I hate to say this but I don't foresee Graphene being "mainstream". Most users will stick to the stock ROM. The most "mainstream" custom ROM Lineage is only installed on 0.04% of Android devices as of 2023 [1]. Even if Graphene appears in some mainstream news, I highly doubt any ordinary person can recognize it when they see one.

If the threat model is hiding from random people, I think a hidden profile works very well.

Now let's talk about motivated adversary as you put it. Hidden profile and wiping are not either-or, they can coexist. If one is really targeted by a motivated adversary, it should be apparent in most cases, and the targeted person can choose to enter the wiping PIN instead of the secondary profile PIN.

Now if one is targeted by a really motivated and threatening adversary, I don't think wiping PIN is any better than secondary profile PIN. The moment one chooses to wipe the phone, the adversary could be triggered by the action and harm the victim anyway.

[1] https://9to5google.com/2023/11/20/lineageos-number-of-device...

▲ mbananasynergy 2 days ago | parent | next [-]

GrapheneOS isn't a project that plans to be an aftermarket OS forever. In fact, we're currently working with an OEM to have their devices have official GrapheneOS support. This can mean devices being sold with GrapheneOS without someone even having to install it.

We're of the opinion that there's a growing portion of the population that is becoming more security and privacy conscious, and that's reflected in our userbase, which has been growing consistently over the last few years.

We're not saying we're going to have iPhone's marketshare, but we're constantly growing.

>Now if one is targeted by a really motivated and threatening adversary, I don't think wiping PIN is any better than secondary profile PIN. The moment one chooses to wipe the phone, the adversary could be triggered by the action and harm the victim anyway.

Yes, but at that point, the data is irreversibly rendered inaccessible. There are situations where the data itself is the most important factor, and where the owner of the device being hurt doesn't benefit the adversary now that the data is gone. Of course, as with everything, it depends on one's situation, but the duress PIN feature doesn't involve trickery. It's a way to reliably and quickly do a very specific thing.

▲ crossroadsguy 2 days ago | parent | next [-]

> In fact, we're currently working with an OEM to have their devices have official GrapheneOS support

Oh god, yes. Please! I can't wait to leave the walled fruit garden, but can't tolerate Google sniffing everything I do or do not do on my phone either.

PS. I just hope it's an OEM that sells devices to a lot of countries including developing ones and not something like Fairphone.

▲

ThePowerOfFuet 2 days ago | parent [-]

Google has no access to anything you do on a Pixel with GrapheneOS installed just because it's their hardware.

	▲	CommenterPerson a day ago \| parent [-]
		Explain this please. With enough detail for the HN gurus.

▲ dotancohen 2 days ago | parent | prev | next [-]

  > we're currently working with an OEM to have their devices have official GrapheneOS support.

It's a long shot, but please see if you can get this vendor to include an EMS stylus like the Samsung Note devices and S Ultra devices. That is what is keeping me on Samsung, and I will be one of their first customers if they have an integrated EMS pen.

▲ YoumuChan 2 days ago | parent | prev [-]

I think it is all about audience. There is no one-size-fit-all. Different audience have different threat models and different requirements.

For a corporate using an OS in work phones. The threat model is state/corp-sponsored actors. Trade secret leak is unacceptable. When in doubt, data should be wiped. Now wiping PIN makes total sense and is the only sensible option.

An ordinary person, on the other hand, often deals with non tech-savvy ordinary people. The threat model is different. Most likely plausible deniability is enough. The threat level is low. Those users may accept to trade some data security for a more friendly feature.

The ultimate question is whether Graphene envisions itself an opinionated OS that always follows the "best practice" or a generic OS that allows users to define their own threat models.

▲ bogwog a day ago | parent | prev [-]

These are ridiculous scenarios to try and optimize for. A smartphone feature isn't going to save someone from an abusive spouse or a serial killer, and if it does, it'll be an exceptional situation.

There was a youtuber who got kidnapped in Haiti a while back, and his kidnappers demanded to search the photo gallery on his phone for something. So what he did was delete the pictures, but not empty the trash, hoping they wouldn't know about that feature. They didnt, and he got away with it. Did Apple envision a kidnapping scenario when they were designing that feature? Probably not. Is there a design lesson that can be taken from that situation? Also probably not, because it just as easily could have gone the other way.