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▲ nullc 4 hours ago

Has signal ever commented on the fact ( https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24191267-wyden_smart... ) that the push notification services that signal forces users to use have been being used to spy on users?

▲datakan 3 hours ago | parent [-]

They give a literal settings option to block the content of the message in the push notification:

"Settings > Notifications > Notification Content and selecting "No Name or Content" (or "No Name or Message" on Android), the device prevents the operating system from storing sensitive message previews in its internal database. Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."

▲RunSet an hour ago | parent | next [-]

> Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."

Until / unless the recipient responds and the traffic analysis detects back-and-forth and pairs your message's recipient with the recipient's recipient.

https://abcnews.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-...

▲genxy 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

It is ridiculous that you have to go through multiple steps to "harden" signal. It should have a macro, akin to lockdown mode that turns off all the dangerous features. And their electron app should be running the majority of their logic in multiple wasm compartments.

▲questionedon 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

They wouldn't get the content anyway, even if you didn't have that on. It would just be stored locally like the rest of your Signal messages.