GrapheneOS community manager here. The problem with something like this is that it cannot be reasonably hidden when it would be exposed by someone using basic tools. Our Duress PIN/Password feature doesn't make any attempts to mask itself, precisely because we think doing that only gives people a false sense of security.

We think there's a good chance a motivated adversary is going to be familiar with GrapheneOS and its features, and the more mainstream it becomes, the more this can mean "your abusive significant other" rather than someone at the border.

The moment people know this feature exists, it can become dangerous even if you don't use it. You can be threatened to unlock, and even if you do, the adversary can choose to not believe you since they can think you're just hiding it. That puts you in a dangerous situation where they think you can provide something that's literally not there.

It's a very difficult problem to solve, and we don't think that proposal can solve it.

I hate to say this but I don't foresee Graphene being "mainstream". Most users will stick to the stock ROM. The most "mainstream" custom ROM Lineage is only installed on 0.04% of Android devices as of 2023 [1]. Even if Graphene appears in some mainstream news, I highly doubt any ordinary person can recognize it when they see one.

If the threat model is hiding from random people, I think a hidden profile works very well.

Now let's talk about motivated adversary as you put it. Hidden profile and wiping are not either-or, they can coexist. If one is really targeted by a motivated adversary, it should be apparent in most cases, and the targeted person can choose to enter the wiping PIN instead of the secondary profile PIN.

Now if one is targeted by a really motivated and threatening adversary, I don't think wiping PIN is any better than secondary profile PIN. The moment one chooses to wipe the phone, the adversary could be triggered by the action and harm the victim anyway.

[1] https://9to5google.com/2023/11/20/lineageos-number-of-device...

Tbh I’d say 99% of the criminals won’t know about this.

Let’s say someone have you at gunpoint, you can just give your mains profile pass.

If they don’t even know there is a secret profile you’re good to go.

You’re right, they might assume you’re hiding, but I’d say 99% won’t know what’s even graphene and from those who know I’d say they might force you and you can have 3 sets of bank accounts:

Main profile: 100 Secondary: 1000 Terriary: $$$

Also if you hide all traces of grapheneos would be safer too. Nobody even knows is graphene, so they can’t even check what features you have. Again we are talking about 99% of the criminals, not the tech savvy 1%.

I’d prefer plausible deniability like Vera crypt than what we have now.

There are certain threat/risk models where having multiple profiles might be helpful (non-forensic examination by an offical at a securtiy screening kinda scenario). But you're right, it's nuanced, requires know-how by the user, and possibly a foot-gun for some caught unawares. NOT an easy problem to solve. Personally, as a user, I'd like the ability to be able to choose that option in the instances where I needed it, but it's likey a TON of work for a very small actual user community who needs it.

I think this feature nowadays would be mostly for the border control checks, especially in the US. Basically to avoid being sent back over a JD Vance meme found at a glance, as opposed to actually being held hostage.

I remember a conversation with a political activist refugee. They were in a group of people who got checked at the border, and were asked to unlock their laptops. The border security personnel then proceeded to do a short inspection of the visible systems. They all used Veracrypt's Hidden Operating System functionality, and while it would be trivially detectable, the border security did not, so they got through without problems. If they had refused to "unlock", or used a duress passphrase that wiped the system without presenting a dummy version, they would have been held, possibly for a very long time, and definitely not allowed to exit.

Moral of the story: Different contexts allow for different solutions. It is a sign of false privilege to make assumptions, and not let the user decide. An argument can be made in terms of priority of implementation, but not in terms of "pointlessness". The often used argument of "false security" can be addressed by warnings; yes, some people may not understand the implications, but you do not need to make their own (bad/good) choices for them; that's paternalism, not care.

In the real world, where thanks to my political work I am in contact with many people who had to endure real-world security checks, police raids, investigations, and so on, in all the cases no proper (imaginary) forensic analysis was performed. People make mistakes and remain uneducated -- on both sides. The "But NSA!" argument brought forward typically by white techbros kills a lot of useful technology before it even exists, which is unfortunate for those that would actually benefit from it, and when asked would tell you so. It's also not either/or in reality: In many situations, it will buy you time (while e.g. your lawyer may try to get you and your devices out of the situation), and even if they find out you were trying to fool them, they may give you another chance, and then you can still opt for the wipe code. It makes a huge psychological difference to have multiple options and feel in control.

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