defects mentality on the part of the leadership of a ship, which in turn explains why junior officers fail to call the CO to the bridge (or call too late) when they get into a bad situation.

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closewith 5 days ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Generally it would be career-ending for a naval officer (both OOW and captain), but it really is a systemic problem present in a lot of other navies. Seamanship is simply neglected because of the cost (both in time and money) of proper training.

The article mentions the collision would likely have never happened in poor visibility, because the OOW would have kept watch on radar (which they should be doing in all weather conditions, anyway) and would have been a lot slower over ground.

That's because a lot of young (post-PC/smartphone era) sailors hold much more confidence in electronic nav tools than their own abilities. The OOW was most likely accustomed to relying on AIS (which they had turned off for tactical reasons).

> The OOW and trainee officer discussed the floodlights but believed they were ashore and stationary. Confirmation bias and lack of experience led the OOW to keep thinking this was the case until too late. Inexplicably there was only brief use of navigational radar and AIS to check the situation and they interpreted the tanker as a stationary object alongside at the terminal.

The simplest check could have resolved this. If the lights maintained a constant bearing as the warship made way, it would have been obvious (unless heading straight for or away) that it was another vessel. Watchkeeping 101.

It's an issue we see again and again at sea. Militaries and corporates alike aren't willing to put in the time to make seafarers (which takes years) and relies instead on electronic aides, which are excellent and work 90+, 95+ percent of the time. When they don't, though....

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arethuza 5 days ago | parent | next [-]

Obviously I know nothing about navigation - but is relying on AIS a good idea, I was surprised the other week to observe quite a large vessel in the Firth of Forth that looked unusual so I checked an app that uses AIS and it didn't show it. However, what it did show that it was surrounded by three tugs - which I hadn't noticed at first. I concluded that it was being towed by the tugs and wasn't powered up (or whatever the nautical term is) and therefore didn't show in AIS? No idea if that is correct or not.

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closewith 5 days ago | parent | next [-]

It's not so much a matter of relying on AIS (which is never sufficient by itself), but the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (IRPCS or Colregs) require every vessel maintain a proper lookout (Rule 5) and it must be done using all available means, including sight, hearing, radar, GPS, and other electronic aids like AIS.

This is the most fundamental requirement for safe navigation and it is table stakes for everyone on the bridge, OOW or not.

So AIS is not enough, and sure enough the tanker identified the frigate even though it was not broadcasting AIS and even communicated the need for the frigate to manoeuvrer, as the tanker was constrained in its ability to do so.

> However, what it did show that it was surrounded by three tugs - which I hadn't noticed at first. I concluded that it was being towed by the tugs and wasn't powered up (or whatever the nautical term is) and therefore didn't show in AIS? No idea if that is correct or not.

AIS is a broadcast system using VHF transceivers, and services like MarineTraffic rely on shore stations or satellites (S-AIS) which receive AIS signals and forward them via the internet where the central server then pushes them out to the app/web users.

This means that depending on local VHF conditions, you may not see all vessels broadcasting AIS via online services, even though any vessel close enough to be a collision risk would have no issue receiving the signal.

In this specific case, had the OOW consulted either their eyes and compass (ie taken repeated bearings to the lights which would have shown they weren't static/ashore) or radar (which did clearly show the tanker on a collision course - constant bearing, decreasing range), the collision would have been avoided. AIS should have been used only to augment radar and visual data only (ie to identify the vessel, class, draught, etc). Even without broadcasting on AIS, they were receiving this data from other vessels like the tanker.

In addition, had the warship been broadcasting on AIS, VTS (maritime analogue to air traffic control) would most likely have identified the collision risk and also directed the frigate to manoeuvre to avoid the collision. As it was, without broadcasting AIS, the frigate was invisible to VTS (in particular as the VTS had failed to manually plot the warship's route when the warship called in to enter their area of responsibility).

	▲	arethuza 5 days ago \| parent [-]
		Awesome answer, thanks!

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wffurr 4 days ago | parent | prev [-]

The watch crew should have realized the lights had constant bearing decreasing distance, the key visual marker of a collision course. Distance can be hard to tell at night, but I'd expect professional seafarers to know this basic skill.

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db48x 4 days ago | parent [-]

Yea, even I know that and I’ve only been in a boat a couple of times in my life.

	▲	wffurr 3 days ago \| parent [-]
		Come to think of it, they said they thought the lights were on shore. Shore lights wouldn't have a constant bearing.

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_0ffh 4 days ago | parent | prev [-]

> If the lights maintained a constant bearing as the warship made way, it would have been obvious

I'm not a mariner, but I learned this at some point in time, and I must say it also comes in handy on the road.

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Deestan 5 days ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Mostly they put full blame on the trainee they put on overtime guard duty and called it a day. https://www.nrk.no/vestland/vaktsjefen-pa-_helge-ingstad_-do...

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einarfd 5 days ago | parent | next [-]

If you look at the article, they do not use his name. Even after there is a final judgment against him. He only got 60 days of probationary prison, while I personally found it weird he was the only one that got punished. I'm sure the punishment could be a lot worse.

On the name side, the names of the people involved where sparingly if at all mentioned in the press. The did use the names of ministers and top military and navy officers of course. But not the crew. I'm sure their peers knew who they where, and that some careers got hurt. But if you left the navy and did something else, it probably wouldn't follow you though.

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barrkel 4 days ago | parent [-]

I think it's a little bit perverse to pile a lot of punishment on the OOW when it seems pretty clear that it's a training and experience problem, combined with years of efforts to cut crew sizes.

The ship is lean crewed and relies on automation. When that fails, the lack of slack in the system - too few people responsible for too much, suddenly, in a situation they've never been in before - the cliff is much worse.

	▲	closewith 4 days ago \| parent [-]
		> The ship is lean crewed and relies on automation. That is true in general and may be a reason for the lacklustre damage control efforts, but not on the bridge. Commercial vessels of any size usually have a bridge watch of two (OOW and lookout) to three (if a helmsman is needed). 7 is on the high-end for peacetime transits for a destroyer in friendly waters. 5 would be normal (OOW, quartermaster, helmsman and two lookouts). Only below that could be considered lean and the ship could be safely commanded with a watch of 2-3. The fact is that the watch and especially the OOW were negligent, in a manner you would not expect from a junior sea scout.

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yorwba 5 days ago | parent | prev | next [-]

From "7 personnel were standing on watch on the bridge, including the OOW, an officer and a rating under training and 4 other ratings." and "The OOW and trainee officer discussed the floodlights but believed they were ashore and stationary." it can be inferred that the OOW (who was punished) was not a trainee, but a full-fledged officer.

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closewith 5 days ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Well, reading the both articles, the OOW was the proximal cause of this collision, so I think his punishment is quite light.

The AIBN report seems robust, although not acknowledging that the brass are the distal cause of collisions like this.

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blitzar 5 days ago | parent | prev [-]

Navy's, governments, companies, people in general - at least the behaviour is consistent.

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lm28469 4 days ago | parent | prev [-]

> However, quick ask of an AI says that the anecdote ending is probably a urban myth told to demonstrate a management principle, so we don't know what happened to the employee nor how they feel.

Mine says there are two Rs in strawberry, but who knows your oracle of truth might be right