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▲ alibarber 3 hours ago

I'm quite curious to know what the actual attack was. The article is light on detail but does quote 'similar to weak password' but admits that it would have been necessary to get hold of an example device first, which isn't that hard as they're very common.

To me this spells out an unprotected private key or secret residing in the device that could be used to break the authentication checks. In which case once secret is out there - no need to posses it? Could the key/secret have been well protected, but the device could be used to sign anything given to it?

▲OkCompute64 4 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

From the article

> It was thought the UK had largely escaped such hacks as the British refrigeration industry relies on different devices but there was in fact a potential vulnerability the sector has been rushing to fix.

> In late October, security researchers discovered a major flaw that, if found by hackers, could have led to even worse damage to the UK.

Having worked with industrial equipment like this that often had some kind of network interface retrofitted to a 20+ year old device; I am going to guess it was a manufacture default master password that can be used to remotely manage/reset/reprogram the device and that essentially all deployed units never changed/disabled it.

In fact it may not even have been possible to disable or change it. It is scary the number of appliances, both industrial and consumer, that have "secret god mode" reset passwords and also just happen to work remotely..

Now to defend the manufactures a little bit here these master passwords were originally used because these devices didn't have any kind of network connectivity at all when they were originally design back in the 90s (or perhaps even earlier).

They were there for an engineer to come along, plug in an RS232 or similar and they could use the master password to just fix whatever was wrong. Then over time either networking/internet functionality was added via an additional interface (such as a master control unit all machines were connected to and then that MCU had network/internet access but essentially acted like an unmanaged network switch and just passed on whatever it was sent) or directly to the system in a new model revision.

However nobody deals with the whole master password part and so you end up with a warehouse or supermarket freezer that is now on the internet and if you're lucky "protected" by CG-NAT (usually that is the best case, rarely do you see any real network security in these setups) with essentially a remote login that all use the same password.

Of course this is just a guess from my own experience but if I were a betting man that is where I would put my money.

▲mavhc 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

The attack is software for hardware is written by people who don't know how to write good software, they're still writing software as if it's the 80s

▲biofox 16 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Writing software as if it's the 80s? I wish! Aside from hobbyist code and games written for home micros, software of that period was usually extremely efficient (out of necessity) and comprehensively documented as standard.

▲alibarber 13 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I've worked in industries close to both hardware and software and I've really not seen much evidence to support this theory.

▲asah 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

-1 it's AI coming for our laziness - 1000s of CVEs the past month from well regarded software of all kinds, even Linux issuing waves of CVEs and PostgreSQL 19 delayed for the first time in years.