I think the answer to that is resoundingly yes: the kinds of countries that care about curtailing E2EE messaging are also the ones that institute nationwide internet blackouts.

(But also, this isn’t a good argument! Repressive governments love metadata, and email is an amazing source of unbounded metadata even with these kinds of “secure” layers slapped on top. If I was a government looking to snoop on my citizens, I would absolutely push them towards the protocols I can infer the greatest amount of behavior from.)

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Valodim 21 hours ago | parent [-]

Blocking email or gmail is much closer to a nationwide internet blackout than blocking signal or tor. And even repressive regimes are on a budget there.

I'm not sure your second point holds either - for most nations, an active connection to imap.gmail.com leaks little other than how actively the user uses gmail. Correlating senders and receivers from that data sounds technically challenging enough that I wouldn't expect repressive regimes to be capable. But, to be fair, I base that on nothing.

	▲	woodruffw 20 hours ago \| parent \| next [-]
		> Blocking email or gmail is much closer to a nationwide internet blackout than blocking signal or tor. Yes; the point was not that they’re the same, but that regimes that do the former tend to also do the latter. Moreover, we shouldn’t do insecure things because regimes block the secure things; that’s what the regime wants you to do. The answer might not be Signal if Signal is insufficiently decentralized, but it certainly isn’t email. > for most nations, an active connection to imap.gmail.com leaks little other than how actively the user uses gmail This alone is a significantly larger amount of metadata than schemes like Signal leak. But it also isn’t true: a country that controls its internet infrastructure can almost certainly pull much more metadata from plaintext IMAP/SMTP than just access times and addresses. And this isn’t hypothetical: STS is not widely adopted in the email ecosystem, so plaintext downgrades are pervasive.
	▲	heavyset_go 17 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		> I'm not sure your second point holds either - for most nations, an active connection to imap.gmail.com leaks little other than how actively the user uses gmail. Correlating senders and receivers from that data sounds technically challenging enough that I wouldn't expect repressive regimes to be capable. But, to be fair, I base that on nothing. Nations don't have to do any of that, they can just subpoena the email host for the data, or just ask nicely for it, as companies are wont to work with law enforcement and the regimes they do business with. The point of many of anonymizing and "private" chat services is the lack of data sitting on third-party hosts that can later be shared with adversaries.