| ▲ | YuechenLi an hour ago | |||||||
With LLMs, unless you use a more extreme version of Samsung style hardware fuse, there really isn't anything that Google can do to prevent bootloader unlocking from a technical standpoint since all it really takes is one bug in the kernel for the bootloader to be unlocked. | ||||||||
| ▲ | m132 36 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | |||||||
If getting to run your own code is all that matters--possibly. Google is doing much more to crack down on custom software. See the recent rollout of the GMS-based Captcha [1] and Play Integrity [2]. Essentially, Google is actively trying to fracture the Internet into 2 halves: one anything can access, and another that'll require hardware-generated, cryptographic proof of the client running the latest, patched-up version of a locked-down operating system. The goal is clearly to lock anybody who manages to break into their own devices out of the latter. Some banks and even the official EU wallet [3] are already exclusively on that other side. [1] https://support.google.com/recaptcha/answer/16609652 [2] https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity/overview [3] https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-archi... | ||||||||
| ▲ | tgma 39 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | |||||||
I am not as familiar with the Android security model as I am with iOS; how does OS kernel related to bootloader unlock on Android? Don't you need a bootloader exploit? | ||||||||
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| ▲ | grishka 17 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | |||||||
Not really. For a while now, Android devices have had a hypervisor running in a "trusted execution environment", which is at a permission level above the actual Android kernel. This is where all the bullshit "security" and remote attestation code runs. You never get to unlock this, a regular bootloader unlock only lets you boot an unsigned kernel with the TEE knowing that you've done it and snitching on you. That's the whole reason SafetyNet is so hard to bypass these days. And of course, this is also the part that manages the bootloader lock state. So at most, with a kernel exploit, you're going to get a temporary root, and you don't get to modify the system partition because the system will refuse to boot the next time because there are integrity checks. Something similar to PS4 and PS5 jailbreaks. | ||||||||
| ▲ | kmeisthax 6 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | |||||||
LLMs can hack into a device but they can't keep a secret. For garbage IoT-tier crap, Claude can absolutely get into your device that you own. But for devices where the vendor has the economic desire to actually maintain effective control over your device you need to be able to stockpile bugs to retain access even after a patch. This is the same sort of "theoretically impossible but plausibly doable" logic that gives us the CIA's NOBUS policy - i.e. "security vulnerabilities only we know about because it's a pain in the ass to find them". What an LLM does to this is make NOBUS actually impossible, because anyone can spend $200/mo on a Claude pro plan and get actually novel vulnerabilities out of it. Great if you're worried about the CIA, terrible if you want to steal general purpose computing from a device vendor. What is actually happening is that bugs are getting leaked by prompt kiddies and patched before viable exploit chains can be made for them. I mean, think about it: Google is one of the biggest users of AI. You don't think they aren't going to be burning tokens - which they have access to at cost - on finding vulns before you can exploit them? | ||||||||
| ▲ | throawayonthe 14 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | |||||||
which is the only kind of device graphene will ever support :p | ||||||||
| ▲ | 43 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | |||||||
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