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▲ wood_spirit 4 hours ago

So the implication is that the LLM that assisted the Calif researchers might have read this previous bug report and not independently discovered it?

▲dlenski 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I don't think that's a reasonable implication at all.

There are lots of bugs in lots of software, and lots of them get ignored when reported.

I personally aware of multiple security vulnerabilities in major pieces of software that everyone has heard of, which I very quickly and easily stumbled on while working on this software as an AWS engineer several years ago. I had never used an LLM of any kind at the time.

I presented my findings both internally and externally, and the reactions ranged from shrugs to delays to hostility towards me for "getting distracted" or "being overly negative."

Those bugs that I discovered still exist, last time I checked.

▲cryptonector 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Idk that u/notmine1337 meant that. I have questions:

- why was this not a secure vulnerability report, why was it public?

- why was this closed [by the submitter]?

For the second question, I suspect it's because they were told a different fix was coming.

▲jakewins 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Why it was closed, surely, was because the only reaction to the PR was a bot saying it will automatically close the PR soon because of inactivity?

I know I have opened a lot of PRs where the only result is I get bot spam in my email and no project reaction, so I close the PR to stop the bot spam; if nobody from Oracle has reacted in 2 months it seems unlikely anyone will.

Nowadays I’ve stopped opening “cold-call” PRs like this. I find a way to chat with a maintainer first and anchor what I want to do (“I hit this bug, would you take a PR to fix it? I was thinking it could be solved by x, would that work?”

Much much better outcomes that way.

▲eru an hour ago | parent [-]

Though in the age of LLM, I really wonder what the benefit of asking for permission to make a PR is? It's not like you are wasting much effort, if they don't want it. And if they do want it, the PR is right there, instead of waiting for another round-trip.

▲ApolloFortyNine 30 minutes ago | parent [-]

Yea I've let claude make a couple PRs when it's clearly a bug in the repo, if the maintainer wants to take a stand against AI PRs so be it, my local copy has the fix.

▲philipwhiuk 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> why was this not a secure vulnerability report, why was it public?

Because it was seen as a crash not an RCE. AI's power has been chaining simple crashes into exploits. But that's not generally going to be true.

▲wat10000 3 hours ago | parent [-]

I'd be surprised if that's what happened. The instant I see "corrupting the heap" I assume it's a serious vulnerability unless proven otherwise. AI is taking it to another level, but the days of dismissing memory corruption as unexploitable died years before.

▲eru an hour ago | parent | next [-]

Yes, even before LLMs it was a common heuristic that if you can make something crash, with a bit more cleverness you can usually take over.

▲cryptonector 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

100% this.