Generally it would be career-ending for a naval officer (both OOW and captain), but it really is a systemic problem present in a lot of other navies. Seamanship is simply neglected because of the cost (both in time and money) of proper training.

The article mentions the collision would likely have never happened in poor visibility, because the OOW would have kept watch on radar (which they should be doing in all weather conditions, anyway) and would have been a lot slower over ground.

That's because a lot of young (post-PC/smartphone era) sailors hold much more confidence in electronic nav tools than their own abilities. The OOW was most likely accustomed to relying on AIS (which they had turned off for tactical reasons).

> The OOW and trainee officer discussed the floodlights but believed they were ashore and stationary. Confirmation bias and lack of experience led the OOW to keep thinking this was the case until too late. Inexplicably there was only brief use of navigational radar and AIS to check the situation and they interpreted the tanker as a stationary object alongside at the terminal.

The simplest check could have resolved this. If the lights maintained a constant bearing as the warship made way, it would have been obvious (unless heading straight for or away) that it was another vessel. Watchkeeping 101.

It's an issue we see again and again at sea. Militaries and corporates alike aren't willing to put in the time to make seafarers (which takes years) and relies instead on electronic aides, which are excellent and work 90+, 95+ percent of the time. When they don't, though....

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arethuza 5 days ago | parent | next [-]

Obviously I know nothing about navigation - but is relying on AIS a good idea, I was surprised the other week to observe quite a large vessel in the Firth of Forth that looked unusual so I checked an app that uses AIS and it didn't show it. However, what it did show that it was surrounded by three tugs - which I hadn't noticed at first. I concluded that it was being towed by the tugs and wasn't powered up (or whatever the nautical term is) and therefore didn't show in AIS? No idea if that is correct or not.

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closewith 5 days ago | parent | next [-]

It's not so much a matter of relying on AIS (which is never sufficient by itself), but the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (IRPCS or Colregs) require every vessel maintain a proper lookout (Rule 5) and it must be done using all available means, including sight, hearing, radar, GPS, and other electronic aids like AIS.

This is the most fundamental requirement for safe navigation and it is table stakes for everyone on the bridge, OOW or not.

So AIS is not enough, and sure enough the tanker identified the frigate even though it was not broadcasting AIS and even communicated the need for the frigate to manoeuvrer, as the tanker was constrained in its ability to do so.

> However, what it did show that it was surrounded by three tugs - which I hadn't noticed at first. I concluded that it was being towed by the tugs and wasn't powered up (or whatever the nautical term is) and therefore didn't show in AIS? No idea if that is correct or not.

AIS is a broadcast system using VHF transceivers, and services like MarineTraffic rely on shore stations or satellites (S-AIS) which receive AIS signals and forward them via the internet where the central server then pushes them out to the app/web users.

This means that depending on local VHF conditions, you may not see all vessels broadcasting AIS via online services, even though any vessel close enough to be a collision risk would have no issue receiving the signal.

In this specific case, had the OOW consulted either their eyes and compass (ie taken repeated bearings to the lights which would have shown they weren't static/ashore) or radar (which did clearly show the tanker on a collision course - constant bearing, decreasing range), the collision would have been avoided. AIS should have been used only to augment radar and visual data only (ie to identify the vessel, class, draught, etc). Even without broadcasting on AIS, they were receiving this data from other vessels like the tanker.

In addition, had the warship been broadcasting on AIS, VTS (maritime analogue to air traffic control) would most likely have identified the collision risk and also directed the frigate to manoeuvre to avoid the collision. As it was, without broadcasting AIS, the frigate was invisible to VTS (in particular as the VTS had failed to manually plot the warship's route when the warship called in to enter their area of responsibility).

	▲	arethuza 5 days ago \| parent [-]
		Awesome answer, thanks!

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wffurr 4 days ago | parent | prev [-]

The watch crew should have realized the lights had constant bearing decreasing distance, the key visual marker of a collision course. Distance can be hard to tell at night, but I'd expect professional seafarers to know this basic skill.

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db48x 4 days ago | parent [-]

Yea, even I know that and I’ve only been in a boat a couple of times in my life.

	▲	wffurr 3 days ago \| parent [-]
		Come to think of it, they said they thought the lights were on shore. Shore lights wouldn't have a constant bearing.

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_0ffh 4 days ago | parent | prev [-]

> If the lights maintained a constant bearing as the warship made way, it would have been obvious

I'm not a mariner, but I learned this at some point in time, and I must say it also comes in handy on the road.