| ▲ | wqaatwt 2 days ago | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
> embolden opposition If there even is one. In the USSR most reformists or people who achieved real power after the collapse were opportunistic party insiders who were at the right place at the right time. There were some exceptions of course. > afganistan war killed a lot of people, food shortages would kill others too. Not that many in relative terms. Even according to independent estimates it was ~26k over 10 years (compared to 1-3 million Afghans..). That was of course much more than what NATO/etc. lost in their war but several times less than what Russia is losing now in Ukraine every single year. And of course there was no famine in the USSR in the late 80s (and as for general shortages the worst came when the collapse was effectively inevitable). | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | spinytree21 2 days ago | parent [-] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
> And of course there was no famine in the USSR in the late 80s. I'm curious on what you base this information on. Having lived that period and experiencing first hand the shortages, I can say the opposite. > In the USSR most reformists or people who achieved real power after the collapse were opportunistic party insiders who were at the right place at the right time That is generally what happens with revolutions. In some places it got better though. Not all ex-USSR ended up like belarus or russia. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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