| ▲ | vlyan a day ago | |||||||
>The phone number does not compromise your privacy. it links your account to a government issued ID in most countries. >All that's known by anyone is that your payment method purchased a Signal account. We kill people based on metadata. >There are third party clients. there is no public API. any platform can have the kind of frankensteined clients that reverse engineer the official one. the point is that if they cared about privacy like the OP claims, the official client would be a suggestion. >So you're advocating for web cryptography. That opens up a significant attack vector for your privacy. are you under the impression that web cryptography uses random npm libraries for cryptographic primitives? >Instead of spreading fud, since signal clients are fully reproducible, meaning the code on github is what's in the apps running on your phone is the server code on github also? | ||||||||
| ▲ | questionedon a day ago | parent [-] | |||||||
Yes it is. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server How would you be linked to your phone number if you used usernames and changed them after connecting with the contact as they suggest? Web crypto: https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto Just as we don't know exactly what's running on a signal server, that's the whole thing with web crypto. Maybe a public API matters for user freedom, but it doesn't matter for user privacy. >We kill people based on metadata Again, signal is not a highly metadata private messenger. So this is a real concern, I agree. But it's for a threat model with more advanced adversaries than national law enforcement like the FBI in the US. They do take significant steps to minimize metadata. But it's not anonymous. | ||||||||
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