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▲ TFNA 6 hours ago

I have followed digital privacy and nation-level-actor interception stories since the European Parliament's ECHELON report over a quarter-century ago, and to me it is a given that no strong state like the USA would permit a truly secure app being used at a societal scale. I use Signal myself, but am under no illusions.

The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.

▲rpdillon 5 hours ago | parent [-]

This is a reasonable take, though I would add that simply compromising the notification server is enough to get the metadata about who's talking to who.

My general impression is that Signal is about as secure as I can reasonably expect, but that the entire ecosystem is compromised because it's going through two companies that are beholden to the US government.