Absolutely! The thing that rubs me the wrong way is that Russia has very intentionally used nuclear sabre rattling in an attempt to limit the flow of Western military aid to Ukraine.

Unfortunately for the world, that's an extremely dangerous propaganda approach to take, because it blurs the actual red lines that Russia would resort to nuclear retaliation. (Of which Russia certainly has some! And possibly even some within Ukraine's military ability to inadvertently cross)

Trusting that "Russia never means what it says" is problematic on so many levels.

Imho, the biggest mistake in the West's approach to the entire war has been its failure to proactively announce military aid changes and the conditions that would trigger them.

It's like the West collectively forgot how to properly create deterrence in the 1960s sense.

F.ex. the West could have publicly announced "If Russia receives military aid from North Korea or Iran, in the form of ammunition or soldiers, then we will provide additional long range strike options to Ukraine and authorize their use against Russian territory."

That might have encouraged Russia to self-limit and not pursue those actions.

Instead, it's been a hamfisted, weak display of waiting for Russia to do something, then hurriedly conferring behind closed doors, then announcing a reaction.

Which... the entire point of deterrence is to cause the opponent not to take the action in the first place. >.<

> So what, would you say, triggered the US to cross their own red line...

I'd first reject the use of the term "red line" entirely for the ATACMS situation.

"No, not ever" is a red line. The Russians love issuing these for other people, but it's embarassing when they're crossed without significant consequence.

"No, not now" is not a red line. The US tends to shy away from issuing them - one of Obama's biggest mistakes was proclaiming one in Syria and then looking a bit feckless when they violated it. (https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-president-bli...)

Letting Ukraine hit Russian territory with ATACMS is like the fourth or fifth expansion of how they're permitted to use that weapons system so far, as was giving them ATACMS in the first place after HIMARS (which saw a similar set of gradually reduced limitations; https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/07/08/us-to-send-more-...).

> And, backtracking, how aware have you been about the situation in Ukraine, or baltic sea infrastructure, in the past few months (even year), compared to the last week? Just a marginal increment, no doubt.

I've closely followed the situation in Ukraine since Euromaidan.

But the article itself addresses only the context of ATACMS. Not whether the US is "dictating what can and cannot happen in the war" generally.

Either way -- according the definition in Wikipedia, it is a proxy because one side is strongly supported by an external power. Sounds reasonable, and I can go with it (on at least a technical basis).

Where people go wrong (not saying you here) is when they accept the term "proxy war" and assume (or insinuate) that it means or supports the idea that Ukraine is simply a puppet state, not really fighting out of its own motivations.